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Abstract 
This thesis uses a historical materialist Gramscian framework to develop an alternative, critical 
analysis of two post-Cold War international arms control campaigns by non-governmental 
organisations (NGO) – the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) in the early to mid-1990s 
and the Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC) a decade later. Dominant liberal and liberal-constructivist 
narratives  portray  the  campaigns  as  indicative  of  a  broader  ‘power  shift’  in  the  international  system  
towards traditionally less influential actors, including NGOs as representatives of an emerging 
‘global’   or   ‘transnational’   civil   society,   small   and   middle   power   states,   and   intergovernmental  
organisations (IGOs). This is seen to have arisen from the decreased polarisation of the international 
system since the end of the Cold War and the globalisation of the information revolution, which are 
said to have enhanced the salience of soft or communicative power and contributed to an emergent, 
more multi-actor and more democratic system of global governance networks in which NGOs, small 
and   middle   powers   and   IGOs   can   increase   their   influence   by   working   in   ‘partnership’   – yet all 
concerned maintain their fundamental autonomy and independence.  
 
By  contrast,  drawing  on  Gramsci’s  understanding of civil and political society as integral components 
of capitalist states that are dominated by elite interests and interact in the reproduction of capitalist 
hegemony, this thesis shows how both campaigns were driven by large, professionalised Western 
NGOs   despite   their   ‘global   civil   society’   appearance;   depended   on   likeminded   sections   of   the  
Western donor community of Western governments, IGOs and private foundations for support; and 
ultimately exerted international influence through reconstructing the legitimacy of existing Western-
dominated  international  military  and  economic    power  structures  on  an  alternative  ‘humanitarian’,  
more pluralistic, and ostensibly more democratic basis. This reflected the normally hegemonic, non-
autonomous role of civil society   from   a   Gramscian   perspective   in   generating   consent   to   states’  
monopoly of force and the class interests this protects, but also the neoliberal restructuring of states 
since the 1980s towards privatisation and outsourcing of governance functions to NGOs, including at 
the international level. This has increased the resources available to NGOs and their international 
influence, while simultaneously reducing their autonomy from the Western donor community and 
integrating them more tightly into international governance structures and the increasingly 
transnationalised interests of Western states.  
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8 
 
 
EU     European Union  
 
G7     Group of Seven Finance Ministers from US, Japan,  
     France, Germany, Italy, UK, and Canada 
 
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining 
 
HI     Handicap International 
 
HRW     Human Rights Watch 
 
IANSA     International Action Network on Small Arms 
 
IASC     Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
 
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
 
ICISS  International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty  
 
ICRC     International Committee of the Red Cross 
 
IED     Improvised Explosive Device 
 
IGO Intergovernmental Organisation 
 
 
IHL International Humanitarian Law 
 
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation 
 
IPPNW International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear 
War 
 
LSN Landmine Survivors Network 
 
LSE London School of Economics  
 
MAC     Mines Action Canada 
 
MAG Mines Advisory Group 
 
MCPA Mine Clearance Planning Agency 
 
MI     Medico International 
9 
 
 
MSF     Médecins Sans Frontières 
 
NATO     North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 
NGO     Non-Governmental Organisation 
 
NIEO     New International Economic Order 
 
NORAD    Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
 
NNGO     Northern Non-Governmental Organisation 
 
NPA     Norwegian  People’s  Aid 
 
NSM     ‘New’  Social  Movement   
 
ODA     Official Development Assistance 
 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
 
OECD-DAC    OECD Development Assistance Committee 
 
OSI     Open Society Institute 
 
Oslo Process    Diplomatic process leading to the CCM 
 
Ottawa Process   Diplomatic process leading to the APLC 
 
PCI Italian Communist Party 
 
PHR     Physicians for Human Rights 
 
Protocol II Protocol On Prohibitions Or Restrictions On The Use Of 
Mines, Booby-Traps And Other Devices (Protocol II to 
the CCW) 
 
Protocol V Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to 
the CCW) 
 
R2P     Responsibility to Protect 
 
SIPRI     Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
 
SACBL     South African Campaign to Ban Landmines  
 
10 
 
SNGO     Southern Non-Governmental Organisation 
 
TANs     Transnational Advocacy Networks  
 
UN United Nations 
 
UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs 
 
UNDP     United Nations Development Programme 
 
UNDP-BCPR    UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 
 
UNDPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations 
 
UNHCR    United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
 
UNICEF United  Nations  International  Children’s  Emergency  
Fund 
 
UNIDIR UN Institute for Disarmament Research  
 
UNOCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
 
UNOPS UN Office for Project Services 
 
USAID United States Agency for International Development  
 
USCBL     US Campaign to Ban Landmines 
 
UXO     Unexploded Ordnance  
 
VVA      Vietnam Veterans of America  
 
VVAF     Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation 
 
WMD     Weapons of Mass Destruction 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
11 
 
Introduction 
 
The idea actors other than states can play a significant role in world politics (Kaiser 1971; Nye and 
Keohane 1971a, 1971b; Skjelsbaek 1971; Warwick 1971; Young 1972; Huntington 1973; Feraru 1974; 
Forsythe 1976; Strange 1976) is a core tenet of the liberal literature on civil society and global 
governance, in which the increasing prominence of non-state actors is seen to indicate a shift from 
an   ‘old’   realist   interstate   system   to   a   ‘new’   multi-actor governance system (Risse-Kappen 1995; 
Rosenau 1995, 1999, 2000; Sikkink 1998; Khagram et al. 2002a; Risse 2002; Karns and Mingst 
2010a). This new system is seen as qualitatively different in terms of organisation and power. Rather 
than being composed solely of centralised and internally hierarchical states and dominated by great 
powers defined by their command of material power resources and hard power, global governance 
is said to be at least partly organised through decentralised, informal and horizontal communication 
networks that facilitate the exchange of information and ideas across a broader range of state and 
non-state actors (Rosenau 1995, 1999, 2000; Mathews 1997a; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Stoker 1998; 
Khagram et al. 2002a).  
 
This is said to have enhanced the efficacy of soft or ideational power, so that expertise or moral 
authority can endow historically less powerful actors, such as non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), and small and middle powers more influence. For 
much of the liberal literature, these developments contain the seeds for a more norm-based global 
order and democratisation of world politics (Held 1997; Scholte 2002, 2004; Archibugi 2004; Van 
Rooy 2004, pp.128–160), especially as all these actors are seen to be more effective when they 
work  in  ‘partnership’ (Maslen 1998; White and Rutherford 1998; Cameron 1998, 1999; Cameron et 
al. 1998; Dolan and Hunt 1998; Thakur and Maley 1999; Anderson 2000; Hubert 2000; Bleicher 2000; 
Brem and Rutherford 2001; Atwood 2002; Hampson and Reid 2003; Hansen 2004; Davis 2004; Cave 
2006).  
 
Often cited as evidence for this shift is the growing involvement of NGOs at all levels of governance – 
from community-level service provision to national-level lobbying to international policy-making. 
From a liberal standpoint, globalisation and improvements in information and communications 
technology (ICT) substantially account for this, allowing NGOs to share information, network and 
coordinate their activities transnationally (Salamon 1994; Salamon et al. 1999, p.4, 2003, p.2; 
Carothers 2000, p.27; Warkentin and Mingst 2000; Anheier et al. 2001a, p.6; Florini 2001, p.36). In 
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the optimistic 1990s,   this   was   said   to   have   sparked   a   ‘global   associational   revolution’   (Salamon,  
1994), laying the basis for a transnational or global civil society, with NGOs its most prominent 
representatives. In  a  widely  cited  article  entitled  ‘Power  Shift’,  Mathews   (1997a, p.51) identified  ‘a  
novel   redistribution   of   power   among   states,  markets   and   civil   society’   so   that   governments  were  
‘sharing  powers…with  businesses,  with  international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens 
groups,   known   as   nongovernmental   organizations’.   More   recently,   a   popular   undergraduate  
textbook on global governance (Karns and Mingst 2010b, p.25) reaffirms the view that transnational 
civil society undermines state sovereignty, while a leading United Nations (UN) expert has claimed 
‘NGOs  are  the  dominant  influence  upon  new  items  being  added  to  the  agenda’  and  ‘have  been  the  
leading  actors  in  transforming  the  nature  of  global  politics’  (Willetts 2011, p.134; 144). The result, for 
Risse, has been ‘a  growing  consensus’  that  NGOs  ‘make  a  difference  in  world  politics’,  so  that  most  
analysts no longer dispute their influence, but investigate the conditions under which they are 
influential  and  ‘the  significance  of…intervening  factors’   (2002, pp.262–3).  While even its strongest 
exponents  admit  interest  in  NGOs  and  global  civil  society  has  ‘waned’  since  the  early  2000s  (Kaldor 
et al. 2012, p.3) and  may  even  be  “passé”   (Edwards 2009, p.16), the belief civil society and NGOs 
play a progressive, democratising and even potentially transformative, role in global governance has 
been remarkably resilient.  
 
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is probably the most frequently cited example 
of  this  apparent  ‘power  shift’  and  is  referenced by virtually every prominent author in the liberal and 
liberal-constructivist1 literature on global civil society and global governance (Mathews 1997b; 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Sikkink 1998; Keohane and Nye Jr. 1998; Florini 2000a; Scholte 2002; 
Kaldor 2003a, 2003b; Price 2003; Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2004; Nye 2004; Edwards 2009; Willetts 
2011). Combining an international civil society campaign with a multi-actor partnership involving UN 
agencies  and  a  ‘Core  Group’  of  small  and  middle  powers  led  by  Canada  and  Norway,  NGOs  helped  
achieve an international ban on a conventional weapon within five years of establishing the 
campaign in 1992, despite opposition from the US and other major military powers. The landmine 
ban rapidly became an emblem of a claimed evolution of world politics towards a more multi-actor, 
norm-based system after the end of the Cold War and has acquired totemic status in the global 
governance and global civil society literature as ‘a   standard   case   of   the   power   of   NGOs   vis-à-vis 
states,   and   a   testament   to   a   transformation   of   the   dynamics   of   global   politics’   (Sending and 
Neumann 2006, p.664). On a more practical level, it has been presented as a  ‘benchmark’  (Grillot et 
al. 2006, p.68) or model for other campaigns, with modus operandi, in particular the reframing of 
                                                     
1 ‘Liberal-constructivist’  is  used  throughout this thesis as shorthand for liberal and/or  ‘idealist  constructivist’  
(Chandler 2004a, chap.3) perspectives. 
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issues in a humanitarian context, replicable in a range of other contexts (Williams 1999; Bleicher 
2000; Hubert 2000; Brem and Rutherford 2001; Laurance and Stohl 2002; GCAP 2004; Behringer 
2005; Goose 2008a; Williams and Goose 2008).  This was tested in the Cluster Munitions Coalition 
(CMC), launched in 2003, which involved many of the same NGOs and a similar multi-actor 
partnership, and also produced an international ban treaty, in 2008. In addition to providing an apt 
comparison  on  ‘most  like’  grounds,  its  timing  under  the  less  propitious  geopolitical  conditions  of  the  
War on Terror facilitates identifying durable features of the new multi-actor governance and its 
evolution since the 1990s. The model of civil society organisation and influence derived from the two 
campaigns therefore provides a useful means of investigating the nature of NGOs and   ‘global civil 
society more broadly, and the nature and conditions of their influence under the new multi-actor 
system of global governance posited by liberal-constructivist theorists.   
 
This thesis elaborates an alternative, more critical interpretation of the two campaigns, and by 
extension  of  the  role  of   ‘global  civil  society’   in  global governance generally, which  attributes their 
success, not to a power shift from states to non-state actors, or increased influence of historically 
less powerful actors, but a reconfigured relationship between civil and political society in capitalist 
states arising from the increasing outsourcing of governance functions as part of neoliberal 
privatisation processes and the growth of transnational relations in line with the accelerated 
globalisation of capitalism since the end of the Cold War. Drawing on  Gramsci’s  understanding of 
civil and political society as integral components of capitalist states, it argues the campaigns 
achieved their aims based on dependent, insider relationships with sections of Western states and of 
the elites whose interests they represent  – in particular government agencies, IGOs, and 
foundations concerned with development, humanitarian and human rights issues and legitimising 
Western military and economic power. This problematises liberal-pluralist understandings of the 
state  and  suggests  Gramsci’s  concept  of  the  integral  state  as  a  dialectical  unity  of  civil  and  political  
society (Buttigieg 1995; Forgacs 2000a; Fontana 2008; Thomas 2011) may be more insightful in 
theorising the increased prominence of NGOs in international relations. The focus of the thesis is 
therefore the nature of the campaigns and the conditions and implications of their success for the 
relationship between civil society and states in the international system and the role of ‘global  civil 
society’ in global governance.  
 
Theoretical Framework  
The  nature  of  civil   society,   the  very  existence  of   ‘global  civil  society’  and  the  character of the new 
global governance are all contested, so the choice of theoretical approach will shape the answers to 
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these questions. Although, in theory, there is universal agreement that civil society is a broad 
concept irreducible to NGOs and their activities, empirically the liberal-constructivist literature has 
concentrated heavily on NGOs. The   terms   are   also   virtually   interchangeable   for   the   ‘donor  
community’  of Western governments, IGOs and private foundations that funds much of the research 
into civil society and has helped to shape the reality of civil society in developing countries (Howell 
and Pearce 2002) as well as domestically in the West.  
 
This liberal-constructivist and donor literature generally assumes NGOs are autonomous, non-
governmental and non-profit actors and that global civil society is a largely independent sphere, 
discrete from state and market, and characterised by the disinterested   promotion   of   ‘principled  
ideas’.  These notably include  humanitarianism (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Florini and Simmons 2000, 
p.7; Anheier et al. 2001a, p.16; Edwards and Gaventa 2001, p.2; Pianta 2001, p.171; Heinrich 2004, 
pp.13–14; Kaldor 2007a, pp.148–149), which was the central normative framework of the two 
campaigns. As we shall see,  this dematerialised, ideational approach reifies NGO values and goals by 
detaching them from material and historical conditions, including the socio-geographical 
organisation of ‘global  civil  society’  in  ways  that  mirror  hierarchies  of  power  in  the  interstate  system  
and global market and the frequently dependent relationship of NGOs on the ‘donor community’.  
 
By   contrast,   an   alternative   approach   based   on   Gramsci’s   (1971) understanding of civil society as 
integral to the production and maintenance of hegemony and as largely part of, rather than separate 
from, integral capitalist states suggests the autonomy of NGOs and civil society should be assessed 
rather  than  assumed,  points  to  the  historical  and  material  context  in  which  ‘principled  ideas’  such  as  
humanitarianism are produced, and generates quite different conclusions as to the nature of NGOs, 
‘global  civil  society’  and  global  governance  and  the  nature  and  conditions  of  their  influence.   In light 
of   Gramsci’s   insistence   on   the   necessity   for   independence   from   elites   in   order   to   build   alliances  
capable of transforming society, using his ideas can redress the under-problematisation of autonomy 
in   the   liberal   literature.   Applying   them   to   global   civil   society   focuses   attention   on   NGOs’  
relationships with elites, which shape them as actors and constrain their autonomy.  
 
At the core of Gramsci's approach is the contention that civil societies and states are embedded in 
global capitalist socioeconomic relations, dominated by capitalist interests, and in general reproduce 
capitalist  hegemony.  However,  whereas  the  ‘state  proper’ or government, which Gramsci refers to 
as ‘political  society’,  is seen as entirely  an    ‘organ’  or  representative  of  capitalist  interests    (Gramsci 
1971, p.12; 170 n71; 264–264; 182; Thomas 2011, p.222), civil society, while dominated by capitalist 
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interests and normally reinforcing them could also directly represent subordinate class interests. It 
therefore has the potential for independence from capitalist interests and is a site of class 
contestation. This implies the autonomy of NGOs must be assessed on a case-by-case basis to 
comprehend their class nature, the conditions and significance of their influence, and how this 
relates to broader conflicts between dominant and subordinate actors in the global system.  
 
Gramsci’s   ideas   form  the   theoretical   core  of   this   thesis  and  although  elaborated  mainly   in  various  
‘national’  situations  were always  situated  in  a  wider  ‘international’  or  global  context  (Ives and Short 
2013), in line with his revolutionary internationalism. While neo-Gramscians have done much to 
translate his ideas to contemporary global politics (Gill 1993a, 1993b; Cox and Sinclair 1996; Murphy 
1998b; Rupert 1998; Showstack Sassoon 2001; Cox 2002, 2007), their most influential work has been 
on   ‘international   political   economy’   issues   like   economic   globalisation   and   neoliberalisation, 
including their impact on the state  (Gill and Law 1989; van der Pijl 1989, 2004; Cox 1992, 2002; Gill 
1995a; Overbeek 2005), rather than security or liberal political norms (Neufeld 1995, 2004; Cox 
1996; Beier and Denholm Crosby 1998; Conteh-Morgan 2002; Pugh 2004, 2005; Beier 2011). The 
neo-Gramscian literature on civil society is also relatively small and rather generalised (Gill 1995a; 
Robinson 1996; Cox 1999; Demirovic 2000, 2003; Hirsch 2003; Showstack Sassoon 2005; Katz 2006). 
As a result, there has been a strong emphasis on the hegemonic role of neoliberal economic ideas, 
while hegemonic liberal political ideas like humanitarianism and human rights have been 
overlooked. Another is that while neo-Gramscians and other critical theorists have frequently 
mentioned the question of NGO autonomy (Smillie 1993; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Hudock 1999; 
Demirovic 2000; Pouligny 2000; Pinter 2001; 2007; Wallace 2003a; Rieff 2003; Roelofs 2003; Van 
Rooy 2004, pp.117–9; Zaleski 2006; Chikoto 2007, 2009; Hearn 2007; Stavrianakis 2010), 
methodologies for assessing it are vanishingly few (Chikoto 2007; 2009), creating the need for a 
novel holistic methodology in this area. 
 
An additional issue in  applying  Gramsci’s   ideas   to  contemporary  world  politics      is   that   ‘Gramsci   in 
International  Relations’  has been influenced by a particular interpretation of the Prison Notebooks 
(Thomas 2011, pp.44–6; 137–140), derived from his introduction to academia via post-Marxism 
(Mouffe 1979; Bobbio 1979; Cohen & Arato 1992; Laclau & Mouffe 2001) and  the  associated  ‘retreat  
from   class’   begun in the 1970s (Meiksins Wood 1998). This has informed neo-Gramscian and 
contemporary liberal understandings of global civil society (Anheier et al. 2001a, p.14; 2003a, p.584, 
2003b, p.20) and created a   ‘”soft”   Gramscianism’   (Thomas 2011, p.11) entailing a post-Marxist, 
social democratic, or straightforwardly liberal politics. Characteristics include portraying opposition 
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to neoliberalism and economic globalisation, rather than capitalism per se, as   ‘counterhegemonic’; 
eliding  Gramsci’s   class-based approach to hegemony with statecentric realist understandings that 
identify it with the dominance of particular states (Cox and Sinclair 1996); and dispensing with his 
insistence on working class autonomy and leadership in the construction of an alternative 
hegemony. In the process, concepts of emancipatory politics have travelled a considerable distance 
from   Gramsci’s   Marxist,   anti-capitalist and class-based approach and a very broad range of 
oppositional  civil  society  activities  have  been  labelled  as  ‘potentially’  ‘counterhegemonic’,  so  long  as  
‘subaltern  groups’  are  involved,  and  even  when  they  ally  with  elites  (Gill and Law 1993, p.122; Katz 
2006).  This occludes the normally hegemonic role of civil society in reinforcing capitalist dominance 
and inverts Gramsci’s ideas entirely if alliances with capitalist elites seeking to reconstruct capitalist 
hegemony  through  reforms  are  portrayed  as  ‘counterhegemonic’.   
 
This thesis seeks to remedy these problems through an original re-reading of Gramsci’s writings, 
both in his Prison Notebooks (1971, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c, 1992, 1996, 1999a, 2000) and Letters 
(1988) and his oft-neglected pre-prison output (1975a, 1977d, 1978, 1994a). This draws on the 
numerous scholars, mainly from other disciplines, that rightfully situate Gramsci in the Marxist 
tradition (Merrington 1968; Harman 1977; Buci-Glucksmann 1979; Buttigieg 1995, 2005; Anderson 
2002; Donaldson 2007, 2009; Saccarelli 2008; Callinicos 2010; Fusaro 2010; Coutinho 2012). Other 
recent Marxist writings on civil society (Meiksins Wood 1990; Hearn 2001, 2007), the capitalist state, 
and the liberal separation of economics and politics were also useful in developing  Gramsci’s  ideas  in  
a contemporary globalised context, as were critiques of post-Marxism and  the  ‘retreat  from  class’,  
neo-Gramscianism, and global governance theory (Miliband 1965, 1969, 2004; Poulantzas 1969, 
1976; Harvey 1976; Meiksins Wood 1981, 1990, 1998; Burnham 1991; Cammack 2003, 2004, 2006).  
 
Following Gramsci, class relations are seen as fundamental to civil society’s   hegemonic role, 
rendering autonomy from capitalist interests of central importance, both analytically and politically. 
An important empirical implication is that NGO autonomy needs to be assessed, not from the state 
per se, but from hegemonic elites whose control of the state and IGOs and domination of civil society 
reproduces capitalist class relations. Although Gramsci does not use that phrase himself, it is coined 
here to refer to the capitalist class and allied ‘intellectuals’ – a hegemonic alliance he discusses 
repeatedly in his work. In   Gramsci’s   (1971, pp.3–23) extended sense of the concept, the term 
‘intellectuals’   denotes all those who play directive, leadership, educative, ideological or 
organisational roles in political or civil society, or the economic base, such as government officials, 
politicians and civil society organisations (Gramsci 1971, p.16; 97; Forgacs 2000b, p.300), or NGOs.  
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In the case of intellectuals objectively allied with the capitalist class, this includes individuals and 
organisations that are not necessarily capitalist themselves, but fulfil intellectual functions in ways 
that continually reconstruct, (re-)legitimise and reproduce capitalist social relations and capitalist 
hegemony on ever-evolving bases.  
 
This a process that seldom occurs monolithically, but instead through the theorisation, organisation 
and competition of diverse hegemonic governance projects and alliances that disproportionately 
represent the particular interests of different fractions of the capitalist class and differentially appeal 
to different support bases among the subordinate classes, while coercing other subordinate groups. 
Within this framework, one of the main ways hegemony is constructed is through the activity of 
intellectuals, which link   political   and   civil   society   with   the   economic   base   by   ‘intellectualising’   in  
universal, ideological terms the material interests of classes and class fractions rooted in the 
economic base (Gramsci 1971, pp.115–6), through processes of political and ideological competition.  
 
At the national level, this occurs through competition between political parties, associated capitalist 
elites and allied civil society groups, such as religious groups, trade unions or NGOs, which articualrlt 
alternative governance projects or hegemonic strategies. Internationally, such processes and 
articulations are increasingly organised transnationally, reflecting ongoing trends of economic 
globalisation and involving competition between formal and informal transnational hegemonic 
alliances or coalitions. Mediated through the interstate system, IGOs, and/or transnational multi-
actor networks, these are potentially composed of the central foreign policy organs of states, other 
state and intergovernmental agencies, corporations, business groups, private foundations and 
NGOs.  This argument owes some inspiration to Keohane (1971),  Nye  and  Keohane’s  (1971a, 1971b), 
and  Keohane  and  Nye’s  (1974) work on transnational and transgovernmental relations and Keck and 
Sikkink’s   (1998) on transnational advocacy networks, but is adapted here to a class-based rather 
than pluralist ontology of the international system.   
 
Applying this updated development of Gramsci's to the contemporary global context of the case 
studies, the relevant subgrouping of hegemonic elites from which NGO autonomy is assessed are 
those sections of Western capitalist states, IGOs, political parties, the foundation sector and 
individual elites that support international development, humanitarian, human rights and arms 
control activities, both financially and politically, and play significant material and ideological roles in 
maintaining capitalist hegemony and Western dominance internationally. They include: foreign 
affairs and aid departments of the member states of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
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of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), particularly small and 
middle powers; UN agencies concerned with these issues; many private foundations and wealthy 
philanthropists; and supportive political parties, politicians, and other elites. In general, such elites 
tend towards more liberal-social democratic than conservative governance strategies or hegemonic 
projects and so appear as natural allies for likeminded NGOs.   
 
Assessing NGO autonomy from these hegemonic Western elites is essential to understanding the 
nature and conditions of their influence, in particular the extent to which it depends on elite 
connections and compatibility with elite perspectives and interests and can be considered part of 
the  capitalist  class’  hegemonic  apparatus – or represents fundamentally different social forces and 
the interests of subordinate groups. If the campaigns are better understood as instances of 
hegemonic civil society activity, their primary significance from a Gramscian perspective would be as 
ameliorative, consensual-hegemonic practices that reproduce a fundamentally unjust hegemonic 
capitalist world order through incrementally reforming and (re-)legitimising it. This would represent 
a significant departure from the overwhelming majority of analyses, which see them as indicating a 
progressive, democratising power shift in the global system. The multi-layered transnational political 
environment in which INGOs operate makes this assessment a complex task and necessitates a 
theoretical approach and   methodology      that   can   apply   Gramsci’s   ideas   to   contemporary   global  
politics, situate the campaigns in their historical and material context, assess their autonomy from 
hegemonic elites and evaluate their overall impact on global power relations. The structure of the 
thesis and how it went about achieving this are now outlined.   
Chapter Outline  
Chapter 1 elaborates the theoretical framework outlined in this Introduction, through an in-depth 
critique of the liberal-constructivist literature on civil society and global governance and the origin 
narrative it provides of ‘global civil society’’s   apparent emergence in the 1990s. This dominant 
narrative has attributed this sudden appearance primarily to new possibilities for transnational 
activism opened up by the end of the Cold War (Cameron et al. 1998; English 1998; Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998; Lawson et al. 1998; Cameron 1999; Rutherford 1999a, 2003; Thakur and Maley 1999; 
Bleicher 2000; Warkentin and Mingst 2000; Williams 2000; Hubert 2000; Kitchen 2002; Hampson 
and Reid 2003; Davis 2004) and the globalisation of the information revolution (Salamon 1994; 
Mathews 1997b; Keohane and Nye Jr. 1998; Salamon et al. 1999; Rutherford 1999b, 2000a; 
Warkentin and Mingst 2000; Anheier et al. 2001a, 2012; Florini 2001; Brem 2003; Nye 2004, pp.90–
91; Albrow and Glasius 2008; Shawki 2010; Willetts 2011). 
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Chapter 2 develops an alternative Marxist interpretation of Gramsci’s   ideas that emphasises the 
inextricable combination of coercion and consent in capitalist hegemony and hegemonic power 
and the similarly dialectical  integration of political and civil society within integral capitalist states. It 
then translates this understanding to the contemporary global political context of the case studies 
via the development of an alternative ‘global   civil   society’   narrative. This attributes the growing 
international prominence of NGOs to the accelerated globalisation of neoliberal models of capitalism 
following the end of the Cold War, within which the outsourcing of governance functions to NGOs 
has been an integral, constitutive element. The result has been a rapid transnationalisaion of the 
consensual-hegemonic functions of NGOs, in line with a contemporaneous reduction in reduced 
their independence from Western donor and hegemonic elites. 
 
Chapter 3 elaborates the methodology used to analyse the two campaigns and explains how the 
research was carried out. Briefly, this involved an analytical framework that: situates the campaigns 
in a wider historical-material context; examines their material base in terms of their financial and 
personnel basis and internal organisation and the discourses and tactics that emerged in that 
context; assesses the autonomy of each of these aspects from the Western donor community; and, 
finally, evaluates both their direct and wider, or indirect, political outcomes.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 critique conventional liberal interpretations of the ICBL and put forward an 
alternative Gramscian interpretation, by examining the material basis, discourse and tactics of the 
campaign and the nature and conditions of its influence. This builds on the comparatively small 
critical literature on the campaign (Beier and Denholm Crosby 1998; De Larrinaga and Turenne 
Sjolander 1998; Short 1999; Anderson 2000; Latham 2000; Pouligny 2000; Kitchen 2002; Beier 2003), 
but is primarily based on an original application of the Gramscian analytical framework developed in 
the preceding chapters. Chapter 4 begins by reviewing conventional liberal-constructivist narratives 
of the campaign and shows how changes in geopolitical conditions, the economic and military 
significance of anti-personnel mines (APMs), and the outsourcing of governance functions to NGOs, 
contributed to a shift in the interests of Western states, IGOs and other hegemonic Western elites in 
this area. This facilitated a more prominent role for IGOs, middle and small powers and NGOs and a 
new ‘humanitarian’ approach, in contrast to the overt North-South politicisation of the issue in the 
1970s and 1980s. It then examines the financial, personnel and organisational basis of the ICBL and 
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concludes it was dominated by a small core of Northern NGOs2 (NNGOs) with limited Southern input 
and limited financial and personnel autonomy from the Western donors.  
 
Chapter 5 examines  the  campaign’s  discourse  and  tactics  in  in  the  context  of  the  material  base  and  
historical-material conditions elaborated in Chapter 4 and assesses its discursive and tactical 
independence from the donor community. This shows how NGOs depoliticised the landmines issue 
by framing it in terms of hegemonic humanitarian and international humanitarian law (IHL) norms 
and demonising APMs as aberrant, unsophisticated weapons that deviated uniquely from civilised 
Western military norms and so could  not  be  used  ‘responsibly’.   This pandered to Western interests 
by ignoring the similar humanitarian impacts of more useful and profitable weapons, and by 
situating the issue within a voluntary humanitarian aid framework undercut Southern demands for 
user/producer responsibility that would place heavy financial liabilities on several major Western 
powers. These   discursive   choices   are   then   linked   to   the   campaign’s   reliance on insider tactics, 
particularly its partnership with the UN, ICRC and a Core Group of mainly Western middle and small 
powers. All these factors contextualise the assessment of the direct and indirect outcomes of the 
campaign on the landmine problem, the world military order and global governance, and the nature 
and conditions of the   ICBL’s influence in the concluding section. This argues that the   campaign’s  
broader political effects in reinforcing Western hegemonic humanitarian and IHL norms; discursively 
(re-)legitimising the world military order through contributing significantly to the construction of an 
emerging alternative hegemonic human security paradigm; and supplying an exemplar of multi-actor 
‘partnership’   in   the   new   system   of   global   governance hailed by liberal-constructivists suggest a 
hegemonic  role  for  ‘global  civil  society’,  rather  than  a  ‘power shift’.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 examine NGO campaigning on cluster munitions, beginning in the late 1990s 
following NATO’s   ‘humanitarian’   cluster   bombing of Kosovo and concluding in 2008 with the 
agreement of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). This case study represents a substantial 
contribution to the limited literature on the campaign, which to date has been analysed almost 
exclusively from a liberal-constructivist perspective (Wiebe 2003; Cave 2006; Petrova 2007, 2010; 
Borrie 2009; Bolton and Nash 2010; Breitegger 2010a; Garcia 2011; Moyes and Nash 2011a; Nash 
2012; Rappert et al. 2013) and predominantly by participants in it. The same analytical framework of 
examining the campaign’s   discursive and tactical practices in terms of its material basis and 
historical-material context is used to highlight similarities and differences between the two cases. 
                                                     
2 For the purposes of this thesis, NNGOs are defined as national or international NGOs (INGOs) that originated 
in the North and are headquartered there.  
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These include: an even lower level of autonomy from supportive elites; learning from the earlier 
campaign and the  institutionalisation of partnerships with supportive states and international 
agencies developed during it; as well as changes in the geopolitical context, from the heady liberal 
optimism that characterised the immediate post-Cold War period of the landmines campaign to the 
more national-security dominated environment of the War on Terror, and how these affected NGOs’ 
humanitarian and human security framings. Overall, contrary to the globalising expectations of the 
liberal-constructivist literature on civil society and global governance, this later campaign was even 
more concentrated in the North and generally involved even less NGO autonomy, including a more 
marked reproduction of hegemonic discourses and an increased reliance by NGOs on 
professionalised insider tactics to exert influence.  
 
The Conclusion revisits the theoretical issues raised in the first two chapters, finding that the model 
of NGO campaigning pioneered by the ICBL and reproduced by the CMC exhibits durable features of 
the nature and conditions of NGO influence within contemporary multi-actor systems of global 
governance. In short, rather than representing a power shift in the international system from states 
to civil society, or governments to NGOs, the campaigns represent an internationalised form of 
hegemonic civil society activity that reproduces hegemonic power relations within a Western-
dominated world capitalist order, through helping to reconstruct them on an ostensibly more 
‘humanitarian’   and   ‘democratic’   basis. In contrast to liberal-constructivist approaches, then, NGO 
influence in these cases does not reflect a general increase in civil society influence or a 
transformative power shift, but is limited to international NGOs (INGOs) based in the North, whose 
autonomy from Western states and elites is severely limited and which promote approaches to 
issues compatible with hegemonic governance discourses and Western elite interests. This clearly 
has major implications for the political significance of ‘global   civil   society’ and its growing role in 
global governance.  
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Chapter 1 – ‘Global Civil  Society’  and  Global  Governance  in  
the Liberal Tradition 
 
Increased attention to NGOs in the 1990s emerged alongside a burgeoning literature on 
globalisation,   ‘global   civil   society’   and   global   governance. This literature was dominated by both 
liberal  and  constructivist  approaches  that  situated  NGOs  in  an  emergent  transnational  or  ‘global  civil  
society’,  whose  autonomous  soft  or   ideational  power  was  seen  to  contribute  to  a  more  pluralistic,  
democratic global governance compared to the formerly statecentric international system (Rosenau 
1995, 2000, 2002; Mathews 1997a; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Willetts 2000, 2011; Price 2003; Van Rooy 
2004). This chapter examines how the literature within a liberal tradition conceptualises NGOs and 
‘global  civil  society’  as  part  of  a  theorisation  of  a  system  of  global  governance.   
Civil society in the liberal tradition 
The dominant portrayal of civil society is as an autonomous sphere in a tripartite civil 
society/state/market model. Although this pluralist perspective is alien to holistic Marxist 
approaches, liberals and constructivists habitually attribute it to Gramsci (Habermas 1998, p.367 
n55; Edwards 2009, p.8). The first Global Civil Society Yearbook, published by the London School of 
Economics  (LSE),  claimed  that  Gramsci  ‘rescued’  this  understanding  of  civil  society  ‘for  modern  use’  
(Anheier et al. 2001a, pp.13–14). However its origins date back much further and this section 
discusses how liberal perspectives on civil society developed, up until the 19th century, through to its 
separation  from  the  ‘market’   in  the  20th. It  then  explains  how  ‘new’  social  movement  theory  and  a  
parallel NGO literature merged with civil society discourse in the late 20th century in an increasingly 
idealised account of civil society, distanced from material interests.  
 
Civil society in the liberal tradition up to the end of the 19th century denoted a free, pacific zone of 
private, individual, economic and social interests and relations, distinct from the state, whose 
monopoly  of   force  enabled   it   to  maintain  a   ‘civil’  peace  and  adjudicate  conflicts  of   interest,  while  
civil society reciprocally prevented the state from sliding into despotism. It had thus been strongly 
distinguished from the state, though not yet from the market as it remained strongly identified with 
economic interests. This bifurcation was consistent with the characteristic liberal separation of 
economics from politics (Meiksins Wood 1981) , but presaged the future incompatibility of liberal 
concepts  of  civil  society  with  Gramsci’s  concept  of  the   ‘integral  state’     as  a  dialectical  unity  of  civil  
society and state (Buttigieg 1995). Moreover, as Locke, Ferguson, de Tocqueville and most other 
classical liberals supported colonialism and implicitly or explicitly limited civil society to the middle 
and upper classes (Seymour 2008, pp.27–28; Losurdo 2011), their liberal-democratic ideas about the 
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proper   relationship  between  civil   society  and  state  were   largely   inapplicable  outside   the   ‘civilised’  
upper echelons of the capitalist West.  
 
Marx also discussed and critiqued the liberal concept of civil society, principally in his earlier work 
(1954, 1970, 1977, 2000; Marx and Engels 2004). On the one hand, he resembled his liberal 
antecedents in distinguishing civil society from the state, but not from economic relations. On the 
other, he radically re-interpreted and reduced that distinction by conceptualising both civil society 
and  the  state  as  dominated  by  capitalist  interests,  rather  than  representing  ‘individual’  or  ‘general’  
interests. Civil society was thus a bourgeois civil society, or the type of civil society that had emerged 
in tandem with the capitalist mode of the production, just as the state that had emerged was a 
capitalist state (Marx and Engels 2004, p.16). This highlighted the class bias of contemporary liberal 
notions of civil society and the state – which were particularly glaring in an era of property-based 
censitary  discrimination.  Marx’s  most mature view on civil society is summarised in his 1859 Preface 
to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.  This  equates  Hegel’s  concept  of  civil   society  
with   the   ‘totality’  of   ‘the  material   conditions  of   life’,   from  which  Marx  argues   ‘legal   relations’  and  
‘political   forms’   ‘originate’,   but concludes ‘the   anatomy   of   this   civil   society,   however,   has   to   be  
sought   in  political  economy’   (1970, p.20).  This  anticipates  Marx’s  move  away  from the term in his 
later towards a holistic, base-superstructure model of society incompatible with the liberal 
separation of economics and politics, or civil society and state. The term civil society subsequently 
fell into relative disuse for much of the 20th century (Meiksins Wood 1990, p.62), before re-emerging 
in the 1980s and 1990s with an additional and equally strong distinction between civil society and 
‘the  market’.   
 
In theoretical terms, this novel trifurcation grew out of new social movement theory, a post-war 
literature on NGOs or   the   ‘voluntary’,   ‘non-profit’,   or   ‘third’   sector,   and   post-Marxist and liberal 
readings of Gramsci. What they all had in common was an ideational approach to civil society and 
the actors within it that distanced it from the economic interests central to classical liberal and 
Marxist theory.  
New social movement (NSM) theory  
NSM theory emerged in the 1980s as an alternative  to Marxist theories of collective action and 
resource mobilisation and relative deprivation theories (Cohen 1985; Buechler 1995, pp.441–442) 
that had emphasised material resources, conditions and/or class experiences of grievance as factors 
in movement formation and impact. Reacting against this, it focused on the role of ideational factors 
like collective identity formation, culture and framing in what it saw as a qualitatively new type of 
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social movement that had emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, organised around non-
economic issues and non-class based identities and values, including the environment, peace, 
human  rights,  women’s  rights,  and  gay  rights  movements  and  identity  politics  generally (Shaw 1994, 
p.650). Its central   premise   that   ‘The   common denominator of all of them would  be their 
differentiation   from  workers’   struggles, considered as “class”   struggles’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 
p.159), or as Cohen (1985, p.667) put   it,   ‘Unlike   the   Old   Left,   actors   involved in the new social 
movements  do  not  see  themselves  in  terms  of  a  socioeconomic  class’  and  while  ‘they  come  primarily  
from  the  “new  middle  classes”,  ‘class  background  does  not  determine  the  collective  identities  of  the  
actors  or  the  stakes  of  their  action’.  
 
NSM theory framed these developments as a response to the  ‘crisis’  or   ‘failure’  of  the  ‘old’   labour  
movement (Cohen 1985, pp.667–668; Buechler 1995), whose trade unions and political parties were 
portrayed as hierarchical, exclusionary and insensitive to gender, race and sexual orientation. In 
contrast,   the   ‘new’  movements     were   said   to  emphasise  democracy,   internal  processes   and   ‘non-
hierarchical’,   horizontal,   decentralised,   and   networked   forms  of   organisation   (Cohen 1985, p.667; 
Buechler 1995) and to eschew state power in favour of alternative democratic spaces and lifestyles 
outside the state (Melucci 1980; Cohen 1985).  Moreover,  whereas  the  ‘old’  labour  movement    had  
emerged from the industrialisation and modernisation which had created the  working class, the 
‘new’   movements   were   said   to   have   developed   in   ‘post-industrial’,   postmodern   societies,   or  
‘informational  capitalism’   (Touraine 1971; Castells 2010a, 2010b), which had created an educated, 
professional middle class freed from immediate material concerns, with sufficient income and 
leisure   to   devote   to   ‘post-material’   values   (Inglehart 1971, 2008), cultural issues and altruistic 
causes. Meiksins Wood (1998) connects  these  tropes  to  a  ‘retreat’  from  the  working  class,  beginning  
in the 1970s, which accelerated with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of revolutionary 
socialist movements around the globe.  
 
Many  of  the  same  themes  are  reflected  in  liberal  ‘global  civil  society’  theory  (Shaw 1994) and in Keck 
and   Sikkink’s   influential   analysis of values-based   ‘transnational   advocacy   networks’3 on 
humanitarian,  human  rights,  women’s  rights  and  environmental  issues,  which  are  similarly  portrayed  
as responding to a crisis of the left (1998, pp.32–33; 15; 27; 130).   The   LSE’s  Global Civil Society 
yearbook  thus  asserts   that   the   ‘new  social  movements’  addressed   ‘emancipatory   issues…excluded  
from  the   compact  with   labour’   and  entailed   ‘a  new  kind  of  horizontal   form  of  organisation  and  a  
                                                     
3 These can include likeminded sections of states, IGOs, foundations and the media (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 
p.9),  but  NGOs  are  the  authors’  main  focus.   
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commitment to a radicalisation of democracy. They were not anti-state; they wanted to change the 
relationship  between  state  and  civil   society’   (Kaldor et al. 2012, p.15). Moreover, the depiction of 
the   revolutions      in   Eastern   Europe   as   the   ‘culmination’   of the  NSMs and NGOs as their ‘tamed’  
incarnation draws a direct line to the ‘activist’ ‘‘global   civil   society’’   of   the  1990s   (2003a, pp.588–
589, 2003b, pp.85–86, 2008, p.42; Kaldor et al. 2012, p.15).  
Civil society and the NGO literature  
The second theoretical impetus for separating civil society from class and economic relations was a 
parallel post-war literature on NGOs (Feld 1972, 1979; Willetts 1982),   or   the   ‘voluntary’   ,   ‘non-
profit’,  or  ‘third’  sector  (Weisbrod and Long 1975; Weisbrod 1978; Kramer 1981; Brenton 1985). In 
tandem with trends in donor discourse that saw the OECD (1993, 1996), World Bank (Willetts 2011, 
p.25), USAID (1996, 1998), UN (ECOSOC Secretariat 2003; Panel of Eminent Persons on United 
Nations–Civil Society Relations 2004; UN Security Council 2004; UN Global Compact 2009) all begin 
to shift from NGO to civil society language from the mid-1990s, so too did the academic literature, as 
prominent researchers switched from examining NGOs(Edwards and Hulme 1996, 1998; Hulme and 
Edwards 1997; Edwards 2000a) to civil society (Edwards 2000b, 2003, 2009; Edwards and Gaventa 
2001). Institutionally, this was reflected in the absorption of the Comparative Nonprofit Sector 
Project at John  Hopkins’  University  into  the  Center for Civil Society Studies in 1997 and the London 
School   of   Economics’   (LSE)   Centre   for   Voluntary   Organisation   evolvution into the Centre for Civil 
Society in 1999 (LSE Centre for Civil Society 2006, p.4) These two academic centres strongly 
influenced  liberal  ‘global  civil  society’  theory,  with  John  Hopkins  ‘mapping’  its  empirical  dimensions  
cross-nationally (Salamon et al. 1999; Salamon and Sokolowski 2004) and the LSE producing the 
Global Civil Society yearbooks. The yearbook contributors sometimes criticise John Hopkins for 
equating civil society with the non-profit sector (Anheier et al. 2001a; Kaldor 2003a, 2007a; Salamon 
et al. 2004, p.3), yet do the  same themselves in  also  empirically  ‘measuring’  ‘global  civil  society’  by  
counting NGOs and NGO resources (Salamon et al. 1999; Anheier et al. 2001b; Anheier and Katz 
2003; Anheier 2004; Heinrich 2004; Salamon and Sokolowski 2004; Katz 2006). Moreover, their 
conceptualisation   of   ‘global   civil   society’   is   broadly   compatible   with   the   ‘Four   Nons’   that   define  
NGOs and civil society for international donors (ECOSOC 1968, 1996; World Bank 1989, 1997) 
and from pluralist liberal perspectives (Willetts 1996a, 2001; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Uvin and Weiss 1998; 
Khagram et al. 2002b; Martens 2002, pp.277–278), that delink them from state and market by portraying 
them as non-governmental, non-violent,  ‘non-political’ and non-profit.  
 
NGOs are usually defined as non-governmental based solely on their formal separation from 
government. This is the approach taken in UN procedures for consultative status and by the Union of 
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International Associations (UIA 2004, p.2911), which is the main source of data on NGO numbers. It 
regards any self-described NGO as non-governmental, provided it was not established by an 
intergovernmental   treaty,  while   the  UN   allows  NGOs  with   ‘members   designated  by   governmental  
authorities, provided that such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of 
the  organization’  (ECOSOC 1996, para.12). Salamon et al. (2004, p.9) similarly assert that NGOs – and 
civil society organisations (CSOs) in general – are  ‘not part of the apparatus of the state, even though 
they   may   receive   support   from   governmental   sources’,   while   the Global Civil Society Yearbook 
proclaims  NGOs  ‘are  not   instrumentalities  of  government’   (Anheier et al. 2001a, p.4); and Willetts 
avers they ‘must   be   independent   from   the   direct control   of   any   government’   (2001, p.5). Few 
analysts have investigated if this coincides with autonomy in practice (Steen 1996; Hulme and 
Edwards 1997; Chikoto 2007, 2009), meaning formal separation is generally assumed to correspond 
to substantive independence, as in liberal civil society theory.  
 
Defining NGOs as non-governmental   is   linked   to   the   second   ‘non’  of non-violence (ECOSOC 1968, 
1996; 1996a, p.4, 2001; Uvin and Weiss 1998, p.213; Martens 2002, p.277). This reinforces the 
differentiation of NGOs and civil society from the state, seen as the monopolist of legitimate force 
that ensures the   conditions   for   peaceful   ‘civil’   communication   and   association   in   civil   society 
(Diamond 1994, p.6; Anheier et al. 2001a, p.15; Keane 2001, pp.23–24; Kaldor 2003b; Albrow and 
Anheier 2006). Moreover, it portrays   ‘the  formal  restraints   imposed  upon  the  use  of  force…by  the  
governmental apparatus of the state as a boundary line that demarcates the separation between the 
state  and  civil  society’  (Buttigieg 1995, p.27). This contrasts with the Gramscian perspective outlined 
in the next chapter, which argues that rather than being benignly ‘protected’   in by   the   state’s  
monopoly on force as in liberal pluralist approaches, NGOs and civil society are constituted by the 
latent, structural coercion embedded in the capitalist state, which they internalise in their own 
organisational forms, discourses and objectives. Ironically, this includes the  four  ‘nons’  that structure 
liberal-constructivist concepts of NGOs and civil society, all of which are drawn from national and 
international regulations of NGOs and their activities by capitalist states and IGOs.  
 
The  third,  rather  paradoxical  ‘non’,  given  their  claimed status as important political actors relates to 
the   depiction   of   NGOs   and   civil   society   as   ‘non-political’   through   dissociating   them   from   political  
parties and depoliticising them as values-based actors, or a value-based ideational sphere. The latter 
is examined in detail later, but the former means that in accordance with national law and IGO rules, 
political parties are never classified as NGOs (ECOSOC 1968, 1996; World Bank 1989; Willetts 1996a, 
p.4; Uvin and Weiss 1998, p.213), which are also often situated normatively as an alternative to 
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‘traditional   forms  of  political  participation,  such  as  voting,  party  affiliation  and  union  membership’  
(Salamon 1994, p.110). Keck and Sikkink (1998, p.27) exemplify this in conceding single-issue NGO 
activism is ill-equipped   to   tackle   structural   problems,   but   claiming   that   ‘with   the   decline   almost  
everywhere  of  mass  parties  of  the  left,  few  alternative  agendas  remain  on  the  table’.  
 
A similar anti-party orientation is evident across the civil society literature, with analysts alternately 
including political parties theoretically but concentrating empirically on NGOs and/or social 
movements (Shaw 1994; Donini 1995, p.435 n30; Uvin and Weiss 1998, p.213; Salamon et al. 1999; 
Edwards 2001, p.3; Kaldor 2003a; Heinrich 2004, p.14; Salamon and Sokolowski 2004); explicitly 
excluding political parties (Cohen and Arato 1992, p.ix; Diamond 1994; Scholte 2002) and/or 
identifying   civil   society   with   ‘non-party’   or ‘anti-politics’   (Kaldor 2003a, p.588). This reflects the 
ongoing malaise surrounding party politics in the West, which has led neo-Gramscians, post-Marxists 
and liberals to portray political parties in general as outmoded, hierarchical, ‘increasingly  obsolete’  
(Gill 1995a, p.96) and ‘losing  their  vibrance’  (Keane 1998, p.164).  This  is  said  to  necessitate  a  ‘new  
politics   of   resistance’   rather   than   ‘conventional   electoral   politics’   (Falk 1997). Cohen   and   Arato’s  
(1992) Civil Society and Political Theory exemplifies this anti-party meme, which was already evident 
in   NSM   theory’s   hostility   to  Western   left-wing parties , but is attributed in the first Global Civil 
Society yearbook to Eastern European dissidents ‘more   interested   in   ‘reclaiming’   space   that   the  
authoritarian  state  had  encroached  upon  than  in  taking  over  the  reigns  [sic]  of  power’(Anheier et al. 
2001a, p.14). Such generalised anti-party sentiment tends to exclude political parties from civil 
society analysis, not only as objects of enquiry in themselves, but in terms of their relationship to 
‘non-political’   NGOs   – which the liberal dichotomy of civil society and government/party politics 
renders conceptually awkward – so that even when they are present in empirical analyses, they still 
tend to be situated as ancillary.  
 
The  fourth  and  final  ‘non’  is  that  NGOs  are  non-profit, which is a condition of UN consultative status 
and favourable tax treatment in many states (ECOSOC 1968, 1996; World Bank 1989; Uvin and Weiss 
1998, p.213; Anheier et al. 2001a, p.4; Willetts 2001). Technically, this only distinguishes them from 
corporations, but in practice it also tends to occlude their own economic role as employers, service 
providers and competitive bidders for contracts and grants, and coincides with the broader 
disassociation  of  civil  society  from  the  ‘market’  and  economic  relations  generally.  This  is  exemplified  
in the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil  Society  Relations’  report (2004, p.13), which 
defines civil society as  
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the associations of citizens (outside their families, friends and businesses) entered into 
voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas and ideologies. The term does not include profit-
making activity (the private sector) or governing (the public sector).    
In a similar vein, Scholte (2002, p.283) argues  that  ‘“pure”  civil  society  activities  involve…no  pursuit  
of  pecuniary  gain  (so  excluding  firms  and  the  commercial  mass  media)’,  while  Kaldor describes civil 
society  as  ‘forms  of  social  interaction  that  are  distinct  from  both  the  state  and  the  market’   (2003b, 
p.20) – an insight she and her colleagues attribute to Gramsci (Anheier et al. 2001a, pp.13–14). 
  
Liberal and Post-Marxist interpretations of Gramsci  
A final theoretical influence on the conceptual separation of NGOs and civil society from economy 
and state derives from liberal and post-Marxist readings of the Prison Notebooks (Bobbio 1979; 
Cohen and Arato 1992; Laclau and Mouffe 2001), which rehabilitated Gramsci for academia by 
eviscerating him of class and revolutionary content (Saccarelli 2008). A seminal example that 
strongly   influenced   the   LSE’s   Global Civil Society yearbooks4 is   Cohen   and   Arato’s   (1992)   ‘post-
Gramscian’  Civil Society and Political Theory, which draws on an earlier influential idealist reading of 
Gramsci  by  Bobbio,  and  on  Cohen’s  work  on  declassed  ‘new’  social  movements.  This  study  explicitly  
situates   itself   in  a   ‘“discourse  of  civil   society”’   that   ‘focuses  precisely  on new, generally non-class-
based   forms   of   collective   action…differentiated   not   only   from   the   state   but   from   the   capitalist  
market   economy’   and   that  makes   its   idealism  equally   explicit,   declaring   bluntly   that   ‘Political   and  
economic society generally arise from  civil  society’  (1992, pp.164–174; 2; ix). 
 
Published   in   1992,   Cohen   and   Arato’s   study  was   heavily   influenced   by   the perceived role of civil 
society in the revolutions in Eastern Europe, which as Buttigieg (1995, pp.2–3) puts it, had  become  ‘a  
magical  explanatory  formula’  for  a  complex  multi-causal historical process. As he also points out, this 
focus   deflected   attention   from   ‘The  main   value   of   Gramsci's   concept   of   civil   society’,   namely   ‘its  
exposure of the mechanisms and modulations of power in capitalist states that purport to be 
democratic’   and   its   ‘forceful,   demystifying   critique   of   the   liberal/capitalist   state’.   Against   this  
backdrop, the absence of a capitalist market in Eastern Europe accentuated pre-existing liberal 
tendencies to de-emphasise the constitution of civil society by class and economic relations and 
depict it as separate from the market and   predominantly   in   conflict  with   ‘the state’, rather than 
                                                     
4 Kaldor (2003b, p.19) describes it as  ‘monumental’;  Albrow and Glasius (2008, p.4) call  it  ‘seminal’;  and  several  
editions of the yearbook cite it as a major influence (Anheier et al. 2001a; Glasius et al. 2005). 
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contesting or supporting class interests rooted in the economy and represented in the state 
(Meiksins Wood 1990; Buttigieg 1995).  
 
Cohen  and  Arato’s  central  claim,  which  the  next  chapter  refutes,  was  that  Gramsci  focused  ‘on  the  
problem of civil society as independent  of  economic  development  and  state  power’,  asserted   ‘the  
independence and  even  the  primacy  of  the  superstructure’  and  even  propounded  ‘two  “declarations  
of   independence”,  one   from  the  economy  and   the  other   from  the   state’   (1992, pp.143–146). This 
inspires   their   ‘radically   reformist’   yet   ‘self-limiting’   vision   of   civil   society   as   ‘a   new   terrain   of  
democratization’   that   can   expand   democratic   space under capitalism, but never overthrow it. 
According to them, learning the lessons of capitalist restoration meant forever abandoning the goal 
of democratic socialism, which they disparagingly allude to as ‘fundamentalist   projects   of  
suppressing bureaucracy,   economic   rationality,   or   social   division’, and accepting instead the 
impossibility of ‘total  democratization’  while renouncing ‘the  utopia  of  the  revolution’ (1992, p.149; 
16–17; 72). This approach was consistent with the post-Cold War consensus that liberal democracy 
of  one  form  or  another  was  the  only  show  in  town  after  the  ‘end  of  history’  (Chandhoke 2002, p.52).  
 
Drawing on Cohen and Arato, Bobbio and a similar interpretation of the Prison Notebooks by Shaw 
(1994, pp.648–649), Kaldor (2003a, p.584, 2007a, p.135) and the other editors of the Global Civil 
Society yearbooks, Anheier and Glasius (2001a, p.13), also attribute the contemporary conceptual 
separation of civil society from state and market to Gramsci. This leads to a series of misleading 
claims about his views on civil society, including  that  he  believed  ‘the  “theatre  of  history”  is  not  the  
story   of   economic   development,   but   of   ideological   and   cultural   struggles’   (Kaldor 2003c, p.8) and 
‘divorces   the   notion   of   civil   society   from   economic   interactions’,   ‘as   the   non-state and the non-
economic   area   of   social   interaction’   (Anheier et al. 2001a, pp.13–14). The glaring incongruity of 
these   statements   with   Gramsci’s   historical   materialism   is   dispensed   with   by   complaints   that   his  
concept   of   civil   society   is   ‘notoriously   confusing’,   inconsistent,   ‘contradictory’   and   ‘ambiguous’  
(Cohen and Arato 1992, pp.143–146; Shaw 1994, p.647; Anheier et al. 2001a, pp.13–14; Glasius 
2005, p.245; Katz 2006, p.334). As Buttigieg (2005, p.38), the Prison  Notebooks’    English translator, 
points out, the real origin of this confusion is their inability  ‘to  break  free  from  the  binary  State/non-
State  opposition  that  resides  at  the  heart  of  classical  liberal  theory’,  leaving  them  ‘totally  bafﬂed  by  
Gramsci’,  who  they  ‘woefully  misread’.  
 
The separation of NGOs and civil society from state and market that  results  from  the  four  ‘nons’,  the  
distancing of new social movements from class, and idealist readings of Gramsci is typically 
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articulated  via  a   spatial  metaphor  of  a   ‘third’   ‘realm’  or   ‘sphere’   that  exists   ‘between’ (Cohen and 
Arato 1992, p.ix; Anheier et al. 2001a, p.16, 2005, p.2; Anheier 2004, p.20),  ‘outside’ (Salamon et al. 
1999, p.3; Pianta 2001, p.171; Kaldor 2003a, p.584; Heinrich 2004, p.13; World Bank 2007, p.1), or 
‘beyond’ (Anheier et al. 2001a, p.17) them.  This  necessitates  drawing  ‘boundaries’,  dividing  lines  or  
‘borders’   (Shaw 1994, p.649; Scholte 2002, p.283; Heinrich 2004, p.13; LSE Centre for Civil Society 
2004) between them (Figure 1.1) and leads to boundary problems, particularly in the case of political 
parties   which   become   ‘a   borderline   case   between   civil   society   and   government’   (Heinrich 2004, 
pp.13–15). Caveats   that   these   distinctions   are   ‘fuzzy   ’   (Heinrich 2004) or   ‘complex, blurred and 
negotiated’  (LSE Centre for Civil Society 2004) preserve their essential separation and misleadingly 
depict  civil  society  as  a  ‘bounded  space’  (Amoore and Langley 2003, p.92).  
Figure 1.1 A Spatial Representation of Civil Society (Heinrich 2004, p.14) 
 
Anheier’s   research   for   CIVICUS makes one of the most concerted efforts to overcome this and 
articulate  civil   society’s   relationship   to  other   spheres,   insisting  civil   society ‘is  an  analytic   category  
and does not typically exist as a separate identifiable element like a physical infrastructure or a 
geographic   feature’   (2004, p.31). However, his pluralistic liberal approach limits him to a series of 
abstract descriptions, rather than explanations, of how civil society is simultaneously distinct from, 
yet  somehow  connected  to  other  spheres.  Civil   society   is  thus   ‘between’  the   family,  the  state  and  
the  market;   ‘outside   the   stricter   realms  of   state  power  and  market   interests’;  has   ‘many   relations  
and   intersections’  with  the   family,  state  and  market’;  and   is   ‘grounded   in  different  components  of  
economy,  polity  and  society’, while  simultaneously  ‘permeating’  the  state  and  market    (2004, p. 20–
22; 31). The empirical limitations of this is demonstrated by the methodology he chooses for 
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‘measuring’  civil  society,  which  simply  excludes  the  ‘market’  and  the  state  and  largely  equates  civil  
society with the non-profit sector.  
 
Related to their lack of any clear general   theory   of   how   the   ‘spheres’   of   society   interrelate,   the  
liberal tradition also lacks a general theory of inequality to explain disparities of power within civil 
society. An underlying reason is their ontological and methodological individualism (Anheier et al. 
2001a, p.17; Kaldor 2003b, p.20; 79 , 2008, p.42; Anheier 2004, p.20), evident in the definition of 
civil society in the 2004/5 Global Civil Society yearbook   as   ‘the  medium…through   which a social 
contract is negotiated and renegotiated between individual citizens on the one hand and the centres 
of  power  and  authority  on  the  other’  (Kaldor et al. 2004, p.2). A subsequent edition simply extends 
this  definition  to  ‘global  civil  society’,  duly  defined  as  ‘the  medium  through  which  one  or  more  social  
contracts are negotiated by individual citizens and the various institutions of global governance 
(national,   international   and   local)’   (Anheier et al. 2005, p.31). As Meiksins Wood (1998, p.68) has 
argued in relation to liberal  democratic  discourse   in  general,   this  serves   ‘to  mystify  and   legitimate  
the relations of class domination and exploitation, indeed to deny their very existence by redefining 
them as relations between free  and  equal  individuals’.   
 
Where  inequality  among  ‘individual’  global  citizens  is  addressed,  various,  sources  of  inequality  such 
as  ‘gender,  race,  class,  education  or  income’  and  North-South relations are simply listed (Albrow and 
Glasius 2008, p.11), or at best vaguely causally related  to  a  pluralist  account  of  ‘globalisation’  (Kaldor 
et al. 2003; Glasius and Timms 2006). Often, they are simply ignored, as much liberal civil society 
theorising is concerned with the normative ideal of civil society rather than civil society as it actually 
exists, or remarked on in passing almost as a natural fact. Hence Kaldor (2007a, p.150) expounds her 
normative  ideal  of  civil  society  as  ‘a genuinely free conversation, a rational critical dialogue’  before  
briefly   commenting   that   such   debates   ‘are   never,   of   course,   genuinely   free,   and   the   rich   and  
privileged   always   dominate   them’.   This   appears   to   be an inherent problem with ‘public   sphere’  
approaches to civil society, as according to Albrow and Glasius (2008, p.11) they proceed from the 
premise   that   ‘Inequalities   in   status   based   on gender, race, class, education or income 
are…”bracketed”,  i.e.  for  the  purposes  of  the  dialogue  they  are  to  be  treated  as  if  they  did  not  exist’.  
Against  this  backdrop,  Colas’  (2005, p.182) criticism  that  Kaldor’s  work  contains  no  ‘clear  sociological  
conception of the socio-economic and political inequalities that attend to civil society as a domain of 
capitalist  social  relations’  has  a  wider  applicability,  as  liberal approaches seem to have an inherent 
difficulty in analysing the material basis of civil society or explaining its relationship to other 
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‘spheres’.   This   can   also   be   linked   to   the   idealisation   of   civil   society   in   the   liberal literature as an 
autonomous sphere of ideas and values, discrete from state, market and material or class interests. 
 
Idealising civil society  
The idealisation of (global) civil society in the liberal literature involves portraying it as a discrete 
communicative  or   ideational   realm  of   ‘principled   ideas’  and  post-material values, characterised by 
the exercise of ideational and soft, rather than material and hard power, and separable from 
economic, class interests. This approach can be discerned even in the phraseology and ordering of 
attributes in the definition in the inaugural Global Civil Society yearbook of ‘global  civil  society’  as   
the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located 
between the family, the state, and the market and  operating  beyond  the  confines  of  
national societies, polities, and economies (Anheier et al. 2001a, p.16 my emphasis).  
A communicative or ideational sphere  
While most definitions of civil society to some extent conceive it in ideational or communicative 
terms, Kaldor (2007a) and Heinrich (2004) explicitly define it in terms of the communication and 
promotion of ideas and values in preference to identifying it with particular organisations. Heinrich 
(2004, pp.13–15) thus  asserts  that  civil  society  is  a  ‘distinctly  different’  ‘space’  ‘where people come 
together  to  debate,  discuss,  associate,  and  seek  to  influence  broader  society’  and  that  ‘membership’  
depends   on   ‘”function…rather   than   organisational   “form”’.   Consequently,   the   same   actors   can  
‘belong’   simultaneously   to  different   spheres,  depending on the activities they are carrying out, so 
that firms make profits in the market but are philanthropic in civil society. The same approach is 
implicit in UN criteria for consultative status, which exclude corporations but permit business 
associations (Willetts 2001),  and  Edwards’  (2009, p.29) distinction  between  ‘profit-seeking activities 
by  individual  enterprises  and  the  civic  or  political  role  of  business  associations’.  While  this  entails  a  
broader concept of civil society than NGO-centred approaches, because it takes the separability of 
economic,  ‘civil’  and  political  “functions”  as  a  starting  point,   lacks  any  analysis  of  class,  and  assigns  
no priority to any function, it merely rearticulates the separation of spheres and is no more useful in 
conceptualising their interrelationship.  
 
Kaldor (2007a, pp.148–9) ultimately falls into a similar trap, despite beginning her latest 
reconceptualisation of civil society by arguing   ‘the  tendency  to  think  of  civil   society,   the state and 
the market as separate spaces or spheres is misleading’  and  suggesting  ‘It  would  be  better  to  think in 
terms of processes, in which these terms refer to different ways of coordinating activities, even 
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though  they  are   intermeshed’.  Drawing  on  Habermas’   ‘public  sphere’,  she   identifies  the  respective  
coordinating  processes  as  ‘communicative  action’,  ‘authorized  power’  and  ‘money’  and  later  editions  
of the Global Civil Society yearbooks   similarly   suggest   ‘”global   civil   society”   can   be   defined   as    
“communicative  power”  as  opposed  to  the  power  of  force  or money’  (Kaldor et al. 2008; Anheier et 
al. 2012, p.3). This establishes another equally sharp conceptual distinction, however, inferring 
neither  ‘force’’  nor  ‘money’  coordinates civil society. As Fontana (2008, p.88n6) points out, the end 
product  of  such  public  sphere  approaches   is  ‘an   idealized  and  romanticized  version  of  civil  society,  
within  which  rational  discussion  and  deliberation  deﬁne  democratic  practice’,  so  that  ‘Shorn  of  the  
struggle   for   power   and   conﬂict   for   competitive   advantage   democratic politics is reduced to a 
philosophical  contest  over  ideas’.  In empirical terms, it also appears to preclude analysing CSOs like 
private   foundations  whose   influence   is   overwhelmingly   financially   based,   or   the   ‘coordination’   of  
civil society in practice  by the ‘authorized  power’  and   ‘money’ of states, IGOs and other donors. 
Moreover,   it   reproduces   the   tendency   to   ignore   CSOs’   economic   role   as employers and service 
providers   associated  with  defining  NGOs   as   ‘non-profit’,   or   ‘spatially’   separating   civil society from 
the economy.  
 
A  sphere  of  ‘values’ 
An additional dimension of idealising civil society is the normative sense it should, or actually does, 
represent  ‘principled  ideas’,  or  values  separable  from  individual  or  collective  economic  self-interest. 
This is a significant departure from the 19th century identification of civil society with economic 
interests and is influenced by NSM theory, the conflation of civil society with NGOs and the general 
separation of civil society from the economy. The influence of NSM theory is evident in Kaldor  et  al.’s  
(2012, p.15; 22) argument   that   ‘global   civil   society’   involves   a   shift   towards   ‘post-material’,   non-
economic and non-class-based issues and the use  of  ‘post-material’  values  in  the  Global Civil Society 
yearbooks as an indicator of civil society strength (Kaldor et al. 2008, p.344; Anheier et al. 2012, 
p.22). Keck and Sikkink also cite NSM theory as influencing their values- and networks- based 
analysis  of  humanitarian,  human  rights,  women’s  rights  and  environmental  ‘transnational  advocacy  
networks’,   asserting   transnational   civil   society   activists   are   ‘Motivated   by   values   rather   than   by  
material  concerns’  (1998, pp.32–33; 2). Occasionally,  a  ‘middle  class’  (Risse and Sikkink 1999, p.37; 
Kaldor et al. 2003, p.18; 29; Albrow and Glasius 2008, p.11) and/or Western basis is mentioned for 
all this, but few political inferences are drawn, aside from a presumed predilection for disinterested 
cosmopolitan, liberal or post-material values (Anheier et al. 2001b).  
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Willetts was one of the  first  NGO  theorists  to  make  a  similar  distinction  between  ‘sectional  groups’,  
which  ‘seek  to  protect  the  interests  of  a  particular  section  of  society’  like trade  unions  or  employers’  
federations,  and  ‘Specific  Issue  Promotional  Groups’    or  NGOs,  which  ‘come  together  solely  for  the  
purpose   of   promoting   social   change   on   a   particular   issue’   (1982, p.2; 8). Sikkink (2002, p.313) 
similarly dichotomises class or collective self-interest against altruism in the service of single issues 
or  the  ‘public’  interest,  arguing  NGOs, 
must be perceived as not self-interested. That is, they need to be seen as not personally 
interested in acquiring political and economic power, or as too linked to government or 
industry. It is exactly because these groups are neither political parties nor interest groups in 
the classic sense of the word, or representing the political or economic interests of a 
particular group, that they acquire moral authority.  
Sikkink’s   phraseology   demonstrates   a   characteristic   slippage   between   analytical   and   normative  
criteria,   as   in   the   first   two   sentences,  NGOs   ‘must  be  perceived’  or   ‘need   to  be   seen  as’   not   self-
interested, but by the  third  they  simply  ‘are’.  
 
In  a  similar  vein,  Florini  and  Simmons’  (2000, p.7) claim  transnational  civil  society  actors  ‘are  bound  
together more by shared values than by self-interest’   and   contrast   ‘purely   self-interested’   trade 
unions   to   NGO   activists   ‘with   no   discernible   selﬁsh   interests’.   According   to   Tvedt (2006, p. n20), 
donors have shaped such normative conceptualisations, through constructs such as the World 
Bank’s   (1995, p.13) definition of   NGOs   as   ‘typically value-based   organizations’,   characterised   by  
‘principles   of   altruism   and   voluntarism’.   A   similar   dichotomy   between   collective   economic   self-
interest  and  values  appears   in  Edwards’   (2000b) definition of civil society – and the  World  Bank’s  
(2000, p.5) while he worked there – as   ‘the arena in which people come together to advance the 
interests they hold in common, not for profit or political power, but because they care enough about 
something  to  take  collective  action’.  All  of  this feeds into propositions about civil society influence 
that  focus  on   ideational  and  soft  power   in   isolation  from  the  material  resources  at  NGOs’  disposal  
and   the  material   conditions   in  which   ‘principled   ideas’   and  persuasive   power  are   produced.  Clark 
(1995, pp.510–513) thus equates NGO  influence  with  an  abstract  ‘power  of  principle’  and  for  Risse  
(2000, p.20),  NGOs  rely  on  the  ‘“power  of  the  better  argument”’.  
A Sphere of soft and ideational power  
Nye’s   concept   of   soft   power,   or   ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than 
coercion or payments' (Nye 2004, p.x), is widely cited n the liberal civil society literature (Florini and 
Simmons 2000, p.10 n22; Sikkink 2002; Albrow and Anheier 2006, p.4; Alqadhafi 2007), where NGO 
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power is generally understood in compatible terms, as relating primarily to ideas, communicative 
power and moral or expert authority. Nye and Keohane (1998, p.3) conceive soft and hard power as 
forms  of  ‘behavioural  power’  that  respectively  use  power  resources  to  attract,  persuade  and  co-opt, 
or   coerce   and   induce,   whereas   ‘resource   power’   denotes   ‘the   possession   of   resources   that   are  
usually associated  with  the  ability   to  reach  outcomes  you  want’.  Nye initially equated hard power 
solely with coercion, but subsequently expanded it to include economic inducement (1990, pp.167–
168, 2004, p.31) – an afterthought reflective of his implicit conflation of coercion and economic 
resources, delinking of soft power from money, and underestimation of the primary importance 
from a Gramscian perspective of economic resources fungible into hard or soft power. 
 
Nye  asserts  ‘the  general  association  between  the  types  of  behaviour  and  certain  resources  is  strong  
enough  to  allow…shorthand  reference  to  hard- and soft-power  resources’  (2004, pp.7–8), producing 
a  neat  taxonomy,  wherein  force,  sanctions,  payments  and  bribes  are  the  ‘most   likely  resources’  of  
hard  power  and  institutions,  values,  cultures  and  policies  the  ‘most  likely  resources’  of  soft  power.  
The same rationale underlies his aforementioned dichotomous definition of soft power relative to 
hard  power  (‘the  ability  to  get  what  you  want  through  attraction  rather  than  coercion  or  payments’),  
and summary of ways to affect the behaviour of others ('You can coerce them with threats; you can 
induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want'). These 
formulations conflate economic resources and hard power and occlude the primary, structural role 
of economic resources in attraction and co-option, as well as coercion and inducement. Indeed, Nye 
states explicitly that soft power uses ‘a  different   type  of  currency   (not   force,  not  money)’,  but   ‘an  
attraction   to   shared  values  and   the   justness  and  duty  of   contributing   to   those  values’   (2004, p.7). 
Consequently, some ideas are just intrinsically attractive,   like   the      ‘universal   values’,   ‘attractive’  
culture  and  policies  that  ‘promote  values  and  interests  that  others  share’  of  the  US,  as  compared  to  
the   ‘‘Narrow   values   and   parochial   cultures’   of   other   countries,   which   according   to   Nye   is   what  
accounts for the superior soft power of the US (2004, p.11) ignoring the role of American economic 
power   in   shaping   what   appear   as   ‘universal’   values.   Sikkink and her co-authors similarly assume 
humanitarianism  and  human   rights   are   innately   transculturally   appealing,   asserting   they   speak   ‘to  
aspects of belief systems or life experiences  that  transcend  a  particular  cultural  or  political  context’  
(Keck & Sikkink 1998, p.204; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p.907).  
 
Such under-theorisation of the interrelationship of hard, soft and economic power is reinforced by 
Nye’s  occasional  non-explanatory equivocations that hard and soft power and economic resources 
sometimes mutually reinforce each other and sometimes do not (2004, pp.7–10). He thus 
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acknowledges   that   ‘sometimes   the   same   power   resources   can   affect   the   entire   spectrum   of  
behaviour   from   coercion   to   attraction’,   implying   hard   and   soft   power   can   coincide.   Nye   is more 
interested  in  the  opposite  scenario,  however,  generalising  that  ‘soft power does not depend on hard 
power’  (2004, p.9) and citing  the  Pope’s  influence  without  an  army  as  an  example.  This ignores how 
the  Church’s  enormous  monetary  resources  (derived  in  part  from  a  history  of  conquest  and  vestigial  
state  power)  both  enable   its   ideational   influence  and   ‘induce’  adherence   through  educational and 
other social services (2004, p.2; 9; 94). Consequently, how Nye poses the issue again glosses over the 
centrality of economic resources as the ultimate source of soft and hard power.  
 
Delinking   soft   power   from  material   resources   is   problematic   enough   in   Nye’s   original   US   foreign  
policy context, but when applied to externally dependent CSOs that lack an autonomous economic 
base becomes even more misleading. Whereas US economic power means it can decide how to 
wield its soft power relatively free of external constraints, NGOs usually have to consider which 
activities will attract grants and political support, subjecting them to the agenda-setting power of 
donors and other elites before they can exercise soft power, or reducing their resource power 
altogether.  This  has  not  deterred  liberal  theorists  from  simply  extending  Nye’s  concept  of  soft  power  
to NGOs (Risse 2000; Nye 2002, p.67, 2004, pp.90–96; Sikkink 2002) and Sikkink exemplifies the 
evasion of the implications of external funding dependency this involves in asserting NGOs have 
‘significant   degrees   of autonomous soft   or   communicative   power   on   some   issues’   and   dismissing  
concerns about autonomy as an unhelpful   ‘fixation’,   before   acknowledging ‘the   continued  
dependence of the non-profit sector on the state’  (2002, p.304; 313–314). 
 
Even  where  soft  power  terminology  is  not  used,  NGOs’  influence  is  understood  in  compatible  terms  
as emanating primarily from the   ‘principled’   ideas   they  promote  and/or  their  expertise, which are 
seen to endow them with moral and expert authority (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Van Rooy 2004, pp.77–
91). These attributes are often opposed to economic power, rather than connected to it, as in Keck 
and  Sikkink’s (1998, p.16) argument that ‘Since they are not powerful in a traditional sense of the 
word,  they  must  use  the  power  of  their  information,  ideas  and  strategies’.  Flowing  from  this,  both  
Willetts and  Keck  and  Sikkink   see  NGO   influence  as   ‘predominantly   an  explanatory  process’   (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998, p.16),   involving   ‘rational   argument’,      with   the   potential   to   alter   ‘normative   or  
analytical  perceptions  of  the  world’,  prompt  states  to  reconceptualise  their  interests  and  identities 
and thereby effect  transformative change (Keck and Sikkink 1998, pp.214–217; Willetts 2011, p.5; 
116; 138–142).  
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NGOs are seen to achieve this primarily through strategic deployment of information and ideas. Keck 
and   Sikkink’s   (1998, p.16) schema of information, symbolic, leverage and accountability politics 
demonstrates this, as leverage politics is the only category to foreground the material support of 
powerful elites, while the other three presuppose adequate material resources and/or elite support 
for NGOs to communicate effectively. As Tarrow (2001, p.13) argues, this sidesteps whether 
Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN) ‘operations  depend  – incidentally or fundamentally – on the 
power   of   the   states   they   come   from?’   Moreover,   even   where   material   power   is   considered,   its  
relationship to ideational influence is treated as extrinsic. Hence, in summarising their constructivist 
analysis of the internationalisation of human rights norms, Risse and Sikkink (1999, p.36) claim that  
Only if it can be shown empirically that pressures generated by great powers and/or 
international   financial   institutions   are   the   most   significant   factors   in…sustainable   human  
rights improvements, or if any changes in state human rights practices end as soon as 
material pressures end, would this constitute a challenge to our model.  
This overlooks the influence of economic power on the content and very existence of human rights 
norms, meaning it is not limited to post hoc pressures. 
 
However, because liberal-constructivists tend to treat existing norms as independent variables 
(Neumann and Sending 2007, p.688), they fail to account for the historical-material conditions under 
which they were produced or their substantive content, and, ultimately, why demands framed in 
terms of some norms appear more feasible than others. Instead, norms simply exist and linking NGO 
demands to them is the key to success (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998a). Keck  and  Sikkink’s  
brief history of the internationalisation of human rights norms (1998, pp.79–88) exemplifies this, 
merely setting the scene for NGO efforts to ensure compliance, rather than analysing their actual 
content or the historical reasons for their emergence. Likewise, Risse and Sikkink (1999, p.31) can 
see   ‘no  obvious   reason’   for   the   simultaneous  adoption  of  human   rights  norms  across  a   swathe  of  
developing and transition countries from 1985-1995, despite its coincidence with the collapse of 
both the Eastern bloc and Third World demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
(Augelli and Murphy 1993), the debt crisis and the related emergence of disciplinary neoliberalism as 
an integral part of North-South relations (Abrahamsen 2000).  
 
Keck and Sikkink (1998, p.27) do specify that norms   around   ‘legal   equality   of   opportunity’   and  
‘against  practices  involving  bodily  harm  to  populations  perceived  as  vulnerable  or  innocent’  – which 
broadly correspond to human rights and humanitarianism – are the most promising frames for 
transnational advocacy, but while they acknowledge more structural issues are less amenable to 
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NGO  advocacy  and  the  contemporaneous  decline  ‘of  mass  parties  of  the  left’,  these  correlations  are  
not investigated. Moreover, even when they mention in passing that the resonance of NGO 
demands is connected to the internalisation of liberal values in the West, they offer no political or 
economic explanation for this or for the content of liberal norms (1998, pp.205–206). Indeed, 
Finnemore   and   Sikkink   reject   evidence   that   ‘norms   about   issues   congruent   with   capitalism   and  
liberalism   will   be   particularly   powerful’   as   ‘too   vague   to   be   useful’,   arguing   many   norms   are  
compatible with capitalism, but only some are transnationally effective (1998, p.907).  
 
This makes sense when the objective is to identify which liberal-capitalist norms are transnationally 
persuasive, as opposed to problematising the limitations and hegemonic logic of a politics 
circumscribed by liberal-capitalism, but it also undermines the central purpose of liberal-
constructivist  analyses,  as  ‘bracketing’  existing  norms  as  de-historicised, depoliticised, independent 
variables without explaining their content renders any analysis of how new norms are constructed 
superficial. This is especially problematic given the attribution of causal primacy to ideas involved in 
contending that ‘ideas  and  communicative  processes  define  in the first place which material factors 
are perceived as relevant and how they influence understandings of interests, preferences, and 
political  decisions’  (Risse and Sikkink 1999, pp.6–7).   
 
The end result is that both the emphasis that is placed on soft and ideational power and how these 
forms of power are interpreted leads to an idealisation of civil society as a sphere of ideas and 
norms, which is autonomous from and coordinated by a different logic to state and market. In the 
process, NGOs are presented as disinterested, moral actors, whose legitimacy derives from 
‘universal’   – or hegemonic – standards or values (Van Rooy 2004, pp.77–91), In a contemporary 
global context, this also coincides with an equally idealised and Western-biased understanding of 
‘global  civil  society’,  accompanied  by  a  normative  ‘bottom-up’  origin  narrative.   
 
‘Global  civil  society’  from  the  ‘bottom-up’   
At least three conceptualisations of global or transnational civil society exist in the literature in the 
liberal tradition. The first equates it with all civil society activities, regardless of whether they involve 
transnational communications or cross-border issues (Salamon et al. 1999; Salamon and Sokolowski 
2004).   The   second   restricts   it   to   ‘global’   practices   involving   transnational   linkages,   cosmopolitan  
values and/or global relevance (Anheier et al. 2001a, p.17; Anheier and Katz 2003; Kaldor 2003b; 
Kaldor et al. 2004; Albrow and Seckinelgin 2011),   and   the   third   prefers   to   call   it   ‘transnational’  
because linkages, practices and values may not be global in scope (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p.33; 
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Florini and Simmons 2000, p.7; Price 2003). Notwithstanding these differences, all these liberal 
approaches  tend  to  construct  ‘global  civil  society’  in  a  manner  biased  towards  liberal  Western  values  
and the concerns of international elites, arguably generating a contemporary counterpart of the 
exclusion of the working class, trade unions, colonised peoples and other subordinate groups from 
civil society in the classical liberal sense.  
 
This is exemplified in the inaugural Global Civil Society Yearbook,  which   reports   ‘one  of   the  most  
striking  findings…is  that  ‘global  civil  society’  is  heavily  concentrated  in  north-western  Europe’,  having  
measured  it  according  to  factors  including:  ‘the  growth  of  global  consciousness  as  evidenced  by  the  
absence  of  human   rights  violations’;   ratification  of  human   rights,  arms   control   and  environmental  
treaties;   ‘outward  tourism’; ‘Internet  usage’   (Anheier et al. 2001a, p.7), overseas development aid 
(ODA),   the   UN’s   Human   Development   Index   and   the   number   of   English-speakers (Anheier et al. 
2001c, p.233; 276–279; 251). Significantly, neither trade union density nor religious adherence was 
measured,  despite  ostensibly  being  included  in  ‘‘global  civil  society’’. 
 
All three liberal approaches to global or transnational civil society also recount similar origin 
narratives that, attribute its apparently sudden appearance predominantly   to   ‘bottom-up’   rather  
than   ‘top-down’   processes (Reimann 2006). The Global Civil Society yearbooks’   metanarrative   is  
globalisation (Anheier et al. 2001a, p.7),  which  according  to  Kaldor  is  ‘what  is  new  about  the  concept  
of   civil   society   since   1989’   (2003b, p.1), and although not all liberal accounts foreground 
globalisation to this extent, the range of bottom-up factors they identify are compatible with a 
pluralist,   ‘transformationalist’   understanding of globalisation in terms of increasing global 
interconnectedness across all spheres (Held et al. 1999) and    ‘growing  global  consciousness’  (Anheier 
et al. 2001a, p.7; Kaldor et al. 2009, p.3). The  main  ‘bottom-up’  factors identified are:  
 transnational communication between activists enabled by the globalisation of information 
and communications technology (ICT) (Salamon 1994; Commission on Global Governance 
1995a; Salamon et al. 1999, p.4, 2003, p.2; Warkentin and Mingst 2000; Carothers 2000, 
p.27; Anheier et al. 2001a, p.6, 2012, p.1; Florini 2001, p.36; Castells et al. 2006; Albrow and 
Glasius 2008, p.1; Willetts 2011, pp.84–113); 
 an account of the end of the Cold War that emphasises the development of civil society in 
Eastern European and transnational networking with Western civil society activists (Salamon 
1994, p.111; Carothers 2000, p.19; 27; Lipschutz 2000, p.398; Anheier et al. 2001a; Florini 
2001; Kaldor 2003b; Edwards 2009, p.2; 7; 11);  
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 the spread of post-material, cosmopolitan liberal values,  especially democracy, human 
rights and environmentalism (Kaldor 2003b; Kaldor et al. 2003);  
 improved education and skills (Lipschutz 1992, p.411; Salamon 1994, p.118; Commission on 
Global Governance 1995a; Rosenau 1995, p.19; Boli et al. 1999; Kaldor et al. 2003, p.18), 
sometimes associated with a burgeoning global middle class;  
 organic reactions to   ‘globalisation   from   above’   and   the   ‘decline’ or   ‘failure’   of   the   state  
(Cohen and Arato 1992, p.71; Lipschutz 1992; Shaw 1994, pp.649–650; Salamon 1994; 
Commission on Global Governance 1995a; Falk 1997; Salamon et al. 1999, p.4; Anheier et al. 
2001a, 2012, p.19; Pianta 2001; Edwards 2009, p.2; 11) through  ‘globalisation  from  below’  
(Falk 1997; Kaldor 2003b, p.8) demanding a reformed global governance, so   that   ‘The  
emergence  of   ‘global   civil   society’   can   be   seen  both   as   a   response   to   the   globalisation   of  
state  power  and  a  source  of  pressure  for  it’  (Shaw 1994, p.650).  
 
All   these   ‘bottom-up’   explanations   foreground   ‘global   citizen   action’   (Edwards and Gaventa 2001) 
and situate financial and political support from governments, IGOs and other elites as ancillary. The 
inaugural Global Civil Society Yearbook accordingly puts the funding chapter last, an order of priority 
characteristic of the literature (Salamon 1994, pp.112–114; Florini 2000b, p.217, 2001, p.36; Anheier 
et al. 2001a, p.6; Willetts 2011, pp.150–151). Or as Salamon et al. (2003, p.3) put it,   ‘a  variety  of  
external  actors  have  helped  to  move  the  process  along’  but  ‘The  most  basic  force  is  that  of  ordinary  
people who decide to take matters into their own hands’  (Salamon 1994, p.112). Likewise, Willetts 
(2011, p.150) asserts that  ‘NGO  demands  have  been  the  major  driving  force’.   ‘Global  civil  society’ 
for Kaldor (2008, p.42) is therefore ‘a  process  of  management  of  society  that  is  ‘bottom-up’  rather  
than   ‘top-down’,   which   Salamon   (1994, p.109) imagined   amounted   to   ‘a   global   “associational  
revolution”’,  potentially  ‘as  significant  to  the  latter  twentieth  century  as  the  rise  of  the  nation-state 
was  to  the  latter  nineteenth.’   
 
Arguably   the   most   significant   ‘bottom-up’   factors   from   a   liberal   perspective   relate   to the 
globalisation of information and communications technology (ICT), which for Mathews (1997a, p.51) 
is ‘The  most    powerful    engine  of  change    in…the    rise  of  nonstate    actors’.  ICT  is  seen  as  important  
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not only for communicating and organising transnationally, but for its perceived democratising 
effects, which include freer access to information formerly monopolised by states (Mathews 1997a, 
p.51; Florini 2000b, p.220; Kaldor et al. 2012, p.3) and easier participation by marginalised groups 
(Florini 2000b, p.221; Anheier et al. 2001a, p.6). On top of this is its facilitation of transnational 
networking, which Rosenau (2002, pp.76–77) connects   to   ‘the   growing   relevance   of   NGOs…the  
possibility   that   a   global   civil   society  may   be   emerging’ and a putative power shift from states to 
‘small,   non-state   actors’   that he   sees   as   ‘one   of   the  most   important’   contributory   factors   in   the  
perceived decline of the state.   
 
Post-Marxist theorist Manuel Castells,   whose   work   on   the   ‘Network   Society’   has   influenced   the  
liberal literature in this area, has argued that ICT means ‘the   traditional   limitations  of  networking  
forms   of   organization   to   manage   complexity   beyond   a   certain   size’   can   be   transcended,   so   that  
transnational   networks   can   ‘keep   their   flexibility   and   adaptability’   while   continuously   expanding.  
Consequently, hierarchical  organisations  are  being  displaced  as  relics  of  a  bygone  ‘industrial’  age  and  
networks  have  become  ‘a  superior  social  morphology  for  all  human  action’.  The  result  is  ‘a new form 
of social interaction, mobilization, and decision-making…a  new  political culture: networking means 
no center, thus no central authority (2000, p.15, 2004, p.156, 2010a, p.xviii). 
 
Drawing in part on Castells, liberal theorists typically describe networks as horizontal, voluntary, 
reciprocal, informal, decentralised and less hierarchical than other forms of organisation (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Khagram et al. 2002a, p.11; Kaldor 2003b, pp.22–23; Karns and Mingst 2010b, p.29) 
and generally portray them as new and exciting, in contrast to older, vertical, authoritative, formal, 
centralised and hierarchical states, political parties and trade unions. In this vein, Khagram et al. 
(2002a, p.11) argue that in the non-governmental sector,   ‘the characteristic form of relation is 
neither authority or hierarchy (as in government and bureaucracy), nor the market, but rather the 
informal   and   horizontal   network’,   which   for   Keck   and   Sikkink   (1998, pp.8–9) is inherently 
‘characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns   of   communication   and   exchange’.  
Such language imputes networks with normative egalitarian and democratic characteristics, albeit 
usually without saying so directly, and contributes to a sanguine view of the information revolution 
as  ‘spreading    power  among    more  people  and  groups’,  disrupting  hierarchies,  and  fostering  ‘more  
broadly  participatory  (transnational)  political  processes’  (Warkentin and Mingst 2000).  
 
Despite   frequent   references   to   Castells,   his   view   of   NGOs   as   ‘neo-governmental   organisations’  
internal  to  the  ‘network  state’  (Carnoy and Castells 2001, p.14) and networks per se as  ‘value-free or 
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neutral’  (2000, p.16) and frequent pessimism about their effects on inequalities of power and wealth 
are largely ignored in the liberal literature. As well as the benign qualities ascribed to networked 
organisation in general, this derives from a presumption that civil society and transnational advocacy 
networks are value-based and so can be understood ideationally as networks of information, 
communication  and values (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Karns and Mingst 2010b, p.29), rather than also 
networks of economic power, coercion and inducement. Viewed ideationally, transnational networks 
involving donors and NGOs can appear horizontal if communications flow easily in all directions, but 
this becomes incongruous if the same networks are viewed from the perspective of funding, which 
travels vertically from donor to recipient. Moreover, such vertical flows of money also structure 
seemingly  horizontal  flows  of  information,  as  NGOs’  capacity  to  communicate  necessitates  access  to  
the material resources to carry out research, attend conferences, set up websites and hire staff. Only 
some of those costs are falling in the information revolution and focusing solely on the benefits of 
ICT occludes vast disparities of access. 
 
Notwithstanding this, the significance accorded to ICT and other bottom-up  factors  in  liberal  ‘global  
civil society’   origin   narratives   reinforces   its   depiction   as   a   benign,   communicative   and   ideational  
sphere, discrete from economic, class interests and populated by disinterested, altruistic actors 
exercising influence through the soft power of moral authority or expertise and the innate 
attractiveness of liberal or post-material values.  
 
‘Global  Civil  Society’ and Global Governance 
The centrality of civil society organisations and NGOs to liberal accounts of global governance is 
evident from the Commission on Global  Governance’s  (1995a) view  of  them  as  ‘vital  and  flourishing  
contributors to the possibilities  of   effective   governance’   that   ‘greatly   increase   the   capacity   of   the  
governance   system’   and   more   recently   in   Willetts’ claim in Non-Governmental Organizations in 
World Politics: The construction of global governance that   ‘NGOs  have  created  global  governance’  
(2011, p.150). While most liberals would not state this quite so crudely, NGOs are generally seen to 
have been centrally involved in a perceived shift from an international system analytically reducible 
to states, towards a multi-actor global governance that increasingly resembles pluralist policy-
making at the national level.  As Sending and Neumann (2006, p.654) argue,  ‘The  increased  influence  
and  power  of  actors  representing  ‘‘civil  society’’  and  its  implications  for  the  power  and  authority  of  
the state are at the core of what global governance  is  all  about’.   
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While   in  the  1990s  the   liberal   literature  predicted,  or  reported,  a   ‘power  shift’   in  the   international  
system  as  a  result,  the  dearth  of  major  change  attributable  to  ‘global  civil  society’  since  has  forced  
something of a rethink. Edwards now admits (2009, p.24) ‘scholars   cannot   agree   on   what   the  
broader implications of these trends might be.  An  “associational  revolution”  or  “power  shift”  would  
surely  signal  structural  changes  in  politics,  economics  and  social  relations’.  Similarly,  the  introduction  
to the 2012 Global Civil Society’   yearbook   belatedly   concedes   that   perceived   ‘global   civil   society’  
successes  on  human  rights,  humanitarian  intervention  and  ‘new  treaties  like  the  Land  Mines  Treaty’ 
‘effectively’  displaced  ‘an earlier  discourse  about  social  justice’  and coincided with the ‘triumph’  of  
neoliberalism (Anheier et al. 2012, pp.15–17). Yet despite such admissions, this literature has been 
unable  to  explain  this  coincidence  between  the  perceived  blossoming  of  ‘global  civil  society’   in  the  
1990s and 2000s and neoliberalism. The vagueness and explanatory poverty of liberal civil society 
theory in this respect is equally evident in the liberal global governance literature.  
 
At its broadest and most general, governance   denotes   ‘systems   of   rule’   or   ‘control  mechanisms’  
(Rosenau 1995) and ‘the   exercise   of   authority   within   a   given   sphere’   (Hewitt de Alcántara 1998, 
p.105) and so relates to the pursuit and attainment of order (Stoker 1998; Biersteker 2010). 
‘Government’   is   therefore   a   subcategory   of   governance   (Smouts 1998, p.81) involving formal 
hierarchical   authority   derived   from   the   state’s   monopoly   of   legitimate   force;   but   a   multitude   of  
other governance forms exist that involve a range of non-state   actors   and   ‘layers’   of   governance  
above and below the state (Hewitt de Alcántara 1998, p.111) and interact with government to 
create   ‘global   governance’.   Rosenau,   who   is   probably   the   most   influential   global   governance  
theorist,   duly   explains   that   a   governance   approach   ‘is not in opposition to the statecentric 
perspective; rather it encompasses and extends beyond the governance sustained by states' (2000, 
p.188).  
 
This   combination  of   government   and  other   forms  of   governance   is   encapsulated   in  Weiss’   (2009, 
p.257) description of governance as ‘the  range  of  both  informal  and  formal  values,  norms,  practices,  
and institutions that provide better order than if we relied purely upon formal regulations and 
institutions’,   so   that   ‘Global   governance   encompasses   an   extremely   wide   variety   of   cooperative  
problem–solving arrangements.  Likewise, the influential Commission on Global Governance (1995a) 
defined global governance as  
the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their 
common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may 
be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and 
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regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people 
and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest. 
 
In distinguishing a new field, however, governance theorists generally focus on forms of governance 
other than government, such as private governance by self-regulating networks of corporations or 
NGOs, multi-actor public-private partnerships, such as Keck   and   Sikkink’s   transnational   advocacy  
networks, and informal rule systems. Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) dubbed this Governance without 
Government, which Stoker (1998, pp.17–8) describes as  ‘governing  mechanisms  which  do  not  rest  on  
recourse  to  the  authority  and  sanctions  of  government’  and  are  ‘about  autonomous  self-governing 
networks  of   actors’.   Linked   to   this   is   a   growing  emphasis  on  non-state, non-governmental or civil 
society  organisations  and  a  dichotomisation  of  government  and   ‘governance  without  government’  
based  on  a  similar  series  of  oppositions  as  the  ‘global  civil  society’  literature. 
 
Rosenau thus typologises governance processes along two dimensions, corresponding  to  ‘the  degree  
to   which   authority   is   formally   established’   and   ‘flows   in   vertical   or   horizontal   directions’   (2002, 
pp.80–81) and emphasises ‘the   shifting   balance   between   hierarchical   and   network   forms   of  
organization,   between   vertical   and   horizontal   flows   of   authority’   (2005). He also distinguishes 
‘institutionalized’   from   ‘nascent’   governance   – including civil society networks, which he assumes 
are   ‘not   state-sponsored’   (1995, p.22) – and argues the former ‘tend   to   be   marked   by   explicit  
hierarchical  structures’  and  are  epitomised by states, whereas the latter are ‘self-organizing systems, 
steering  arrangements   that  develop   through   the   shared  needs  of   groups’   (1995). All of this bears 
strong   linguistic   and   thematic   similarities   to   the   liberal   ‘global   civil   society’   literature,   particularly  
Keck  and  Sikkink’s  work  on  ‘transnational  advocacy  networks’.     
 
Adjectives like horizontal, voluntary, informal, networked and decentralised are now so intermingled 
in  liberal  governance  and  ‘global  civil  society’  discourse  that these quite distinct qualities have come 
to   appear   as   natural,   inevitable   and   even   interchangeable   ingredients   of   ‘governance   without  
government’   that   imply   a  more   egalitarian   and  democratic   system  of   global   governance   than   the  
previous statecentric international one. The qualities thereby ascribed to governance are implicitly 
normative and work off a series of positive comparisons with the vertical, formal, hierarchical and 
centralised state – in much the same way as the communication, association, altruism, soft power 
and post-material,   liberal   values   of   ‘global   civil   society’   contrast   positively   with   characteristics  
associated with state and market.  An additional similarity is that ideational and soft power are 
assigned greater significance. Willetts (2011, p.150) thus   argues   that   ‘Global   governance  
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implies…power  is  not  just  the  ability  to  exercise  coercion.  It  is  also  achieving  influence  by  mobilizing  
support  for  the  endorsement  of  values  and  the  adoption  of  norms’  and  he  focuses  primarily  on  these  
‘soft’  aspects of persuasion, socialisation and institutional pressure. 
 
The  upshot  is  that  ‘governance  without  government’/government  and  civil  society/state  and  market  
are constructed to impute implicitly positive characteristics to the former term and implicitly 
negative characteristics to the latter and to dichotomise them in ways that hinder identifying, let 
alone analysing, how vertical, formal, hierarchical and centralised processes, material self-interests 
and  material  or  hard  power   shape   ‘governance  without   governance’   and   civil   society   and   interact  
with putatively horizontal, informal and decentralised processes and ideational or soft power. 
Moreover,  because  ‘global  civil  society’  and  ‘governance  without  governance’  are  the  main  empirical  
focus of liberal analyses  of   ‘global  governance’,  their  presumed  positive  characteristics  tend  to  get  
transferred onto global governance in general, which is then situated as normatively preferable to 
the previous state centric international system.  
 
Reinforcing this are two assumptions or orientations that divert attention from hierarchies of power 
in global governance: a pluralist understanding of power as limited and issue-specific; and 
approaches to governance as a cooperative, consensual  ‘system’  or  ‘process’.  The first assumption is 
characteristic of liberalism in general, and contrasts with realist and Marxist approaches that 
foreground overarching (or underlying) power structures. The classic debate between Dahl (2005) 
and Mills (1979) on power in America illustrates the unbridgeable chasm between the two. In 
relation to global governance, such assumed pluralism accentuates the construction of civil society, 
state  and  market  in  the  ‘global  civil  society’  literature  as  discrete  realms,  characterised  by  different  
modes of power and (at least implicitly) different power structures, by emphasising issue-area 
variations in actor influence over general patterns of dominance (Nye and Keohane 1971a, 1971b; 
Young 1972; Keohane and Nye 2001).  
 
For Rosenau, it means global governance involves  ‘a  disaggregated  array  of  actors  whose  power  is  
limited   to   a   particular   expertise   or   set   of   issues’,   producing   discrete   ‘spheres   of   authority’   not  
arranged in any broader hierarchy (1999, p.297; 295). Consequently, global governance comprises 
‘multiple,  disaggregated,  distinct  and  overlapping  rule  systems’  that  form  a  ‘crazy  quilt’  rather  than  a  
coherent whole, and 
any effort to trace a hierarchical structure of authority that loosely links disparate sources of 
governance to each other is bound to fail. ln terms of governance, the world is too 
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disaggregated for grand logics that postulate a measure of global coherence (1995, pp.15–
16).  
Likewise, Shaw (1994, p.650) describes   the   contemporary   interstate   system   as   ‘inherently  
incoherent and “messy”,   while   Held   and   McGrew   also   perceive   that   the   ‘geometry’   of   global  
governance   varies      ‘from   issue   to   issue’   (2002a, p.9) and   that   ‘policy   outcomes   are   not   readily  
controlled   by   the   dominant   powers,  whose   interests   and   influence  may   vary   from   issue   to   issue’  
(2007, pp.151–152). In contrast to realist and Marxist approaches that foreground the hierarchical 
and/or class-based nature of the international system as a whole, this downplays overarching and 
underlying power structures and tends both to exaggerate the geopolitical significance of actors like 
NGOs or middle powers, whose influence appears limited to particular issues, and to decontextualise 
it from the function it serves in the wider Western-dominated international capitalist power 
structure. 
 
The second assumption, whereby governance is approached as  a  cooperative,  consensual   ‘system’  
or  ‘process’,  rather  than  from  an  actor- or conflict-oriented perspective, also  diverts attention from 
disparities of power and additionally depoliticises them (Jaeger 2007). This is evident in   Weiss’  
(2009, p.257) identification of  global  governance  with  ‘cooperative  problem–solving  arrangements’  
and the Commission  on  Global  Governance’s   (1995a) perception  of   ‘a continuing process through 
which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative  action  may  be  taken’  
so  as  to  enable  diverse  actors  to  ‘manage  their  common  affairs’  through  arrangements  they  ‘either  
have  agreed  to  or  perceive   to  be   in   their   interest’.  Overbeek   (2005, p.39) criticises   the  ‘normative  
bias’  inherent  in  such  conceptions  of  global  governance  as  ‘a  consensual  process  of  accommodation’    
that  ‘eliminates  any  possible  connotation  of  domination  or  force’,  while  De  Senarclens   (1998, p.98) 
criticises the Commission on Global Governance (1995) for   tending   ‘to   mix   together   all   those  
involved on the international scene, without ranking their functions, the lines of authority and force 
that   connect   them,   their   political   inﬂuence,   or   the   nature   of   their   speciﬁc   contribution   to   the  
regulatory  structures’.     
 
The same approach is evident from Keck and Sikkink, who examine the influence of multi-actor 
transnational advocacy networks as a whole, rather than internal power dynamics or the relative 
influence  of  their  members.  They  justify  this  on  the  basis  that  networks’  agency  ‘is  not  reducible  to  
the agency  of  their  components’,   ‘leading  members’,  or   ‘most  powerful  node’  and  that  their voice 
represents the product, rather than the sum, of their interactions. So although they concede 
networks  are   ‘asymmetrical  or   lopsided’  and   ‘Stronger  actors...often  drown  out   the  weaker  ones’,  
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their systemic or processual approach – and faith in the benignity of networks – leads to the 
assertion   that   ‘because  of   the  nature  of   the  network   form  of  organization,  many  actors   (including  
powerful northern ones) are transformed’  (1998, p.5; 216; 207).  
 
Such issued-based approaches to power and inattention to the relative power of the different actors 
involved in seemingly cooperative governance processes  often  coincide  with  narratives  of  a  ‘decline  
of  the  state’.  Typically,  this  is  linked  to  a  particular  interpretation  of  the  impact  of  globalisation, the 
information revolution, and increasing interdependence  (Wendt 1992, p.424; Ohmae 1996; 
Mathews 1997a; Rosenau 1999, 2000, 2005) on the state,   whereby   it   is   claimed   that   “power is 
migrating to small, non-state actors who can organise into sprawling networks more readily than 
traditionally hierarchical nation-state  actors”  (Arquila and Ronfeldt, quoted in Rosenau 2002, p.77). 
Rosenau (1999) and Mathews (1997a) thus interpret undoubtedly significant organisational changes 
in governance – including decentralisation to sub-state and local governments, outsourcing to non-
state actors, supra-state pooling of authority in IGOs and the growth of informal networks – as a 
fundamental,  and  welcome,  redistribution  of  power  or  ‘power  shift’  away  from  states  to  non-state 
and civil society actors, rather than a mere re-organisation of governance or shift in governmentality 
(Sending and Neumann 2006, p.658). Several commentators criticise the   ‘zero-sum conception of 
power’   this   implies,   whereby   apparently   increased   power   and   influence   for   nonstate   actors   is  
assumed to correspond to reduced state power (Sending and Neumann 2006, p.652; Soederberg 
2006, p.28; Zaleski 2006, p.116).  
 
The  idea  that  the  international  system  contains  a  form  of  ‘governance  without  government’  and  that 
the increased prominence of non-state   actors   necessitates   a   ‘decline   of   the   state’   has   been  
challenged from a liberal perspective. Held and McGrew (2002a), Nye and Keohane (1971a, 1971b; 
Keohane and Nye 1974) and Slaughter (1997) agree states are ‘disaggregating’  into  components  that  
increasingly engage in transnational governance relatively autonomously and that non-state actors 
have become more prominent, but dispute that this inevitably results in increased power for non-
state actors at the expense of states. On the contrary, states  are  seen  to  have  become  ‘increasingly  
crucial as strategic sites for  suturing  together…various  infrastructures  of  governance  and  legitimizing  
regulation   beyond   the   state’   (Held and McGrew 2002b, p.9). Likewise, Neumann (2002) argues 
states increasingly seek to become central nodes in governance networks, as multi-actor governance 
networks can increase the influence of some states. This argument is central to the liberal middle 
powers   literature,  which   imputes   similar  qualities  and  behaviours   to  middle  powers  as   the   ‘global  
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civil  society’   literature  associates with NGOs and sees them increasing their international influence 
for similar reasons.  
Global Governance and Middle Powers 
Despite its common currency, there is no generally accepted definition of a middle power. Chapnick 
(1999, p.73) describes   the   term   as   ‘deceptively   ambiguous’   and   for   Neufeld   (1995, p.12) it is an 
‘“essentially   contested   concept”.   Clearly,   a   middle   power   is   ‘neither   a   great   power   nor   a   small  
power’   (Chapnick 1999, p.73), but the appellation can entail varying material, behavioural and 
normative attributes and encompass different states. The  trend  in  the  ‘global  civil  society’  and  global  
governance literature towards emphasising soft and ideational power as modes of international 
influence also appears in the middle powers literature in the 1990s and 2000s, resulting in a similar 
downplaying of material and hard power resources and a gradual de-emphasis of economic and 
military prerequisites for middlepowerdom.  
 
State  power  has  traditionally  been  ranked  in  terms  of  material  attributes,  so  that  ‘great’  or  ‘major’  
powers combine large economies and populations with advanced militaries (particularly nuclear 
weapons),   enabling   them   to   ‘exercise international   influence   regardless   of   circumstance’   (Handel 
1990, pp.12–21; Chapnick 1999, p.77; 74; Bolton and Nash 2010, p.173). Gramsci (1971, p.264) 
concurs, believing   it   ‘necessary   to   distinguish:   between   great   powers,   with   relative   international  
autonomy, and other powers’   and   arguing   ‘”permanent” attributes,   especially   “economic   and  
financial   potential”   and   population’   are   particularly   important in this context. Since the Second 
World War, the US, USSR/Russia, China, the UK and France have generally been recognised as great 
powers, a status reflected and reinforced by their permanent membership of the UN Security 
Council. At the other end of the scale, small powers with small economies arising from small 
populations and/or underdevelopment and weak military capabilities (Handel 1990, pp.12–21) were 
seen  as  ‘incapable  of  exercising  real  influence’  (Chapnick 1999, p.74).  
 
In between are middle powers, including a wide variety of developed and developing states with 
relatively large economies  and military expenditures  that are often regional powers and/or major 
aid  donors,  but   lack  the  great  powers’  military  dominance   (Wood 1987; Correlates of War Project 
2008). Although Germany and Japan have increasingly been recognised as great powers since the 
end of the Cold War and India and Brazil appear to be moving in that direction (Correlates of War 
Project 2008, pp.2–3), the vast majority of middle powers are significantly weaker economically and 
militarily than the great powers and only a minority can aspire to great power status. A generous 
estimate, based on states that regularly appear in the top quintile in terms of GDP and military 
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expenditure5, plus five additional states included for their regional power, high military expenditure, 
GDP or aid contributions, produces a diverse list of forty middle powers (Table 1).  
Table 1.1 Middle Powers (UN, SIPRI and OECD data, 1988 to 2011) 
Thirty-Five Middle Powers, 
based on GDP & military 
expenditure 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Iran, Italy, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, Spain, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, Venezuela 
Additional Five Regional 
Middle Powers:  
Egypt, Nigeria, North Korea6, Kuwait, Taiwan 
 
In recent decades, however, the middle powers literature has increasingly de-emphasised such 
material prerequisites in   favour   of   defining   ‘middlepowerdom’   in   terms   of   behavioural and 
normative criteria,   or   ‘middlepowermanship’   (Evans and Grant 1991; Cooper et al. 1993; Cooper 
1997; Michaud and Belanger 2000; Rutherford et al. 2003; Behringer 2005; Brysk 2009; Bolton and 
Nash 2010).  Middle  powers  are  thus  said  to  be  ‘avid  multilateralists’  (Brysk 2009, p.39), ‘mediators  
and   problem   solvers’   (Matthew 2003, p.5), who favour ‘multilateral   solutions   to   international  
problems’   and   ‘compromise   positions   in   international   disputes’   (Cooper et al. 1993, p.19). This is 
seen to help counteract their relative lack of material and hard power, so that middle powers 
‘compensate  for  a  lack  of  structural  power  through  the  exercise  of  bargaining and negotiating skills 
directed  at  bringing  competing  interests  together’  (Hampson and Hart 1999, pp.41–42).  
 
In addition, whereas great powers can influence virtually all international issues and small powers 
few,   if   any,  middle   powers’   are   said   to   exercise significantly more influence on some issues than 
others   and   to  practice   ‘niche  diplomacy’   (Potter 1996; Cooper 1997; Michaud and Belanger 2000; 
Behringer 2005; Henrikson 2005).  This  entails  concentrating  ‘resources  in  specific  areas  best  able  to  
generate  returns  worth  having,  rather  than  trying  to  cover  the  field’  (Evans and Grant 1991, p.323), 
which is often seen to involve substantial contributions to international institutions, development 
assistance and multilateral peace operations. As a result, such behavioural-normative criteria tend to 
restrict middlepowerdom mainly to Western states, imputed with particular ‘soft’   power 
characteristics, that present development, humanitarian and human rights programmes as central 
                                                     
5 Excluding the great powers i.e. the US, China, Russia, France, the UK, Germany and Japan.  
6 Egypt and Nigeria are regional powers that regularly or intermittently appear in the top 40 military spenders 
and top 40 economies respectively. Taiwan and Kuwait both regularly rank in the top 40 military spenders and 
are  major  aid  donors.  No  SIPRI  data  is  available  on  North  Korea’s  military  spending,  but  it  has  nuclear  weapons  
and a huge army and a think tank estimated its expenditure at $8.77bn in 2009 (Reuters 2011), placing it in the 
top thirty globally.  
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planks of their foreign policy – such as Canada, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands or Australia 
(Cooper et al. 1993; Cooper 1997; Matthew 2003; Behringer 2005; Brysk 2009; Bolton and Nash 
2010).  
 
Whereas from a realist or Marxist perspective, such behaviours might appear as pragmatic 
influence-maximising strategies dependent on substantial albeit limited material resources, from the 
perspective of liberal preferences for cooperation and consensus, they acquire positive normative 
connotations. Soft, cooperative, legalistic behaviours are thus frequently linked to normative, and at 
times  hagiographical,  characterisations  of  middle  powers  as  states  that  ‘generally  favour  peace,  law,  
and  trade,  each  of  which  militates  towards  moral  universalism’    (Brysk 2009, p.39),  have  ‘a  legacy  of  
moral   stewardship   in   the   global   arena’   (Matthew 2003, p.5);   and   ‘embrace   notions   of   “good  
international  citizenship”’  (Cooper et al. 1993, p.19). Behringer makes this deontological component 
even more explicit , claiming the so-called  ‘likeminded  middle  powers’  – Canada, Denmark, Sweden, 
the Netherlands and Norway – are   ‘guided   in   their   foreign  policies  by  a  “humane   internationalist”  
orientation’   that   accepts   transnational   moral   responsibilities   towards   the   suffering   and   indigent  
(2005, p.307). Similarly, Bolton and Nash (2010, p.174) characterise middle powers as supporting 
‘the   development   of   international   law,   strengthening   of   global   justice,   respect   for   human   rights,  
environmental  conservation  and  expansion  of  access  to  development’.  
 
This resembles how, despite also theoretically including a much broader variety of actors,   ‘global  
civil   society’   is   empirically   constructed in the liberal literature as predominantly composed of 
Western organisations that concentrate on single issues or issue areas where they possess expertise 
or moral authority (Willetts 1982; Clark 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998), particularly development, 
humanitarianism and human rights. This suggests synergies between  middle  powers  and  ‘‘global  civil  
society’’  that  Thomas Nash (Bolton and Nash 2010), who coordinated the CMC, and Lloyd Axworthy, 
the  Foreign  Minister  behind  Canada’s  leadership  of  the  landmine  ban,  have repeatedly articulated. 
Against this backdrop, Michaud and Belanger (2000, p.97) distinguish  ‘routine’  middlepowermanship  
involving quiet diplomacy that emphasises multilateralism and strengthening existing international 
institutions without necessarily involving novel normative content,   from   ‘heroic’  
middlepowermanship, a newer phenomenon associated with multi-actor global governance that 
also utilises public diplomacy, including collaboration with NGOs, to promote new norms and which 
presents   itself   as   ‘presumably   disinterested,   for   the   common   good’.   The   ICBL   is   seen   as a 
quintessential example of this more normative, multi-actor middlepowermanship that has caught 
the imagination of liberal theorists (Cooper 1997; Behringer 2005; Brysk 2009).  
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Both types of middlepowermanship are seen to have been facilitated by a more cooperative post-
Cold War international environment and the globalisation of ICT and networked organisation, which 
have increased the salience of soft power (Nye 1990; Axworthy and Taylor 1998), including middle 
powers’  talent  for  coalition-building and the attractiveness of the liberal norms they espouse in their 
foreign policies (Axworthy and Taylor 1998; Dolan and Hunt 1998; Lawson et al. 1998; Brinkert 2003; 
Hampson and Reid 2003; Behringer 2005). This helps justify emphasising soft and ideational power 
as   the   primary   bases   of   middlepowerdom,   just   as   in   the   liberal   ‘global   civil   society’   and   global  
governance   literature   it  substantiates  NGOs’   increased  international   influence.  As Behringer (2002: 
307) puts it in a passage that could have NGOs as its subject,  
The soft power resources possessed by middle powers, such as their capacity to persuade 
through the use of information, communications, and multilateral institutions, are becoming 
increasingly more useful for effective leadership in a post-Cold War world that features 
greater interdependence and transnational cooperation. 
 
Significantly, this behavioural and normative turn has encouraged extending the middle power label 
to states that lack its material prerequisites – even according to the generous standard above. As 
Chapnick (1999, p.76) points  out,  this  means  ‘any  state,  great  or small, could be—or could at least 
behave like—a  middle  power’.  Brysk   (2009) duly identifies Costa Rica, which has no army and was 
then the 88th largest economy, as a middle power, while Bolton and Nash (2010, p.173) include New 
Zealand and Ireland, then the 52nd and 44th largest economies and further outside the top 40  largest 
military spenders. This denudation of the material content of middlepowerdom is also reflected 
politically in the inclusion of Ireland and New Zealand in the multi-actor   ‘Middle  Powers   Initiative’  
(2011) on nuclear weapons. Brysk (2009, p.223) justifies this by arguing that 
In  some  ways,  the  “middle  power”  label  and  literature  is  misleading,  because  it  refers  more  
to a cosmopolitan power projection strategy than a structural niche (albeit a strategy 
historically developed by countries that often passed through that niche).  
 
Hence, in extending middlepowerdom to smaller states that seem to behave like some Western 
middle powers and profess similar normative aspirations, their cooperative, soft power strategies or 
middlepowermanship become equated with middlepowerdom itself. Ergo, if small states practice 
such middlepowermanship, they are middle powers, implying they must also have increased their 
influence to that of a middle power. Chapnick (1999, p.79) sees such behavioural approaches as 
‘politically  motivated’,   as   ‘By   ascribing   to  a   smaller   state   “middle   power”   attributes…scholars   and  
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politicians  enhance  the  status  of  that  state.’  This  glosses  over  the  differential  influence  of  small  and  
middle   powers,   similar   to   how   the   liberal   ‘global   civil   society’   and   global   governance   literature  
exaggerates  civil  society’s independent  influence  by  emphasising  NGOs’  soft  and  ideational  power  in  
isolation from their material underpinnings. The overall effect is to reinforce claims of the increased 
salience of soft and ideational power in the international system and link middle powers and NGOs, 
as actors apparently dependent on soft and ideational power as their primary means of influence.  
Conclusion  
The   normative   assumptions   and   commitments   of   the   ‘global   civil   society’,   global   governance   and  
middle powers literature produce an optimistic vision of multiple actors working together to bring 
about progressive, democratic change in the global system, exploiting the enhanced opportunities 
for multi-actor transnational networking and cooperation flowing from the end of the Cold War and 
the globalisation of the information revolution. The  potential  of  ‘global  civil  society’  and  multi-actor 
governance to progressively reform and democratise the international system is a key normative 
claim  and  the  construction  of  ‘global  civil  society’,  global  governance  and  middle  powers  all  point  in  
this same optimistic direction.  
 
First, as a multi-actor system, global governance is assumed to be inherently more democratic than 
an international system dominated by great power states. Second, states   and   ‘government’   are  
constructed as vertical, formal, hierarchical and centralised actors defined by a monopoly of force or 
hard power, in contrast to the horizontal, informal, non-hierarchical and decentralised networks of 
‘global   civil   society’   and   ‘governance  without   government’,  which   exert   influence   through   soft   or  
ideational power. Third, networks are exalted, implicitly or explicitly, as inherently more modern, 
egalitarian and democratic forms of organisation, associated with the information revolution and 
soft and ideational power. Fourth, as the primary means through which civil society actors and 
middle powers exercise international influence in multi-actor global governance, soft and ideational 
power are seen as becoming more important and are frequently idealised as working through the 
‘power   of   the   better   argument’   and   the   intrinsic   attractiveness  of   universal   liberal   ideas,   discrete  
from class interest and the hard and material power of those promoting them. Finally, because the 
liberal   ‘global   civil   society’,   global   governance   and  middle   powers   literature   share   pluralist,   issue-
based approaches to international influence, significant international influence appears more 
attainable for NGOs and smaller states than from realist or Marxist perspectives focused on 
overarching interstate hierarchies and/or capitalist dominance. All these factors combine to portray 
meaningful global democratisation as plausible, so that the emergence of ‘global  civil  society’’  and 
its growing role in global governance is predominantly situated in this optimistic perspective.   
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Chapter 2 advances an alternative view to this liberal perspective that is based on a Marxist reading 
of Gramsci, which updates his ideas by translating them to the global level in order to theorise 
NGOs’  role  in  global  governance  in  terms  of  hegemonic  processes. 
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Chapter 2 – A Gramscian Perspective on Civil Society, 
Hegemony and States 
 
This  chapter  applies  Gramsci’s  ideas  to  contemporary  global  politics  by  theorising  the  role  of  ‘‘global  
civil   society’’   in   global   governance   in   terms   of   hegemonic   practices,   as   opposed   to   liberal  
frameworks of democratic reform, or post-Marxist and neo-Gramscian  ‘counterhegemony’. Contrary 
to citations of Gramsci as inspiration for conceiving of civil society as a discrete ideational and 
cultural sphere separate from state and market (Cohen and Arato 1992, pp.143–146; Kaldor 2003a, 
p.584, 2007a, p.135), his historical materialist ontology actually precludes separating ideas or culture 
from the capitalist system in which they are embedded. For Gramsci, the economic base, and civil 
and  political  society  which  together  form  ‘the  State  proper’  (Gramsci 1971, p.170 n71), are integral 
components of a dialectical social totality that can only be temporarily, methodologically 
distinguished  as  ‘levels’  or  ‘moments’  of  analysis  (Gramsci 1971, p.160; 12; 180–185). This is because 
all aspects of society are linked and delimited by class relations rooted in the economic structure 
(Marx 1970, p.20) and   interwoven   by   hegemonic   class   power   ‘which   spilling   over   arbitrary 
boundaries  underpins  the  whole’  (Chandhoke 2002, p.35).  
 
Gramsci’s   understanding   of   the   economic   base   or   structure   is   a much broader concept than the 
commonplace liberal notion of the market or economy, as it not only includes ‘economic’ 
transactions as commonly understood, but more importantly the social relations of production or 
class structure that enable economic transactions and which are the social context in which they can 
take place. It thus denotes the entire material or productive basis of human existence. Gramsci’s  
main reference point for this is  Marx’s  1859 Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy,  which  he  describes  as   ‘the  most   important  authentic   source   for  a   reconstruction  of   the  
philosophy   of   praxis’   (1971, pp.459–460) and references over and over  throughout the Prison 
Notebooks (1971, p.106; 114; 138; 162; 177; 336; 365; 367; 371–2; 410; 432, 1999a, p.461; 548–
560). 
 
In using this as the starting point for his entire politico-theoretical project, Gramsci proceeds from 
the fundamental historical materialist premise of economic primacy (Miliband 2004, pp.8–9), which 
is in no way synonymous with economic determinism or economism, but means rather that   “The  
mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and 
spiritual  processes  of  life”  (Marx, as quoted in Gramsci 1971, p.459) – but never their exact content 
(Gramsci 1971, p.162; 427; 437, 2007, p.176). These can  take  a  panoply  of  ‘legal,  political,  religious,  
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artistic  or  philosophic…forms’  (Marx 1999, p.4) , which in turn react back onto the economic base. In 
other words, class relations and class conflict rooted in the mode or production or economic 
structure of society permeate   and   delimit   the   political   and   ideological   ‘superstructures’   (Gramsci 
1971, pp.459–460; 160), but are reciprocally shaped by the diversity of politics, culture and ideas 
that can develop within those broad parameters.  
 
Flowing   from   this,   Gramsci   believes   ‘expressions of political and intellectual will, action or 
initiative…emanate   organically   from   economic   necessity,   and   indeed   [are]   the   only   effective  
expression  of  the  economy’ (Gramsci 1971, p.161) and that ‘it  is  on  the  level  of  ideologies  that  men  
become  conscious  of  conflicts  in  the  world  of  the  economy’  (Marx cited in Gramsci 1971, p.162; 365; 
371–372),   and   ‘fight   it   out’   (Marx 1999, p.4). This is the overarching ontological and theoretical 
context in which he develops his key concepts of hegemony, civil society, the integral state (Buttigieg 
1995; Forgacs 2000a; Fontana 2008; Thomas 2011), and intellectuals and in which he consistently 
connects them to class interests. This understanding  of  Gramsci’s approach is by no means widely 
accepted, however, as while he is one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century, he is 
also among the most contested.  
 
Gramsci never completed his Prison Notebooks or arranged them into a holistic argument and at 
times used deliberately ambiguous phrasing to elude the prison censor. Against this backdrop, it is 
generally agreed that they are unusually open to interpretation, although the impact of this has 
probably been exaggerated (Thomas 2011, pp.102–108; Ives and Short 2013). As Thomas (2011, 
p.45) puts   it,   ‘Deformed,   distorted   and   over-determined by the perceived needs of particular 
political   conjunctures,   Gramsci’s  work   has   been   invoked   to   justify   diverse   and   even   diametrically  
opposed  political  strategies’.   Foucault  observed  nearly   thirty  years  ago  that  Gramsci   is  “an  author  
more  often  cited  than  really  known”   (quoted in Buttigieg 2009, p.21) – and this problem has since 
been exacerbated by habitual usage of influential readings of the Prison Notebooks (Bobbio 1979; 
Cohen and Arato 1992; Laclau and Mouffe 2001) as though they were those of Gramsci himself. In 
this   respect,   an   accurate   observation   in   Germain   and   Kenny’s   (1998, p.8) critique of the neo-
Gramscian literature  is that ‘Gramsci  comes  to   IR  at  a   third remove: abstracted from the debates 
which sparked his   thinking,   from   the   interpretive   difﬁculties   surrounding   his   ideas,   and   from   the  
contending   interpretations   which   his   thinking   has   ignited’.   A brief outline of influential 
interpretations is therefore necessary, before elaborating a Marxist re-reading of his work.  
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The first major influence on interpretations of Gramsci’s   ideas  was   the   Communist Party of Italy 
(PCI),   whose   framing   of   their   former   leader’s   work   evolved   according   to   changing   political  
exigencies: first of Stalinist orthodoxy and later its long rightward drift towards Eurocommunism, 
‘historic   compromise’ with the Christian Democrats and self-immolation in 1991 (Morton 2007a, 
p.80; Saccarelli 2008, p.13; Thomas 2011, pp.105–106). As Saccarelli (2008, p.76 n138) observes, the 
latter   set   of   imperatives   placed   it   ‘in   the   unenviable   position   of   having   to   concoct   a   democratic,  
liberal-pluralist   interpretation   of   Gramsci’s   texts’,   consistent   with   its   ‘retreat   from   class’   and  
revolutionary politics towards cross-class alliances and culturalist reformism (Harman 1977; Meiksins 
Wood 1983, 1998; Germain and Kenny 1998, p.13; Saccarelli 2008, p.27; 39–45). Its success is 
evident in the widespread   misconception   that   Gramsci   advocated   a   ‘long   march   through   the  
institutions’   (Buttigieg 2005, p.50 n21), or never-ending   ‘war   of   position’   involving   the   infinite  
deferral  of   revolution,  or   ‘war  of  manoeuvre’.  Kaldor   (2007a, pp.135–136) reiterates this, claiming 
Gramsci’s   ‘strategy   for  the   Italian  Communist  Party,  which,   in   fact,  was   followed  right  up  until   the  
1980s, was to gain positions in civil society – in universities, in the media, and so on – so as to 
challenge  the  hegemony  of  the  bourgeoisie’.   
 
Eurocommunist (Buci-Glucksmann 1979), liberal (Bobbio 1979) and post-Marxist readings (Cohen 
and Arato 1992; Laclau and Mouffe 2001) contributed to this reformist re-interpretation, 
incrementally eviscerating the class and revolutionary core   of   Gramsci’s   work   (Saccarelli 2008; 
Thomas 2011). One of the earliest and most influential came from Bobbio, a leading Italian 
intellectual and friendly critic of the social democratic Italian Socialist Party (PSI), who was 
encouraging  the  PCI’s  move  to  the  right  and  seeking  a  compromise  between  liberalism  and  socialism  
(Anderson 1988, pp.8–11; Bellamy 2004; Johnson 2004; Magri 2011, p.179). His reading of Gramsci, 
first published in 1967 (Boothman 1999, p.70n70), laid the groundwork for the subsequent delinking 
of his ideas from class. On the one hand, Bobbio (1979, pp.30–34) recognised, more or less correctly 
(Thomas 2011, p.72; Coutinho 2012, pp.77–78),  that  Gramsci  had  ‘moved’  civil  society  from  Marx’s  
‘material  conditions  of  life’  to  the  political  and  ideological  superstructures  (Marx 1970, p.20). On the 
other, he extrapolated from this that Gramsci had inverted the relationship between base and 
superstructure and was effectively an idealist (Bobbio 1979, pp.30–34). Coutinho (2012, pp.77–78) 
points out this was a  logical  leap,  as  ‘if  Gramsci’s  concept  of  civil  society  is  not  the  same  as  Marx’s’,  
there is no reason  to  assume  it  has  ‘the  same  function’  in  this  thought.     
 
Nevertheless, this idealist Gramsci proved attractive to liberals, post-Marxists (Cohen and Arato 
1992; Khilnani 2001, p.16; Kaldor 2003c, pp.7–8; Glasius 2005, p.245) and many neo-Gramscians 
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(Murphy 1998c, pp.417–420) and shaped the theory and practice of civil society across Europe in the 
1980s and 1990s. Much as in the 1970s Gramsci’s  writings   had  been   re-interpreted to justify the 
PCI’s  move  to  the  right,  after  the  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union  re-interpreting  them  gave  ‘permission  to  
the left and radical activists to reconsider the concept of civil society, which many then used to 
extricate    themselves  from  Marxism  yet  justify  remaining  active  in  politics’  (Howell and Pearce 2002, 
p.245).  This  process  is  evident  in  Cohen  and  Arato’s  work,  which  acknowledges  the largely negative 
function   of   civil   society   for   Gramsci   in   the   ‘stabilization’ or   ‘social   integration   of   capitalist  
domination’,  only to dismiss  it  as  an  outmoded  ‘totalitarian-revolutionary’  dimension  of  his  thought  
in need of ‘radically  reformist’  transcendence (1992, pp.149–155). In essence, this meant replacing 
the working class as an agent of change with civil society, or NSMs and NGOs, as the explicitly ‘self-
limiting’   (Cohen and Arato 1992) ‘surrogate   for   a   revolution   that  might  never  happen’   (Cox 1999, 
p.4). This substitution accelerated  the  ‘retreat  from  class’  begun  in  the  1970s (Meiksins Wood 1983, 
1990, 1998) and built on earlier post-Marxist work on declassed social movements (Cohen 1985; 
Buechler 1995). Cohen and Arato (1992, pp.71–72) can therefore claim with some justification that 
‘The   contemporary  discourse  of   civil   society  was   internationally  disseminated,   at   least   initially,   by  
the circulation of post-Marxist  ideas’.  A  cornerstone of this particular appropriation of Gramsci is his 
depiction as a groundbreaking idealist standing alone against the tide of so-called ‘orthodox  Marxist’  
‘economism’  or  ‘iron  economic  determinism’  (Bobbio 1979; Mouffe 1979a, p.177; Laclau and Mouffe 
2001; Glasius 2005, p.245). Hence, Cohen and Arato (1992, p.146) assert that Gramsci   ‘burst   the  
bounds of historical   materialism’,   while   the   inaugural Global Civil Society yearbook contrasts his 
supposed  idealism  to  the  straw  man  of  ‘a  purely  economic,  Marxist  view  of  society’   (Anheier et al. 
2001a, p.13).  
 
Given this contested legacy, a prerequisite for understanding what Gramsci actually said and 
translating it to contemporary global politics is to examine his ideas in their original context. The 
Prison Notebooks (Gramsci 1971, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c, 1992, 1996, 1999a, 2000) and letters 
(Gramsci 1988) are the main source for Gramsci's ideas on hegemony, civil society, intellectuals and 
the integral state and are read here in conjunction with his pre-prison writings (Gramsci 1975a, 
1977d, 1978, 1994a), which reformist liberal, post-Marxist and neo-Gramscian readings typically 
ignore. As Thomas (2011, p.37 n114) argues,   ‘Despite   the   long-standing legend, there is little 
evidence  that  Gramsci  “revised”  his  precarceral  positions,  and  much  that  suggests  he  instead  sought  
to  deepen  them’,  while  Germino  and  Fennema  (1998, p.183) can  also  find  ‘no  justification  for  the  all  
too common  practice of largely ignoring the pre-prison  notebooks’.   
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Thomas’   (2011) seminal interpretation of the Prison Notebooks is invaluable in reconstructing 
Gramsci’s   ideas,   as   are   elements   of   the   analysis   of   other   authors   that   examine   them   in   their  
historical materialist framework (Buci-Glucksmann 1979; Texier 1979; Buttigieg 1995, 2005; 2002; 
Donaldson 2007, 2009; Saccarelli 2008; Callinicos 2010; Fusaro 2010; Coutinho 2012). Aspects of 
neo-Gramscian  adaptations  of  Gramsci’s  thought  to  global  politics  have  also  been  useful,  although 
many tend towards idealist and/or reformist readings incompatible with his historical materialist 
ontology and revolutionary politics. Reading Gramsci in this way contests several commonly held 
beliefs about his ideas and reveals theoretical solutions   to  problems   in   liberal   ‘global   civil   society’  
and global governance theory, including the relationship between civil society, state and market, 
through his concept of the integral capitalist state and the interconnection of hard and soft power in 
hegemony.  Before  Gramsci’s  views  on  civil  society  can  be  explained,  however,  his  conceptualisation 
of hegemony must be elaborated, as the concept of class power and social order that pervades, 
structures   and   links   civil   society,   state   and   the  economy  and  all   ‘levels’   of  world  politics   from  the  
local to the global.  
Hegemony    
The  concept  of  hegemony  is  probably  Gramsci’s  best  known  contribution  to  political  theory  and  has  
been   aptly   described   as   ‘a   conceptual   bundle   in   which   are   woven   several   highly   complex   and 
interrelated   notions’   (Fontana 2008, p.95). It is simultaneously a three-dimensional, relational 
understanding of power that incorporates its economic basis in class relations and expression 
through coercion and consensual economic and ideological practices and discourses; a radical theory 
of order, or governance;  and a political strategy for social transformation derived from it (Buttigieg 
2009, p.28).   Moreover,   Gramsci’s   understanding   of   capitalism   as   a   holistic,   ‘world   historical  
phenomenon’   (Gramsci 1977d, p.69) means hegemony pervades, structures and links the three 
‘spheres’   of   liberal theory and national, international, global and world politics, while assuming 
diverse and ever-changing forms at different levels of analysis and in different historical contexts.  
 
While  ‘national’  societies  were  Gramsci’s  primary  ‘level  of  analysis’,  Thomas argues hegemony was 
his way of theorising the links between national and international politics, the domestic and 
international class struggle (2011, pp.213–232). Similarly, for Morton (2007a, p.101),  it  ‘can  sustain  
explanatory  power  beyond  the  “national”  context  in  relation  to  “the  international”  because  this  was  
already   how   Gramsci   developed   the   concept’.   This reciprocal, iterative interaction of national, 
transnational and international class relations was thus at the heart of hegemony and how to 
challenge it. Indeed, for Gramsci,  
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This form of relationship exists throughout society as a whole and for every individual 
relative to other individuals. It exists between intellectual and non-intellectual sections of 
the population, between the rulers and the ruled, elites and their followers, leaders 
[dirigenti] and led, the vanguard and the body of the army. Every relationship of 
“hegemony”  is  necessarily  an  educational  relationship and occurs not only within a nation, 
between the various forces of which that nation is composed, but in the international and 
world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilisations (1971, p.350).  
 
Consequently, Gramsci uses the concept to analyse diverse countries at different historical junctures 
and many other levels of analysis, including international (1971, p.118; 176–177, 1999a, p.152; 333–
339; 368, 2007, p.5; 40; 43; 55; 59) and transnational relations and relations among CSOs (1978, 
p.164; 194; 200, 1999a, p.199). This permits extending it to contemporary global governance and 
‘global  civil  society’,  but  first  a  working  general  concept  of  hegemony  applicable  at  different  levels  of  
analysis must be sketched. This is elaborated over the course of the chapter and entails the following 
elements:  
 A structure of power and governance in the interests of a fundamental class central to the 
prevailing mode of production.  
 Consensual leadership of some subordinate groups, characterised by hegemonic 
compromises and hegemonic ideas,  which  reinforce  the  fundamental  class’  dominance. 
 Coercion of   some   subordinate   groups   in   the   dominant   class’   interests   and   a   capacity   for  
generalised coercion.  
 Competing hegemonic alliances that represent the interests of the dominant class in 
different ways through varying hegemonic projects, or strategies of class dominance 
combining   coercion   and   consensual   leadership.   Each   consists   of   a   core,   or   ‘directive  
grouping’  of  dominant  class  fractions  and  allied  elite  ‘intellectuals’  and  a  wider  support  base  
of different subordinate groups.  
 Continually shifting combinations of coercion and consent, evolution of hegemonic 
compromises and hegemonic ideas, and expansion and contraction of hegemonic alliances, 
according to: elite competition and class struggle against subordinate groups.  
Conceiving hegemony in this way means it combines economic, ideational and coercive dominance 
(Gramsci 1971, pp.181–182, 1999a, pp.548–549, 2000, pp.260–261); is in constant flux (Gramsci 
1971, pp.181–182); and is  fundamentally  ‘a  form  of  class  rule’,  ‘not  primarily…a  hierarchy  of  states’  
(Overbeek 1994, p.368; Morton 2007a, p.117).  
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Class hegemony  
Gramsci  stresses  that  hegemony  operates   in  the   interests  of  a   ‘fundamental’  class,   (Gramsci 1971, 
pp.181–182; 161; Mouffe 1979a, p.183; Augelli and Murphy 1993, pp.130–132), whose centrality to 
the prevailing mode of production provides the necessary, but not sufficient, economic basis for 
hegemony. He thus argues that ‘though   hegemony   is   ethical-political, it must also be economic, 
must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive 
nucleus  of  economic  activity’  and   that  consent   to   it   is  at   least  partly   ‘caused  by   the  prestige   (and  
consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the 
world  of  production’ (1971, p.161; 12). Consequently, Gramsci (1971, p.285) says of the particular 
historical  form  of  capitalism  he  identified  as  ‘Americanism  and  Fordism’  that  ‘Hegemony  here  is born 
in    the  factory’.   
 
Under capitalism, Gramsci specifies that the two fundamental classes and contenders for hegemony 
are capital and the working class (1971, p.116),  which   in  accordance  with  Marx’s   labour theory of 
value mutually constitute each other through the exploitation of wage-labour by capital in the 
production process. This mean they have fundamentally opposed interests and cannot 
independently exist. Given capitalism has not been superseded, the working class in the broad 
Marxist sense of wage-labourers who do not own or control their means of production and so are 
directly or indirectly exploited by capital (Meiksins 1986) (as opposed to the commonplace narrow 
sense of industrial or manual workers) remains the co-constitutive fundamental class alongside 
capital  and  the  only  possible  alternative  hegemonic  class  in  Gramsci’s  framework.  
 
One   of   the   main   inspirations   for   Gramsci’s   class-based   conception   of   hegemony   is   Marx’s  
theorisation of the development of group consciousness from an occupation or trade, to a class, to 
political consciousness that challenges for leadership of society (Gramsci 1971, p.162; Marx 1977, 
pp.167–170).  Marx  explained  the  bourgeoisie’s  assumption  of  power  during  the  French  Revolution  in  
terms   of   this   process,   arguing   it   had   progressed   from   ‘its   narrow-hearted’   to   ‘its   magnanimous  
essence’ to arrive at  
a moment in which it fraternizes and merges with society in general, becomes confused with 
it and is perceived and acknowledged as its general representative, a moment in which its 
claims and rights are truly the claims and rights of society itself. Only in the name of the 
general rights of society can a particular class vindicate for itself general domination (2000, 
pp.9–10).  
Drawing  on  Marx’s  writings,  which  he  argues   ‘contained  in  a  nutshell  the  ethico-political aspect of 
politics  or   the   theory  of  hegemony  and  consent,  as  well  as   the  aspect  of   force  and  of  economics’  
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(Gramsci 1999a, p.553), Gramsci  traces essentially the same three stages of group consciousness 
and  concurs  that  the  final,  hegemonic  stage  involves  transcending  a  ‘narrowly  corporate  economic’  
view  of   ‘immediate’  group  or  class   interests,  or   ‘the   immediate  and  narrowly  selfish   interests  of  a  
particular  category’,  in  favour  of  a  long-term  perspective,  ‘in  their  present  and  future  development’  
of  a  class’  ‘general  and  permanent’  hegemonic  interests (1971, pp.181–182; 71, 1978, p.431). 
 
A key characteristic of this phase  is the presentation  of  a  class’  interests  as  universal,  which  involves  
disseminating   ideas   ‘throughout   society’   that  portray  a  class’   interests   ‘on  a  “universal”  plane’,   so  
that  its  ‘development  and  expansion…are  conceived  of,  and  presented,  as  being  the  motor  force  of  a 
universal  expansion,  of  a  development  of  all  the  “national”  energies’  (1971, pp.181–182). The same 
passage identifies this as a function of the state, suggesting a revolutionary hegemonic 
consciousness can exist before a class assumes control of the state, but that state power is necessary 
for hegemony to be fully realised and maintained. Indeed Fusaro (2010, pp.10–11) highlights that 
Gramsci refers  elsewhere  to  ‘the exercise of real hegemony over the entire  society’  as  requiring  ‘the  
possession of  the  State’  (Gramsci 1977c, p.1862), while Thomas (2011, pp.163–164) similarly argues 
that  Gramsci  differentiates  between  ‘a  hegemony  that  tends  towards,  or  forms  the  preconditions  of,  
a future   position   of   dominance’   and   established   hegemony,   or   ‘achieved   dominance’,   whose  
maintenance is assured through the integral state. It is this latter form of established capitalist 
hegemony rather than its revolutionary establishment that is the main focus here.  
 
Hegemonic Compromises and Ideas 
For  the  universalisation  of  a  hegemonic  class’  interests  to  have  wider  resonance  requires  taking the 
interests  of  at   least  some  subordinate  groups   into  account,  meaning   ‘hegemony  presupposes   that  
account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be 
exercised’   (Gramsci 1971, p.161). This requires the dominant fundamental class to make some 
‘sacrifices  of  an  economic-corporate  kind’  (Gramsci 1971, p.161) to secure its long-term dominance 
or hegemonic interests. The range of possible compromise may be broad, but is always 
circumscribed  by  the  dominant  class’  economic   interests.  Hence,  while   ‘stopping  short  of  narrowly  
corporate  economic   interest’   (1971, pp.181–182),   ‘such  a  compromise  cannot   touch   the  essential’  
(Gramsci 1971, p.161) and invariably   ‘the   interests  of   the  dominant  group  prevail’   (1971, pp.181–
182).  
Gramsci identifies a wide variety of hegemonic compromises, including population-wide measures 
and concessions targeted at particular groups. The former can include: public services such as 
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welfare and education (1971, pp.258–262, 1994a, pp.23–5, 1999a, pp.180–181; Cox 1989, p.831; 
Buttigieg 1995, pp.12–13); social mobility (1971, p.56 n5; 260); and limited elements of equality, 
such as civil and political rights (Gramsci 1971, p.56 n5), legal equality or non-discrimination. More 
targeted measures include: employment opportunities in the public service (1971, p.13; 74; 94; 103–
4),  ‘transformism’  or  cooptation  of  leading  individuals  from  subordinate  groups  into  governing  elites  
(1971, pp.55–59; 94; 97–98; 128 n6, 1988, p.222); and charity for particularly marginalised 
subordinate groups (1999a, p.282; 148; 122–123), now including development and humanitarian 
aid.  
Flowing from the above, hegemonic ideas typically distance themselves from dominant class 
interests  by  portraying  themselves  as  ‘universal’  or  ‘non-political’,  thereby  downplaying  conflicts  of  
interest, and legitimise hegemonic compromises with subordinate groups. The first set of ideas 
include notions of national (Miliband 1969, pp.72–73; Althusser 1971; Marx 1999, p.83; Bieler and 
Morton 2003, p.484) and   public   interest   central   to   liberal   democracy,   the   ‘utopian’   impartial 
Hegelian   state   that   ‘stands   above   class   conﬂict’   (Gramsci 1994b, p.21) and law in general, which 
Gramsci (1996, pp.83–84) argues   ‘is   falsely   assumed’   to   be   ‘an   integral   expression  of   society   as   a  
whole’,   but   ‘rather,   is   an  expression  of   the   ruling   class,  which   “imposes”   on   the  whole  of   society  
those norms of conduct that are most tightly connected   to   its  own   raison   d’être   and   expansion’.  
More cosmopolitan  contemporary  variants  include  notions  of  ‘human’  or  ‘global’  interest,  central  to  
liberal  theories  of  ‘global  governance’  and  ‘‘global  civil  society’’  and  concepts  of  mutually  beneficial  
‘partnership’  (Fowler 2000; Hearn 2001; Howell and Pearce 2002, p.104; 117). Discourses of human 
rights,   humanitarianism   and   human   security   that   portray   universal   ‘human’   interests   and   moral  
imperatives (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rieff 2003, p.94; Nye 2004), 
divorced from geopolitical or economic context (Chandler 2001, p.693) could also belong in this 
category.  
 
A second category of hegemonic ideas legitimise limited compromises with subordinate groups and 
can include discourses of charity, humanitarianism, development, economic and social rights, 
equality of opportunity, social mobility or the welfare state. Such ideas tend to legitimise the 
dominant class and allied elites by situating them – and the social order in general – as generous, fair 
or progressive, or at least aspiring to move in that direction. These dynamics are particularly evident 
in discourses of charity, philanthropy and international development and humanitarian aid, which in 
addition to presupposing poverty and wealth and responding with only a minimal safety net, 
through their voluntariness leave their structural distribution wholly intact; indeed, benevolence 
only increases the vaster the inequality of wealth. Gramsci thus regards charity as a hegemonic 
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‘element  of  “paternalism”’  that   ‘implies  the  existence  of  poverty’   (Gramsci 1999a, p.282; 148) and 
‘opposition  to  philanthropy  is  a  consistent  theme  throughout  his  writing’  (Germino 1990, p.43).  
Intellectuals as secondary hegemonic subjects 
According to Gramsci, the actual articulation of hegemonic ideas and organisation of hegemonic 
compromises is carried out on a dominant   class’   behalf   by   ‘intellectuals’,   who   in   this   sense   are  
secondary hegemonic subjects. Intellectuals for Gramsci are an extremely broad category, 
encompassing ‘the entire social stratum which exercises an organisational function in the wide sense 
whether   in   the   field   of   production’,   ‘culture’   or   ‘political   administration’   (1971, p.97n) and on a 
formal or informal basis. Moreover, although he primarily applies the term to individuals, it can also 
refer   to   organisations   as   ‘collective   intellectuals’   (Forgacs 2000b, p.300) and so can include 
conservative or socialist political parties as well as politicians; government officials; military officers; 
religious groups; trade unionists, prominent entrepreneurs; private associations or NGOs like the 
Freemasons and Rotary Clubs; and leading academic intellectuals like the Italian liberal philosopher 
Croce  (Gramsci 1971, pp.5–6; 182; 286, 1978, pp.454–462, 1988, p.222, 1996, pp.269–271).  
 
Contrary to the received wisdom at the time, Gramsci (1992, p.37) argued intellectuals as a group 
were not a separate, united or autonomous class but comprised individuals from many different 
class backgrounds and positions. Consequently,  they  included:  ‘organic  intellectuals’  of  the  working  
class like PCI activists (1971, p.15; 204; 340); ‘organic’  capitalist  intellectuals,  which  included  leading  
business people and their representative organisations (1971, p.60; 5–6; 8), but also professional 
intellectuals like economists, industrial technicians and managers that had developed alongside 
capitalism  but  apart  from  the  ‘top  urban  intellectuals’  were  not  capitalists  themselves  (1971, pp.5–6; 
14–15);   and   finally,   ‘traditional’   intellectuals   formally   occupied in long-established intellectual 
professions that predated capitalism, such as clergy, doctors, politicians, teachers, academics, 
journalists, lawyers, civil servants and the military (1971, pp.6–14). As with organic intellectuals, 
there were many gradations within this group, ranging from the lower ranks of the army and 
administrative   ‘jobs   of   a   manual   and instrumental   character’   with   ‘no   apparent   attribution   of  
directive  or  organisational    functions’,  to  elite  ‘officials  or  functionaries’  and the  actual  ‘creators    of  
the  various    sciences,  philosophy,  art’  (1971, p.13).  
 
Gramsci  is  particularly  interested  in  ‘traditional’  intellectuals and makes two main arguments about 
them. First, he argues many of them come from non-fundamental class origins and/or occupy those 
class positions themselves. At the time, this included the better off peasantry and landowning 
aristocracy (1971, pp.83–84; 18–19; 216 n6), but especially self-employed professionals and small 
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business people, the petit bourgeois or  ‘”saving”’  classes  (1971, p.11). Gramsci (1971, p.60) believed 
that this meant traditional intellectuals were inevitably drawn towards representing and promoting, 
directly  or   indirectly  and   ‘whether  consciously  or  not’   (Thomas 2006, p.77), the interests of either 
capital or labour as the only two fundamental classes with the economic power needed for 
hegemony.  
 
His other argument is that, in addition to their class origins and/or position, professional norms of 
neutrality, objectivity and detachment (1971, p.7) encourage   traditional   intellectuals   to   ‘put  
themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the   dominant   social   group’   and   to   see 
themselves as ‘”independent”,  autonomous,  endowed  with  a  character  of  their  own’  (1971, pp.7–8). 
This can make them particularly effective at intellectualising the economic interests of a 
fundamental class into hegemonic ideas, so that ‘what  is  practice  for  the  fundamental  class  becomes  
“rationality”   and   speculation   for   its   intellectuals’   (1971, pp.115–6). Reinforcing this was their 
professional   ‘”esprit   de   corps”’   and ‘uninterrupted   historical   continuity’   (1971, p.7), which meant 
most   traditional   intellectuals   were   innately   conservative   and   ‘delighted   with   any   form of 
regularisation  that  prevented  intense  struggles  and  violent  change’   (1996, p.11). The class position 
and  origins  of  many  of  Gramsci’s   traditional intellectuals has obviously changed significantly since 
the  1930s  with  the  proletarianisation  of  ‘intellectual’  jobs  such  as  teaching  (Meiksins 1986) and the 
disappearance of the peasantry and aristocracy in many countries. On the other hand, many 
members of other professions, such as many doctors, lawyers and clergy, remain self-employed and 
continue to occupy intermediate class positions between capital and labour, while education and 
professional training shape the consciousness of all traditional intellectuals.  
 
This   latter   point   indicates   how   the   defining   characteristic   of   Gramsci’s   intellectuals   is   not   their  
objective class position or origins as such, but their class identification. Consequently, while 
intellectuals from particular class backgrounds or positions are more likely to identify with working 
class or capitalist interests, there is no inevitable correspondence between the two. Indeed, Gramsci 
repeatedly identifies reformist trade union leaders not as organic working class intellectuals but as 
representatives of hegemonic capitalist interests (1978, p.355; 164–165, 2007, p.170). He thus 
suggests determining the class identification of intellectuals from their ‘psychological   attitude  
towards   the   fundamental  classes’,  positing   that   those   identified  with  dominant   class   interests  will  
have   ‘a  “servile”  attitude  towards  the  ruling  classes’  or  think  of  themselves  as  ‘leaders,  an   integral  
part   of   the   ruling   classes’,   whilst   having   ‘a   “paternalistic”   attitude’   towards   subordinate   classes  
(1971, p.97).  Hence, as Thomas (2006, p.74) argues, the class identification of intellectuals depends 
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on  the  extent  to  which  they  are  ‘fused  with  the  political  aspirations  of  a  class,  rather  than  deduced  
from  their  personal  class  origins’.   
 
Notwithstanding this, Gramsci expected most intellectuals would gravitate towards the capitalist 
class (1971, p.10; 18–19, 1978, pp.460–462),  given  its  “spontaneous”  attraction  or  ‘prestige’  (1971, 
p.12; 60–61), control of the education system and dominance of intellectual life (1971, p.104), and 
the hegemonic compromises its economic power allows, including measures targeted at intellectuals 
like government jobs, transformism, or, nowadays, NGO funding. Another factor is what he terms a 
‘caste   spirit’   or   ‘esprit   de   corps’, through which lower ranking intellectuals tend to the follow the 
leaders in their fields, whether in education, academia or the military (1971, p.7; 13; 19; 104, 1992, 
p.153).  
 
As a result of all this, the vast majority of intellectuals act as ‘the  dominant  group’s  “deputies”’,  who 
as   ‘”functionaries”’   of   the   superstructures (1971, p.12) connect civil society and state to the 
economy and mediate  and  lead  hegemonic  alliances  of  subordinate  classes  on  the  dominant  class’  
behalf (Gramsci 1978, pp.456–459). Consequently, they perform  ‘an  essential  mediating  function  in  
the  struggle  of  class  forces’  (Hoare and Nowell Smith 1971a, p.3):  ‘exercising  the  subaltern  functions  
of   social   hegemony   and   political   government’   by   organising   the   “spontaneous   consent”   of   the  
masses to capitalist dominance;   and   overseeing   ‘The   apparatus   of   state   coercive   power   which  
“legally”  enforces  discipline  on  those  groups    who  do  not  “consent”’  (1971, p.12). This points to the 
coercive basis of hegemony and its dialectical relationship with consent, which for Gramsci is at least 
as important and is inseparable from it. 
The dialectic of hegemony  
The importance Gramsci assigns to coercion is evident  in  his  identification  of  ‘the  relation  of  military  
forces’  as  a  third  ‘moment’  or  level’  of  the  overall  “relation  of  forces”’,  alongside  the  economic  and  
the political (1971, pp.180–183). Its dialectical relationship with consent appears in his advocacy of a 
‘far  wider’  understanding  of  military  leadership,  extending  beyond  ‘military    leadership in the strict, 
technical  sense’    to  ‘politico-military  leadership’  (1971, pp.85–89). The same logic defines his general 
concept of hegemony, so that, as Thomas (2011, p.164) argues,   the   ‘dialectical   integration   of  
hegemony  with  domination,  of  consent  with  coercion,  united  in  their  distinction,  was  Gramsci’s  true  
“starting-point”’.  Anderson  (2002, p.21) similarly  describes  hegemony  as  a  ‘a  dynamic  equilibrium  of  
force   and   consent’,   for   Callinicos   (2010, p.494) it   is   a   ‘synthesis   of   political   domination   and  
ideological   leadership  necessary   for   stable  class   rule’, and for Fusaro (2010, p.1) it   is  a   ‘dialectical  
unity  between  leadership  and  domination,  including  both  the  moments  of  consensus  and  coercion’.   
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These Marxist readings of hegemony as dialectically internalising coercion conflict with the dominant 
view in IR, as neo-Gramscians, post-Marxists (Mouffe 1979a, p.179; Femia 1981, 2005; Cohen and 
Arato 1992, pp.143–144; Laclau and Mouffe 2001) and liberals (Anheier et al. 2001a; Kaldor 2003a) 
alike  all conceive of hegemony as a predominantly consensual order, even if its necessary basis in 
economic, ideational and coercive dominance is acknowledged (Cox 1981, p.102 n24; Morton 2007a, 
p.95).   Cox’s   seminal   adaptation  of  Gramsci’s   ideas   in   the  early  1980s,  which   introduced  him   to   IR  
largely singlehandedly (Germain and Kenny 1998, p.3), set a precedent in this respect in asserting 
that ‘“hegemony”  is  reserved  for  a  consensual  order’  and that ‘a  hegemonic  structure  of  world  order 
is  one   in  which  power  takes  a  primarily  consensual   form’   (1981, p.102 n24). Although Cox initially 
stressed hegemony only appeared consensual, but that in reality ‘power’   remained ‘a   necessary  
combination  of  consent  and  coercion’  (1983, p.52), a slippage between appearance and reality often 
occurs. Gill and Law (1989, p.476) thus  assert  that  ‘For  Gramsci…A  hegemonic  order  was  one  where  
consent, rather than coercion, primarily characterized the relations between classes and between 
the  state  and  civil  society’,  while  writing from a liberal perspective, Kaldor (2007a, p.136) omits force 
altogether,   declaring   ‘It   was   Gramsci   who   drew   the   distinction   between   hegemony, based on 
consent,  and  domination,  based  on  coercion’. 
 
As Fusaro (2010, p.11) helpfully points out, the roots of such divergent interpretations lie partly with 
Gramsci  himself,  as  he  ‘uses  the  term  hegemony  both  to  characterise  the  unity  of  the  two  moments 
[of   consent   and   force]   and   to   label   one   of   the   two  moments   [consent]’.   Hence,   in   the  meaning  
preferred by consensual readings, hegemony denotes dominant class leadership and subordinate 
class consent (Gramsci 1971, p.161; 169–170; 239, 1999a, pp.127–128; 491), generated by 
hegemonic compromises, ideology and culture (1971, pp.420–421, 1988, pp.213–215, 1999a, 
pp.128–129; 285; 548; 637–639). However, what such readings occlude is that even when used in 
this consensual sense, hegemony remains part of a wider, integral exercise of hegemonic power that 
necessarily also involves coercion. This means consensual-hegemony (hegemonic leadership and its 
counterpart of hegemonic consent) already dialectically internalises coercion (Buttigieg 1995, p.7; 
Thomas 2011, Gerratana in 2011, p.227). At the root of this is a key ontological difference between 
Gramsci’s   holistic,   dialectical   historical   materialism   and   pluralist   approaches,   in   the   sense   social  
phenomena are understood to be internally rather than externally related7.  
                                                     
7 ‘An  internal  relation  is  one  in  which  each  part  is  constituted  in  its  relation  to  the  other,  whereas  an  external  
relation  is  one  in  which  each  part  has  an  existence  independent  of  its  relation  to  the  other’ (Robinson 2001, 
p.163). 
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Elsewhere in the Notebooks,   ‘hegemony’   directly denotes the integral sense of hegemony as a 
dialectical unity of coercion and consent. This occurs when Gramsci describes foreign domination of 
Italy in the 16th century  as  having  evolved  from  ‘direct  domination’  to  domination  of  a  ‘hegemonic  
character  (or  a  combination  of  direct  domination  and  hegemony)’  (Gramsci 1977c, p.1962; based on 
translation in Fusaro 2010, p.11). A better known example appears  in  his  ‘Notes  on  French  National  
Life’  between  the  Revolution  and  the  First  World  War,  when  he  asserts  that   
the  “normal”  exercise  of  hegemony  in  what  became  the  classic  terrain  of  the  parliamentary  
regime is characterized by the combination of force and consent variously balancing one 
another, without force exceeding consent too much. Indeed one tries to make it appear that 
force is supported by the consent of the majority (2000, p.261).  
Likewise,  in  ‘Americanism  and  Fordism’,  he  writes: 
it was relatively easy to rationalize production and labour by a skilful combination of force 
(destruction of working-class trade unionism on a territorial basis) and persuasion (high  
wages, various social benefits, extremely subtle ideological and political propaganda) and 
thus succeed in making the whole life of the nation revolve around production. Hegemony 
here is born in the factory and requires for its exercise only a minute quantity of professional 
political and ideological intermediaries (1971, p.285).  
Finally,  Gramsci  generalises  that  ‘to  exercise  political  leadership  or  hegemony  one  should  not  count 
solely on   the   power   and  material   force   that   is   given   by   government’   (1992, p.137), which again 
suggests force is internal to hegemony and, moreover, that force can predominate over consent. 
Consequently, hegemony as Gramsci understood it does not require a predominance of consent, but 
only a degree of consensual leadership.  
 
This dialectical, integral interpretation of hegemony as involving some combination of force and 
consent   is   further   supported  by  Gramsci’s   application  of   the   terms   ‘hegemony’  or   ‘hegemonic’   to  
numerous blatantly coercive and/or undemocratic social orders with limited popular support, as well 
as to ‘expansive’  (Mouffe 1979a, pp.182–184; Thomas 2011, pp.141–145) or  ‘integral’  (Femia 1981, 
pp.46–47) forms of capitalist hegemony generally recognised in both consensual and dialectical 
readings as hegemonic – in particular  the mass popular consent enjoyed by the bourgeoisie during 
the French Revolution (Gramsci 1971, p.18; 77–84; 260; 421, 1992, p.155, 2000, pp.260–261).  
 
At   the  other  end  of  Gramsci’s  hegemonic   scale   are   ‘limited’,   ‘minimal’   (Femia 1981, pp.47–48) or 
‘restrictive’     (Morton 2007a, p.63) forms of hegemony, such as: the various  equilibria of force and 
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consent   involved   in   the   aforementioned   ‘parliamentary’   regimes   in   France,   in  which   ‘attempts   at  
insurrection alternated with pitiless repression, enlargements of political suffrage with restrictions, 
freedom  of  association  with  restriction  or  annulment  of  that  freedom’    (1977c, pp.1635–1650, 1992, 
pp.155–6, 2000, pp.260–261);   and   what   Gramsci   specifically   calls   the   ‘limited   hegemony’   of   the  
bourgeoisie in Italy (1978, p.344),  during and long after the Risorgimento8 (1971, pp.59–60; 76–77; 
104–106; 115–120, 1999a, p.375), including under fascist dictatorship (1971, p.120; 255–256, 1978, 
pp.343–344)9. According to Gramsci (1978, p.344), this was grounded in a narrow capitalist 
hegemonic alliance, which by the mid-1920s   still   extended   mainly   to   ‘landowners   and      petty  
bourgeoisie’,   and  was   ‘based  on  a   solidarity  of   interests  between  certain  privileged  groups,  at   the  
expense of the general interests of production  and  of  the  majority  of  those  who  work’   
 
It  thus  appears  that  Gramsci’s  concept  of  hegemony  as  a  theory  of  class  dominance  is  characterised  
by a continual quest   for   ‘the  “proper”  balance  or  proportion  between  the  two  moments  of      force    
and  consent’   (Fontana 2008, p.95) that can satisfy the interests of competing fractions within the 
dominant class and its allies while also securing the compliance of subordinate groups. This means 
coercion and consent mutually reinforce each other, up to a point, and emphasises their positive 
interaction. Against this backdrop, two main types of coercion can be distinguished: the direct use of 
force, primarily against subordinate groups excluded from hegemonic alliances, and the structural or 
latent coercion that sets the limits within which all consent operates.  
 
The first, active, form of force is connected to hegemonic alliances between the dominant class, 
allied elites and subordinate groups, which   ‘internally’   appear   characterised   by   consensual  
leadership,  but  ‘externally’  coerce  excluded  groups.  Gramsci  thus  argues  that  ‘a  class  is  dominant  in  
two   ways’,   ‘it   is   “leading”   and   “dominant”.   It   leads   the   allied   classes,   and   dominates   over   the  
adversarial  classes’  (1992, p.136).  Hence,   in  general,   ‘leadership-hegemony…is the form of political 
power exercised over those classes in close proximity to the leading group, while domination is 
exerted  over   those  opposing   it’   (Thomas 2011, p.163). In addition, Gramsci argues the capacity to 
coerce opposed groups outside a hegemonic alliance depends on maintaining consent inside it, 
producing  ‘”coercion  by  consent”  (Thomas 2011, pp.163–165), or consensual coercion. As he sees it, 
                                                     
8 The historical process of Italian unification, lasting roughly from 1815-1870.  
9 Cox ignores this and attributes  to  Gramsci  the  view  that  ‘the  industrial  bourgeoisie  failed  to  achieve  
hegemony’  in  Italy,  rendering  it  a  ‘nonhegemonic  society,  one  in  which  no  dominant  class  has  been  able  to  
establish hegemony in the Gramscian  sense’  (Cox 1983, pp.54–55). Gill (1995b, p.401) and Zahran and Ramos 
(2009, p.19),  follow  Cox’s  example  in  this  regard.  This  can  be  related  to  the  incompatibility  between  
consensual neo-Gramscian reading of hegemony and blatantly coercive and exclusionary hegemonic orders. 
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If   the   union   of   two   forces   is   necessary   in   order   to   defeat   a   third…the   only   concrete  
possibility is compromise. Force can be employed against enemies, but not against a part of 
one’s   own   side   which   one   wishes   rapidly   to   assimilate,   and   whose   “good   will”   and  
enthusiasm one needs (Gramsci 1971, p.168).  
 
Thomas argues this also works in the other direction, in the sense coercing excluded groups can 
increase consent inside hegemonic alliances, thereby producing consent-by-coercion or   ‘”coercive 
consent”’  (2011, p.145). This happens directly if,  say,  repressing  ‘out-groups’  such  as  criminals,  illegal  
immigrants or rogue states increases a government’s   popularity,   but   also   indirectly,   as   routine  
oppression  of  excluded  groups  performs  the  dominant  group’s  capacity  for  generalised  oppression  
and focuses minds towards acquiescence through a ‘deterrent   effect’.   Gramsci   alludes   to   this   in  
describing the court  system  as  ‘a  repressive  and  negative  educative  function’  of  the  state  that  forms  
part   of   ‘the   apparatus   of   the   political   and   cultural   hegemony   of   the   ruling   classes’   (1971, p.258). 
Another aspect is that the perceived need to police out-groups justifies maintaining a coercive 
apparatus with the capacity for more generalised coercion that could in future be used against 
currently  ‘included’  groups.  Consequently, Gramsci argues: 
The  apparatus  of  state  coercive  power  which  “legally”  enforces  discipline  on  those  groups  
who  do  not  “consent”  either  actively  or  passively…is…constituted  for  the  whole  of  society  in  
anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has 
failed (1971, p.13).  
 
This latter point is linked to the second, structural  type  of  coercion  in  Gramsci’s  framework. This sets 
the limits within which consent operates and means hegemony presupposes force (Fontana 2008, 
p.95). From this perspective, the use of force both succeeds and precedes ‘consensual’   politics   as  
well as continuously interacting with and shaping it. The same basic idea is latent in liberal notions of 
civil society as a peaceful zone of non-violence  protected  by  the  state’s  monopoly  of  force.  
 
As a result of his dialectical understanding of the relationship between force and consent in 
hegemony, Gramsci places a strong emphasis on how the maintenance and use of force is 
legitimised.  This  accounts  for  his  expanded  concept  of  ‘politico-military  leadership’  (1971, p.89; 98; 
183), which  he  argues  should  ideally  be  ‘capable  of  taking  into  account  the  deepest aspirations and 
feelings   of…human  masses’   to   ‘prevent   disintegration   and   defeat’   (1971, p.88). The same logic is 
evident in his opposition   to   counterposing   ‘the   levels   of   force   and   of   consent,   authority   and  
hegemony, violence and civilisation’  on  the  grounds  that 
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the  more  the  first  “perspective”  is  “immediate”  and  elementary,  the  more  the  second  has  to  
be   “distant”   (not   in      time,   but as a dialectical relation), complex and ambitious. In other 
words, it may happen as in human life, that the more an individual is compelled to defend 
his own immediate physical existence, the more will he uphold and identify with the highest 
values of civilisation and of humanity, in all their complexity (1971, p.170).  
 
Internationally, the laws of war – comprising jus ad bellum or legal justifications for initiating war 
and jus in bello,  or  ‘international  humanitarian  law’  (IHL),  governing  its  conduct  (Bugnion 2002) – are 
particularly significant in this respect as, together with international arms control law, they define 
and thus legitimise acceptable use of force. A Gramscian perspective would therefore concur that 
they   ‘have   facilitated   rather   than   restrained   wartime   violence.   Through   law,   violence   has   been  
legitimated’ (Normand and Jochnick 1994, p.50) and that  the  ‘coincidence  of  apparent  adherence  to  
the  laws  of  war  and  terrible  civilian    suffering’  (Jochnick and Normand 1994, p.409) is no coincidence 
at all. In other words, as Latham (2000, p.27) puts   it,   ‘the   laws   of   war   have   more   to   do   with  
legitimating the social institution of warfare than with actually humanizing or civilizing the 
battlefield’,  by  creating  ‘the  illusion  that  the  institution  of  war  – because it is governed by civilized 
rules of conduct – is  itself  civilized  and  thus  legitimate’.   
 
This can be seen as an international extension of the role of the national legal system in legitimating 
the capitalist  state’s  national  monopoly  on  force  by  providing  it  with  a  supporting  body  of  ‘norms’.  
From a Gramscian perspective, it fulfils essentially the same purpose of legitimising the maintenance 
of existing class relations through force. However, at the international level, the content of law 
additionally reflects the balance of power, or outcome of competition, among capitalist states10. 
Consequently, IHL, like other kinds of international law, disproportionately reflects the interests of 
the dominant Western bloc whose dominance of the world military order derives from the 
continuing concentration of capital in the West and the relative weakness of non-Western capital 
and non-Western capitalist states. The domination of the South by the North therefore remains a 
core aspect of the structure of capitalist domination internationally and of the world capitalist 
system as a whole.   
 
                                                     
10 In Marxist terms, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, virtually all states, including formerly Stalinist 
Russia, China and Vietnam, are now capitalist. North Korea and Cuba are arguably the only remaining 
exceptions. 
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Against this backdrop, the rules of IHL and their application have generally favoured stronger 
Western militaries by delegitimising lower cost military practices and weapons ‘of   the  weak’ like 
‘terrorism’  and  chemical weapons (Price 1998a, p.641), while ignoring or even legitimising the high-
tech weapons disproportionately possessed by advanced military powers. The seemingly obvious 
illegality of nuclear weapons according to the core IHL principles of proportionality, involving the 
minimisation of ‘unnecessary’  suffering, and distinction between military targets and civilians, has 
therefore never resulted in an international ban, whereas those same principles have been used to 
legitimise the  concept  of   ‘collateral  damage’ and so-called ‘smart’  weapons developed by Western 
forces. Moreover, the increasingly humanitarian framing of the laws of war since the 1990s, 
exemplified in the lamdmine and cluster munitions treaties, has helped to displace the longstanding 
UN arms control framework of ‘general  and  complete  disarmament  under  international  control’  (UN 
General Assembly 1959, 1961), which was conducive to more radical critiques of Western military 
expenditure and the world military order generally.  
 
In addition, this has also formed part of a wider process whereby conflicts in the South that would 
previously have been regarded as political have been reframed in depoliticised humanitarian terms. 
This has displaced earlier, more radical anti-imperialist frames, undermined anti-war movements, 
and led to a disproportionate emphasis on preventing weapons proliferation to the South (Cooper 
2011) that structurally reinforces the existing, Western-dominated world military order.  Related to 
this, humanitarianism has also provided perhaps the main justification for Western military 
interventions in the South since the end of the Cold War, according to the new consensual-
hegemonic concepts of humanitarian intervention, since rebranded the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P)11, and human security (Chomsky 1993, 1999, 2008; 2003; Meiksins Wood 1999; Orford 1999; 
Chandler 2001, 2004b, 2008; Bricmont 2006; Seymour 2008; Chandler and Hynek 2011). In all these 
ways, the increased emphasis on humanitarian framings of the laws of war, arms control, and 
Western military interventions has served to reproduce a Western-dominated world military order 
for the post-Cold War era, by reconstructing its legitimacy on an altered humanitarian rather than 
anti-communist basis.  
 
The legitimisation of force in the service of capitalist interests can thus be seen as a third core 
function of hegemonic ideas, alongside universalising dominant class interests and legitimising 
hegemonic compromises. Taken together, Gramsci sees these various hegemonic ideas as 
                                                     
11 Thomas Weiss, who led the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) research 
team that developed the concept, has explained that ‘prevention  and  rebuilding  were  “tagged  on”  to  R2P  in  
order to make military intervention  more  palatable’  (cited in Bellamy 2009, p.52).  
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comprising  a  ‘Weltanschauung’,  worldview  or  ‘particular  system of  moral  life’ (Gramsci 1971, p.381, 
1977b, p.1084) that helps a class to become and remain hegemonic. He places Marxism, and religion 
under feudalism, in this category (Gramsci 1971, p.381, 1977b, p.1084) and identifies the hegemonic 
ideology of capitalism as liberalism in the broadest sense, encompassing political concepts like 
individualism, liberal democracy, liberal internationalism and its characteristic separation of 
economics and politics, as well as economic liberalism. He thus describes the   ‘doctrine’   of   the  
international capitalist class as   ‘liberalism   in  politics  and   free   trade   in  economics’   (Gramsci 1975a, 
p.105),    equates    ‘democracy  in  the  modern  sense’  with  hegemony  (1999a, p.282), and characterises 
Wilsonianism   and   the   League   of   Nations   as   ‘the   proper   ideology   of   modern   capitalism’   (1975a, 
p.114).  
 
In contrast   to   Gramsci’s   holistic   critique   of   liberalism,   most   neo-Gramscians concentrate on 
neoliberal economic norms like competitiveness, deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation  (Gill 
and Law 1989; van der Pijl 1989, 2004; Cox 1992, 2002; Gill 1995a; Overbeek 2005), rather than 
political   liberalism,  while   Laclau   and  Mouffe’s   post-Marxist   ‘counterhegemonic’   project   is   not   ‘to  
renounce liberal-democratic   ideology,   but   on   the   contrary,   to   deepen   and   expand   it’.   Robinson’s  
(1996) neo-Gramscian   critique   of   polyarchy   promotion,   Neufeld’s   (1999, 2004) of democracy 
promotion  and  human  security  and  Beier’s  (Beier and Denholm Crosby 1998; Beier 2011) of IHL are 
exceptions in this respect. Consequently, there has been little consideration of how NGOs might 
contribute to capitalist hegemony by promoting liberal political discourses. Against this backdrop, 
the discourse of human security that has emerged since the 1990s acquires a particular hegemonic 
significance as a composite liberal paradigm that combines President   Roosevelt’s   invocation   of  
‘freedom   from   fear’   and   ‘freedom   from  want’  and is increasingly used to justify Western military 
interventions.  
 
The differing functions of hegemonic ideas and their relationships to force and consent illustrate the 
dialectical unity, mutual constitution and inseparability of the economic, coercive and consensual 
elements of hegemonic power – even as they may be exercised by different intellectuals at different 
‘levels’   of   governance:   from   the   economic   base   to   the   ideological   and  political   superstructures  of  
civil   society   and   political   society   that   comprise   Gramsci’s   integral   capitalist   state   (Buttigieg 1995; 
Forgacs 2000a; Thomas 2011) – and from within and without the state. Against this backdrop, civil 
society   becomes   a   superstructural   ‘sphere   of…hegemony’   where   class   interests   rooted   in   the  
economic  base  find  ideological  and  political  expression  in  competing  hegemonic  projects  and  ‘fight  it  
out’  (Buttigieg 1995, pp.6–7) for influence over economy and state. With some modifications, these 
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concepts can be used to examine contemporary (global) civil society and global governance, given 
Gramsci’s   ‘conception  of   civil   society,   far   from  adhering  narrowly   to   the  national,  operates   across  
domestic/international  boundaries’  (Ives and Short 2013, p.641). To do this, his understanding of the 
relationship between civil and political society at the national level must first be examined.  
Civil Society, Hegemony and the Integral State  
Gramsci’s  understanding of civil society differs radically from liberal approaches in two main ways.  
First, whereas liberal theory assumes civil society is a meaningfully autonomous sphere separable 
from state and market and the NGOs within it are non-governmental, non-violent,  ‘non-political’  and  
non-profit,  Gramsci  stresses   it  can  only  be  methodologically  separated  from  the  other   ‘”levels”’  or  
‘moments’  of  society,  ‘for  the  moment’  (Gramsci 1971, p.160; 12; 180–185), so that any autonomy 
from hegemonic class interests is normally limited. Consequently, a Gramscian perspective 
problematises how independent NGOs actually are from the capitalist class and allied elites that 
dominate state, civil society and market, and highlights autonomy  as      ‘an  essential,  yet   frequently  
side-lined,  feature  of  civil    society’  (Hearn 2001, p.44).  
  
This   is   linked   to   Gramsci’s   second   major   divergence from liberal approaches in how he 
conceptualises civil society in terms of hegemonic processes, involving the economic basis and 
consensual and coercive dimensions of power, as opposed to a discrete communicative sphere of 
principled ideas and values, characterised by soft or ideational power and distanced from economic 
self-interests.   Indeed,  Gramsci’s   conceptualisation   of   civil   society   is   so   interlinked  with   hegemony  
that for Buttigieg (1995, p.26) ‘scrutiny  of  civil  society  and  the  study  of  hegemony  are  virtually  one  
and   the   same   thing’,   and for Boothman (1999, p.70) ‘the   principal  meaning   of   civil society is the 
place  where  hegemony  is  exercised’.  This  exaggerates  the  situation  somewhat  and  also occludes the 
hegemonic  role  of  political  society,  or  ‘the  State  proper’  (Gramsci 1971, p.170 n71), but it highlights 
how the qualities Gramsci associates with consensual-hegemony also pertain to civil society and the 
conceptual parallel between the integral, dialectical meaning of hegemony   as   a   ‘a   dynamic  
equilibrium  of  force  and  consent’  (Anderson 2002, p.21) and the integral state as  a  ‘dialectical  unity  
between  government  power  and  civil  society’  (Gramsci 1999a, p.469; Thomas 2011, p.137; Coutinho 
2012, p.83).  
 
This   correspondence   is   apparent   in   Gramsci’s   reference   to   ‘the   State   (in   its   integral   meaning:  
dictatorship   +   hegemony)’   (1971, p.239) and in his citation of the   ‘claim   that   two   things   are  
absolutely   necessary   for   the   life   of   a   state:   arms   and   religion…force   and   consent,   coercion   and  
persuasion, state and Church, political society and civil  society’  (1999b, pp.427–248).  Moreover, in 
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discussing  what  he   calls   ‘the   “dual  perspective”   in  political   action  and   in   the   life  of   the   State’, he 
identifies   a   specifically   ‘dialectical   relation’  between   ‘the   levels  of   force   and  of   consent,   authority  
and   hegemony’   (1971, p.170). In all these formulations, Gramsci identifies civil society and 
consensual-hegemony as part of a wider integral state or hegemony in its integral dialectical sense, 
which also includes political society or coercion.  
 
Political society  
Within this framework,  political  society  denotes  ‘the  State  in  the  narrow  sense  of  the  governmental-
coercive   apparatus’,   which   according   to   Gramsci   has   the   function   of   ‘”direct   domination”   or  
command  exercised  through…”juridical”    government’ (1971, pp.264–265; 12). Political society thus 
encompasses   the   formal   ‘machinery   of   government   and   legal   institutions’   (Thomas 2011, p.137), 
such as the police, military, legal system, parliament, government departments and the public 
service, which set the boundaries within which consent in civil society operates. Similar to the classic 
understanding of the state in terms of a monopoly of force, Gramsci believes political society 
primarily   functions   as   a   ‘dictatorship,   or   an   apparatus   of   coercion   to   control   the   masses   of   the  
people in accordance with the  mode  of   production   and   the   economic   system’   (1988, p.161). But 
notwithstanding this, he also argues   that   a   political   society   ‘whose functions are limited to the 
safeguarding  of  public  order  and  of  respect  for  the  laws…has    never  existed  except  on    paper’  (1971, 
p.261) and discusses its role in propagating hegemonic ideas and organising hegemonic 
compromises.  
 
Foremost among these is the universalising hegemonic idea of the impartial Hegelian state (Gramsci 
1994b, p.21), including the perfectibility of its ‘democratic   institutions’. According to Gramsci, this 
has led to the erroneous social democratic belief that the liberal-capitalist state ‘can  be  corrected,  
touched up here and there, but in fundamentals must  be  respected’  and  that  political  ‘activity  must  
consist  of  trying  to  become  the  majority’  in  parliament  (Gramsci 1977d, p.76, 1994b, p.23; Buttigieg 
1995, pp.12–13). In addition, Gramsci also discusses the consensual-hegemonic role of public 
education (Gramsci 1971, pp.24–43; 258–259, 1999b, pp.180–181; 322–323), welfare (1971, 
pp.258–262, 1994a, pp.23–5; Cox 1989, p.831; Buttigieg 1995, pp.12–13), civil service employment 
(1971, p.13; 74; 94; 103–4) and transformism (1971, pp.55–59; 94; 97–98; 128 n6, 1988, p.222).  
 
He thus recognises that the functions of political society are not exclusively coercive, indicating that 
‘force   and   policies   aimed   at   achieving   consent   can   be   applied   in   any   of   the   three   social   realms’  
(Augelli and Murphy 1993, p.130). However, he does not systematically analyse the consensual-
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hegemonic role of political society to the same extent as with civil society. This likely reflects the 
relative underdevelopment of consensual government functions and the coercive, unstable 
atmosphere in the 1930s (Miliband 1969, p.183).   Consequently,   this   is   an   aspect   of   Gramsci’s  
thought that can be expanded, devoting particular attention to the ties between consensual arms of 
government and CSOs working in similar areas. In the particular context of this thesis, this means 
examining the relations between NGOs and overseas development, human rights and foreign affairs 
departments that have emerged as important  consensual  arms  of  the  ‘state  proper’.     
International political society  
To  further  develop  Gramsci’s  concept  of  political  society,  the  political  societies  of  different  states  can  
be seen to comprise a much looser international political society alongside IGOs and international 
law,   the   latter   of   whose   functions   are   mainly   ‘consensual’,   but   underwritten   by   the   (selective)  
enforcement capacity of powerful states, particularly the US. Contrary to some neo-Gramscian 
approaches, however, this international political society is insufficiently integrated to form a 
‘transnational   state’   (Robinson 2001, 2004, 2007) or   ‘global   extended   state’   (Zahran and Ramos 
2009) alongside   a   transnational   or   ‘global   civil society’.   This   is   partly   due   to   the   greater  
competitiveness of the capitalist class internationally, which is reflected and reinforced by the 
persistent division of the world into states and the absence of a global monopoly of force.  
 
Against this backdrop, great, middle and small Western powers play at times competing, but on the 
whole complementary, roles in preserving Western dominance, and are influenced not only by their 
respective positions in the interstate hierarchy, but the varying forms of national capitalist 
hegemony that arise from class struggle and differing civil societies at the national level.  
Civil society: a superstructure with a material structure  
Compared to political society, Gramsci regards civil society as more exclusively concerned with 
consensual-hegemony.   Hence,   in   delineating   civil   society   as   one   of   ‘two   major      superstructural    
“levels”’   alongside   political   society,   he   notes   its   correspondence   ‘to   the   function   of   “hegemony”  
which the dominant group exercises   throughout   society’ (Gramsci 1971, p.12) and clarifies 
elsewhere  that  it  is  ‘political  and  cultural  hegemony…the  ethical  content  of  the  state’  he  has in mind 
(2007, p.20).   Civil   society   is   thus   conceived   as   a   second   ‘level’   of   the   superstructure   alongside 
political society (Gramsci 1971, p.12; Anderson 1976, pp.34–35; Femia 2005, p.343; Thomas 2011, 
p.72) and is connected to the economic base through its ideological expression of the economic 
hegemony of a fundamental class and the class conflicts that arise in response. As Gramsci (1999a, 
pp.548–550) puts it, in   language   almost   identical   to  Marx,   ‘men  become  conscious   of   their   social  
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position and therefore of their tasks on  the  terrain  of   ideologies’   so  that   ‘there  exists  a  necessary  
and  vital  nexus  between  structure  and  superstructure’.  Clearly,  then,  civil  society  for  Gramsci  is  not  
‘divorce[d]   from   economic   interactions’   (Anheier et al. 2001a, pp.13–14) or   ‘independent   of  
economic  development’  (Cohen and Arato 1992, pp.143–4).  
 
In addition to their roots in the economic structure, Gramsci argues that the superstructures of civil 
society  also  have  their  own  ‘material  base’  or  ‘social-institutional  materiality’  (Coutinho 2012, p.82), 
consisting  of  ‘the  ensemble  of  organisms  commonly    called  “private”’  (Gramsci 1971, p.12). Mouffe 
(1979b, p.199) highlights this as one of his major theoretical innovations, arguing  he  ‘was  the  first  to  
stress   the   material   nature   of   ideology’,   ‘its   inscription   in   practices   and   its   materialisation   into  
apparatuses’.   In   Gramsci’s   day,   the   ‘material   structure’   of   civil   society   (Thomas 2011, p.96 n30) 
included  ‘Everything    which  influences  or  is     able  to  influence  public  opinion,  directly  or  indirectly’,  
such as newspapers and other media,   ‘mass  movements’,   political   parties,   trade   unions,   religious  
organisations, especially the Catholic church, charities, associations and proto-INGOs like the 
Freemasons and Rotary clubs (1971, p.52; 182; 188; 220–221; 286, 1978, pp.454–462, 1988, p.222, 
1992, p.155; 259, 1999a, p.282, 2000, pp.380–381; 260–261). Just as the functions of political 
society are not exclusively coercive and aspects such as the court system combine coercive and 
consensual governance, civil society practices are not exclusively consensual. Gramsci thus refers to 
mass  movements’  involvement  in  ‘repression’  (Gramsci 1992, p.155) and  discusses  ‘customs,  ways  of  
thinking   and   acting,   morality’   and   ‘public   opinion’   as   forms   of   ‘“coercion”’   in   civil society (1971, 
p.242; 196).  
 
Of  course,  Gramsci  does  not  ‘locate’  all of civil society in the integral state, but only those ideational 
aspects and material organisations that   ‘tend   to   consolidate   and   stabilise   a   certain   form   of  
established   power’   (Cox 1987, p.409 n10)– or reinforce the hegemonic compromises, ideas and 
monopoly   of   force   of   the   capitalist   class   and   so   form   part   of   its   ‘hegemonic   apparatus’   (Gramsci 
1971, pp.228–229; 246; 264–265; 365, 2000, p.261). Consequently, civil society is figuratively both 
‘larger’   and   ‘smaller’   than   the   integral   state,   so   that   when   Gramsci   writes   that   ‘civil   society…is  
“State”   too,   indeed   is   the   State   itself’   (1971, p.261) and identifies it with the hegemony of a 
dominant class (1971, p.12; 261, 2007, p.20), it is civil society in this limited sense he means.  
 
The fundamental reason for this is that civil society, like the economy of which it is an expression, 
represents the interests of conflicting classes, whereas the integral state – including political society 
and those parts of civil society that support it – is seen by Gramsci as irredeemably capitalist 
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(Gramsci 1971, p.182; 52; Thomas 2011, p.222; Coutinho 2012, p.78). He makes this crystal clear, 
explaining   in   elaborating   his   concept   of   hegemony   that   ‘the   State   is   seen   as   the   organ   of   one  
particular group, destined to create favourable conditions   for   the   latter’s   maximum   expansion’  
(1971, p.182) and  averring  elsewhere  that  ‘The  historical  unity  of  the  ruling  classes  is  realised in the 
State’,  which   ‘concretely,   results   from  the  organic   relations  between  State  or  political   society  and  
“civil   society”’   (1971, p.52).  Consequently,  Gramsci’s   integral  state   represents only the interests of 
the dominant class and reflects those of subordinate groups only indirectly – or hegemonically – 
insofar as deemed optimal for maintaining class dominance. It can thus be described as a hegemonic 
class state, rather than a class state that represents the interests of capitalist class without regard to 
the combination of consent and coercion required to secure the compliance of subordinate groups.  
 
Civil  society’s  transformative potential  
The  idea  that  not  all  of  civil  society  ‘belongs’  to  the  integral  state  means  it  can  be  a  ‘level’  of  society  
where subordinate groups can theorise and organise the overthrow of the existing class hegemony 
the state embodies. This is the progressive Gramscian sense of civil society and has been heavily 
adapted by liberals, post-Marxists and neo-Gramscians. It appears overtly in several places, including 
Gramsci’s   identification   of   civil   society   with   the   ‘struggle   of   political   “hegemonies”’,   which   ‘take  
place…first  in  the  ethical  field  and  then  in  that  of  politics  proper’  and  his  argument  that  ‘There  can  
and  there  must  be  a  “political  hegemony”  even  before  assuming  government  power’   (1971, p.333, 
1992, p.137).  
 
Such passages have inspired neo-Gramscians and post-Marxists to examine civil society primarily as 
a  site  of  ‘counterhegemony’  or  ‘counterhegemonic  blocs’  (Gill and Law 1989; Cohen and Arato 1992; 
Cox 1999; Neufeld 1999; 2002; Gill 2000, 2002, 2009; Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Rupert 2003; Glasius 
2005; Katz 2006; Morton 2007a), although Gramsci never actually uses those terms (Buttigieg 2009, 
p.31). This is because, in his view, the transformative potential of civil society can only be fulfilled by 
developing a coherent alternative hegemony, led by the working class with the support of other 
subordinate groups and the objective of socialism,  rather  than  through  ‘counter-hegemonic’  activity,  
in the sense of disparate opposition by a variety of subaltern groups to the current form of capitalist 
hegemony with no clear leading group or shared end goal.  
 
Gill’s  (2000) suggestion of the entire anti-globalisation  movement  of   ‘multiple  and  diverse  political  
forces’  as  a  ‘postmodern  Prince’  exemplifies  this  latter  approach,  which  has  led  neo-Gramscians to 
identify an eclectic miscellany of actors as potential members of a counterhegemonic bloc, including: 
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NSMs, environmentalists, feminists, local community groups (Gill and Law 1993, p.122; Cox 1999, 
p.15, 2002, p.186; Rupert 2003, pp.194–198; Katz 2006, pp.336–367); religious groups (Gill and Law 
1993, p.122; Katz 2006, p.336); solidly reformist liberal INGOs like Amnesty International and Oxfam 
(Gill and Law 1993, p.122); ‘transnational   advocacy   networks’   that   include   foundations,  
governmental and IGO elites (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p.9; Katz 2006, p.337); and even Tony  Blair’s  
‘New  Labour’   (Showstack Sassoon 2000, p.96; 91). From here it can be a short hop to the liberal 
position of assuming   ‘global   civil   society’ in general is a progressive force, as exemplified by 
Lipschutz’s   (1992, p.398 n41) hope   that   it   ‘may   be  a   reaction   to   the  Gramscian   hegemony  of   the  
state  system’.   
 
In contrast, owing to his more rigorous conception of an alternative class hegemony, Gramsci 
identifies two main characteristics of transformative civil society activity: autonomy from capitalist 
influence (1971, pp.160–161, 1975b, pp.100–101, 1977d, pp.73–874, 1978, pp.72–74; 355; 362–362) 
and a basis in active, critical and participatory mass consent. These qualities remain relevant to the 
progressive potential of ‘global   civil   society’  and   international  NGO  campaigns.  As Gebauer (2007, 
p.12) argues,  ‘NGOs  can  only  succeed  as  independent  actors  when  like  social  movements  they  have  
their  own  constituency  on  which  they  are  based’  and  ‘are  not  part  of  the  institutions  of  an  extended  
state’.   Unlike   the   liberal   literature,   Gramsci   recognises   the   difficulty of achieving practical and 
intellectual autonomy under capitalist hegemony and   so  argues   that   achieving   ‘Complete political 
independence’   is   a   ‘fundamental   task’   (1978, p.362), which must be constantly fought for and 
defended to avoid cooptation through hegemonic compromises and ideologies (Buci-Glucksmann 
1979, pp.212–214; 232).  
 
The other, and closely connected, characteristic of transformative CSOs is a basis in active mass 
participation and critical, intellectually-engaged consent (Gramsci 1975a, pp.50–51, 1996, pp.48–52, 
2000, p.244; Buttigieg 1995). According to Gramsci, such organisations should be characterised by 
‘active   and   direct   consent,   the   participation   of   individual   members,   even   if   this   provokes   an  
appearance  of  break  up  and  tumult’  (Gramsci 2000, p.244). He saw this as necessary to develop an 
independent hegemonic consciousness that can critique and supersede the hegemonic ideas of the 
capitalist class. First, though, the overwhelmingly negative, hegemonic role of actually existing civil 
society  in  Gramsci’s  framework  must  be  addressed.  
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Civil society and capitalist hegemony  
Those writing in a liberal framework tend to assume civil society is a discrete, predominantly 
‘bottom-up’  progressive  social  sphere,  while  post-Marxists and neo-Gramscians’  focus  on  identifying  
potentially  ‘counterhegemonic’  civil  society  actors.  Consequently,  neither  is  centrally  concerned  with  
analysing the links between NGOs/civil society, state and market, despite often remarking on them 
in   passing.   Cox   exemplifies   this,   acknowledging   ‘Many   NGOs…are   institutions of the established 
order  integrated  with  the  existing  states  and    interstate  system’  (1989, p.836 n10), but concentrating 
on  ‘counterhegemonic’  civil  society  actors  (Cox 1999). Consequently, despite the many IR theorists 
claiming Gramscian inspiration, analyses of hegemonic civil society and the relations between civil 
and political society from a Gramscian perspective are rare (Robinson 1996; Demirovic 2000, 2003; 
Gebauer 2001, 2007; Hearn 2001; Ives and Short 2013) and  Gramsci’s   ideas  have  seldom  provided  
the theoretical framework for the many useful critical analyses of civil society that exist (Meiksins 
Wood 1990; 1997, 1999; 2002, 2006, 1998; Chandhoke 2002, 2005; Colas 2002; Mohan 2002; 
Wallace 2003a; 2005; Shivji 2007).   This   is   unfortunate   as   Gramsci’s   approach   to   hegemonic   civil  
society, in foregrounding the symbiotic relationship of civil and political society in the integral state 
and the role of intellectuals in mediating these two levels of the superstructure and linking them to 
class interests rooted in the economy can be very useful in addressing the oft-remarked lacunae in 
the NGO and civil society literature vis-à-vis  the relationship of civil society and state and NGO 
autonomy from government interests (Tvedt 2002, 2006; Zaleski 2006).  
 
For  Gramsci,  the  central  purpose  in  empirically  analysing  CSOs  is  thus  to  ‘study…how  the  ideological 
structure of a dominant class is actually organized: namely the material organization aimed at 
maintaining,  defending  and  developing  the  theoretical  or  ideological  “front”’  (Gramsci 2000, p.380) 
and to connect civil society organisations and ideas to capitalist interests (Ives and Short 2013, 
p.641). He thus identifies a broad range of hegemonic CSOs, including the Catholic Church, elite 
associations like the Freemasons and Rotary clubs, liberal, fascist and populist political parties, the 
leadership of the social democratic parties and the large trade unions, the mainstream media 
(Gramsci 1971, p.56; 286, 2000, pp.380–381), and charities, which for  Gramsci  are  ‘national  nexuses  
between  governors  and  governed…factors  of  hegemony’  (1999a, p.282).  
 
As well as lacking autonomy from capitalist interests, Gramsci argues this hegemonic civil society is 
characterised by passive, manipulated, fraudulent and coercive forms of consent (Gramsci 1971, 
p.203; 210; 228, 1999a, pp.127–128; 548–549, 2000, pp.260–261, 2007, p.213; Femia 1981, pp.45–
47; Buttigieg 1995, p.7; Thomas 2011, pp.227–228). This is necessitated by the exploitative nature of 
the capitalist mode of production, which renders all concessions to subordinate class interests 
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inevitably   limited   and   any   depiction   of   capitalist   interests   as   “universal”   fundamentally false 
(Gramsci 1999a, pp.548–9).  
 
This  is  facilitated  by  the  uneven  distribution  of  the  power  to  ‘manufacture’  consent  as  a  result  of  the  
uneven distribution of wealth (Buttigieg 1995, p.7), which enables elites to drown out alternative 
perspectives with the volume of their material and ideological resources.  
 
The theme of manufacturing consent appears throughout the Prison Notebooks (1971, p.259, 2000, 
pp.380–381, 2007, p.213) and   Gramsci   generally   ‘locates’   it   predominantly   in   civil   rather   than  
political  society.  He  thus  argues  that  ‘The  State…“educates”…consent,  by  means  of  the  political  and  
syndical associations; these, however, are private organisms, left to the private initiative of the 
ruling   class’   (1971, p.259). Consequently, hegemonic consent appears  ‘“spontaneous”’,  
‘“voluntary”’,  or   ‘“private”’   (1971, p.242; 12; 266, 1996, pp.48–52, 2000, p.260, 2007, p.317), as it 
seems  to  emerge  from  ‘below’  in  civil  society,  rather  than  from  ‘above’  in  political  society.  However,  
according to Gramsci, there are two main ways in which this seeming spontaneity is false.  
 
First,  the  dominant  class’  ownership  and  control  of  the  means  of  production  and  hence  its  superior  
resources and attractiveness to intellectuals means that it quite naturally produces a variety of 
hegemonic ideas and associations that represent capitalist interests in different ways: whether by 
promoting the particularistic interests of different capitalist economic fractions; and/or alternative 
hegemonic projects or political strategies within the confines of a broad pro-capitalist consensus. 
Because these ideas and the organisations and intellectuals that propagate them are dominated by 
capitalist interests, they correspond naturally with the broad contours of government policy, which 
for Gramsci represents the interests of the capitalist class as a whole, rather than individual 
capitalists – albeit while also disproportionately favouring the interests of particular capitalist 
fractions or particular hegemonic strategies over others.  
 
Consequently, the government often has no need to organise civil society hegemonically from the 
‘top-down’,  as  this  happens  “spontaneously”  from  ‘below’  in  any  case.  Indeed,  Gramsci  repeatedly  
identifies the privatisation of consensual leadership as characteristic of capitalist hegemony (1971, 
pp.258–259, 1992, p.137; 153) – and linked to the seeming separation of civil society (and the 
economy) from the state in the first place. In Italian history, this was exemplified by the Moderates, 
who according  to  Gramsci  organised  ‘their  intellectual,  moral  and  political  hegemony’:   
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In  forms,  and  by  means,  which  may  be  called  “liberal”  – in other words through individual, 
“molecular”,   “private”   enterprise   (i.e.   not   through   a   party   programme   worked   out and 
constituted according to a plan, in advance  of the practical and organisational action). 
However,  that    was    “normal”  given    the  structure    and    the    function  of  the  social  groups  of  
which the Moderates were the representatives, the leading stratum, the organic 
intellectuals (1971, pp.59–60).  
 
The second way in which the apparent spontaneity of hegemonic consent is misleading is that the 
state-as-government also directly intervenes in civil society to organise it in particular directions 
consonant with its perception of the interests of capital-in-general. Gramsci thus observes that 
‘When  the  state  wants to embark on an action that is not popular, it starts to create in advance the 
public opinion that is required, in other words,  it organizes and centralizes certain elements of civil 
society’  (2007, p.213).  
 
The implications of all this for assessing NGO influence to a large extent depends on the attitudes of 
elites to NGO activities and their views of the optimum hegemonic strategies or projects to pursue. 
In general, differences in attitude towards NGO demands can be expected between more 
consensual arms of state, such as development and foreign affairs departments that have close 
relations with NGOs, and more directly coercive arms of the state such as defence departments. In 
addition, liberal and social democratic political parties appear generally to have closer relations with 
NGOs, both in personnel and ideological terms and to have similar outlooks vis-à-vis optimum 
governance strategies, generally favouring human rights and development discourses to a greater 
extent  than  conservative  parties.  Finally,  elite  preferences  are  also  shaped  by  states’  positions  in  the  
international system in the sense smaller and middle powers will also often favour similar 
legitimising strategies to NGOs, as compared to larger powers. These raise the prospects of 
particular types of hegemonic alliances for moderate NGOs acting as part of hegemonic civil society 
within the  broad  consensual  parameters  established  for  ‘global  civil  society’  by  Western  donors.   
 
Significantly  for  analysing  ‘global  civil  society’,  Gramsci  links  changes  in  the  organisation  of  consent,  
or the balance between political and civil society in the integral state, to the historical development 
of the capitalist state and the expansion of international relations in the second half of the 19th 
century (1971, p.259; 220–221; 243). He thus contrasts  the  ‘relatively  rudimentary  State    apparatus,  
and  greater   autonomy  of  civil   society   from  State  activity’   before  1870,   to   the   ‘more   complex  and  
massive’   ‘internal   and   international   organisational   relations   of   the   State’   and   the   accompanying  
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expansion of civil society to produce ‘“civil  hegemony”  afterwards, and, further, connects this to the 
integration of national economies into the   world  market   and   ‘the   colonial   expansion   of   Europe’  
(1971, p.243 my emphasis). In essence, what Gramsci articulates here is a 19th century model of 
hegemonic   civil   society   growth,   linked   to   globalisation,   encouraged   from   ‘above’   by   capitalist  
governments,  and  rooted  in  capitalists’  disproportionate  control  of  ‘private’  resources  from  ‘below’,  
which is seen to have reduced civil   society’s   autonomy   from   the   newly   integral   state   and   the  
capitalist class it represents.  
 
Gramsci’s  explanation  of  how  these  changes  come  about  is  intertwined  with  his  concept  of  ‘passive  
revolution’  or   ‘revolution-restoration’   (Forgacs 2000c; Gramsci 2000, pp.249–276), of which there 
are two types. Passive revolution originally denoted   the   initial   establishment  of   ‘limited’   capitalist  
hegemonies through a combination of compromises with ancien régimes, transformism, gradual 
reforms, and foreign influence from more advanced capitalist countries, rather than active, 
indigenous mass  popular  revolutions  of  the  French  type.  Gramsci’s  prototype  was  Italian  unification,  
which lacked a strong popular base, involved compromises with the landowning classes, particularly 
in the South, and was strongly influenced by imported liberal ideals from France and foreign military 
interventions (Gramsci 1971, pp.115–120, 1977d, pp.12–13, 1978, p.344, 1996, p.232; Hoare and 
Nowell Smith 1971b, p.46). As Morton (2007a, 2007b) has pointed out, passive revolution in this first 
sense   is   compatible   with   Trotsky’s   theory   of   uneven   and   combined   development (Trotsky 2000, 
pp.1–9; Rosenberg 2005, 2006) and can help to explain the establishment of capitalist hegemony 
and capitalist states in peripheral countries outside the Western core, as happened in the former 
Eastern bloc and parts of the South following the end of the Cold War.  
 
Gramsci later extended the concept of passive revolution to the restructuring of established 
capitalist hegemonies (Showstack Sassoon 2001; Morton 2007a, 2007b; Fusaro 2010, p.12) in 
response to economic changes, the demands of competing elites and class struggle. Thomas thus 
argues  that  for  Gramsci  passive  revolution  in  this  second  sense  describes  ‘the  bourgeois  hegemonic  
project for an entire historical   period’   after  1848  – and  possibly   for  modernity   as   a  whole’   (2011, 
pp.145–157), while  Forgacs  also   sees   it  as  a   ‘typical’  mode  of   capitalist  hegemony   (2000d, p.424). 
Gramsci thus describes 19th century   ‘moderate   and   conservative   liberalism’,   early   20th century 
reformist trade unionism and fascism as passive revolutions in this second sense, as different means 
through which capitalist hegemonies were restructured, in more consensual, coercive, expansive, or 
limited directions (1971, p.106; 119–120, 2000, pp.260–265). As Morton (2007b, p.600) usefully 
summarises,  what  all  the  various  types  of  passive  revolution  share  is  ‘the  survival  and  reorganisation  
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of state identity through which social relations are reproduced in new forms consonant with 
capitalist  property  relations’,  or  as  Losurdo  puts  it,  ‘the  persistent  capacity’  of  the  capitalist  class  ‘to  
produce socio-political transformations, sometimes of significance, conserving securely in its own 
hands power, initiative and hegemony, and leaving the working classes in their condition of 
subalternity’  (quoted in Thomas 2011, p.147).   
 
‘Global  civil  society’  from  the  ‘Top-Down’ 
Both  senses  of  passive  revolution  and  Gramsci’s  theorisation  of  the  complementary  manipulation  of  
hegemonic   consent   in   political   society   from   ‘above’   and   civil   society   from   ‘below’   – and their 
essential unity in the integral state – can  be  used  to  analyse  the  apparent  appearance  of  ‘global  civil  
society’   in   the   1990s.  Whereas   this   is   explained   in   the   literature   as   a   predominantly   ‘bottom-up’  
process,  it  is  argued  here  that  the  apparent  emergence  of  ‘global  civil  society’  has  been  elite-driven, 
from  both  ‘above’  and  ‘below’.  This  can  be  described  as  a  ‘top-down’  model  of  ‘global  civil  society’  
emergence, encompassing sponsorship of civil society, not only by governments and IGOs, but also 
by private capitalist elites, such as private foundations, corporations and wealthy individuals. The 
literature   on   civil   society   and   development   and   alternative   ‘top-down’   accounts   of   civil   society  
growth have problematised this relationship, questioning the capacity of NGOs to be an autonomous 
voice if they are dependent on elite funding (Tvedt 1995, 2002, 2006; Abrahamsen 2000; Colas 2002; 
Hirsch 2003; Agg 2006; Reimann 2006; Zaleski 2006).  
 
Two inter-related passive revolutions shaped this process. The first was neoliberal restructuring of 
capitalist states, a passive   revolution   in   Gramsci’s   later   development   of   the   term   (Thomas 2006, 
p.81; 2007a, 2010), which took hold in the West from the late 1970s under Thatcher and Reagan and 
was internationalised in the 1980s and 1990s through the foreign policies of Western states and the 
international activities of IGOs and US foundations (Augelli and Murphy 1993). This process 
accelerated after the end of the Cold War, which led to the establishment of capitalism and capitalist 
states in the former Eastern bloc and formerly proxy-war-torn parts of the South. The latter can be 
understood   as   a   passive   revolution   in   Gramsci’s   original   sense,   occurring   via   a   combination   of:  
foreign  economic  and/or  military  interventions  in  the  form  of  ‘shock  therapy’,  structural adjustment, 
aid packages, peacebuilding and humanitarian interventions; accommodation of elites from ancien 
régimes; and elite-sponsored civil society activity. The result was an unprecedentedly rapid 
geographic expansion of capitalism, which Rosenberg (2005, p.2; 6) argues was largely responsible 
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for the globalisation12 ‘Zeitgeist’   of   the   1990s,   creating   ‘an   enormous’,   but   transitory,   ‘sense   of  
temporal   acceleration   and   spatial   compression’.   This overlapped with the neoliberal passive 
revolution, as the type of capitalism globalised to developing countries and the former Eastern bloc 
reflected its ongoing restructuring in the West. How   this   ‘top   down’   development   of   ‘global   civil  
society’  unfolded  is  now  examined,  beginning  with  the   impact  of  neoliberal  capitalist  restructuring  
on civil society in the West and then examining its projection abroad in Western foreign policies and 
the international activities of IGOs and US foundations.  
 
Globalising Neoliberalism  
Key characteristics of neoliberalisation that have altered the economic base and the relationship of 
civil and political society include privatisation, marketisation, the growth in services and a 
concomitant shift towards public-private partnerships and multi-actor governance (Cerny 1997, 
2008; Hirsch 2003; Cammack 2006b; Harvey 2007a, 2007b). This has changed the shape of civil 
society, as hegemonic compromises like social welfare and development aid that during the post-
war   era   of   the   ‘welfare   state’   were   predominantly   organised   in   political   society   have   been   re-
privatised   through   outsourcing   to   ‘autonomous’   NGOs   in   a   sort   of   neoliberal   ‘re-feudalisation’  
(Gebauer 2001; Hirsch 2003, p.252) of the state. Hirsch  identifies  a  similar  ‘privatization  of  political  
processes   of   decision  making   and   implementation’   as   aspects   of   foreign   policy   and   international  
policy formation have also increasingly been outsourced, particularly from the mid-1990s onwards, 
in   accordance  with   the   shift   towards   ‘regulatory   neoliberalism’,   ‘good   governance’   and   the   Post-
Washington Consensus.  
 
In   the   process,   the   role   of   government   has   been   redefined   in   terms   of   creating   an   ‘enabling 
environment’  for  civil  society  to  carry out activities previously the domain of political society, much 
as neoliberalism deems it must do for the market (Cerny 2008, pp.24–26). This has changed the 
relationship   between   the   ‘economy’,   civil   and  political society in the integral state, strengthening 
ties  between  ‘consensual’  arms  of  political  society and CSOs in similar areas, such as development 
and foreign policy. A similar process has also occurred internationally with the development of 
closer ties between CSOs, private foundations, IGOs and foreign (Western) governments, particularly 
vis-à-vis development and humanitarian aid. Two main empirical indicators of these shifts can be 
identified:   increased   ‘top-down’   funding   of  NGOs  by  OECD   governments,   private foundations and 
                                                     
12 Showstack Sassoon (2001) examines economic globalisation as a passive revolution, although from a rather 
different political perspective. 
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IGOs; and the creation of an enabling environment through donor promotion of pro-NGOs norms, 
including enhanced NGO access to international governance processes (Reimann 2006).  
 
These developments are evident in the substantial growth of the non-profit sector across the West 
from the 1980s onwards, including but not limited to the US, UK, Germany, France and Canada. In 
many cases, this was an integral component of neoliberal restructuring that correlated with stagnant 
economic growth, cutbacks in direct government social provision, but increased state funding of 
NGOs as well as in user fees for privatised services (Salamon et al. 1999, p.278; 184–185; 89; 114; 
Canadian Council on Social Development 2003, p.165). Zaleski (2006, p.22) terms  this  the  ‘crisis  and  
transformation   of   the   welfare   state’,   Cerny   (2008, p.36) identifies   a   shift   to   ‘the   post-welfare 
contracting    state’,  while  Gebauer  (2001) argues,  
The privatisation of states corresponds to the state-building of NGOs. The state divests itself 
of its caring responsibilities in proportion as it partially transfers them to non-state actors, 
which  can  be  considered  as  part  of  an  “extended  state”.  
Overall, government funding accounted for almost half the variation in non-profit sector size in 
twenty-two countries13 studied by John Hopkins researchers in the mid-1990s (Salamon et al. 2002, 
p.2; 10–14) and 48% of civil society revenue on average in sixteen Western states (Salamon and 
Sokolowski 2004, p.33). Yet despite these findings, Salamon and Sokolowski (2004, p.33) stick to the 
‘bottom-up’  narrative,   framing   ‘global   civil   society’  growth  as   ‘A  dramatic  associational   revolution’  
and  listing  ‘external  assistance’  as  a  fifth  contributory  factor. 
 
Cutting government costs was a major driver of this shift (Zaleski 2006, p.122) and much of the 
savings   accrued   from   ‘flexibilisation’,   or   lower   wages   and   less   job   security   for   workers   (Salamon 
2002; Canadian Council on Social Development 2003, p.168; 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; Skills – Third 
Sector, NVCO, et al. 2013).   This   is   facilitated   by   the   sector’s   moral,   values-based image, which 
encourages staff to regard poor pay and conditions as worth the sacrifice, in a neoliberal example of 
how economic, political and ideological hegemony ‘arises in the ownership and control over the 
labour-process’  (Buci-Glucksmann 1979, pp.226–228).  
 
While this was happening, there was also a marked increase in foundation grants arising from cuts to 
marginal and corporate tax rates and  ‘unprecedented’ wealth accumulation in the US (Anheier and 
Toepler 1999, p.5), where most of them are based. This paralleled rising inequality, which by 2007 
                                                     
13 This included four Central and Eastern European countries, five Latin American countries and thirteen 
developed countries.  
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had reached its highest level since 1928 (Inequality.org 2013). Foundations represent capitalist 
interests  more   directly   and  particularistically   than   states,   as   they   ‘receive most of their resources 
from one source and are as such considered to be donor-controlled’   (Anheier and Toepler 1999, 
p.11), are based on accumulated profits, their ongoing revenue derives from equity and financial 
investments and, like charities in general, they enable the rich to divert profits from taxation to 
favoured causes. Most foundations are controlled by individual capitalists (1998, p.210), but even 
some of the longer-established internationally-active foundations with independent boards, like 
Ford and Carnegie, remain bound ‘by   the   donor’s  will,   as   laid   down   in   the   charter’   (Anheier and 
Toepler 1999, p.15). Roelofs (2003, p.20) sees   this  as   ‘an  example  of  mortmain,   the  dead  hand  of  
past  wealth  controlling  the   future’.   Just as in the early 1900s foundations were established by the 
owners of growth industries like automotives (Ford), steel (Carnegie) and mining (Rockefeller), in the 
1980s, 1990s and 2000s, ‘new   foundations   based  on   fortunes   in   technology,  media,   and  ﬁnance’,  
such as the Gates and Soros foundations, appeared (Spero 2010, p.8).  
 
The increase in donor funding of domestic civil society in the West was paralleled by a simultaneous 
massive increase in funding for international activities by NGOs  by nearly all Western donors (UN 
Secretary General 1994, p.6; Donini 1995, p.426; Hudock 1999, p.3; Pinter 2001; Agg 2006; Reimann 
2006). In the 1990s, this coincided with cuts in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) overall14, 
paralleling cuts in social provision in the West. The resulted was an estimated increase in the 
financial dependency of development/humanitarian NGOs on Western governments from 1.5% in 
1970 to 30.8% in 1980, 35% in 1992 and 40%-plus by the mid-1990s (UN Secretary General 1994, 
p.6; Donini 1995, p.426). This was a structural shift and as of 2009 remained at around 43% (OECD 
2011, p.10; 55). At the same time, there was also a substantial increase in foundation grants. This 
was particularly significant for human rights NGOs, many of which avoid government funding (Lopez 
et al. 1998).  Adding government and foundation funding together, Pinter (2001) estimates that by 
the late 1990s around $10bn in donor NGO funding was available to NGOs, four-fifths of it from 
Western governments and a fifth from US foundations. Reimann argues such funding increases 
fuelled  ‘the  growth  of  NGOs  and  their  spread  to  non-Western  parts  of  the  globe’  and  concludes  that  
‘given  the  billions  of  dollars  of  international  funding…available…it  would  have  been  more  surprising  
if   there   had  been  no  explosive   growth  of  NGOs   in   the   1980s   and  1990s’   (2006, p.48; 63). It thus 
appears that the increase in NGO numbers cited as evidence of  global  civil  society’s  emergence  was  
largely due to increased donor funding.  
 
                                                     
14 OECD statistics. Available at: http://stats.oecd.org/qwids (accessed 8/10/2013).  
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Aside from directly funding NGOs, Western donors have also encouraged the development of civil 
society by promoting pro-NGO norms (Howell and Pearce 2002, pp.89–122; Reimann 2006). This has 
included funding academic research on civil society to create a legitimising discourse; improving tax 
incentives for charitable giving; pressuring developing countries to create legal structures conducive 
to NGO growth; and increasing NGO involvement with IGOs. Examples of donor funding of influential 
academic research include the financing of the Center for Civil Society Studies at John Hopkins 
University (Ford 1999, p. 250; Carnegie, 2002: 206) by the Ford and Carnegie foundations and the 
funding  of  the  LSE’s  Global  Civil  Society  programme  (LSE Civil Society and Human Security Research 
Unit 2012) by Soros’   Open   Society   Institute   (OSI)   and   the   MacArthur,   Rockefeller   and   Ford  
Foundations. As for tax incentives, Roodman and Standley (2006) found them in eighteen out of 
twenty-one OECD countries, funnelling billions of dollars in foregone tax to  the  NGO  ‘shadow  state’.  
This   ‘tax   bonus’   has   increased   significantly   since   the   early   1990s,   as   states, such as Norway and 
Japan, introduced tax incentives for the first time (Smillie 1993, p.29), while other states, such as 
Canada and UK have substantially increased tax relief to NGOs through regulatory changes 
(Canadian Council on Social Development 2003, p.172; Directgov 2005).  
 
The third aspect of the pro-NGO  norm   relates   to   states’   decision   to increase NGO involvement in 
IGOs, first in service provision and field activities and then in policy processes. This reflected the shift 
to   ‘Third  Way’,   ‘“regulatory”, ‘“managed”’,   ‘“social”’   or   ‘embedded’   neoliberalism   from   the  mid-
1990s (Cerny 2008), which was embodied internationally in the shift from the Washington 
Consensus to Post-Washington   Consensus   policies   emphasising   ‘good   governance’   (Chandhoke 
2002; Howell and Pearce 2002, pp.89–122; Cammack 2004, 2006a). In addition to encouraging NGO 
involvement in its humanitarian, development and newly expanded peacebuilding missions, the UN 
also actively encouraged NGO attendance at its topical mega-conferences, accrediting nearly 1500 
new NGOs to the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 and 2500 new 
organisations at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995  (ECOSOC Secretariat 2003, pp.4–
5),   and   designating   them   as   “partners”   in   implementing the resulting programmes of action 
(Reimann 2006, p.60).   This   encouragement  of  NGO  participation  was   institutionalised   in   the  UN’s  
review of Consultative Status procedures from 1993-6, which extended eligibility to national NGOs 
(ECOSOC 1996) and produced a large increase in NGO numbers. Similar processes occurred in other 
IGOs (Howell and Pearce 2002, pp.89–122), with NGO participation in World Bank projects peaking 
in 1999 (Pinter 2002). Colas (2002, p.152) points out all of this was dependent on government 
support, particularly from the major Western donor states.  
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‘Global  civil  society’  with  Western  characteristics 
The civil society that emerged from these top-down interventions has been highly uneven and can 
be seen more as an internationalisation of Western civil society (Tvedt 1995, p.2) than the 
development   of   indigenous   civil   society   in   the   South,   or   a   truly   ‘global   civil   society’.   This   partly  
reflects donor efforts to globalise capitalist markets through promoting supportive social structures 
similar to those in the Western core, but is also a result of more traditional foreign policy concerns 
related to individual donor interests. As Tvedt (1995, p.101) argues,  ‘Foreign  policy  makers  in  most  
countries have long regarded NGOs or voluntary organisations as potential instruments in 
conducting   a   foreign   policy   the   state   cannot   so   easily   do’,   as   they   enable   donors   to   bypass  
potentially  obstructive   local   governments  by   intervening   ‘from  below’  and  allow  greater   flexibility  
and deniability in politically charged situations.  
 
Against this backdrop, despite the global rhetoric, donors have overwhelmingly favoured NGOs 
based in their own countries (Pouligny 2000, 2001; Agg 2006), which accounted for 76% of OECD-
DAC core support to NGOs from 1980-2008 and 60-70% of international funding by US foundations 
(Spero 2010, p.2). These ratios have changed little over time (OECD 2011, p.7), despite rhetorical 
shifts towards supporting SNGOs (Agg 2006). According to Pouligny, similar dynamics prevail at IGOs 
and   international   conferences,   where   NGOs’   main   interactions   are   with   their   own   governments  
(2001, p.15),   on   whose   political   support   they   largely   depend   for   influence.   Consequently,   ‘each  
national  delegation  works   in  close  collaboration  with   ‘their  NGO’  during   international  negotiations  
(2001, pp.15–17).  
 
The same can be said of Western donor support of NNGO activities in the South more broadly and 
helps to account for the widespread scepticism towards NGOs among Southern governments, which 
‘have  often  viewed  the  rise  of  NGOs  in  their  own  nations  as  a  phenomenon  promoted  from  ‘‘above’’  
them by wealthy, democratic   countries   and   IGOs’   (Reimann 2006, p.65). This also applies where 
significant amounts of donor funding have been made available to SNGOs, which are widely 
estimated to be 80-90% dependent on foreign funding in many cases (Uvin 2000, p.16; Risse 2002, 
p.260). All but nine of 120 NGOs established in Kenya from 1993-6 received all their income from 
foreign sources (The Economist 2000), while research in Uganda has found foreign funding is the 
‘main   determinant’   of   NGO   survival   (Burger and Owens 2011, p.1). Likewise, Chandhoke (2005, 
p.362) suggests   SNGO   involvement   in   ‘global   civil   society’   is   largely   a   means   of   connecting      to  
Western NGOs and through them to powerful Western donor states, while Tvedt (2002, p.371) 
argues   SNGOs’   limited   leverage   in   the   international   aid   system   derives   from   their   hegemonic  
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function as the needy beneficiaries that legitimise it. Cheru (2000, p.260) argues that such foreign 
dependency  of  African  NGOs  ‘influences  their  priorities  and  agendas’  and  leads  to  ‘accountability  to  
foreign  interests  and  external  ideological  direction’.   
 
These patterns are not confined to developing countries or the international development sector, as 
the   ‘global   civil   society’   clustered   around   IGOs   is   also   heavily  Western-dominated. European and 
North American NGOs accounted for two-thirds of NGOs with UN consultative status in 2007, a drop 
of only thirteen percentage points since eligibility was expanded in 1996 (Global Policy Forum 2009). 
Moreover, SNGOs are represented mainly in the lowest category with fewest rights, while the top 
two categories are reserved for INGOs, disproportionately based in the North. This is confirmed by 
Katz’s  network  analysis  of   INGO  distribution, which finds 80% based in high-income countries and 
nearly three-quarters in Western Europe or North America. Contrary to the horizontal, egalitarian 
expectations   of   liberal   network   theory,   ‘A clear core/semi-periphery/periphery   structure’   also  
emerges in network nodes and links, with more than half in the US, UK, Belgium, France or Germany. 
In  fact,  ‘differences between core, semi-periphery, and periphery are considerably more pronounced 
in  the  INGO  network’  and  ‘its  core  is  also  more  biased  to  the  north  than that of the inter-state and 
trade  networks’,  so  that  it  reproduces  ‘hegemonic  networks  of  states  and  global  capitalism’ (2006, 
pp.340–344).  
 
Accentuating all these inequalities is the fact that even among NNGOs, revenue is concentrated in a 
small number of large organisations. The top 20% of European development NGOs received over 
90% of funding in 1993 (Woods 2000, p.17), while in the US the nine largest development NGOs 
accounted for nearly half of revenue in 2008 (OECD 2011, p.11). This obviously affects NGO capacity 
at  the  global  level,  where  the  costliness  of  international  lobbying  makes  it  ‘simply  inaccessible  to  the  
vast  majority  of  organizations’,  creating  ‘a  real  hierarchy between them (which is often simplified as 
a north/south cleavage, [which is] revealing but very clearly insufficient, [as] inequalities and 
hierarchies reproduce themselves at all levels)’  (Pouligny 2001, pp.10–12).  
Hegemonic  ‘Global  Civil  Society’ 
From a Gramscian perspective, top-down support of global civil society activities appears as a 
hegemonic manufacturing of consent and while significant differences may exist between individual 
states on particular issues, in general there is a shared discourse among Western states and a broad 
consensus on the general parameters of international development (Tvedt 2002, 2006), 
humanitarian and human rights policy. This is illustrated by the shift of all the major donors towards 
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supporting NGOs and civil society in the 1980s and 1990s and also by the contemporaneous shift 
towards reduced aid overall and increased humanitarian assistance by many donors (Development 
Initiatives 2000, p.1; 4; 9–10; 60).  
 
This is reinforced by donor efforts to coordinate, harmonise, and standardise funding criteria 
through hegemonic projects such the Millennium Development Goals, the Monterrey Aid Compact, 
the   OECD’s   Paris   Principles   and   the   Accra   Agenda   (OECD 2008); increased collaboration among 
foundations and Western governments and the general ideological compatibility of their activities 
(Pinter 2001, p.205; Anheier and Daly 2004, p.159; Roelofs 2007, p.480; Spero 2010) and personnel 
circulation between governments, IGOs, foundations (Spero 2010, pp.2–6) and NGOs, which also 
generates similarities of outlook.  
 
Against this backdrop, NGO strategies to protect their autonomy by spreading financial dependency 
across a range of individual donors (Pinter 2001, p.212) appear insufficient from a Gramscian 
perspective if the end result is dependency on a broader variety of capitalist elites. While the 
substantial increases in civil society financial dependency on donors indicate a probable loss of 
autonomy in this class sense, this is reinforced by the  numerous  ‘control  mechanisms’,  or  modes  of  
governance,  that  have  accompanied  the  outsourcing  or  ‘disaggregation’  of  governance  functions  to  
NGOs. It is argued here that this is largely responsible for the new forms of apparently cooperative 
multi-actor governance networks and partnership observed in the liberal literature, so that ‘The shift 
from  government  (state  power  on  its  own)  to  governance  (a  broader  conﬁguration  of  state and key 
elements  in  civil  society)  has…been  marked  under  neoliberalism’  (Harvey 2007a, p.76).  
 
The increased significance of these control mechanisms manifests itself in various ways. First, the 
exigencies of applying and accounting for funding from donors have encouraged NGOs to engage in 
corporate behaviours, re-shaping them as actors. Numerous scholars have shown how neoliberal 
management techniques like log-frames and performance management have become embedded in 
NGO practices (Donini 1995, pp.429–430; 2003a, 2003b; Shivji 2007, p.33), which Donini attributes 
to   ‘donor   pressure   to   conform   to   established   norms   and   standards’.   Contractual   incentives   and  
competitive pressures in the state-subsidised  NGO  ‘market’  (Cooley and Ron 2002) encourage other 
corporate behaviours too, from competition for market share and oligopolisation (Uvin 2000, p.20; 
Woods 2000, p.17), to professionalisation, ‘institutional  isomorphism’  (Tvedt 2002, pp.369–370) and 
inflated executive pay (Charity Navigator 2010; Devex 2013). Another aspect is that donor 
preferences for channelling   funds   to   SNGOs   via   their   ‘own’   NGOs   have   situated   NNGOs   as  
91 
 
intermediaries that monitor and control the behaviour of their Southern NGO partners on behalf of 
Western donors. This has created lasting hierarchies of power among Northern and Southern NGOs 
(Uvin 2000, p.16; 2003, p.256; Agg 2006, pp.24–26) and reinforced patterns of power in global civil 
society that reflect those in the interstate system and global market.  
 
Second, even though donor funding often accounts for a minority of NGO resources, it can structure 
the locations, types of activities and discourses chosen by NGOs. Research by Koch et al. finds the 
three   strongest   predictors   of   the   geographic   location   of   NGO   aid   are:   location   choices   of   oﬃcial  
‘‘backdonors”;   ‘herding’   effects   related   to   whether other NGOs are already in the country; and 
shared  colonial  history.  By  contrast  they  find  ‘only  limited  evidence  that  poverty  aﬀects  the  NGOs’  
choice   to   be   active   in   a   country’   and   conclude   ‘NGOs   behave   less   autonomously   than   widely  
believed’   (2009, p.913; 902). Another aspect of this is that shared donor preferences for certain 
types of civil society activity and government and IGO restrictions on political activities, as conditions 
of   tax   exemption   or   access   to   international   fora,   ‘channel’   NGOs   into   depoliticised   tactics   and  
discourses. Roelofs (2003) has documented the ways in which foundations exert hegemonic 
influence   on   civil   society   ‘by   promoting   consent   and   discouraging   dissent   against   capitalist  
democracy’,  but  the  modalities  she  identifies are equally applicable to other donors. They include: 
creating ideology and the common wisdom; providing positions and status for intellectuals; 
controlling   access   to   resources…compensating   for   market   failures;   steering   protest  
movements into safe channels; and supporting those institutions by which policies are 
initiated and implemented (2007, p.480).  
In particular, foundations  ‘channelled’  radical  social  movement  activity  towards  professionalism  and  
legalistic strategies from the 1960s onwards (Jenkins and Eckert 1986), mainly by favouring 
moderate reformist organisations that approached social problems as resolvable through social-
scientific expertise, rather than as political and economic conflicts of interests (Roelofs 2003, p.121). 
Similar trends persist in the international human rights sector,  where  ‘less  radical  NGOs,  which  take  
a more compromising, apolitical stance, and adopt the agenda promoted by their donors, or, at 
least, did  not  directly  challenge  it,  are  likely  to  get  a  larger  share  of  the  pie’  (Gordon and Berkovitch 
2006, p.17).  Likewise,  Tvedt  argues  that  ‘tens  of  thousands  of  NGOs  have  been  mobilised  to  work  for  
basically  the  same  secular  development  language’,  leading  to  a  discursive conformity he refers to as 
‘NGO-speak’  (2002, pp.369–370, 2006, p.687). This same is true of donor funding generally, meaning 
more moderate organisations that stick to widely accepted hegemonic norms and discursive frames 
like civil and political rights or humanitarianism will find it easier to attract revenue. This helps to 
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explain the concentration of NGO resources in a relatively small number of super-NGOs that act as 
‘safe  hands’  for  donor  funding.   
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine in more detail the extent to which NGOs can be considered 
autonomous, versus the extent to which they form part of the global hegemonic structure and what 
the character of NGOs says about the nature of the global system particular global governance. Here 
it  is  argued  that  Gramsci’s  parallel  concept  of  hegemony  offers  a  powerful  insightful  into  the  place  of  
international civil society in the international system, which incorporates the economic, coercive and 
consensual dimensions of power and coherently theorises their interrelationship. This is because the 
relationship between states and civil society can be better comprehended through a Gramscian 
approach, which, instead of idealising civil society and separating it from state and market, theorises 
how  ‘state’,  ‘market’  and  civil  society  are  interwoven  through  class  relations  and  interests.       
 
Using case studies of the landmines campaign, which is widely perceived to be an example of NGO 
influence that illustrates the shift to a multi-actor system of global governance, and the cluster 
munitions campaign, which consciously emulated it, the thesis will analyse in detail the relationship 
between   ‘global   civil   society’   and   states   in   the   international   system.   Building   on   Gramsci’s  
conception of the nature of hegemony and the role of civil society in creating and maintaining it, the 
question of the degree of civil society autonomy from the state, and therefore from the capitalist 
elites that form the state, is central to analysing the place of civil society in global governance.  
 
Derived from a class-based Gramscian perspective on civil society and also from the wider academic 
literature on NGOs, civil society and social movements discussed above, the  campaigns’ autonomy is 
analysed along four dimensions – the economic and organisational basis of the campaigns and their 
tactical and discursive practices. Funding, organisation and personnel constitute the material 
structure of the two campaigns, while tactics and discourse can be seen as their superstructures. 
Consistent with a historical materialist ontology that posits a mutually constitutive relationship 
between base and superstructure in which the former plays a primary role in shaping the broad 
parameters of practice and discourse – which can nonetheless significantly vary – these four 
dimensions are regarded as interactive and recursive within parameters delimited by the material 
structure and the broader context of the Western-dominated international system in which the 
campaigns took place. The next chapter outlines the methodology used to assess the extent of NGO 
autonomy as operationalised in the case study chapters.  
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
This thesis examines the NGO campaigns on landmines and cluster munitions as a way of 
illuminating the nature and conditions of NGO influence in the international system and the 
implications of this for global governance in an age of multi-actor   ‘partnerships’.   This   chapter  
elaborates the methodology used to achieve this and is divided into two main parts. The first briefly 
outlines the rationale for the case study selection and how NGO autonomy was conceived and 
operationalised. The second outlines the analytical framework and indicators used in the case 
studies and how they were operationalised and assessed. The point of departure for developing this 
methodology was the critical Gramscian Marxist framework elaborated in the previous chapter. To 
paraphrase Marx and Engels (1975), this choice of  theoretical approach arose from a concern not 
merely to interpret the world, but to contribute to changing it – or  in  Robert  W.  Cox’s  (1981) more 
academic language, to engage in critical rather than problem-solving theory. An alternative 
framework may well have produced different conclusions, as multiple interpretations of social 
phenomena from multiple class perspectives and variations of subordinate and elites 
consciousnesses are possible. However, only a critical Gramscian Marxist framework is capable of 
providing both a rigorous theoretical alternative to dominant liberal-constructivist narratives and 
suggesting practical forms of class-based   praxis   that   avoid   the   political   sterility   of   ‘radically  
indeterminate’  postmodernist  approaches  (Laclau and Mouffe 2001).  
 
Case Study Selection 
The main rationale for choosing the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster 
Munitions Coalition (CMC) as case studies was that the ICBL is considered the exemplar of a new 
type of civil society engagement in global governance, while the CMC consciously built on the 
perceived success of the ICBL model. The two case studies are similar enough to provide valid 
comparison  on   ‘most   like’   grounds   and   as   they   span   the period in which the literature considers 
‘global  civil  society’  to  have  emerged  and  its  role  in  global  governance  to  have  evolved  they  provide  
a test case through which to examine these new relationships.  
 
A security related campaign was chosen for two main reasons. First, according to realist assumptions 
(Guzzini 1998; Donnelly 2000), NGO influence might  be  expected  to  be  limited  to  ‘soft’  issues  and  to  
have   little  purchase  on  ‘hard’   issues   like  security.  This  would  seem  to  make  the  campaigns  a   ‘hard  
case’.  Second,   international  security  discourse  has  been  undergoing  a  process  of  redefinition  since 
the   end   of   the   Cold  War,  whereby   its   focus   has   shifted   from   an   exclusive   concern  with   ‘national  
94 
 
security’   to   also   include   the   concept   of   ‘human   security’. As a result, the security agenda has 
expanded to encompass development, human rights and humanitarian issues, suggesting a change 
in hegemonic ideas related to the legitimisation of force. The landmines and cluster munitions 
campaigns are generally seen as having contributed to this shift, so examining them can shed light 
on the broader hegemonic significance of these international reframing processes.  
 
The major variation between the two campaigns is timing and geopolitical context. The ICBL was one 
of the first high profile NGO campaigns after the end of the Cold War and occurred when expanded 
civil society engagement in global governance was in its infancy and optimism about a more 
cooperative international order was prevalent. It also coincided with the emergence of concepts of 
‘global  civil  society’,  ‘global  governance’  and  ‘partnership’  as  hegemonic  discourses  and  the  birth  of  
the  new  ‘human  security’  paradigm,  but  predated  the  shift in the international security environment 
after 9/11 when there was a return to a more traditional national security-oriented presentation of 
US interests under President Bush.  
 
By contrast, the CMC took place under markedly different geopolitical conditions. Although its roots 
lay  in  NATO’s  use  of  cluster  bombs  during  its  ‘humanitarian  intervention’  in  Serbia  in  1999,  the  CMC  
was not formally launched until 2003 after the US and UK used cluster munitions in Iraq. As the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) was agreed in 2008, the entirety of the campaign took place 
during   the   ‘War   on   Terror’   under   a   US   administration   hostile   to   liberal   internationalism.   This  
historical variation allows assessment of the extent to which the role of NGOs was conjunctural to 
the cooperative conditions of the immediate post-Cold War period, or reflects more enduring 
changes in the international system. The case study chapters are therefore presented 
chronologically, beginning with the landmine campaign in 1991 and concluding with the 
implementation  of  the  cluster  munitions  convention.  This  allows  the  evolution  of  NGO  or  ‘global  civil  
society’   participation   in   an   evolving   global   hegemonic   order   of   multi-actor governance and a 
changing international security system to be traced over the two decades since the end of the Cold 
War.  
Autonomy  
NGO/civil society autonomy is central to this study. As discussed in Chapter 1, civil society in the 
liberal tradition is conceptualised as an autonomous sphere discrete from state and market, and on 
this basis the literature generally assumes NGO autonomy for empirical purposes. Due to the 
strength of this assumption, there has been little empirical investigation of whether this is the case 
in practice, and the potential implications if NGOs are not autonomous, in terms of their practices 
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and discourse, have generally not been considered. The Gramscian perspective discussed in Chapter 
2 problematises the assumption of civil society autonomy, and expects autonomy from capitalist 
elites to be difficult to achieve and that in practice the majority of CSOs will normally play a role in 
generating consent to hegemonic power structures by propagating hegemonic ideas and organising 
hegemonic compromises with subordinate groups on behalf of the capitalist class. Consequently, 
defining what constitutes autonomy for civil society organisations and developing ways to assess it 
are essential in order to analyse the nature, conditions and political significance of NGO influence on 
states and on the outcomes of internationally negotiated policies.  
 
The autonomy of the two NGO campaigns is analysed vis-à-vis Western states, particularly the small 
and middle powers that were significant actors in the campaigns, IGOs, and private foundations that 
are major funders of NGO activities in the relevant issue areas of development, humanitarian aid, 
human rights, and arms control. This range of actors was chosen as the subsection of international 
hegemonic elites on which NGOs depend for financial and political support. This is a significant 
departure from conventional approaches to autonomy, which tend to treat it as a matter of 
independence from individual state actors. This occludes the possibility of broader structural 
dependence on a web of interlinked international organisations, national agencies and private elites 
and investigating whether and how this dependence is linked to the framing of NGO goals to be 
compatible with a broad consensus among Western elites in the global system.  
 
The financial, organisational and personnel basis of the campaigns and their tactical and discursive 
practices are the four dimensions along which their autonomy is analysed. These dimensions are 
derived from a class-based Gramscian perspective towards civil society and the wider academic 
literature on NGOs, civil society and social movements. Funding, organisation and personnel 
constitute the material structure of the two campaigns, while tactics and discourse can be seen as 
their superstructures.  
Structure and Analytical Framework of the Case Studies 
Each case study is covered by two chapters, the first chapter contains an analysis of the political 
context in which the campaigns took place, including relevant changes in the international system, 
elite interests in the issue and the origins of NGO involvement, the nature of landmines and cluster 
munitions as weapons, and their history on the international agenda. This is followed by an 
examination of the material structure of the campaigns in terms of their internal organisation, 
financial and personnel resources.  The  second  chapter  on  each  case  study  examines  the  campaign’s  
super structure that is the tactics and discourses that emerged within that broad historical context 
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and out of the specific material basis described in the first chapter. The chapter then assesses their 
influence, both on a practical issue-specific basis and also in term of wider outcomes related to elite 
interests and global power relations. How each of these dimensions was examined and assessed is 
now elaborated. 
Context  
The origins of NGO involvement in landmines and cluster munitions and the practices and discourse 
of the two campaigns are historicised against a wider material and ideational backdrop. This 
involved identifying general material and ideational changes in the international security system that 
facilitated the placing of the two issues on to the international agenda. It specifically investigates 
NGO involvement and how the interests of states and IGOs in relation to landmines and cluster 
munitions evolved. The primary sources used are listed in Table 3.1; in addition to this practitioner 
accounts and secondary literature were used to develop the narrative framework.  
 
Table 3.1 Primary Sources on Context  
a) General changes in the international security system 
Data on historical trends in armed conflict (e.g. Uppsala Conflict Data Project, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute Yearbooks, Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict 
Research’s  Conflict  Barometer  etc.);  media  coverage  of  recent  conflicts;  documents and 
quantitative data on international security interventions (e.g. from UN, Global Policy Forum 
website etc.) 
 
Major reports and policy documents on security, especially human security, produced by the 
donor community, including: donor governments (e.g. US National Security Strategies, Canadian 
Human Security Policies), IGOs (e.g. UNDP), foundations, high level panels/commissions etc.   
b) Specific changes in state and IO interests vis-à-vis landmines and cluster munitions 
Materials on the history of landmines and cluster munitions use and the post-conflict problem, 
including: histories, media reports, government documents, UN documents (e.g. Secretary-
General’s  Reports  and  Statements)  and  other  IO  documents  (e.g.  Geneva  International  Centre  
for Humanitarian Demining), practitioner journals, ICRC and campaign documents, especially 
Landmine Monitor/Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor. 
Materials on the arms industry and international arms transfers from: think tanks (e.g. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute); UN data; government agencies (e.g. US 
Department of Defense); and industry news sources. 
Documents on state positions, including: statements during the diplomatic processes on 
landmines and cluster munitions; personal observation of at Dublin Diplomatic Conference on 
97 
 
Cluster Munitions, May 2008, government and political party policy documents and statements; 
multilateral statements (e.g. NAM, G77 and China); public statements and articles by politicians; 
leaked US embassy cables  etc. 
c) History of international efforts to address landmines and cluster munitions 
Documents on international disarmament and international humanitarian law processes, 
including: UN documents (conference documents, reports by groups of experts, treaties, 
General Assembly resolutions, UN  Yearbooks etc.); ICRC documents; bilateral documents; arms 
control practitioner journals (e.g. Disarmament Diplomacy, Arms Control Today, Disarmament 
Forum); practitioner accounts (e.g. blogs, book chapters, journal articles etc.). 
Organisation  
Examining the organisation of the campaigns involved assessing whether they reproduced the 
hierarchical patterns of power that exist in the interstate system and global market, or if they 
offered an alternative, horizontal and non-hierarchical mode of organisation, as liberal network 
theories suggests (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram et al. 2002a). Factors included in this are - the 
geographic distribution and chronological development of the campaigns; comparative levels of 
activity in the North and the South; the balance between formal and informal decision-making 
procedures; and the location of lead organisations. This aspect also involved identifying the lead 
NGOs in each campaign, using the following criteria: involvement in founding the campaigns and 
length of participation; formal and informal leadership roles, such as representing the campaign at 
international  conferences  or  in  the  global  media;  acting  as  ‘switchers’  between  NGO  and  state/elite  
networks (Castells 2000, p.16); financial contributions and control of financial resources; and 
discursive contributions to major campaign publications and overall organisational resources. 
 
As I was carrying out my research, an opportunity arose to attend the final negotiations of the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in May 2008 as part of a team of student interns from 
Dublin City University, which the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs had requested at short notice to 
assist them with basic organisational aspects of the Dublin Conference. This included distributing 
draft documents to delegate, helping with room set-up etc., and effectively meant I had full access 
to almost all negotiating sessions, including ‘informals’ closed to the public and even academics. This 
provided a unique opportunity to observe at first hand the interaction of NGOs, states and IGOs and 
gain a more direct sense of the power dynamics at play than would otherwise have been possible. At 
no point was any request made for a confidentiality agreement, but in accordance with the ethical 
obligations of producing an academic thesis, I have nonetheless avoided directly reproducing exactly 
what identifiable individual government and NGO representatives said in what they believed to be 
private informal diplomatic negotiations closed to public scrutiny. Instead, I have used the 
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experience more to give a broad sense of the political atmosphere and inter-actor dynamics of the 
proceedings and have generally cited alternative publicly available sources to substantiate insights 
initially gained through personal observation as to the positions and actions of participants.  
 
In addition to this, information was gathered from the sources listed in Table 3.2. Obtaining primary 
sources was easier for the more recent CMC, whereas a much larger secondary literature was 
available on the ICBL. This included the many available participant accounts of the campaigns (Wiebe 
2003; Cave 2006; Borrie 2009; Bolton and Nash 2010), which were particularly numerous and useful 
in the case of the ICBL. This included first-hand accounts by NGO representatives (Peters n.d.; 
Carstairs 1997; Wareham 1998, 2006a, 2006b, 2008a; Warmington and Tuttle 1998; White and 
Rutherford 1998; Williams and Goose 1998, 2008; Chabasse 1998; Atwood 1999; Rutherford 1999a, 
2000a, 2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2010; 2002; Anderson 2000; Mekata 2000; Scott 2001; Brem and 
Rutherford 2001; 2003; Bernstein 2008; Goose et al. 2008), as well as governments (2002, 1997a; 
Axworthy 1998a; Axworthy and Taylor 1998; Lawson et al. 1998; English 1998; Hubert 1998, 2000; 
Bleicher 2000; Brinkert 2003; 2004; Smith 2008; Kmentt 2008) and the ICRC (Maslen 1998, 2001a, 
2004a; Maslen and Herby 1998; Benesch et al. 1999; Maresca et al. 2000a; Davis 2004; Herby and La 
Haye 2007).  
 
The Internet was still a novelty from 1991-7 during the main campaigning phase of the ICBL and its 
‘headquarters’,  at  the  Vietnam  Veterans  of  American Foundation (VVAF) where the ICBL Coordinator 
was based, did not establish dedicated webpages until March 1996, while a separate ICBL website 
was only established in 1998 (Rutherford 1999b). The other lead NGOs, and many other member 
NGOs and national ban campaigns, also posted campaign information on their websites, much of 
which  is also accessible through the WayBack Machine or Internet Archive, which caches obsolete 
webpages dating back to 1996. This included Landmine Updates sent to the membership by the ICBL 
Coordinator, conference information, membership lists and so forth and provided an invaluable 
insight into events as they occurred, as opposed to how they have subsequently been presented.  
 
Reflecting the participant nature of the much of the existing literature on the landmines and cluster 
munitions campaigns – and civil society in general – the dominant methodological approach has 
been  to recount personal experiences and/or conduct interviews with leading figures in NGOs, 
governments and IGOs, in many cases known to the interviewee. As a result, the literature on the 
campaigns  has  a  definite  ‘insider’  quality  and  a  tendency  to  reproduce  hegemonic  elite  perspectives,  
which the current analysis was concerned to avoid given its critical Gramscian approach. A 
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deliberate decision was therefore taken not to interview campaign participants, but to rely instead 
on contemporary documents and theoretically-informed critique of dominant liberal-constructivist 
participant-academic narratives. This was methodologically justifiable given the wealth of primary 
and secondary source material available and helped ensure an alternative, more detached and more 
critical perspective. The goal in not conducting interviews was therefore to avoid reproducing the 
subjective perspectives of campaign participants, as has so often been the case in the existing 
literature, but rather to focus instead on more objective factors, such as the material organisational, 
financial and personnel basis of the campaigns, their actual tactical practices and the discourses and 
arguments they articulated in public, rather than the viewpoints they would have liked to express, 
but kept diplomatically to themselves. or their subjective intentions in choosing particular practical 
courses of action.  
Table 3.2 Primary Sources on Organisation 
Campaign membership lists 
Reports of NGO meetings and other international conferences 
Diplomatic records  
NGO websites, newsletters, reports, videos and photographs  
External evaluations commissioned by donors 
Media reports  
Financial basis 
Financial dependency is the most obvious potential constraint on autonomy and the most frequently 
mentioned in the literature (Smillie 1993; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Hudock 1999; Pinter 2001; 
Tvedt 2002; Rieff 2003; Roelofs 2003, 2007; Van Rooy 2004, pp.117–9; Zaleski 2006; Chikoto 2007, 
2009; Stavrianakis 2010). Rigorous studies of the impact of levels of dependency on NGO 
behaviour are few, although one such study found a strong propensity for German NGOs to 
establish operations in donor-favoured locations, irrespective of variations in their level of 
financial dependency on states,  and that the correlation between poverty and the volume 
of aid allocation weakened once NGOs became more than 70% ODA-dependent (Dreher et 
al. 2010, pp.13–15). Roelofs (2003, p.124) argues a ten percent stake can produce significant 
influence similar to a minority shareholder. Assessing the effect of financial dependence is 
really only possible on a case-by-case basis and by relating it to the other autonomy 
indicators, which allows deterministic assumptions to be avoided. 
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Due to their size and breadth, it was impossible to comprehensively track the funding of the 
campaigns, especially for the ICBL, which published no central accounts. The situation was more 
straightforward  for  the  CMC,  but  in  both  cases  ‘headquarters’  funding  was  only  a  small  proportion  of  
overall income. Consequently, lead NGO funding was also analysed, with particular emphasis on 
campaign-specific expenditure. Primary sources included: campaign and NGO reports; accounts from 
NGOs and foundations filed with government bodies, such as the US Internal Revenue Service; 
online charity portals, such as GuideStar (http://www.guidestar.org.uk/default.aspx, 
http://www2.guidestar.org/), Charities Direct http://www.charitiesdirect.com/, Better Business 
Bureau http://www.bbb.org/us/bbb-accredited-businesses/, and the Foundation Center 
http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/990finder/); and government and IGO funding data. 
Additional information was gathered from secondary literature. Data quality has markedly improved 
since the early 1990s, with NGOs increasingly publishing relatively detailed annual accounts, so more 
specific information was available for the CMC. However, few NGOs publish breakdowns of 
campaign-specific income detailing the amounts provided by each donor or which activities 
individual donors paid for. Where possible, this information was compiled from other sources, 
including funding acknowledgements for publications, conferences and campaign events, and 
secondary literature. 
 
Table 3.3 Primary Sources on Financial Basis  
NGO, CMC and ICBL reports 
NGO accounts and tax returns filed with government agencies, from GuideStar database, UK 
Companies Office etc.  
Foundation websites, annual reports and tax returns filed with US authorities 
Funding acknowledgements for publications, conferences, campaign events etc. 
Personnel  
Numerous authors have identified a  ‘revolving  door’  between  NGOs,  IGOs  and  government  in  terms  
of jobs and board appointments as a potential threat to NGO autonomy (Donini 1995, p.424; 
Gordenker and Weiss 1995, pp.545–6; Baehr 1996; Tvedt 1998, 2002; Pouligny 2001; Rieff 2003; 
Wallace 2003a; Zaleski 2006; Dearden 2006, p.262; Bond 2008, p.16). Such elite circulation is most 
conspicuous among large, high profile INGOs, whose top personnel, or leading intellectuals, occupy a 
similar professional echelon to their government and IGO counterparts. This can be seen as a type of 
transformism, but its scale has not been assessed and its implications for NGO autonomy remain 
under-analysed, in part because the idealisation of NGOs has led to exceptional tolerance of what 
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would otherwise be seen as conflicts of interest (Tvedt 2006, p.688). Professionalisation in the NGO 
sector can be seen as a broader form of hegemonic compromise targeted at intellectual groups that 
particularly in developing countries distances NGO staff from the marginalised groups they claim to 
‘represent’.  All  of  these  factors  could  lead  to  paternalistic  attitudes  towards  subordinate  groups  and 
a  “servile”  attitude  towards  elites  or  identification  with  them,  which  Gramsci  (1971, p.97) regards as 
indicative of intellectuals  identified with dominant class interests.  
 
Similar indicators to those used to identify lead NGOs were employed to identify lead personnel. 
Data gathered mainly from Internet searches was used to reconstruct career trajectories, 
remuneration levels and educational and social backgrounds, enabling the type of personnel 
involved to be qualitatively analysed, in addition to quantitative analysis of elite circulation. Evidence 
of personal connections with elites and information on the types of elites supportive of the 
campaigns was also collated from primary and secondary sources (Table 3.4). Data on remuneration 
was difficult to find, aside from scattered information in NGO accounts, media reports and 
secondary literature. Norwegian NGOs were the exception, as the government has published the tax 
returns of all citizens online since 2006. An additional dimension of elite relations is the composition 
of lead NGO boards, so information on this was also gathered.  Boards are relevant to autonomy, 
given their role in overseeing NGOs and setting, or at least approving, their strategic direction. 
Directors   typically   ‘approve   annual   budgets;   hire;   review   and fire the chief executive officer; and 
control  major  corporate  policy  decisions’  and  are  also  often  involved  in  operational  matters,  such  as  
approving new programmes and advocacy positions (Natsios 1995, pp.408–9),  representing the 
organisation to external stakeholders and fundraising (McNamara 2010).   
 
Table 3.4 Sources of Personnel Data 
NGO websites, annual reports and accounts  
Internet searches, including employer websites, LinkedIn, biographies provided to the media and in 
campaign publications 
Media reports, especially interviews and profiles of key individuals   
Secondary literature 
Tactics  
Campaign strategies can  be  differentiated  by  a  preference  for  ‘insider’  or  ‘outsider’  tactics  (Van Rooy 
2004, pp.24–5; Stavrianakis 2010). The former are persuasive techniques aimed at elites (Table 3.5) 
and appear characteristic of NGOs, given lobbying, access to decision-makers, expertise and 
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professionalism are commonly identified as key determinants of their impact (Clark 1995; Cameron 
1998, 1999; Albin 1999; Risse 2000; Reinalda 2001; Arts 2003). Insider tactics reinforce personnel 
circulation   and   professionalisation   as   they   require   elite   access,   ‘expertise,   credibility   and  
constructive   policy   proposals’   (Stavrianakis 2010, p.65), which in turn require fluency in donor 
language derived from similarities of educational training and professional background. Lobbying at 
international conferences and conducting rigorous research also require substantial and reliable 
income streams, which are often most readily accessible from institutional donors, potentially 
reducing financial independence. From a Gramscian perspective, this type of activity can be 
understood in terms of generating active consent among elites at the core of hegemonic alliances 
(Gramsci 1971, p.104).  It includes the way that NGOs contribute articles to specialist publications, 
publish technical research aimed at practitioners, and organise seminars and roundtables aimed at 
policy-making communities, often in conjunction with governments, IGOs or foundations.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 Typology of Insider Tactics 
Lobbying elites and enlisting their public support 
Organising professional seminars, roundtables  
Professional, expert research & publications (e.g. in practitioner/academic journals) 
Participating in government/IGO civil society consultations 
Membership of government delegations to international conferences 
Advocacy partnerships with elites 
 
Outsider tactics aim at generating or demonstrating wider public support. From a Gramscian 
perspective, they can range from manufacturing or manipulating passive or fraudulent public 
consent to extant, or moderately reformed, hegemonic projects at one end of the scale, to 
constructing an alternative hegemonic consciousness based on active mass participation and the 
critical, informed consent of subordinate groups at the other. Consequently, they encompass a 
broad spectrum of passive, routine and contentious tactics.  
 
Passive outsider tactics seek to generate passive public consent to predefined agendas, for instance 
through advertising or media appearances, and/or to demonstrate or at least create the impression 
public consent exists, for instance through opinion polling or claims of public support. Such 
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strategies usually require substantial financial resources to pay for advertising slots and marketing 
companies and rely heavily on the mainstream media, meaning good media contacts and skills, such 
as the ability to convey campaign messages in simple sound-bites, are essential. Routine outsider 
tactics are similar, but seek a somewhat more active consent characterised by fleeting, 
undemanding forms of participation, for instance asking people to sign petitions or send form emails 
or letters to politicians in support of predefined objectives. The orientation of such tactics towards 
public consent is predominantly instrumental; a means of influencing elite decision-makers, rather 
than an end in itself, or stepping stone to deeper public engagement. 
 
By contrast, contentious tactics aim to mobilise active participation and critical engagement and can 
be as much about building an alternative hegemonic consciousness as specific policy goals. They 
typically correspond to stronger, but not necessarily more widespread, public support, as they 
require strong personal commitment and even risk. A preference for routine over such contentious, 
or   ‘extra-institutional’,   activities   is   often   identified   as   a   key   difference   between   NGOs   and   social  
movements (Tarrow 1998, p.2; 8, 2001, p.10; Khagram et al. 2002a, pp.7–8) and tends to correspond 
to   reformist   rather   than   ‘transformist’  objectives   (Stavrianakis 2010). Table 3.6 lists a spectrum of 
outsider tactics from passive to routine and contentious practices.  
 
Table 3.6 Typology of Outsider Tactics 
Professional advertising campaigns  
Professional media strategies: press releases, press conferences, media appearances, publicity 
stunts 
Opinion polling 
Petitions 
Encouraging online activism 
Open public meetings & debates 
Face-to-face canvassing  
Volunteer activist groups 
Mobilising affected, marginalised groups 
Consumer boycotts 
Mass demonstrations  
Sit-ins, strikes, pickets, non-violent direct action 
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For both campaigns the prevalence and strategic centrality of each type of tactic, particularly for the 
lead NGO, was assessed in order to determine their overall tactical orientation. Relative spend, 
sequencing and timing were key indicators of this, in particular whether the campaigns began with 
insider or outsider tactics. Table 3.7 lists the main sources consulted.  
 
Table 3.7 Sources on Tactics 
Campaign strategy documents 
Campaign and lead NGO newsletters, activity reports, annual reports and websites 
External evaluations by funders and public assessments by NGOs of progress (e.g. articles in  
practitioner journals, blog posts) 
Media reports 
Participant accounts  
Secondary literature 
 
Discourse  
The question of discursive autonomy is generally not addressed in the liberal literature, which 
distances NGO ideas from material conditions and assumes the norms NGOs promote are self-
evidently universal or beneficial. However the issue of discursive autonomy arises naturally from a 
Gramscian perspective. Assessing this form of autonomy required determining the extent to which 
campaign discourses significantly challenged elite interests; implicitly or explicitly, problematised 
prevailing power structures; reproduced, reinforced or undermined hegemonic ideas; or put forward 
alternative transformative frameworks. Central to this was the need to distinguish between 
‘politicising’   discourse   and   ‘depoliticising’   discourse.   ‘Politicising’   discourse   was   defined   as  
emphasising conflicts of interest surrounding campaign issues; explaining the broader historical, 
economic  or  geopolitical  context;  and  attributing  responsibility  to  identifiable  actors.  ‘Depoliticising’  
discourse was defined as the use of expert or moralistic arguments to frame issues as irrelevant to or 
above politics or an appeal to hegemonic norms for legitimacy.   
 
A key consideration in this respect was the relative prominence and predominance of politicising 
versus depoliticising discourses in the overall discourse of the campaigns. Particular attention was 
devoted in this respect to the framing of issues in official campaign statements and at key moments 
in the campaigns, as well as to Campaign  ‘Calls’  summarising  NGO  goals  and  how  they  changed  over  
time. Comparing this to the discourses of individual NGOs helped to determine which organisations 
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played leading or hegemonic roles in the sense of having their frames adopted by the campaign as a 
whole,  and  which  organisations’  frames  were  ‘mobilised  out’  by  the  ‘non-decision-making  power’  of  
other NGOs (Bachrach and Baratz 1962), so that they failed to reach official campaign agendas.  
 
Source materials in this area included NGO publicity materials aimed at the media and general public 
(Table 3.8) and specialised output targeted at expert and elite audiences.  
 
Table 3.8 Sources for Campaign Discourse 
General Publicity Materials 
Campaign  ‘Calls’  and  slogans 
Press releases, interviews and media articles 
Campaign and lead NGO websites 
Other campaign and lead NGO publications and imagery 
Targeted Materials  
Statements at diplomatic conferences 
Articles in professional/practitioner journals 
Detailed expert reports 
 
Interrelationships 
In general, mutually constitutive relationships are anticipated between the organisational, financial  
and personnel basis of the campaigns and their choice of tactics and discourse, so that the nature of 
NGOs as autonomous or elite-dependent actors is over determined. For instance, large amounts of 
donor funding and personnel circulation between NGOs and their intellectual counterparts in 
governments and IGOs are likely to encourage expensive insider and passive outsider tactics and also 
to coincide with further opportunities to raise more funds from the same sources. On the other 
hand, especially given the size and breadth of the campaigns, contradictory relations between these 
dimensions are also likely to exist, and no single dimension can be regarded as definitive. Autonomy 
is thus regarded as existing along a spectrum and therefore levels of independence will vary among 
the different member NGOs. Nonetheless,  a  general  estimation  of  the  campaigns’  overall  autonomy  
can be made, and therefore the significance of NGO influence on the campaign outcomes. 
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Chapter 4 – The International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(ICBL): Historical Context and Material Base  
 
The international NGO campaign on landmines is generally regarded as an exemplar of global civil 
society and its influence on global governance. Established in December 1992 by three American and 
three European NGOs, its primary goal was a ban on anti-personnel landmines (APMs), with 
secondary goals of a UN fund for mine clearance and awareness to  which  ‘countries  responsible  for  
the   production   and   dissemination   of   antipersonnel  mines’  would   ‘contribute’   (ICBL 1993; Lawson 
2002, p.105). By 1997 when the Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention (APLC) was agreed, it had 
grown to over a thousand member organisations in more than fifty countries and included 
humanitarian, human rights, arms control and development NGOs and religious groups (ICBL 1997a). 
UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supported the campaign from 
the   beginning   and   were   later   joined   by   a   ‘Core   Group’   of   supportive   states   led   by   Canada   and  
Norway, and consisting mainly of Western small and middle powers. This group of states organised 
an ad hoc series of negotiations known as the Ottawa Process from 1996-7 in response to the 
perceived failure of conventional UN arms control processes.  
 
The bulk of the sizeable academic and participant literature on the campaign examines the ICBL from 
a liberal or liberal-constructivist standpoint and presents it in terms of the positive qualities 
generally ascribed to global civil society and its role in global governance. Two of the main factors to 
which   this   literature   attributes   the   ICBL’s   success:   its   broad   international  membership and loose, 
horizontal network (Koh 1998a; Rutherford 1999b, 2000a; Edwards 2001; Rutherford and Matthew 
2003; Nye 2004, pp.90–91; Shawki 2010) structure (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998a; 
Cameron 1999; Mekata 2000; Warkentin and Mingst 2000; Kaldor 2003a, p.588); and the multi-actor 
governance partnership it involved between NGOs, small and middle powers, and UN agencies are 
the subject of this chapter.  External factors also seen to have facilitated success include a benign 
interpretation of the cooperative climate of the post-Cold War period (Cameron et al. 1998; English 
1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Lawson et al. 1998; Cameron 1999; Rutherford 1999a, 2003; 
Thakur and Maley 1999; Warkentin and Mingst 2000; Williams 2000; Hubert 2000; Hampson and 
Reid 2003), globalisation, and the information revolution (Mathews 1997b; Keohane and Nye Jr. 
1998, p.8; Rutherford 1999b, 2000a; Warkentin and Mingst 2000; Brem 2003; Nye 2004, pp.90–91; 
Shawki 2010). These interpretations see the campaign as exemplifying optimistic liberal-
constructivist narratives of a post-Cold   War   power   shift   to   ‘global   civil   society’   and   likeminded  
middle powers(Lawson 1997b; Hampson and Oliver 1998; Lawson et al. 1998; 2001a, 2001c; 
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Neumann 2002; Brinkert 2003; Rutherford et al. 2003; Behringer 2005; Sending and Neumann 2006), 
rooted in soft power and new forms of transnational organisation and partnership that democratise 
global governance. This account depends on the same elisions as the literature on global civil society 
and global governance critiqued in Chapter 1, vis-à-vis   civil   society’s   autonomy   from   elites,   its  
economic basis, class and North-South  relations  within  it  and  the  hegemonic  nature  of  its  ‘universal’  
discourses.  
 
This chapter critiques this dominant liberal-constructivist narrative of the landmines campaign  
through an examination of its material base,  including its sources of finance; leading personnel and 
elite links; and organisational structure, with particular attention paid to the inter-organisational and 
North/South hierarchies within it. It begins by contextualising the campaign in the pre- and post-
Cold War debates on landmines and the geopolitical conditions and institutional structures in which 
they took place. 
 
The Landmine Issue before 1990 
 
Internationally, concerns about mines were first raised during the Vietnam War, when they were 
used offensively on a large scale, causing more casualties than with purely defensive use (HRW and 
VVAF 1997, pp.4–11). This was facilitated by US development of remotely-delivered   ‘scatterable’  
mines in the late 1960s, which can be delivered in large quantities by artillery or aircraft and inhibit 
lateral and rearward as well as forward movement (HRW and PHR 1993, p.10; Prokosch 1995, 
pp.107–11). Because scatterables land on the surface they are easier to remove than conventional 
hand-buried mines, which the Vietnamese also lifted and re-used in improvised mines or booby-
traps – to such an extent that by 1969, 90% of the components were thought to be of US origin. 
Together with far fewer factory-made mines, such improvised explosive devices (IEDs) played an 
important role in Vietnam’s  victory  over  an  overwhelmingly  superior  force,  causing  at  least  a  third  of  
US casualties (HRW and VVAF 1997, pp.8–9), or 65,000 dead or wounded (Koh 1998a, p.659n178). 
Table 4.1 outlines these main landmine types.  
Table 4.1 Landmine Types  
Anti-personnel mines (APM) Activated by pedestrians 
Anti-vehicle mine (AVM) Activated by vehicles  
Conventional mine Hand-emplaced APM or AVM 
Scatterable mine APM or AVM delivered by aircraft or artillery 
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‘Smart’  mine APM or AVM self-destruct/self-neutralisation 
mechanisms 
‘Dumb’  mine Cheap, low-tech APM or AVM without self-
destruct/self-neutralisation mechanisms 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or 
Booby-Trap 
Improvised AVM or APM, sometimes made from 
scavenged mines or other unexploded ordnance 
(UXO); command-activated IEDs are also common 
Claymore An upright mine that can also be used in command 
mode 
 
The horrors of the Vietnam War helped precipitate the first IHL negotiations since the 1940s, which 
began in 1974 at the instigation of the ICRC and resulted in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions (1977a, 1977b). Parallel discussions on landmines, booby-traps, napalm, cluster 
munitions and other conventional weapons that were used during the War emerged out of this and 
after seven years of talks eventually produced the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to 
have Indiscriminate Effects.   
 
The  CCW’s  focus  on  conventional  weapons  rather  than  weapons  of  mass  destruction  (WMD)  and  its  
humanitarian framing represented a significant shift in international arms control and established a 
precedent developed by the ICBL. Its title contains the core IHL norms of proportionality and 
distinction   and   while   its   Preamble   states   that   it   contributes   to   ‘progress   towards   general   and  
complete  disarmament’  (CCW 1980), there are no actual disarmament measures in the convention. 
The main instigators of the CCW negotiations were the ICRC and Sweden, which had the support of 
fellow Western middle powers, Norway and Switzerland, and also Yugoslavia, Mexico, Egypt and 
Sudan representing non-aligned states (Prokosch 1995, pp.149–150; Rogers 2000). This group 
favoured strong regulations on mine use and banning delivery by aircraft, which would have 
outlawed many scatterables.  
 
Although popular opposition to the Vietnam War was a motivating factor for some states, there was 
little NGO participation, save for the presence of some Quaker representatives (Prokosch 1995, 
p.149). The USSR and the major Western military powers abstained from the General Assembly 
resolution establishing the negotiations (UNBISnet n.d.) and opposed meaningful restrictions, as 
each side viewed mines as an essential defence against the other. At the time, the US and USSR were 
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using mines in proxy conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan and also exporting large quantities to 
allied dictatorships and guerrilla forces. Official US conventional mine exports peaked at 1.4m in 
1975 and it bought large quantities of mines of all types throughout the 1980s, spending $450m on 
the weapons in 1987. Some of the most mine-affected states were also uninterested in regulating 
them and, as discussed below, demanded compensation for past use instead. Ideological 
contestation and national liberation struggles fostered a zero-sum approach to conflict, with a North 
Vietnamese  delegate  arguing  that  “a  weapon  used  by  the  imperialist  is  an  imperialist  weapon,”  but  
“In   the   hands   of   a   liberation   fighter…is   a   sacred   tool”,   and   condemning   the   IHL   concept   of  
“unnecessary  suffering”  as  “inadequate  and  dangerous”  (quoted in Prokosch 1995, p.155; p155 n9).  
 
Against this unpromising backdrop, the military and economic interests of the major NATO powers 
and the Soviets prevailed over humanitarian concerns raised by the Swedish-led group (Prokosch 
1995, pp.150–4). The French-Anglo-Dutch proposal on which the negotiations centred assumed 
landmines were not inherently inhumane or indiscriminate and could be used responsibly by 
adhering to the principles of proportionality and discrimination (Rogers 2000, pp.178–9). The result 
was an ineffectual Protocol that did not apply to internal conflicts, had no verification or 
enforcement mechanisms and imposed limitations on conventional mines qualified to the point of 
meaninglessness. Production, stockpiling and transfer were also outside its remit (Boutros-Ghali 
1994, p.12; US State Department 1994a) and a proposal by the Swedish-led group to ban 
scatterables was rejected in favour of requiring them to be self-neutralising, or for their location to 
be recorded (HRW and PHR 1993, p.300). Moreover, the injunction for advance warning to be given 
of  mine  attacks  was  subject  to  the  proviso  ‘unless  circumstances  do  not  permit’  (Article  5.2),  which  
was deemed to cover the need for surprise! (Maslen 2001a, pp.41–43) 
 
On the other hand, Protocol II applied equally to AVMs and APMs and was nominally linked to a 
wider disarmament agenda. It entered into force on December 3rd 1983 and annual General 
Assembly resolutions on the CCW helped keep landmines on the international agenda throughout 
the   1980s.   In   addition,   beginning   in   1975,   near   annual   resolutions   on   ‘material   remnants   of  war’  
sponsored by mine-affected  states  demanded  user  responsibility  and  compensation.  ‘As  most  of  the  
resolutions  also  identified  ‘colonial  powers’,  ‘foreign  occupation’  or  ‘developed  countries’  as  culprits,  
the problem was politicised in North-South terms.  
 
All the resolutions were sponsored solely by Southern states and from 1980-5, all 115-135 
governments voting in favour hailed from the South or East (UN General Assembly 1981), while 
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every Western state abstained, including Sweden, Norway and Switzerland, which had supported a 
strong CCW. This mirrored bloc voting on the NIEO and other issues, although the strongest 
opposition came from major Western users and producers like Britain, Italy , West Germany (UN 
1982, p.837) and the US, which tried to use its financial clout at the UN to suppress the issue (UN 
1983, p.1011). In addition, for Vietnam, Laos and Nicaragua, which co-sponsored several resolutions, 
compensation for landmines was linked to the wider issue of war reparations from the US. However, 
the vast majority of affected states failed to respond to UN requests for information on the problem 
(UN 1982, pp.836–7), probably due to a lack of resources, the unlikelihood of compensation, 
national   security   concerns,   and   the   resolutions’   political   rather   than   pragmatic   nature.   The   last  
‘Remnants  of  War’  resolution  was  passed  in 1985 (UN General Assembly 1985), after the beginnings 
of perestroika, East/West détente. 
 
Despite their lack of practical impact, the CCW and General Assembly processes demonstrate 
landmines were an established part of the international agenda during the Cold War, but in a highly 
divided international system had been inadequately dealt with. This was unsurprising given the 
intensity of armed and ideological conflict, which situated landmines either in terms of ostensibly 
humanitarian arms control talks dominated by great power military interests, or demands from the 
South and East for reparations. One concrete legacy of the CCW was that it permitted a Review 
Conference  at  any  state  party’s  request  ten  years  after  entry  into  force  (Article  8.3),  placing  it  on the 
radar of the arms control/IHL experts from the early 1990s. By then the collapse of the Eastern bloc 
had utterly re-shaped the geopolitical landscape and shifts in the geography of landmine production 
and trade had additionally altered the economic and military calculus for Western states. 
Problematising Landmines  in the Post-Cold War World  
The return of landmines to the international agenda in the 1990s coincided with profound 
restructuring of the international system, that ushered in a phase of international relations, in which 
Western military, economic and ideological dominance was virtually unopposed. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the result was the passive revolutionary establishment of neoliberal capitalism in 
Eastern Europe and – with varying degrees of success – in mine-affected developing countries 
recovering from proxy conflicts, such as Cambodia, Mozambique and Afghanistan. This neoliberal 
restructuring included a restructuring of the relationship between civil society and states, this was 
particularly apparent in the international arena in the context of that set of developments which has 
become   collectively   described   as   ‘capitalist   globalisation’.   As   in   other   issue   areas, these changes 
drew NGOs into the debate on landmines and prompted a new set of relationships between these 
NGOs,  states  and  IGOs.  It  is  argued  here  that  the  ICBL’s  emergence,  and  the  role  of  NGOs  in  initiating  
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the campaign, formed part  of  this  process  of  ‘top-down’  globalisation, in which a particular vision of 
the role of civil society, based on a Western model and compatible with the needs of neoliberalism, 
was deployed as part of the growing donor emphasis on humanitarian aid and peace operations 
(Pugh 2004).  
 
NGO involvement was encouraged in a several ways. First, the newly cooperative international 
climate altered Western military and geopolitical interests in relation to APMs and was reinforced by 
technological development in the arms industry that altered economic interests. Second, far greater 
cooperation on the UN Security Council authorised an unprecedented wave of ambitious UN peace 
operations in mine-affected states (Armstrong et al. 2004, pp.82–108; Gareis and Varwick 2005, 
pp.103–112; Human Security Centre 2005, pp.152–155), in response to the spike in armed conflicts 
in the early 1990s (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2007) arising from the 
disintegration of the Eastern bloc and ongoing proxy conflicts (Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2 Major UN Peace Operations in Mine-Affected States 1989-1997 
 
Location Year Began 
Afghanistan 1988 
Namibia 1989 
Nicaragua 1989 
Angola 1989 
Cambodia 1991 
El Salvador 1991 
Mozambique 1992 
Somalia 1992 
Bosnia 1992 
Croatia 1992 
Liberia  1993 
Rwanda 1993 
Guatemala 1997 
(Paris 2007, p.407; UN 2011, 2013) 
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Many of the new UN missions were expanded peacebuilding efforts (Paris 2007, p.407), involving 
donor support for civil society building, as a key component of  functioning market economies and 
liberal democracies, and also a greater emphasis on development and humanitarian assistance 
outsourced to NGOs (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; Paris 2002, 2007; Pugh 2005). These missions 
exposed thousands of international peacekeepers and UN, ICRC and NGO staff to the problem of 
landmines and the obstacle they posed to peacebuilding, humanitarian and development efforts. 
Together with the declining military, geopolitical and economic significance of landmines, this 
facilitated reconceptualising them as a humanitarian problem without threatening vital Western 
security or economic interests.  
 
From a military and geopolitical perspective, one of the main implications of the end of the Cold War 
was that Western Europe no longer feared invasion from the East, which rendered one of the main 
defensive functions of conventional minefields increasingly anachronistic. Indeed, apart from the US, 
most other Western state had made little use of APMs since the Second World War (Mekata 2000, 
p.147). Simultaneously, proxy wars in mine-affected Cambodia, Afghanistan and Mozambique lost 
their geostrategic significance (Abrahamsen 2000, pp.32–3; Duffield 2007, pp.115–117) and Western 
military support of Southern belligerents, including supplying them with mines, was scaled back 
(HRW and PHR 1993, p.65; 86; Askin and Goose 1994; Carstairs 1997, p.104). On top of this, Western 
ground troops were not involved in major combat operations from 1992 to the invasion of 
Afghanistan   in   2001,   meaning   they   had   little   actual   military   need   for   ‘dumb’   mines   during   the  
campaign.  More  technologically  sophisticated  ‘smart’  APMs,  which  cost  up  to  $300  each,  were  more 
militarily useful and more profitable for the larger Western military powers, particularly the US and 
UK, who strongly opposed banning them during the CCW review in 1995-6 (ICBL 1996a, p.1; 7, 
1996b, p.1, 1996c; Mekata 2000, p.156), but were not a major economic or defensive interest for 
most other Western states. There was stronger and more widespread opposition to banning AVM, 
however, which were perceived as far more important militarily than any kind of APM, especially if 
they could be fitted with anti-handling devices (HRW and PHR 1993, pp.45–46; 55; 72–76; Biddle et 
al. 1994, pp.68–70; ICBL 1994a, p.42; 79; ICRC 1996a, pp.50–51; Velin 1996a; Rutherford 2010, p.60).  
 
Technological developments since the 1970s  meant   ‘dumb’   conventional   APMs  were   increasingly  
seen as  cheap  ‘weapons  of  the  weak’.  A  report  for  the  Pentagon  argued  they  were  ‘ideally  suited’  to  
Southern  militaries  and  that  banning  them  would  ‘probably  affect  our  opponents  to  a  greater  degree  
than ourselves’,  as  the  US  could  more  easily  afford  ‘smart’,  self-destructing replacements (Biddle et 
al. 1996, p.48; 41). This was reinforced by trends in the arms product cycle that saw  ‘dumb’  APMs  
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become a low-cost commodity most profitable to produce in low wage economies (HRW Arms 
Project & PHR 1993, pp.38-9; 54–5; 90–2; Landmine Monitor 1999m, pp.10–12). Such mines now 
retailed for as little as $3 (US State Department 1993, p.2) and  the  developing  world’s  market  share  
of production was growing, with emerging players including Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil, Chile and South 
Africa. Unlike most Western countries Italy, along with China and Russia was one of the three largest 
exporters (HRW and PHR 1993, pp.61–62; 90–2).  
 
However, given total conventional APM production was valued at only $50-200 million (HRW and 
PHR 1993, p.36), potential economic losses from banning them, even for Southern and Eastern arms 
capital, were relatively minor and posed little threat to diversified Western arms producers (Beier 
and Denholm Crosby 1998, p.280; Anderson 2000, p.106; Warkentin and Mingst 2000). Indeed, 
according to a   comprehensive   early   NGO   report,   there   was   ‘no   indication   that   any   corporation,  
private or state-owned, anywhere in the world depends on conventional A/P mines for more than a 
small  fraction  of  its  annual  revenue’  (HRW and PHR 1993, p.39). Moreover, demining contracts stood 
to compensate APM manufacturers and outstrip the value of global sales, resulting in some states 
with advanced arms industries developing an economic interest in clearance technology (Gebauer 
1998a, p.496).  
 
At the same time as the advantages of APMs were declining, their negative long-term side-effects 
were  becoming  more  apparent  to  the  ‘international  community’. While these had been highlighted 
to no avail by Southern states in the Remnants of War resolutions at the UN General Assembly, the 
UN peace operations of the early 1990s exposed Western actors to the problem and the human and 
financial costs were now borne at least partially by donors, rather than only by non-Western 
governments. Hundreds of UN peacekeepers, deminers, NGO and ICRC staff were injured or killed by 
mines in Afghanistan, Mozambique, Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia in the early and mid-1990s 
(ICRC 1993, p.261; Williams 1993; ICBL 1994a, p.92; UN Secretary-General 1994, p.20) and the UN 
estimated $33 billion was needed for demining (UN Secretary-General 1994). Likewise, the US State 
Department  found  ‘Uncleared landmines pose a significant challenge to the achievement of key US 
foreign   policy   objectives’,   ‘hinder   economic   reconstruction   and   development’   and   were   ‘a  
continuous  impediment  to  the  world  economy’  (1993, p.i, 1994a, p.178).  
 
This combined with the altered geopolitical salience of conflicts in the East and South, which were 
increasingly   reconceptualised   in   Western   foreign   policy   circles   as   mere   ‘lower-order   threats’   or    
‘Low-Intensity  Conflicts’   (US 1990, p.28). There was also the growing perception of unstable post-
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conflict mine-affected states as an international governance problem that threatened international 
stability. All of this helped create the material conditions where it became possible to argue that 
banning APMs was in Western interests.  
 
The landmine problem was particularly pressing for those UN agencies involved in the expanded 
new peace operations. This included the UN  International  Children’s  Emergency  Fund (UNICEF), the 
UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the new 
humanitarian UN agencies - the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) and Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) that had been established in 1991 (UN General 
Assembly 1991) to manage the expansion of humanitarian aid and outsourcing  to  NGOs.  UNICEF’s  
annual reports had mentioned landmines since the late 1980s (1989, pp.36–37, 1991, p.28) and 
heightened attention to mines across the UN system is evident in UN Yearbooks from the same 
period where landmines were mentioned 20 times in 1990 rising to just under 60 by 1992. As early 
as 1990 Secretary-General   Perez  de  Cuellar  had  described   landmines  as   ‘A   serious  problem  which  
deserves  the  urgent  attention  of  the   international  community’   (UN Secretary General 1990), while 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali   also   called   them   a   ‘serious   problem’   in   his   Agenda for Peace (1992, p.17 
section 58).  
 
The new Department of Humanitarian Affairs appointed former British military officer, Paddy 
Blagden, to develop a UN demining strategy in early 1992, (Rutherford 2010, p.35) and he came up 
with the first global estimate of the problem the same year, claiming there were up to 100 million 
mines   in   the  ground  worldwide.  He   later  admitted   these  were  “flagrant  estimates…needed  at   the  
time   to   get   the   whole   mine   clearance   process   started” (quoted in Flynn 1999, p.51), but the 
perception of the UN as an authoritative source of information and their political usefulness meant 
these estimates quickly acquired the status of fact and were repeated by NGOs, the media and 
donors (US State Department 1994b; HI 1995a, p.7; VVAF 1995, p.3). Against this backdrop, many 
UN agencies favoured a ban from the outset but were initially reluctant to say so publicly for political 
reasons (Lawson 2002, p.102; Rutherford 2010, p.35). A ban was also strongly supported by Boutros-
Ghali (Boutros-Ghali 1994; UN Secretary General 1996) and somewhat more cautiously by Kofi 
Annan  (1997a, 1997b). The closeness of the resulting relationship between UN agencies on the 
landmine issue is evident in how UNDHA was invited to the October 1992 meeting commonly 
described as the launch of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (Lawson 2002, p.102; 
Rutherford 2010, p.35) and in how UNHCR, UNICEF and UN Associations were members of the ICBL 
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in several countries (ICBL 1996d) and the New Zealand UN Association actually founded the 
campaign there (Head 1994). 
 
The ICRC had been one of the driving forces behind the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons in the 1970s and its mandate to provide humanitarian assistance for victims of war and its 
legal responsibility towards International Humanitarian Law  (ICRC 1996b) meant it strongly 
supported a ban. The organisation has a unique status as an international quasi-non-governmental 
organisation recognised by international treaties and enjoying a form of diplomatic immunity. 
However,  its  ‘supreme  governing  body’,  the  ICRC  Assembly,  is  composed  entirely  of  Swiss  nationals  
and its last three Presidents have been former high-ranking Swiss government representatives. It 
received 75-80% of its income from Western governments throughout the campaign. National Red 
Cross and Red Crescent societies are also closely integrated with states, with the leadership in many 
countries nominated or approved by government, or at least offering sinecures for politicians, 
diplomats, and royalty (Aidwatch 2011; ICRC 2012). Finally, the International Conference of the 
entire movement including the ICRC and national Red Cross societies, which is held every four years 
and  is  its  ‘supreme  deliberative  body’,  gives equal votes to states party to the Geneva Conventions 
and national Red Cross societies (Willetts 1996b, p.7; Standing Commission of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent 2012). Consequently, the ICRC/Red Cross is essentially an international quango and would 
have been unlikely to support an issue that lacked strong elite support. 
 
Individual Red Cross medical staff publicised the landmine problem in the late 1980s (Hubert 2000, 
p.9)  and it began formally collecting data on victims in the early 1990s, which formed the basis for 
an early report calling for an end to the indiscriminate use of land mines (ICRC 1992a). In November 
1992 it proposed to the UN General Assembly, where it had been granted observer status in 1990, 
that the CCW be reviewed (UN 1993, p.97) and in 1993-7 it held numerous expert symposiums and 
intergovernmental seminars that built support for a ban among elites. In addition, it had an annual 
budget of over half a billion dollars (ICRC 1997; Aidwatch 2011) and was estimated by a conservative 
US think tank to have spent $30m on its own ban campaign (Center for Security Policy 1997a), which 
was  launched  in  1995  and  ‘dominated  all  the  ICRC’s  communication  efforts’   (ICRC 1996c). National 
branches of the Red Cross joined the ICBL in several countries (ICBL 1996d) and the Austrian branch 
of the ICBL partnered with the Austrian Red Cross, (Landmine Monitor 1999b). Like the UN agencies 
mentioned, the ICRC supported a ban at an early stage, but was initially reluctant to publicly endorse 
calls for a ban, due to what it considered at the time as the political nature of the issue, which would 
make  it  inappropriate  to  address  given  the  ICRC’s  professed  neutrality.  
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Growing recognition of landmines as a problem also influenced the aid agencies and foreign affairs 
departments of Western states that were major contributors to peacekeeping, UN mine action 
programmes and the ICRC, particularly in Western middle and small powers that lacked substantial 
countervailing military or economic interests. For those states that would go on to become key 
supporters of the ban – Canada, Norway, Austria, Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands – security 
interventions were generally limited to UN peace operations, while the already remote prospect of 
defensive warfare had further receded with the end of Cold War. APMs could thus be more readily 
reconceptualised as primarily an obstacle to peacekeeping and a drain on international assistance. 
This was reinforced by  the  relative  weakness  of  these  states’ military apparatuses and their lack of 
economic interests in APMs (1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 1999e, 1999f, 1999g).  
 
Canada and Norway have long regarded peacekeeping as a foreign policy niche (Behringer 2005, 
p.307; Henrikson 2005, p.72). Military personnel from both countries were also extensively involved 
in demining, with Canadians active in Angola, Afghanistan and Cambodia (Rutherford 2010, 
p.72n146),   while   Norwegian  military   personnel  mainly  worked   for  Norwegian   Peoples’   Aid   (NPA),  
the development  NGO  arm  of  the  Norwegian  trade  union  movement  with   ‘strong   filial  ties’   to the 
ruling Labour Party (Neumann 2002, pp.109–113; Toje 2011; NPA 2012, pp.24–27). NPA began 
demining in 1992 after being offered large amounts of government funding and went on to become 
the lead NGO in the Norwegian branch of the ICBL. 
 
The expansion of UN peace operations from the early 1990s further increased Canadian and 
Norwegian involvement and from 1992-6 Canada sent peacekeepers to mine-affected Angola, 
Western Sahara, Mozambique, Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia and Iraq/Kuwait, 
while Norway dispatched them to Angola, El Salvador, Mozambique, Somalia, Cambodia and the 
former Yugoslavia (United   Nations   Association   in   Canada   n.d. ;UNDPKO).This resulted in military 
casualties from landmines, with thirty-two Canadian deaths in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia in 
1992-1996 (Landmine Monitor 1999c). Neither Canada nor Norway was responsible for the 
humanitarian problem as Norway had not used APMs since World War Two and had never produced 
or exported them (Landmine Monitor 1999d), while Canada had had not used them since the Korean 
War and had never been a major exporter (Landmine Monitor 1999c).  
 
By contrast, major Western military powers like the US, Britain and France faced a more complex 
nexus of military, strategic and economic interests due to their more central coercive role in the 
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international  security  system,   larger  arms   industries  and  economic  and  military   interests   in   ‘smart’  
scatterable APMs. Consequently, while the development and humanitarian agencies of those states 
were also often supportive of a landmines ban, military and defence agencies exercised more 
influence,  creating  stronger  divisions  among  governing  elites  as  to  whether  a  ban  was  in  the  state’s  
hegemonic interests. This elite division existed in most Western states15 and was reinforced by the 
actions of the ICBL, which allied itself with the more consensual-hegemonic approaches of 
development and foreign affairs ministries opposing military interests.  
 
Given their historic role in creating the problem, the larger military powers also continued to oppose 
user/supplier responsibility, just as in the 1970s and 1980s. This was particularly salient for the US, 
which   admitted   to   being   the   source   of   ‘less   than   15%’   of   uncleared  APMs   (US State Department 
1993, p.178) and  had   transferred   ‘over   four  million  anti-personnel landmines to more than thirty 
countries’   including   ‘Every  major’   affected   state   (Goose 1998a). The UK, France, and core states 
Germany, Belgium and South Africa had also been significant exporters of landmines (HRW and PHR 
1993, p.40; 55; 61; 104; Askin and Goose 1994; 1999f, 1999h, 1999i, 1999j, 1999k), while South 
Africa had also used mines extensively in neighbouring countries under the apartheid régime.  
 
Increasing elite perception of landmines as a problem was also reflected in growing media attention 
to the issue even before the campaign proper began. There was a jump from 650 articles in major 
world publications mentioning landmines in 1989 to 1,491 in 1991, but at this stage most of it 
concerned prolific use in the Gulf and Balkan wars and the idea of a ban had not entered the 
discourse16. Against this backdrop, in campaigning for a ban, NGOs offered a solution to a recognised 
international governance problem and one that, almost uniquely among issues primarily affecting 
the Southern poor, directly endangered Western aid workers and peacekeepers. This is borne out by 
an  early  NGO  report,  which  notes  ‘little  consensus  and  much  confusion  within  the  United  Nations  as  
to how the problem can best be dealt  with  or...whether  it  can  be  dealt  with  at  all’  (Asia Watch and 
PHR 1991, p.84). Consequently, as US ICBL campaigner, Ken Rutherford (2010, p.33) puts  it,  ‘the  APL-
ban idea was already floating in the international community, but  nobody  was  acting  on  it’.   
NGO Involvement in Mine Clearance and the Beginning of the Landmines Campaign 
The six NGOs that founded the ICBL (and the only members of its Steering Committee until 1996) 
were all involved in mine-affected countries like Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mozambique and El 
Salvador.   Indeed,   the   proximate   driver   for   the   ICBL’s   emergence  was   the   repatriation  of   refugees  
                                                     
15 Cameron (1999, p.92n9) refers to it as a factor in Japan despite the lack of an influential NGO campaign.  
16 Survey of Lexis Nexis database. 
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and deployment of peacekeepers to Cambodia, where all the founder NGOs had some sort of 
involvement, under the 1991 peace agreement. In a context of increased involvement in those 
countries by international donors in the early 1990s, these NGOs saw substantial increases in 
funding from Western governments, IGOs and/or US foundations, which enabled them to expand 
their activities. The Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), Handicap International (HI), 
medico international (MI) and the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) all established or expanded 
demining and victim assistance programmes (HRW and PHR 1993, p.211; Williams and Goose 1998, 
p.20; Petrova 2007, p.20; Aidwatch 2009a; USAID 2010), while Human Rights Watch (HRW) and 
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR)  increased their level of reporting on International Humanitarian 
Law and arms control issues.  
 
The increased funding received by the NGOs that formed a key part of the landmine campaign was 
part of a wider trend of increased funding of Northern NGOs engaged in development, and 
especially humanitarian aid, by Western states, IGOs and US foundations in the context of cuts in the 
relative volume of ODA (Rieff 2003). In the case of the identified problem presented by landmines, 
NGOs were resourced to carry out outsourced government functions, first in service provision, or 
demining and victim assistance, and later in policy formation through NGO involvement in the 
Ottawa Process. Demining, which had previously been carried out by the military under UN auspices, 
began to be outsourced to humanitarian and development NGOs and/or private corporations in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s (Pugh 1998, pp.345–346), using a combination of highly paid Western ex-
military and cheap local labour. This led to close cooperation between NGOs, donors, and the UN, as 
the bulk  of NGO demining and victim assistance work was funded by the development agencies and 
foreign ministries of Western governments, either directly or via the UN (HRW and PHR 1993; VVAF 
1995; Landmine Monitor 1999a). In Afghanistan and Cambodia, the two worst-affected countries, 
clearance  was  ‘almost exclusively donor-funded’  (VVAF 1995, p.145),  while  ‘virtually  all  funding’  for 
prosthetics programmes in Cambodia came from donors (USAID 1995, p.24). NGO involvement was 
encouraged for reasons of cost, perceived efficiency and reduction of direct responsibility (UN 
Secretary-General 1994, p.16; Donini 1995, pp.432–3; USAID 1995, p.5; 28; VVAF 1995, p.21; 138–
143; 147; Neumann 2002, p.112; GICHD 2004, pp.95–130), to which the dangers of demining gave 
an added impetus (US State Department 1993, p.179). As with ODA in general, funding went to 
donors’   ‘own   nationally   based’  NGOs  where   possible   (GICHD 2004, pp.202–203), as illustrated by 
Norway’s  patronage  of  NPA.   
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Donors envisaged payroll savings of twenty-five percent (Pugh 1998, p.346), with USAID (1994, 
p.101) asserting  demining  NGOs   ‘often  are   far   cheaper   than   commercial   firms,   and  often  quicker. 
We  need   to   systematically  encourage  capacity’.   In  Afghanistan,   the  UN  established   local  demining  
NGOs  ‘with  the  explicit  intention  of  providing…operational  subcontractor  bodies’  and  circumventing  
UN hiring procedures, which have remained fully or overwhelmingly UN-funded and subject to UN 
‘management   oversight   and   coordination’   (GICHD 2004, p.116; 104; 122). These quasi-non-
intergovernmental organisations later played a leading role in the Afghan Campaign to Ban 
Landmines, which joined the ICBL Steering Committee in 1996 (ICBL 1996e, p.5, 1996f). NNGOs also 
benefited, including MAG, a UK-based demining NGO founded by ex-British army officer, Rae 
McGrath, in 1989 to help the UN demine the country. A similar approach was adopted in Cambodia, 
where MAG and Handicap International began demining in 1992 (Aidwatch 2003),   ‘after   an  
elaborate plan was worked out so that [HI] would assume liability risk rather than the United 
Nations’.  NPA  also  commenced  demining  there  the  same  year  (NPA 2012, pp.25–27). NGO capacity 
to identify, publicise and gather expert data on the problem of landmines that defined their role in 
the ICBL stemmed directly from their involvement in donor-funded mine action programmes.  
 
The Lead NGOs and their Characteristics  
 
Although six NGOs were involved in founding the ICBL, three organisations stand out as playing lead 
roles in shaping the campaign – VVAF (the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation), HRW (Human 
Rights Watch) and HI (Handicap International). These NGOs have been identified as key actors 
because of the leadership role they played in terms of discursive influence, financial resources, and 
political connections. The other three founders, PHR (Physicians for Human Rights), MAG (Mines 
Advisory Group) and MI (Medico International), were smaller organisations with less influence on 
the international campaign. The origins and nature of the three lead NGOs, which help to explain 
their dominance, and their involvement in the campaign is now addressed, before examining the 
financial and personnel basis of the ICBL network as a whole and how it was organised.  
Vietnam Veterans of America Federation  
Established in 1980 by disabled veteran, Bobby Muller, VVAF was an internationally-oriented 
offshoot of the Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA), which he and   his   ‘close   friend’,   future  
Presidential candidate and US Secretary State, John Kerry had co-founded with two other veterans 
to  campaign  for  veterans’  rights  in  1978.  Both  had  also  unsuccessfully sought election to Congress as 
Democratic Party candidates the same year (Kranish 2003). Muller eventually split from VVA in 1987, 
taking VVAF with him (Gillon 2010, pp.273–275), which by the early 1990s had evolved into a 
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Washington lobby group with strong ties to the Democrats, and to the military and the liberal wing 
of the US foreign policy establishment (Murphy 1998a).  
 
By this time, VVAF had two main areas of work: normalising US relations with Vietnam and 
landmines (VVAF 1997a; Wolfe 2008; Veterans For America 2009; Gillon 2010, pp.273–275). VVAF 
had brought the first delegation of veterans to Vietnam in 1981 (Bandler 1998; Murphy 1998a; 
Kranish 2003) and  its  “principal  focus”  for  many  years  was  lobbying  business  people  to  pressure  the  
US government to recognise Vietnam (Muller quoted in Gillon 2010, p.274). This eventually 
happened in 1995 (US Embassy Hanoi 2010),   the   same   year  VVAF’s   ‘Vietnam  Business   Fellowship  
Program’  was  established  to  organise  ‘high-level  internships’  for  Vietnamese  business  executives  in  
leading  US   corporations   to   ‘foster[s]   an   understanding   of   the   dynamics   of   a   free  market   system’,  
‘open[s]   a   dialogue   between   Vietnamese   and   American   business   leaders   on   productivity   and  
profitability’   and   ‘institutionalize[s]   the   growing   US-Vietnam   business   partnership’   (VVAF 1997b). 
The programme was co-funded   by   the   US   Information   Agency,   the   US   government’s   propaganda  
arm during the Cold War.  
 
The  two  strands  of  VVAF’s  work  were  connected  for  obvious historical reasons, but also because a 
key condition of normalisation was Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia (Manyin 2005, pp.1–5), 
where VVAF set up its first USAID-funded victim assistance projects in 1991-2. These were extended 
to Vietnam in 1993 (Journal of Mine  Action 1999),  where  VVAF’s  work  was   funded  by  USAID  and  
corporate sponsorship from US multinationals (VVAF 1998a, 1998b, p.1) and formed part of the first 
wave of US aid to the country after the ending of the twenty-year US embargo. This enabled 
Vietnam to access international aid and loans from the IMF and World Bank, but was conditional on 
Vietnam  dropping  all  claims  to  $3.25bn  in  war  reparations  promised  by  the  US  ‘without any political 
conditions’   in   1973   and   assuming   responsibility   for   the   debts   of   the   South   Vietnamese   regime  
(Chossudovsky 1995; Tucker 2011, pp.1653–1654). Given this context, VVAF was unlikely to 
emphasise   Vietnam’s   earlier   demands   for   compensation   and   user   responsibility   for   material  
remnants of war in its landmines advocacy. VVAF went on to establish victim assistance projects in El 
Salvador and Angola (Journal of Mine  Action 1999), which had also been the site of US-sponsored 
proxy conflicts and fitted its consensual-hegemonic founding mission of providing the lands where 
US  veterans  had  fought  ‘with  reconciliation,  rehabilitation,  and  reconstruction’  (VVAF 1998a, p.1).  
 
Muller and Thomas Gebauer of MI, who had been collaborating on victim assistance in El Salvador 
and Cambodia (Seibert 2000, p.2), came up with the idea for an international ban campaign in 
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October 1991 and VVAF hired Jody Williams to coordinate it (Murphy 1998a; Lawson 2002, p.96; 
Williams 2013, pp.144–147). VVAF (1998a, p.1) was   the   ICBL’s   ‘primary   funder   since   its   inception’  
and worked closely with powerful Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy, who chaired the House 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, which allocates funds to USAID, and had set 
up  USAID’s   Leahy  War  Victims  Fund   to  assist   landmine  victims   in  1989.   Leahy   introduced the first 
export moratorium anywhere in the world in 1992 (HRW and PHR 1993, pp.319–320; Sigal 2006, 
pp.14–16) and lobbied the Clinton Administration to sponsor UN General Assembly Resolutions in 
1993 and 1994 (UN General Assembly 1993, 1994), which called on all UN member states to adopt 
export  moratoria  and  for  ‘the  eventual  elimination’  of  APMs.  Clinton  also  made  the  same  demand  in  
his speech to the UN General Assembly in 1994 in a passage co-written by Leahy, VVAF and HRW.  
 
These efforts kick-started the ICBL internationally and indicated the support of influential liberal 
elites and consensual-hegemonic elements of the US state, particularly in the State 
Department/USAID and the US mission at the UN (under Madeleine Albright who became Secretary 
of State in early 1997) (ICBL 1996a, p.7), even at a time when the Pentagon was firmly opposed to 
such a ban. Although the issue split the Clinton administration, the apparent early support from the 
US and its backing of limited restrictions enabled the ICBL to get off the ground. VVAF also produced 
After the Guns Silent (1995), which researched the socio-economic impact of landmines around the 
world  and  was  one  of  the  ICBL’s  most  influential  publications.  
 
Human Rights Watch  
Most   of   the   rest   of   the   ICBL’s  most   influential   discursive   output   came   from  HRW’s   Arms   Project,  
which was set up in September 1992 (HRW 1993), shortly before the campaign launch. This included 
Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, which   served   ‘as   a   baseline   of   information   on   landmines   and   their  
impact  for  many  years’  (Williams 2013, p.161) and was one of the main resources used by campaigns 
internationally. HRW  largely  defined  the  ICBL’s  framing  of  the  problem  in  terms  of  the  International  
Humanitarian Law (IHL) norms of distinction and proportionality contained in the CCW, rather than 
the  norms  of  state  responsibility   in  the  UN’s   ‘Material  Remnants  of  War’   resolutions. Indeed in all 
HRW’s   (and   the   ICBL’s)   voluminous  output,  only   a   single   footnote   referring   to   the  UN   resolutions  
could be found (HRW 1994a, p.n19), even though they had had far wider support than the CCW, 
which had only twenty-nine parties by 1992, none of which were seriously mine-affected. Related to 
this,   HRW   strongly   influenced   the   ICBL’s   narrow   focus   on   banning   APMs   as   indiscriminate   and  
disproportionate weapons aberrant under IHL, as well as its deprioritisation of demining, victim 
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assistance and user/producer responsibility, even as ancillary issues. Its discursive strategies are 
therefore particularly relevant.  
 
HRW had been aware of the landmine problem since the mid-1980s from reporting on IHL violations 
in proxy conflicts in Central America and Asia (Americas Watch 1986; Asia Watch 1989, 1990; HRW 
1989) and was also behind the first major piece of NGO research on APMs in the early 1990s, 
Landmines in Cambodia: The   Coward’s  War.   This was distributed to influential elites around the 
world, including members of the French, Belgian and European parliaments (ICBL 1994a, p.34; 
Chabasse 1998, p.60) and Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia,  who subsequently called for a ban in his 
address to the UN on the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement (Lawson 2002, p.95). The report was 
co-written by Eric Stover, a consultant to HRW and PHR, and Rae McGrath of MAG, who went on to 
espouse stronger positions than VVAF and HRW on various issues, including APM definitions, 
demining and producer responsibility. It warned of an impending humanitarian disaster once 
refugees were repatriated given the scale of landmine contamination (Asia Watch and PHR 1991, 
pp.84–90) and contained many of the arguments and tropes  that  would  form  the  ICBL’s  discursive  
and political core, as well as aspects that subsequently faded from view.  
 
Those ideas that were incorporated included: a ban on landmines (which at this stage was suggested 
rather than demanded (Asia Watch and PHR 1991, p.103; Sigal 2006, pp.2–3)), a humanitarian rather 
than military approach, which included highlighting civilian casualties, especially women and 
children; and stigmatising mines as inherently indiscriminate weapons akin to weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) rather than normal conventional weapons. The ideas that were dropped or 
minimised included: a ban encompassing all ‘landmines  and  other  devices  that  detonate  on  contact’  
(Asia Watch and PHR 1991, p.103), including AVMs and potentially cluster munitions; a strong 
emphasis on the moral and financial responsibility of suppliers; and quite extensive background 
information on the conflict, including US and UK involvement in supplying opposition forces with 
mines  and  training  them   in  mine  warfare  and  even  how   ‘humanitarian  aid  provided  to  the  border  
population  permitted  the  Khmer  Rouge  to  survive  and  rebuild’  (Asia Watch and PHR 1991, pp.96–97; 
40–42; 26). 
 
Some or all of these latter aspects were taken up by national campaigns and individual NGOs in 
Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, the UK, and the South and by survivors, which variously demanded 
a ban on all mines, emphasised user/producer responsibility and compensation of victims, and/or 
linked the campaign to wider disarmament and peace issues (ICBL 1994a, 1995a, 1995b, 1998a, 
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pp.10–13; 39; German Initiative to Ban Landmines 1997; McGrath 1997a, 1997b; Gebauer 1998a; 
White and Rutherford 1998). This was generally opposed by HRW and VVAF, who wanted to keep 
the campaign narrowly focused and were particularly opposed to emphasising reparations to victims 
(Sigal 2006, pp.182–190).  
 
In addition to its discursive influence, HRW also had close connections to influential liberal elites in 
the US and internationally, which helped finance the campaign and gain support for a ban. 
Established as Helsinki Watch in 1978, the organisation was created, funded and initially staffed by 
the Ford Foundation following discussions between the head of the US delegation to the Helsinki 
Accords and the President of Ford Foundation, McGeorge Bundy, who had been US National Security 
Advisor under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson from 1961-1966 (Spero 2010, pp.2–6) and  was  ‘one 
of  the  primary  architects’  of  the  Vietnam  War  (Holbrooke 2008). With the help of an initial $400,000 
from Ford, HRW began monitoring civil and political rights in the Eastern bloc (Thomas 2002, pp.87–
89) and rapidly developed  a network of dissident intellectuals and civil society groups. It credits its 
work in this area with a key role in the fall of communism (HRW 1998a, 2008a) and ever since has 
remained intimately connected to the liberal Democratic wing of the US foreign policy 
establishment. Indeed, Kenneth Anderson, a co-founder of the ICBL and founding director  of  HRW’s  
Arms Project, has described the organisation as ‘a  relatively  small,  highly  professional,  entirely  elite  
organization funded by foundations and wealthy individuals in the Western democracies, and having 
no discernible base outside international  elites’  (2000, pp.117–8).  
 
Under   Reagan’s   Presidency   in   the   1980s,   additional   Watch   Committees   were   established   in   the  
Americas (1981) and Asia (1985), which gave more credibility to its criticisms of rights violations in 
the Eastern Bloc (Welch 2009, p.479). These merged with Helsinki Watch, Africa Watch and Middle 
East Watch to form HRW in 1988-89 (HRW 1998b),  although  HRW’s  US  section  was  only  established  
in 2001 during the Bush administration (Welch 2009, p.481), reflecting its continuing affiliation with 
the Democrats. Despite nominally accepting the indivisibility of rights, during the Cold War HRW 
focused exclusively on civil and political rights (HRW 1992a; Mutua 2001, p.155; Aka 2006, pp.435–
437), which mirrored US policy and contrasted  with   the   Soviet   bloc’s   emphasis   on   economic   and  
social rights (Chandhoke 2005, p.364). This began to change somewhat after the departure of Aryeh 
Neier, its executive director from 1978-1993, who had opposed HRW defending economic and social 
rights (Neier 2003, p.xxx; Welch 2009, pp.479–480). Neier co-founded the ICBL and gave the keynote 
address at the first ICBL Conference in London in May 1993, but left the organisation shortly 
afterwards   to   head   up   George   Soros’   Open   Society   Institute   (OSI)   (OSI 2009). He was followed 
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shortly afterwards by another ICBL co-founder, Kenneth Anderson, who joined the Soros 
Foundations as its General Counsel (Anderson and Schurtman 1995),   but   remained   on   the   Arms’  
Project Advisory Committee, and in 1996 by the Arms Project’s  Program  Director,  Ann  Peters,  who  
became  director  of  the  OSI’s  new  Landmines  Project.  This  provided  the  ICBL  with  around  a  third  of  
its funding (Short 1999, p.484) and helped it expand to developing countries and Eastern Europe 
(Soros Foundations Network 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 2000). Although HRW officially changed its stance 
on economic and social rights in September 1996 (Mutua 2001, pp.155–156), they have continued to 
be a minor part of its work. This is demonstrated by its one-sided17 condemnatory coverage of 
Venezuela under President Chavez (HRW 2008b, 2013a) and  its  focus  on  ‘arbitrary  or  discriminatory  
government  policies  that  result  in  the  violation  of  economic,  social,  or  cultural  rights’  (HRW 2013b). 
This means it does not prioritise the 45,000 annual American deaths caused by inadequate 
healthcare (Wilper et al. 2009, p.2295) because   this  does  not   ‘discriminate’   against   any  particular  
group.  
 
HRW  began  reporting  on  IHL  violations  in  1982,  which  it  says  were  ‘hardly  ever  mentioned’  in  human 
rights reports before then (HRW 1992a). Over the 1990s, it significantly increased its emphasis on 
IHL and extended its remit to arms control through the Arms Project (HRW 1998b, 1998c), whose 
mandate is ‘to   monitor   and   prevent   transfers   of   weapons   of   all kinds to governments or other 
groups  that  systematically  commit  gross  violations  of  human  rights  or  the  laws  of  war’  (HRW 1993). 
APM proliferation to developing countries and export moratoria fell within this framework and 
although HRW has often been critical of US and European arms transfers to non-Western 
governments,   this   definition   of   the   ‘arms’   problem   notably excludes the wider question of US 
military expenditure, despite widespread hopes for such a peace dividend from the end of the Cold 
War (UNDP 1994, pp.47–60; Commission on Global Governance 1995b; Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict 1997, pp.67–81). HRW – and most of the other ICBL founders – 
consistently  opposed  MI’s  efforts  to  expand  the  campaign  to  wider  disarmament  and  peace   issues  
(Lawson 2002, pp.102–3; Sigal 2006, pp.2–3), which despite the much vaunted transformation of the 
international system with the end of the Cold War were still seen as too ideological and carrying too 
much  “political  baggage”  (quoted  in  Mekata  2000,  p.147). 
 
HRW was also emerging in the 1990s as one of the strongest proponents of military  ‘humanitarian 
intervention’,  which  it  supports  on  a  unilateral  basis  without  UN  authorisation  ‘in  extreme  situations’  
                                                     
17 Over a hundred academic experts on Latin America signed an open letter to HRW in 2008 criticising its 
coverage as failing to “meet  even  the  most  minimal  standards  of  scholarship,  impartiality,  accuracy,  or  
credibility”  (venezuelanalysis.com 2008).  
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(Roth 2004, p.12). Consequently, it has backed foreign military intervention in Northern Iraq, 
Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo,  Burma,  Libya,  Sri  Lanka  and  Côte  d’Ivoire  (HRW 1999a, p.3; Roth 2004, 2011) and its efforts 
to civilise war by banning APMs must be placed in this wider context.  
Handicap International 
In addition to its international role, HI also led national campaigns in France and Belgium, where it 
successfully lobbied the French government to call for a review of the CCW in 1993 and helped bring 
about the first national ban law in Belgium in 1995 (Chabasse 1998; Mekata 2000, pp.149–151; 
Petrova 2007). It also helped found and fund campaigns in Cambodia and Mozambique (Gulamo 
1994; ICBL 1997b, p.29; NGO Forum on Cambodia 1998, p.13) and had the most practical 
involvement   in  demining  and  victim  assistance  of   the   three   lead  NGOs,   increasing   the   campaign’s  
credibility. Together  with  PHR  and  MAG,  it  issued  a  call  to  “Stop  the  Killing  in  the  Cowards’  War”  in  
May 1992 and launched the French and Belgian campaigns by distributing translated copies of The 
Cowards’  War  (ICBL 1994a, p.34; Chabasse 1998, p.60). It initially stopped short of demanding a ban, 
calling instead for the CCW to be reviewed (HI 1995b, p.15; Lawson 2002, pp.98–99; Williams 2013, 
p.157) but its subsequent framing  of the issue was heavily influenced by HRW, whose research it 
translated and incorporated into its own publications (HI 1995c, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a). Its own 
original content was more nationally focused and had less international impact.   
 
Like  VVAF  and  HRW,  HI’s  interest  in  landmines  originated  from  its  work  in  Cambodia,  where  it  began  
demining in 1992 in collaboration with MAG and UNHCR. Its victim assistance work dated back much 
further, however, to the height of the Cold War in the 1970s and early 1980s. Established in 1982 by 
French doctors, Claude Simmonot and Jean-Baptiste Richardier, who had both previously worked for 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (Le Généraliste 2006), HI was initially based in Richardier’s   family  
home in Lyon and grew out of his humanitarian work with disabled Cambodian refugees in UN 
camps across the border in Thailand after the 1979 Vietnamese invasion. This had ended the 
genocide but triggered an exodus of Khmer Rouge and civilians. At the time, the West was backing 
the  Khmer  Rouge  and  other  opposition  groups  against  Hun  Sen’s  Vietnamese-backed government in 
Phnom  Penh,  so  HI’s  humanitarian  efforts  contributed  to  a  broader  Western  strategy  of  undermining  
Vietnamese and Soviet influence through the international aid effort (Observatoire   de   l’action  
humanitaire 2011). As noted in The  Coward’s  War,  its broader geopolitical purpose was to help the 
Khmer   Rouge   and   Prince   Sihanouk’s   anti-Vietnamese forces to rebuild and launch cross-border 
attacks (Asia Watch and PHR 1991, p.26; Pilger 2011, pp.51–59), although the Khao-i-Dang camp 
where HI worked was the only one not controlled by opposition factions (HI 1997b; Rowat 2013).   
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Richardier has repeatedly cited as a role model, the American military doctor, Tom Dooley (Tuininga 
1994;  Saillant  2007,  p.70;  Observatoire  de  l’action  humanitaire  2011), who helped evacuate Catholic 
refugees from North Vietnam in the 1950s and who Richardier credits with inventing  “humanitarian  
marketing”   (quoted in Saillant 2007, p.70). Best known for his best-selling memoir Deliver Us from 
Evil detailing   fictitious   communist   atrocities   against   Vietnamese   Catholics,   Dooley’s   work   was  
‘integral’   to   a   covert   CIA   disinformation   campaign’   that   helped   lay   the   basis   for   US   military  
intervention (Shaw 1991).  
HI initially limited itself to strictly humanitarian activities, in particular providing medical assistance, 
rehabilitation and prostheses to refugees and civilians disabled by war (1997b, 1997c; Saillant 2007, 
p.77), but its involvement in the ICBL led it to modify its statutes in 1996 towards a rights-based 
approach, enabling it to take social or legal actions to prevent disability as well as treat it (HI 2012). 
Its moderate liberal reformist goals are evident in Simmonot’s  explanation  that  it  dreams  of  a  world  
“where   rich   people   would   show   more   solidarity   with   recently   decolonised   people”   (quoted in 
Saillant 2007, p.72) and its revised   mission,   which   includes   ‘international   cooperation’   and  
‘strengthening   of   civil   societies’   (HI 2012). In the 1990s, HI was an expanding international 
organisation under the leadership of the French head office, with additional branches established in 
Belgium in 1986 and Switzerland in September 1996 (HI 2001a) and  ‘Missions’   in  the  South,  which  
are solely implementing agencies overseen by the French or Belgian sections (HI 2009, p.27; HI-
Belgium 2010).  
 
Despite its concern with disability rights, it did not include anyone with a disability on its board until 
2005 (Observatoire  de   l’action  humanitaire  2011) and likewise it did not initially involve victims in 
the international campaign, whose participation only began at the CCW Review Conference in 
November 1995 under the auspices of other groups (White and Rutherford 1998). Despite this, HI 
was more supportive of ICBL campaigning on victim assistance, than VVAF or HRW (White and 
Rutherford 1998, p.111; Sigal 2006, p.188), who had opposed its inclusion in the original ICBL Call 
(Sigal 2006, p.184), and it was only included in ICBL demands from 1995 after much internal 
wrangling (ICBL 1994a, pp.107–109; Williams 1995; Lawson 2002, p.5n5). Even after that, it 
remained a low priority,   due   to  Williams   and   Goose’s   fear   it   could   provide   an   excuse   for   states  
responsible for the problem not to sign the treaty (White and Rutherford 1998, pp.107–9; Sigal 
2006, pp.182–190). This obviously included the US, which was promoting voluntary victim assistance 
to distract attention from its refusal to sign up to a ban and would have been highly unlikely to agree 
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to binding obligations for victim assistance or clearance. The same could be said of other exporting 
states, including Belgium, which supported a ban.  
 
Analysing the Material Base of the Landmines Campaign 
 
The  founder  NGOs’  various  initiatives  united  with  a  meeting  at  HRW’s  offices  in  New  York  in  October  
1991 involving VVAF, MI, HI and HRW. UNDHA and ICRC were also there, indicating their close 
cooperation with NGOs from the outset, but although these IGOs were supportive they could not 
publicly back a ban for political reasons (Lawson 2002, p.102; Rutherford 2010, p.35). Shortly 
afterwards,  the  six  founding  NGOs  signed  the  ‘ICBL  Call’,  which  demanded  an  international  ban  on  
APMs; the establishment of a UN demining fund; and the recognition of producer/user responsibility 
through contributions to the fund from countries that had produced or disseminated mines (ICBL 
1993). Neither AVMs nor victim assistance featured in this document, reflecting the pragmatic 
exclusion of AVMs and the lack of survivor or SNGO involvement. The dominant literature on the 
role  of  civil  society  in  the  international  system  attributes  the  ICBL’s  success  to  three  main  factors:  its  
broad international membership and loose, horizontal network (Koh 1998a; Rutherford 1999b, 
2000a; Edwards 2001; Rutherford and Matthew 2003; Nye 2004, pp.90–91; Shawki 2010) structure, 
its re-framing of landmines as a humanitarian rather than a security or disarmament issue; and the 
multi-actor governance partnership it involved between NGOs, small and middle powers, UN 
agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In the process, it ignores the 
campaign’s  lack  of  autonomy  from  sections  of  state  elites,  its  donor-dependent financial basis, and 
hierarchical organisational structures. In the following sections, a discussion of the financial basis of 
the campaign, its personnel and organisation demonstrate that the NGOs that formed its core can 
be better understood from a Gramscian perspective as hegemonic civil society in action.  
 
The  ICBL’s  Financial Base  
Analysing  the  ICBL’s  financial  base  was  very  difficult  as  it  had  no  bank  account  from  1992-7 (Gebauer 
1998a, p.494; Alcalde Villacampa 2010, p.25n73) and published no accounts. Participant accounts 
have also ignored the issue, or mentioned it only in passing. The only real exception is Muller (1998, 
p.22), who  given  VVAF  was  the  ICBL’s  main  NGO  funder  has  emphasised  the  campaign  took  ‘money 
– lots  and  lots  of  money’.  A review of the Canadian-funded official book on the campaign also notes 
that  the  ICBL’s  ‘dependence  on  particular  funding  sources’  is  ‘not  discussed’  (Harpviken 2002, p.102) 
and the same is true of the wider secondary literature, with the exception of an article by Short 
(1999), who was an observer on the ICBL delegation during the Ottawa Process.  
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The three lead NGOs between them spent upwards of $10m on domestic and international ICBL 
campaigning in five years, 1992-7. Obviously, if campaigning by the entire 1000 member NGOs in the 
ICBL by the end of 1997 were taken into account, the true figure would be much higher. This is well 
beyond the scope of this research, but is not particularly problematic given the lead NGOs played 
such a strong  role  in  defining  the  ICBL’s  goals  and activities at the international level, which national 
campaigning by member NGOs largely just reinforced. VVAF spent $4.5m on the ICBL in 1992-7 
(Campaign Against Landmines - New Zealand 1997; Short 1999, p.493),   HI   $5m   and  HRW’s   Arms  
Project spent a substantial chunk of its annual budget of around $0.5m. Williams has cited a figure of 
$6m  ‘globally’   from  1992-7 (Shulman 1999) and Goose $1-2m during the later years (Hubert 2000, 
p.32n2).  Contrary  to  Williams’  description  of  this  as  “nothing”  and  “politics  on  a  shoestring”, these 
would be massive sums for a grassroots civil society campaign and are only available to large INGOs 
with significant donor backing.  
 
According to Short (1999, p.484), who was an observer on the ICBL delegation during the Ottawa 
Process, approximately a third of this funding came from governments, particularly Canada, Norway 
and Sweden; a third from the OSI; and a third from NGOs and IGOs, particularly UN agencies, which 
also ran their own ban campaigns and produced voluminous publications. Examples of the extent 
and breadth of  UN  support   include  UNICEF’s   logistical  support  for  the  ICBL’s  second  conference   in  
Geneva  and  the  ICBL’s  ‘Ban  Bus  Tour’  and  the  financial  support  of  UNHCR,  UNDP,  UNICEF,  UNOCHA  
and UNDHA for ICBL conferences (ICBL 1994a, p.i, 1996e, p.188, 1997b, p.29, 1998a, p.71; Grant 
1997), (ICBL 1996e, p.188) and  VVAF’s  (1995, p.ii) research  on  landmines’  socioeconomic  impacts.   
 
The   ICBL’s  emergence  coincided  with  the  general  growth   in  ODA  via  NGOs  and  the  outsourcing  of  
mine action to ICBL NGOs like VVAF, HI, MAG and NPA. Norway and Canada were among the top five 
donors of recorded ODA via NGOs in the 1990s, according to OECD statistics, and accounted for over 
ten percent each of ODA in this category from 1991-199818. Moreover, for both Norway and Canada, 
supporting the ICBL was consistent with a broader policy of outsourcing aspects of foreign policy-
formation   to   NGOs.   In   the   early   1990s,   Norway   was   refining   the   ‘Norwegian   model’   of   ODA,  
particularly in its dealings with the South (Tvedt 1995; Neumann 2002; Batora 2005). Toje (2011, 
p.10) defines this as mobilising government,  CSOs  and   research   institutions   ‘for   concerted   foreign 
policy   efforts’,   where   ‘the   shared   effort   remains   directed   by   the   state’,   and   as   characterised   by  
extensive elite interpenetration and circulation. Norway’s  support  of  the  ICBL,  in  part  through  NPA  
                                                     
18 OECD data excludes the US which provided large amounts of ODA through NGOs.  
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(Neumann 2002, p.118; Petrova 2007, p.21) was therefore a further internationalisation of this 
strategy that used international as well as Norwegian NGOs to achieve its foreign policy goals.  
 
Similar dynamics pertained in Canada, albeit in a context of recession and aid cutbacks. Canadian 
development NGOs were 70% dependent on government funding by 1996 (Hudock 1999, p.3) and 
were hard hit by ODA cuts of 40% in the period from 1991/92 to 1999/2000 (Robinson and Epps 
1997), which saw a reduction of their funding from $282 million in 1991 to $175 million in 1997 (Agg 
2006, pp.17–18). According  to  the  Canadian  campaign,  the   impact  was   ‘devastating’  and  left  them  
with   ‘little   remaining   capacity   for   public   education   and   outreach’   (Warmington and Tuttle 1998, 
p.58), but the new Liberal government sweetened the pill by reinvigorating government 
consultations with NGOs (Van Rooy 1997, pp.95–98; Batora 2005, p.7) that had lapsed under the 
Progressive Conservatives. NGOs were invited to participate in a foreign and defence policy review 
from 1993 (Warmington and Tuttle 1998, p.49), enabling them to raise the landmines issue. The 
resulting foreign policy statement also promised Canada would expand personnel exchanges 
between its overseas development agency and NGOs (DFAIT 1995a, chap.VI; VII),  while  the  Liberals’  
1997 election manifesto promised to promote increased NGO participation in IGOs (Liberal Party of 
Canada 1997, p.100),   indicating   a   similar   hegemonising   strategy   as   Norway’s   social   democrats.  
Moreover, in a climate of otherwise severe cuts, involving NGOs in the policy process, funding the 
Canadian campaign (Clark 1998, p.89) and supporting the ICBL was a cost-effective way of 
dampening criticism from the NGO sector and mitigating the impact of simultaneous ODA and 
defence  cuts  on  Canada’s  international  profile  at  relatively  low  cost.  Indeed,  the  budget  for  Canada’s  
stewardship of the Ottawa Process, after the initial Strategy Conference, was only around CA$2m 
(Tomlin 1998, p.19), indicating the value to be had by outsourcing foreign policy to NGOs. Diplomatic 
prestige was particularly important to Canada at the time, as it was campaigning for a seat on the 
UN Security Council (Scott 2001, p.129), having announced its candidacy for 1999-2000 in 1994. It 
thus framed the Ottawa Process as part of a wider human security agenda it would pursue on the 
Council, which may have seemed a relatively cost-effective campaign strategy for competing with 
the Netherlands, another Core Group member, which ran on its more impressive aid record (Malone 
2000).  In the event, both countries won a seat, with Greece losing out.  
 
Funding from Canada, Norway and the other Western governments that formed the Core Group of 
supportive states was especially important during the later stages of the campaign, when NGOs 
received funding to publicise and attend the Ottawa Process and establish campaigns in the South. 
Rutherford (2010, p.89) refers to how the influx of cash sent Williams and the US campaign 
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coordinator,  Mary  Wareham,  ‘scrambling  to  establish  in-country national campaigns, which were an 
important part of the Core  Group’s…strategy’  and   ICBL reports acknowledge funding from Canada, 
Norway, Belgium Sweden, South Africa, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Denmark (HI and ICBL 
1997, p.144; ICBL 1997b, p.29, 1998a, p.71),  including  Belgium’s  sponsorship  of SNGOs and survivors 
to attend the June 1997 Brussels Conference (Landmine Monitor 1999f).  
 
The other major ICBL donor was Soros, who established the OSI Landmines Project in early 1997 and 
promised $4m in donations by 1999. It was planned to  provide  this  ‘in  the  form  of  matching  funds,  
on   the   basis   of   two   dollars   from   other   sources   for   every   dollar   of   Landmines   Project   funds’,  
potentially creating a substantial multiplier effect (HRW and Africa Watch 1994). $1m had already 
awarded by October 1997 (OSI 1997; Soros Foundations Network 1998a, 1999a), most of it to ICBL 
NGOs, and $2.4m by the end of 1998 during the ratification phase of the campaign. All of this money 
was earmarked for advocacy, research and organisational support rather than demining or victim 
assistance (Soros Foundations Network 1999b) and went directly to campaigning and expanding the 
ICBL. All the ICBL founders received grants, as did dozens of national campaigns and NGOs in the 
South and Eastern Europe, where Soros was promoting civil society, privatisation and free markets 
as part of  his  ‘open  society’  agenda.  The  extent  of  his  support  leads  Short  to  question  whether  the  
ICBL  represented  ‘civil  society’  at  all  and  to  suggest  this  type  of  funding  model  may  only  be  possible  
where  campaigns  tally  with  ‘a  liberal  agenda’  supported  by  elites (1999, p.496).  
Funding of the Lead NGOs  
The overall budgets of two of the three lead NGOs, VVAF and HI, increased significantly during the 
campaign,  while  the  establishment  of  HRW’s  Arms  Project  with  foundation  grants  allowed  it  to  move  
into a new area of campaigning.  HI’s   resources  more  than  doubled  between  1993  and  1996,   from  
approximately $20m to over $45m. From a much lower base, VVAF’s  revenue  also  quadrupled,  from  
$2.2m in 1993 to $8.9m in 1997/8, when it spent $4m on the ICBL (VVAF 1998b, p.23; 9; 2). Much of 
this went on advertising and lobbying firms in the US (Priest 1997a), but it also ‘staffed, coordinated, 
and   largely   ﬁnanced’   the international campaign (VVAF 1998a, p.3). Its staff included: the ICBL 
Coordinator, Jody Williams; Liz Bernstein, who helped establish campaigns across southern Africa 
from mid-1996 and was on the ICBL Conference team at the Brussels Conference of the Ottawa 
Process; and the US campaign coordinator, Mary Wareham, who was also a leading member of the 
ICBL conference team at the 4th ICBL Conference in Mozambique and the Ottawa Process 
negotiations in Brussels and Oslo (Bernstein 1997; ICBL 1997c, 1997d, 1998a, p.71; SACBL 1997; 
Wareham 1997a; Rutherford 2010, p.89n54; Williams 2013, p.210). In addition, VVAF was a major 
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funder of ICBL activities at international conferences (ICBL 1996e, p.188, 1997b, p.29, 1998a, p.71; HI 
and ICBL 1997, p.144);  and  public  awareness  activities  like  the  ‘Ban  Bus’  (Grant 1997; VVAF 1998b).  
 
 
*HI figures are very approximate due to varying data sources and conversions between several different 
currencies. The 1997 figure is very rough due to separation of HI and HI-Belgium’s  accounts  that  year  and  may  
not represent an actual funding decrease. 
Two  main  sources  of  VVAF’s  extra  income  can  be  identified:  the  Leahy  War  Victims’  Fund  at  USAID  
and   the  MacArthur   family’s   foundations   (MacArthur Foundation 1998; VVAF 1998b; Gillon 2010, 
p.282).  VVAF’s  President  Bobby  Muller had good access to the latter through his marriage to Solange 
MacArthur, who ‘poured  millions  of   dollars   into  Bobby’s   political   activities,   essentially bankrolling 
the  campaign  to  ban  land  mines’  (Gillon 2010, p.282). The J Roderick MacArthur Foundation, which 
Solange chaired, helped finance After the Guns Fall Silent and also gave $1.75m to VVAF in 1998 
during the ratification phase of the campaign. VVAF also received support for its ICBL work from the 
larger MacArthur Foundation, which approved a $100,000 grant in 1997 (MacArthur Foundation 
1998, p.1122) and Muller’s   personal   wealth   allowed   him   to   make   large   individual donations to 
political candidates, amounting to $380,000 since online records began in 1997. Most went to 
Democratic candidates, which in 1997 included ICBL supporters, Congressman Lane Evans and 
Senator Patrick Leahy (Federal Election Commission 2011).  
On the government side,  VVAF’s  decision  to  accept  state  funding  for  the  first  time  in  1992   (Kranish 
2003) enabled it to access funds for its victim assistance work in Cambodia (USAID 1995, p.1; Kranish 
2003). It received $4.5m from USAID in Cambodia alone from 1992-5 (USAID 1995, p.6), or roughly 
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44% of its overall revenue (VVAF 1998c, p.9) and as of September 1996, was receiving grants worth 
$4.25m for work in Vietnam, Cambodia and Angola. Although earmarked for victim assistance, this 
enabled VVAF to acquire expertise on landmines and grow the organisation. USAID also part-
financed After the Guns Fall Silent (1995, p.285 n25) and  John  English,  the  Canadian  government’s  
special advisor on landmines (English 1998, p.121), has said the US  campaign  ‘received  considerable  
funding  from  USAID’  (cited in Kitchen 2002, p.48 n39), indicating the divisions in the US government 
between elements in the State Department that actively supported the campaign and the Pentagon. 
In this context, although Muller (1997) has  claimed  that   ‘Throughout our anti-landmine campaign, 
we   were   cautioned   that   we   could   be   jeopardizing   our   funding’,   given his personal and political 
connections he was in a relatively strong position to withstand the pressure.  
 
HI was also a major financial contributor. Although the vast majority of its relatively large budget 
(Figure 4.1) went on field operations, it also spent well over $5m19 on the ICBL from 1995-7 alone (HI 
1996c, 1998). This included leading large national campaigns in France and Belgium and sponsoring 
ICBL activities at international conferences (ICBL 1996e, p.188, 1997b, p.29; HI and ICBL 1997, 
p.144), particularly the June 1997 Ottawa Process Conference in Brussels where HI-Belgium is based. 
Although  HI’s demining and victim assistance activities are overwhelmingly government/IGO funded 
(US State Department 1994a, chap.VI; VVAF 1995, p.140; 169; USAID 1997, p.12; Landmine Monitor 
1999l, 1999m) and like much of the ICBL, it received grants for campaign activities from Core Group 
governments and the OSI Landmines Project (Soros Foundations Network 1998b), in general it was 
the most financially independent of the lead NGOs and financed much of its participation from 
public fundraising. 
 
Over the course of the campaign, its overall budget increased significantly (Figure 4.1), due to 
increased income from the EU, UN, governments, as well as the general public. The French and 
Belgian branches pursued different fundraising strategies in this respect, as almost half of HI-
France’s  income  in  1996  came  from  the  general  public,  compared  to  around  a  quarter for HI-Belgium 
(HI 1996c, 1998). This became more pronounced after they separated financially in 1997, when HI-
France further increased its independence from institutional funding whereas HI-Belgium did the 
opposite (HI 1996c, 1998; HI-Belgium 2001, p.29; Aidwatch 2003). Given HI-France accounted for 
nearly three-quarters   of   HI’s   overall   revenue   as   of   1996   (HI 1996c, 1998), its funding model 
                                                     
19$5m is a rough conversion of the figures cited in its combined international accounts. These cover the French 
and Belgian sections in 1995, the French, Belgian and Swiss sections for 1996, but only the French and Swiss 
sections for 1997. This is because the Belgian section separated from the French organisation financially in 
1997, so its activities during the last year of the campaign are not included in this figure. 
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predominated, which meant HI was significantly more financially independent than the other lead 
NGOs – especially given HI-France’s  broad  support  base  of  around  200,000  donors  (HI 1997d).  
 
Like many human rights NGOs, HRW forswears government funding and is largely financially 
dependent on foundations, corporations and wealthy individuals. As an employee once quipped, its 
generous  budget  “doesn’t  come  from  ten-dollar  donations  from  the  Dalits”  (quoted in Brody et al. 
2001, p.69).   It  was   the   fifth   largest   recipient   of  US   foundation   grants   for   ‘International  Affairs’   in  
1998 (Foundation Center 1999), which together with corporate funding accounted for a third of its 
income in 1997/8 (HRW 1998d). Individual donations made up another half, with much of this 
coming from the super-rich. Almost a third20 of its overall income from 1992-6 came from donors 
that each gave over $800,000 (HRW 1998e, p.9) and in 2000 (the only year for which this 
information was publicly available), 69% originated from donors of $5,000 or more (HRW 2001a, 
p.14). This is also the minimum threshold for participation in the elite HRW Council (HRW 2003a, 
p.27), whose members organise fundraising and publicity events. Examples cited in the Council 
handbook  include  dinner  for  fifty  in  a  member’s  home,  prepared  by  a  top  chef  and  featuring  a  fine  
wine auction, and a private  talk  in  another’s  by  Mary  Robinson,  the  former  UN  High  Commissioner  
for Human Rights. HRW also holds an annual gala dinner that brings in around $1.5m (HRW 1998d).  
The   majority   of   HRW’s   income   thus   comes   from   foundations,   corporations   or   very   wealthy  
individuals,   in   which   context   ‘Relatively   large   gifts   from   affluent individuals have proven a 
proportionally less costly strategy to raise funds than a dues-based  structure’  (Welch 2009, p.483). 
The remainder comes mainly from financial and stock market investments (HRW 1998e, p.9), which 
in  1997  included  $250,000  profit  from  Soros’  Quantum  fund  (HRW 1998e, p.1; 9; 13). Until 1994 this 
owned 9% of the shares in Alliant Tech Systems, the largest US manufacturer of APMs (ICBL 1994b, 
p.7).  In  terms  of  funding  specific  to  the  landmines  works,  HRW’s  Arms  Project  was  established  with  a  
$500,000 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation (HRW 1993; Rockefeller Foundation 1993, p.108) 
and additional grants of $2.27m between 1993-1997 (based on Rockefeller Foundation annual 
reports), including $400,000 out of a budget of $1.2m in 1997 (HRW 1998e, p.17), indicate it likely 
accounted for 30-40% of its income annually, with most, or all, of the rest coming  from other 
foundations, including the OSI, which gave the Arms Project $156,000 in 1998 (OSI 1998, p.167). 
Looking at ICBL funding as a whole, its was substantially dependent on its close relationships with 
public and private elites.    
                                                     
20 This also includes donations from corporations and foundations.  
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NGO Personnel and their Elite Allies 
The similarities of background and political outlook of NGOs intellectuals and individual members of 
government, IGO and private foundations, that may have contributed to this capacity to raise funds, 
is  examined  now  in  the  context  of  Gramsci’s  theory  of  intellectuals  as  strata  allied  to  dominant  class  
interests that mediate between civil and political society in integral states. This is in contrast to the 
way the  ICBL’s  diversity  of  membership  has  been  emphasised   (Cameron 1999, p.90; Mekata 2000, 
p.155 Gebauer 1998, p.492) as a key ingredient of its success.  
 
This research identified thirty-six leaders of the landmines campaign, around a third of whom had 
previously worked for Western governments, IGOs or foundations or as elected representatives of 
major Western political parties, and all of whom were NGO employees, aside from two prominent 
Cambodian  landmine  survivors.  Beyond  this,  the  social  basis  of  the  ICBL’s  founders  mainly  consisted  
of ‘traditional  intellectual’  strata,  particularly  doctors  (HI,  PHR,  MI),  lawyers  (HRW),  military  officers  
(MAG, VVAF, NPA) and Christian clergy in the numerous faith-based NGOs and religious groups that 
joined the campaign from 1993. Several of these played key roles in establishing national campaigns 
in the South through their missionary networks and church support was vital in broadening the 
campaign.  
 
Many  of  the  ICBL’s  leading  figures  were  personally  very  well-connected, for example Bobby Muller 
of VVAF, who hosted a private fundraiser for Leahy in his home where President Clinton was the 
main speaker (Clinton 2000). The  closeness  of  VVAF’s  relationship  with  Leahy  is  indicated  by  Muller’s  
rather  sycophantic,  or  in  Gramsci’s  terms,  “servile”  attitude  (1971, p.97) towards the US Senator, as 
demonstrated by his  description  of  his  cooperation  with  Leahy’s  aide,  Tim  Rieser  as  being  a  soldier  
‘under  the  direction  of Tim, who has been given the authority by Leahy to do what is necessary to 
get  the  job  done’  (quoted  in  Sigal  2006,  p.15).   
  
The ICBL Coordinator, Jody Williams, followed a similar personal trajectory from leftish anti-war 
activism to insider lobbying. The daughter of a small businessman, Williams had two postgraduate 
degrees,  including  a  Master’s  in  International  Relations  from  John  Hopkins  (Clancy 1992; The Nobel 
Foundation 1997; Bandler 1998; Murphy 1998a; Peacejam 2011; Williams 2013, pp.12–13; 23), but 
had spent the 1980s working for various US-based Central American solidarity NGOs during the US-
backed  ‘dirty  war’  (Williams 2013, chap.5–6). This included Medical Aid for El Salvador, a small Los 
Angeles-based NGO with humanitarian field projects popular with Hollywood liberals. Its leader, 
Mario Velasquez, was a former envoy for the Salvadoran guerrilla movement, FMLN, and it was 
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through these left-wing connections that Williams met Gebauer of MI, who suggested hiring her as 
ICBL Coordinator (Lawson 2002, p.96; Williams 2013, pp.144–147).  
 
In  contrast  to   the   intermittent  danger  and   low  pay  of  her  Central  American  work,  Williams’   job  as  
ICBL  Coordinator  gave  her  a  ‘profile,  prestige  and  travel  requirements  more  akin to a UN envoy than 
a   staffer   for   a  Washington   nonprofit’   and   a   salary   equivalent   to   over   $80,000   (in   current   value)  
(Bandler 1998; Clines 1998; Murphy 1998a). Initially   sceptical   of   ‘partnership’   with   pro-ban 
governments (Sigal 2006, p.97) and  not  believing  ‘for  a  minute’  that ‘anything  [was]  possible  now  in  
our post-Cold-War  world’  (Williams 2013, pp.147–148), by the time the treaty was agreed, she was 
extolling the virtues of   partnership,   arguing   ‘civil society and governments do not have to see 
themselves as adversaries’   (Williams 1997a) and claiming “Diplomacy in the post-Cold War period 
really   is  different”   (quoted in ICBL 1997e). Widely regarded as a brilliant organiser, Williams had a 
forthright,  confrontational  style,  and  famously  derided  Clinton  as  a  “weenie”  for  failing  to  stand  up  
the Pentagon and sign the ban treaty (Bandler 1998). She  had a huge amount of personal 
responsibility for the campaign, being  ultimately  responsible  ‘for  all  official  ICBL  press  releases’  and  
formed a two-person negotiating team with Stephen Goose of HRW at crucial points in the Ottawa 
Process (Goose 1998b, p.275; Short 1999, p.484; 494)  
 
Goose  was  Williams’  closest  ally,  despite  his  more  cautious  diplomatic  style  (Williams 2013, p.170). A 
History graduate from Vanderbilt University, Goose also had a Masters in International Relations 
from John Hopkins   and  had   joined  HRW’s  Arms Project in 1993 after working as an arms control 
expert for the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations (Augsburg College 1999; 
ICBL 2002a; HRW 2011a), then chaired by Senator Leahy. Before that, he had worked for seven years 
at the Center for Defense Information, a Washington arms control think tank (DanChurchAid 2004a, 
p.41; Williams 2013, p.168).   He   contributed   his   legal   expertise   to   HRW’s   influential publications 
(HRW and PHR 1993; HRW and Africa Watch 1994; HRW 1997a; HRW and VVAF 1997), which formed 
the   ICBL’s  discursive  core.  As  well  as   chairing   the  Steering  Committee  of   the  US  campaign   (USCBL 
1996a, 1997), he represented HRW on the ICBL Steering Committee from 1993 onwards (Nobel 
Committee 1998; Williams 2013, p.168). During the Ottawa Process, he and Williams collaborated 
very closely with Core Group diplomats working for ideologically compatible consensual arms of 
small and middle power states. Both sides have emphasised their collegiality and mutual trust 
(Peters n.d., p.29; Goose 2008a, p.24).  
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HRW’s  entire strategy was based around elites harnessing the power of other elites and it is quite 
open   about   this,   explaining   that   they   ‘sought   to   enlist   the   influence   of   the   U.S.   government   on  
behalf   of   human   rights   worldwide’,   but   had   recently   ‘expanded   these   efforts to other centers of 
influence  such  as  the  United  Nations,  the  European  Union,  the  World  Bank  and  Tokyo’  (1997b). This 
insider strategy and its liberal internationalist ideology orient it towards liberal elites domestically 
and internationally and its governing bodies are almost entirely composed of elite intellectuals in a 
Gramscian sense. Similar to the Moderate Party in 19th century Italy, these can aptly be described as 
‘a  real,  organic  vanguard  of  the  upper  classes,  to  which  economically  they  belonged’  (Gramsci 1971, 
p.60). During the campaign,   HRW’s   Executive   Committee, which essentially runs an organisation 
with no membership or national sections (One World Trust 2008), was chaired by the President of 
Random House, Robert Bernstein, and other directors included the presidents of the MacArthur and 
Carnegie foundations (Foundation Center 2000); Gary Sick, who had served on the National Security 
Council under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan (SIPA 2005); Harold Hongju Koh, a former Justice 
Department adviser under Reagan who was appointed  Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy 
Human Rights, and Labour by President Clinton in 1988 (Koh 2004); and Maureen White, who later 
became   Finance   Chair   of   the   Democratic   National   Committee.   The   Arms   Project’s   International  
Advisory Committee was similar, including the editor emeritus of the Boston Globe and several elites 
that helped develop the concepts of human security and R2P in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Mohamed Sahnoun, a former Algerian ambassador to the US and the UN Secretary-General’s  Special  
Representative to Somalia in 1992, who was later a member of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (HRW 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997c, 1998f) is one example.  
 
The leading ICBL person in HI was Dr. Philippe Chabasse, who coordinated the French campaign from 
1994-7 and currently directs a corporate social responsibility consultancy (Chabasse 1994, 1998, 
2011; HI 1997e, 1999). A past pupil of the prestigious Lycée Concordat in Paris alongside Jean Claude 
Trichet, Edouard de Rothschild and Bao Dai, like Richardier and Simmonot, Chabasse had gotten 
involved in humanitarianism through working for MSF and cites as his role model its founder, 
Bernard Kouchner (Chabasse 1994, 1998, 2011; HI 1997e, 1999), who originated the concept of le 
droit  d’ingèrence in  the  late  1960s.  Kouchner  was  one  of  the  first  signatories  of  HI’s  ban  petition  in  
1992 and co-organised a public hearing with them on landmines in  the European Parliament in 1995 
in his then capacity as President of the Commission for Development and Cooperation in Foreign 
Affairs (HI 1995c, p.54; Chabasse 1998, p.61). Together with other MSF figures, he was an important 
ally for the French campaign.  
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A final important figure was Rae McGrath of MAG, a former British army officer who contributed his 
demining expertise to several early ICBL publications (Asia Watch and PHR 1991; Middle East Watch 
1992; McGrath 1994a), which have a noticeably stronger tone on Western state and corporate 
responsibility for the problem than subsequent HRW and VVAF publications. McGrath continued to 
push stronger positions on these and other issues and even suggested rejecting the Nobel Peace 
Prize  as  “a  stamp  of  official  approval  on  a  civil  society  campaign…that  could  just  take  the  sting  out  of  
it”   (quoted in Monin and Gallimore 2002, pp.24–25). He also subsequently wrote a highly critical 
book   on   the   international   mine   action   sector,   endorsed   by   John   Pilger,   that   opposed   NATO’s  
‘humanitarian  intervention’  in  Kosovo  in  1999  (2000a). This indicates the political differences in the 
campaign and also how they were largely concealed by its cooperative tone and singular objective of 
banning APMs.  
Outside the ICBL itself, elite allies in government, IGOs, the media and foundations were crucial to its 
success. Korey (1999, p.170) notes the increased access and influence of human rights NGOs under 
the  Clinton  administration  when,  as  de  Waal  puts   it   ‘the  human  rights  generation  came  to  power’  
(2003, p.480) and similar processes were happening internationally with the integration of 
humanitarian and development NGOs with governments, in line with neoliberal restructuring and 
outsourcing of governance functions. Even in France, where the political culture has traditionally 
involved greater distance between NGOs and the state (Chabasse 1998, p.67; Pouligny 2001, pp.18–
19), this was changing by the 1990s, at least in the humanitarian field, where numerous prominent 
figures from MSF, which has close links to HI (Saillant 2007, pp.76–77), were appointed to ministerial 
positions in the 1980s and 1990s.  
As mentioned above, UN Secretaries-General Boutros-Ghali and Annan, and the head of the ICRC, 
Cornelius Sommaruga, supported the campaign, as did Jimmy Carter, who lent his support right at 
the beginning in August 1992 (HRW and PHR 1993 Appendix 16). Numerous wives and ex-wives of 
powerful men who engaged in charitable activities also flocked to the cause, including Danielle 
Mitterrand, who headed a human rights foundation and was an important supporter of the France 
campaign (Mitterrand 1994; Chabasse 1998, pp.62–3), Princess Diana, and Graça Machel, the former 
Education Minister and First Lady of Mozambique who married Nelson Mandela in 1998, wrote a UN 
report on the impact of armed conflict on children including landmines (Machel 1995) and 
patronised the Mozambican campaign (ICBL 1996g). Liberalism was a common ideological thread 
linking many of these supportive elites, in addition to religious motives for quintessential traditional 
intellectual supporters like the Dalai Lama, Pope and Archbishop Desmond Tutu.  
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Of   all   the   campaign’s  many   elite   supporters,   the  most   important  were   probably   Leahy, Canadian 
Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, the Norwegian Development Minister, Jan Egeland, and billionaire 
philanthrocapitalist and archetypal organic capitalist intellectual, George Soros. Leahy, Axworthy and 
Egeland shared similar liberal political outlooks and played important political roles in the US, 
Canada and Norway and internationally. Leahy is consistently rated one of the most liberal US 
Senators (That’s  My Congress 2012) and had already established the Leahy War Victims Fund to 
assist landmine survivors. Similarly, Axworthy was a Liberal Party politician with a liberal 
internationalist  academic  background  who  has  written  extensively  on  ‘human  security’,  ‘soft  power’  
and middlepowermanship (Axworthy 1997a, 1998a; Axworthy and Taylor 1998) and under whose 
ministry  Nye’s  writings  on   soft  power  became   ‘required   reading’   for  Canadian  diplomats   (Wallace 
1998).  
 
There was little ideological difference between them and Egeland, who had a background in 
Amnesty International and the Norwegian Red Cross (Neumann 2002, p.110; Petrova 2007, p.20) 
and like Axworthy,  championed  ‘soft  power’  and  middlepowermanship.  His  doctoral  thesis,  Impotent 
Superpower, Potent Small State (1988) was a major influence on the  “Norwegian  model”  of  partially 
outsourcing foreign policy to NGOs, which Egeland put into practice during the Ottawa Process. It 
also proposed maximising Norwegian   influence   by   focusing   on   ‘human   rights   and   humanitarian  
issues’,  a  ‘humanitarian  superpower’  role  he  believed  Norway could play more convincingly than its 
US ally.  
 
The ideological compatibility between these elite intellectuals and the lead NGOs is demonstrated by 
their ready support for the campaign. This applied to Leahy (HRW and PHR 1993, p.319n2; Sigal 
2006, pp.14–16) and also Axworthy, who seized on the campaign as soon as he entered office in 
January 1996 (Mekata 2000, p.157),  as  ‘a way in which a middle power could distinguish itself on the 
world  stage  with  a  “moral”  foreign  policy’  (Kitchen 2002, p.38). Similarly, according to NPA, Egeland 
was   “our   man”   from   the   start   (NPA 2012, p.8),   especially   given   he   had   precipitated   NPA’s  
involvement in demining in 1992 through the offer of large amounts of government funding.  
 
The subsequent trajectories these elites took are also instructive. Axworthy continued his interest in 
‘human  security’  by  developing  a  more  directly  coercive  ‘freedom  from  fear’-based approach to the 
concept that distanced it from its development roots (DFAIT 1999) and  included  supporting  NATO’s  
‘humanitarian   intervention’   in   Kosovo   and   establishing   ICISS,   which   developed the R2P. After 
resigning as Foreign Minister in 2001, he joined the board of HRW (HRW 2002a, p.45) and the 
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MacArthur Foundation (Hrab 2003). Likewise, Egeland is also a member of the International Advisory 
Board Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 
2011) and after the Labour Party lost the 1997 elections he returned to the Norwegian Red Cross as 
its President, before heading UNOCHA from 2003-2006 (Petrova 2007, p.20 n36) and becoming 
Deputy Director of HRW in 2012 (HRW 2012a). Even in 2002 Neumann (2002, p.110), described 
Egeland’s  career  trajectory  as  ‘indicative  of  a  wider  structural  change’,  where  personnel  circulation  
between NGOs, the government and IGOs has become the norm. This is particularly marked in 
Norway, but is also evident in other countries and is closely connected to the increasing outsourcing 
of foreign policy, which has narrowed the apparent gap between civil and political society in the 
integral state.   
 
Finally, the   ICBL’s   largest   single   funder   (Short 1999, p.484), George Soros, was one  of   the  world’s  
richest men, who was in the process of dispensing an estimated $4 billion in grants (Philanthropy in 
Europe 2006, p.4) across Eastern Europe to ease the transition to capitalism (Quigley 1997, pp.87–
102; Arnold 2004; Roelofs 2007, pp.11–18). This included large amounts of aid for civil society 
building and was boosted by further billions he made speculating on the 1997 East Asian financial 
crisis (Clark 2003). Committed to promoting free market capitalism and liberal democracy (Soros 
Foundations 2000, p.134; 2), or what he calls an ‘open   society’,   Soros   had   bankrolled   HRW’s  
activities in the Eastern bloc during the Cold War and has been one of its main supporters for 
decades (Welch 2009, p.483). Like   HRW,   he   was   also   a   strong   supporter   of   ‘humanitarian  
intervention’   in   the   former   Yugoslavia   throughout   the   1990s   and   has been a member of HRW 
regional committees since at least 1992 (HRW 1992b, 1997d).  
 
All these   elite   connections   greatly   facilitated   the   ICBL’s   predominantly   insider   tactical   strategy,  
discussed  in  the  next  chapter,  and  demonstrate  the  lead  NGOs’  ideological  compatibility  with  liberal  
intellectuals in the international political and civil society of IGOs, governments and foundations and 
their broad identification with hegemonic interests.  
The Organisation of the Campaign  
In   contrast   to   the   lead   NGOs’   identification   with   hegemonic   interests   they   had   a   paternalistic  
attitude   towards   landmine   victims,   the   ICBL’s   equivalent   of   Gramsci’s   subordinate   groups,   as  
illustrated   by   the   ICBL   slogan   “To   speak   for   those  who   cannot   speak   for   themselves”   (White and 
Rutherford 1998, p.100) and  Muller’s  (1994a, p.10) keynote address at the second ICBL conference: 
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The people who are the victims of landmines are usually the people who are the most 
vulnerable  within  society…They  do  not  have  a  political  voice.  That   is  our   job.  We  are   their  
voice.  
This reflected North-South relations within the campaign as a whole and its embedded hierarchical 
nature of the campaign. In spite of this, the conventional understanding of the ICBL is as a global or 
transnational civil society network, viewed from a liberal or liberal-constructivist perspective (Price 
1998a; Mekata 2000; Warkentin and Mingst 2000). The editors of the official book on the campaign 
deem  it  ‘a  good  example  of  what  has  been  dubbed  ‘global  civil  society’,  which  ‘holds  the  promise  of  
making existing international institutions more  democratic’  (Cameron and Lawson 1998, p.xiii; 5; 13), 
while Warkentin and Mingst (2000) characterise   the   APLC   as   a   ‘”victory”   of   global   civil   society’.  
Indeed, as Beier (2003, p.793) points  out,  this  interpretation  of  the  ICBL  as  ‘global  civil  society’  is  so  
widespread  that  it  is  habitually  ‘invoked  as  evidence  of  its  very  existence’.   
This account was fostered by the ICBL leadership, supportive governments and the UN, as the 
perception of the ICBL as a global civil society campaign with a diverse North-South membership 
helped legitimise the Ottawa Process and the APLC. Williams has thus described the campaign as a 
‘global   citizens’   coalition’,   an   international   social   movement   and   a   ‘global   civil   society   campaign’  
(Williams and Goose 1998, p.22; UNDP 2002, p.103; Williams 2008, p.187), while the Canadian 
campaign   called   it   as   ‘global   grass-roots   effort’   (Tuttle 1997). Similarly, Axworthy (1997b) claimed 
‘the  involvement  of  civil society and the information technology revolution – are the foundations on 
which   a   profound   democratization   of   international   politics   is   being   built’.   In   this   context,   liberal-
constructivist interpretations have to a large extent reproduced the representations of campaign 
participants. 
 
Academic readings in this vein emphasise the dynamic transnationality and global reach of the ICBL, 
which is essentially treated as a singular actor by focusing on its overall impact, rather than the 
power relations within it. This is consistent with the broader approach towards transnational 
advocacy networks and global governance as cooperative processes involving actors that are 
assumed to be meaningfully independent and horizontally related, rather than imbricated in 
hierarchical   relations   of   dependency   and   domination.   Consequently,   the   ICBL’s   geographical   and  
functional diversity and flexible, horizontal network structure are emphasised and are seen to have 
made it both politically effective and democratically legitimate (Price 1998a, pp.626–627; Rutherford 
2000a, p.100; Shawki 2010), exemplifying   the   democratising   effects   of   ‘global   civil   society’  
participation in global governance and the role of networks as democratic vectors of soft power. 
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Edwards (2001, p.9) thus cites the ICBL as an example of how   ‘The   rising   power   of   information  
technology and the Internet makes it easier for  networks to operate with less centralized structures, 
not  to  mention  a  flatter  hierarchy’,  while  Shawki  (2010, p.108) stresses  it  ‘maintained  a  very  flexible  
structure  and  had  no  international  secretariat  or  central  bureaucracy.  Each  member…remained  free  
to  pursue  ICBL  goals  in  any  manner  it  saw  fit’.   
 
This occludes power relations within the campaign, which can be equally described as driven by a 
small core of well-connected, well-resourced and Northern-based individuals and organisations, with 
minimal democratic input into its overall strategy or discourse from the broader membership. This 
duality  accounts  for  the  apparent  contradiction  between  Sigal’s  (2006, p.6) claim  that  ‘the  campaign  
was   not   organized   hierarchically.   Its   hubs   did   not   control   its   spokes’   and   Gebauer’s   (2007, p.7) 
description   of   it   as   a   ‘hierarchically   structured’,   ‘not   always   transparent   web,   dominated   and  
controlled by NGOs, prominent individuals, churches, lobbyists, self-appointed coordinators and 
careerists’,   in   which   ‘Southern   NGO   especially   are   subject   to   internal   dependency   and   power  
relations’.   This   more   critical   interpretation   is   supported   by   several   academic   accounts (Pouligny 
2001; Beier 2003),   including   Sigal’s   (2006, p.73; 222; 229; 5),   as   well   as   the   ICBL’s   financial and 
personnel basis, its geographic development and decision-making processes. It should also be noted 
that although the emergence of internet and email in the mid-1990s made transnational 
communications faster, easier and much cheaper (Williams 2013, p.167), the democratising effects 
of this were limited by lack of access in developing countries. In 1995 only 40 million people used the 
internet and by 1997, the ratio of access in developed and developing countries was more than 80:1 
(Castells 2010a, p.xxiv). 
 
Contrary to its global image, the ICBL was mainly Northern-based and Northern-led (Figures 4.2 & 
4.3). Its expansion to the South was initially slow and concentrated in a handful of severely-affected 
states with large international aid efforts, where campaigns were set up by NNGOs and missionary 
groups and primarily involved local partner NGOs of international agencies. In addition, its Steering 
Committee,   which   was   responsible   for   ‘global   strategic   direction’,   ‘establishing   broad   policy  
directions, including defining the core objectives, setting out strategy for the various negotiating 
sessions, and targeting important regions and countries for capacity-building  efforts’  (Hubert 2000, 
p.32), was composed of the six founder NNGOs from 1992 until mid-1996 (ICBL 1996e, p.5, 1996f). 
Against  this  backdrop,  SNGOs’  role  was  mainly  to  legitimise  the  campaign through the involvement 
of  victims,  who  served  mainly  as   ‘“poster  children”  for  the  ban  movement’   (White and Rutherford 
1998, p.105) and were not admitted to the Steering Committee until February 1998 (ICBL 1998b). In 
142 
 
addition, many of the Southern campaigns were ex-pat  dominated,  ‘astroturf’  operations  dependent  
on external funding and lacked strong local roots.  
 
The de facto leadership of the six founder NGOs was recognised by the forty European and North 
American NGOs present at the 1st ICBL Conference in London in 1993 (ICBL 1994a, p.15; Lawson 
2002, pp.107–108),   which  mandated   them   ‘to  make   decisions   on   behalf   of   the   ICBL’   (Rutherford 
2010, p.44). By late 1993, campaigning was underway in the US, France, Australia, Germany, 
Sweden, Britain, New Zealand and Italy, but only four developing countries were represented at the 
ICBL’s   Second   International   Conference   the   following   May   (Figure 4.2), despite recognition that 
expanding the campaign to the South would be important for its legitimacy (Rutherford 2010, p.44). 
The ICBL began to make serious effort to expand to the South from mid-1995 (Williams and Goose 
1998, pp.30–31; Mekata 2000, p.153; Sigal 2006, pp.175–180; Rutherford 2010, p.89) in the run-up 
to the CCW Review Conference and held its Third International Conference in Phnom Penh that 
June. However, by that stage its parameters were long established and the ability to significantly 
alter campaign strategy or discourse was limited. 
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Figure 4.2 North-South Distribution of NGO Delegates at 
2nd ICBL Conference in Geneva, May 1994 
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(Sources: ICBL 1996d, 1997a; WCC 1998) 
 
Expansion accelerated in 1996-7, when donor funding during the Ottawa Process facilitated rapid 
growth   in   the   South   and   the   ICBL’s   membership   almost   doubled   (Figure 3.5). Flowing from this, 
Rutherford (2010, p.89 n54) relates   how   ‘From   1995,   many   of   the   national   campaigns   were  
established   largely   by   Liz   Bernstein’,   the American aid worker based in Cambodia who was 
instrumental in setting up the campaign there prior to the  3rd International ICBL Conference in 
Phnom Penh in 1995 and was subsequently dispatched to southern Africa six months before the 4th 
ICBL Conference in Mozambique in February 1997 to build national campaigns in the region and 
coordinate the conference.  
 
Due to their basis in mine-affected states, the Cambodian, Mozambican and Afghan campaigns were 
the most prominent Southern campaigns and in Cambodia and Mozambique attracted dozens of 
member organisations and widespread public support (Williams 1995; ICBL 1996d; HRW 1997a, 
p.100; WCC 1998; Rutherford 2010, p.69), given the serious landmine problem there. 
Notwithstanding this, they remained driven by NNGOs and missionaries (Chabasse 1998; Mekata 
2000; Petrova 2007), who founded the campaigns, provided much of their membership and almost 
all their resources (ICBL 1994a, 1996d; NGO Forum on Cambodia 1998, p.13; WCC 1998; Rutherford 
2010, p.162n61). The Cambodian campaign was coordinated via the expat-dominated NGO Forum 
on Cambodia from its headquarters at Jesuit Refugees Services (ICBL 1996d; 1998, pp.2–3, 2012) and 
by   1997,   60%   of   the   campaign’s   38   members   were   Northern-based INGOs (ICBL 1997a). In 
Mozambique, the campaign grew exponentially to seventy members (HRW 1997a, p.100) in the 
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lead-up to the 4th ICBL Conference in Maputo in February 1997 when external resources poured into 
the region and was described by Williams and Goose the following year (1998, p.38) as   ‘a   prime  
example  of  how  the   landmine  campaign  helped  to  empower  civil   society’.  However,  by  December  
1998  the   ICBL  Coordination  Committee’s   (ICBL 1998c) minutes noted the  Mozambican  campaign’s  
‘need   to   re-establish   and   rebuild’   and decided   to   ‘make   it   clear   to   government   partners   and   any  
donors  who  ask  that  they  would  be  dealing  with  the  ICBL’  vis-à-vis the First Meeting of States Parties 
to  the  APLC  in  Maputo  the  following  year,  as  it  was  necessary  to  take  ‘care  with  funds  and  levels of 
responsibility’  for  the  Mozambican  campaign  given  its  ‘recent  problems’.   
 
Even where local NGOs played a more leading role, they were usually those with the strongest links 
to the international aid/missionary sector. This is demonstrated by the Afghan campaign (ICBL 
1996d; WCC 1998), which was funded by the Swedish branch of Save the Children, Rädda Barnen, 
(Rädda Barnen and Von Essen 1996a) and headed by the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), a 
‘totally   donor   funded’   Afghan   NGO   based   in   the   UN’s   demining   headquarters   in   Pakistan   (ICBL 
1994a, p.22; 25). MCPA was one of several demining quangos established by the UN in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (GICHD 2004, p.116),  which  ‘for  all  practical  purposes’  remained  ‘totally  under  
its   control’   (Donini 1995, pp.432–3).   These   have   been  described   as   ‘neither   genuinely  Afghan  nor  
constituting  civil   society’  and   failing   to   ‘display  many  of   the  characteristics   traditionally associated 
with NGOs, having neither a community grassroots focus nor a specific constituency which they 
claimed  to  represent’  (GICHD 2004, pp.100–1; 119–20).  
 
 Pouligny’s  finding  that  ‘For  most  of  the  campaign,  local  dynamics  were  virtually non-existent’  (2001, 
p.9 own translation) and   Sigal’s   (2006, p.73) that   the   ICBL   ‘had   global   reach,   but   little   local  
penetration’   therefore   seem  fairly  accurate,  especially  as   it   remained  mostly   confined   to   the  NGO  
sector and church groups. This was illustrated by the Final Declaration of the 4th ICBL Conference six 
months before   the   ban  was   agreed,   which   called   for   engaging   groups   ‘not   yet   actively   involved’,    
including   ‘student   groups,   trade   unions,   women’s   organizations,   professional   groups,   disability  
advocacy groups and others’   (ICBL 1997f) and  by   the   ICBL’s   expansion   to   Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Philippines and other Asian countries with a large missionary presence, like Cambodia, and under-
representation in Muslim countries and the former Eastern bloc. There was also hardly any activity 
in Latin America, with no members listed there in ICBL membership lists dated April 1997 (ICBL 
1997a).  
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The numerical dominance of NNGOs continued throughout the campaign, especially as aside from a 
few large national campaigns in Mozambique, Cambodia, Afghanistan and South Africa, Southern 
campaigns were much smaller than their Northern counterparts. By April 1997, seven Northern 
countries still accounted for 60% of the ICBL membership and three-quarters of participants in the 
NGO Forum at the final negotiations in Oslo were from the North (ICBL 1998a, pp.73–83). This 
continuing Northern dominance was also reflected in the Steering Committee, where the Afghan 
and Cambodian campaigns were the first SNGOs to join in April-May 1996, along with Rädda Barnen, 
and the Kenyan and South African campaigns joined in June 1997 only three months before the final 
negotiations (ICBL 1996e, p.5, 1996f; Williams 1997a).  
 
Especially in the later stages of the campaign, Steering Committee meetings were often informal and 
open to representatives of national campaigns (Bernstein 1997), particularly at international ICBL 
and diplomatic conferences where large numbers of NGOs were present. Consequently, the 
Cambodian   campaign   was   ‘represented   at   all international planning   meetings’   even   before   it  
officially joined the Steering Committee (NGO Forum on Cambodia 1998, p.13), but this was 
dependent on SNGOs being able to afford to attend such meetings, which were nearly all in Europe. 
These included ICBL meetings in Rome in March 1995 preparatory to the 2nd ICBL Conference in 
Phnom Penh in June and the CCW Review that September (Mekata 2000, p.153; Rutherford 2010, 
p.60), and in Brussels in December 1996 prior to the crucial Vienna Conference of the Ottawa 
Process (ICBL 1996h), as well as at the CCW Review and Ottawa Process meetings. Getting there was 
out of reach for many, as   shown   by   the   ‘welcoming’   in   the   Final   Declaration   of   the   4th   ICBL  
Conference   in  Mozambique  or   recommendations  by  SNGOs   ‘to  make  consistent  efforts   to   include  
southern   campaigns   in   ICBL   planning   meetings’   (ICBL 1997f). This lack of Southern participation 
persisted  after  the  treaty  was  agreed,  given  the  minutes  from  the  ICBL’s  2nd General Meeting in 1999 
record the  African Regional Group (1999) calling  for  a  ‘good  working  relationship  between  National  
Campaigns   and   the   coordinating   Committee   and   its   staff’,   including   ‘access   to   resources’   and  
‘transparency’  and  the  Asia-Pacific  Group  asking  for  ‘adequate  consultation…in  decision  and  policy-
making’   (ICBL Asia-Pacific Regional Group 1999). Likewise, the South African campaign has 
complained  of  the  Steering  Committee’s   ‘domination’  by ‘individuals  from  the  US’   (cited in Naidoo 
and Heinrich 2000, p.12) and the head of the Afghan campaign complained that during the Ottawa 
Process,  Williams  changed  Steering  Committee  positions  “without  our  knowledge”  and  “unilaterally”  
drafted campaign statements (quoted in Murphy 1998a). 
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In this respect, the unstructured nature of Steering Committee meetings and the use of informal 
consensus decision-making without formal bye-laws or voting procedures to resolve  important 
questions (Bandler 1998; Murphy 1998a; Short 1999, p.483; Hubert 2000, p.32; Mekata 2000, p.166; 
Rutherford 2010, p.60) seem to have had their usual impact of giving dominant actors an effective 
veto and privileging moderate positions through lowest-common denominator effects, as 
represented here by the lead NGOs, particularly Williams and Goose. According to Hubert (2000, 
p.32),   the   campaign’s   organisational   looseness   was   ‘a   major   point   of   contention   for   European  
members   who   consistently   advocated   a   more   structured   approach’   and   this   was   eventually  
instituted after the treaty was agreed, with the first ICBL General Meeting with formal voting 
procedures held in 1998 (ICBL 1998b; Mekata 2000, p.166).   This   ‘tyranny   of   structurelessness’  
(Freeman 1970) was  reinforced  by  Williams  and  Goose’s   (2008, p.187) privileged relationship with 
the Core Group and access to closed negotiations during the Ottawa Process, which they argue 
helped   overcome   governments’   traditional   reluctance   to   engage   with   NGOs   for   ‘fear   of   being  
overwhelmed   by   numbers   and   diverse   views’,   but   effectively   collapsed   ‘global   civil   society’  
perspectives to theirs at key moments.   
 
All  the  above  belies  Rutherford’s  (2010, p.61) claim  that  the  ICBL’s  expansion  from  mid-1995  ‘helped  
create  a  truly  global  movement,  rather  than  one  that  was  “North  Atlantic  dominated”  and  although  
various  aspects  of  the  ICBL’s  Northern-domination and lack of democracy have been mentioned in 
some participant accounts, much of the academic literature  on the campaign does not reflect this 
and  it  has  had  no  discernible  effect  on  the  wider  narrative  of  the  ICBL  as  an  exemplar  of  how  ‘global  
civil  society’  can  democratise  global  governance.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The   ICBL’s   internal   organisation   reproduced   patterns of power in the interstate system, global 
market and capitalist social relations more generally. It was dominated by a small core of leading 
NGOs and NGO professionals, all of which were based in Western countries, depended financially on 
Western governments and capitalist elites for support, and headed up an informally hierarchial 
international campaign network. This organisational hierarchy was structured geographically on 
North-South lines and socially by an upper tier consisting of the professional Northern NGO 
leadership and closely linked to elites in governments, foundations and international agencies 
including   through  a   ‘revolving  door’  of  personnel   circulation;  a  middle   tier,   ‘middle  class’  support  
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base also drawn mainly from traditional intellectual occupations in the West; and a bottom tier of 
landmine survivors and other affected groups in the South that  comprised its subordinate groups.  
 
Against   this   backdrop,   the   ICBL’s expansion to the South, under the direction of these leading 
Northern NGOs and individuals and with the financial support of their elite  benefactors, reflected 
the more general pattern outlined in Chapter 2 of top-down internationalisation of a neoliberal 
Western state/civil society model, involving the outsourcing of government functions to NGOs. This 
process had accelerated with the end of the Cold War and the intensified globalisation of neoliberal 
capitalism to peripheral areas previously closed to Western intervention. Indeed, it was precisely the 
dual effect of these two intertwined passive revolutions that precipitated NGO involvement in the 
landmines issue in the first place, as they were subcontracted by Western donors and international 
agencies to carry out demining and victim assistance as part of expanded UN peace operations in 
Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and other mine-affected and ex-communist states during the 
immediate post-Cold War period. In the process, NNGOs became part of the governance of mine 
action and along with donor states and international agencies reconceptualised APMs as a serious 
humanitarian and governance problem. This was facilitated by the economic insignificance and 
military dispensability of conventional APMs to the West and their significant human and financial 
costs – borne now by donors as well as affected states.  
 
All of these dynamics applied particularly to Western middle powers like Canada and Norway, 
intensifying a tradition of involving NGOs in foreign policy that became a conscious hegemonic 
governance strategy for these countries in the 1990s – albeit in somewhat different domestic 
political contexts. For Canada, it helped maintain NGO support and domestic and international 
prestige in a context of severe aid cuts, while for Norway, coordinating NGOs multiplied its 
international  influence  as  an  aspiring  ‘humanitarian  superpower’.  The  implications  of  the  campaign’s  
historical context, material base and organisation for its discursive and tactical choices are discussed 
in the next chapter, but the evidence so far suggests a radically autonomous transformational 
discourse or contentious outsider tactics were unlikely to predominate and that the campaign was 
structurally inclined towards a hegemonic politics.  
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Chapter 5 – The Landmines Campaign: Discourse, Tactics 
and Outcomes 
 
The liberal-constructivist   literature   has   generally   attributed   the   ICBL’s   success   to   its   re-framing of 
APMs as a humanitarian and IHL issue, as opposed to a security or arms control/disarmament issue 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Koh 1998a, 1998b; Price 1998a; Rutherford 1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 
2001b; Mekata 2000; Lawson 2002); and to the partnership that developed between NGOs, small 
and middle powers, UN agencies and the ICRC (Cameron et al. 1998; Dolan and Hunt 1998; Thakur 
and Maley 1999; Anderson 2000; Hubert 2000; Brem and Rutherford 2001; Atwood 2002; Hampson 
and Reid 2003). This chapter critically examines the related themes of the   ICBL’s   discourse   and  
tactics to reinterpret this dominant narrative. It argues that the   campaign’s   material   basis  
predisposed it to frame the landmines issue in hegemonic terms compatible with Western elite 
interests and also to orient campaign tactics on this basis. The chapter firstly briefly discusses the 
key themes of the campaign’s  discourse,  specifically  the  framing  of  landmines  as  humanitarian  issue  
and banning them as a sensible policy from a military perspective. It then analyses the tactics of the 
campaign and the untilisation of this discourse through a chronological description  of the campaign 
itself, in particular the relationship between NGOs and states elites and the tactics employed by 
these different actors.  
Framing Landmines as a Humanitarian Issue 
From a liberal-constructivist perspective, that the campaign re-framed APMs as a humanitarian and 
IHL, rather than a security and arms control issue (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998b) 
explains its success as it is argued  that  norms  related  to   ‘bodily   integrity  and  prevention  of  bodily  
harm  for  vulnerable  or  “innocent”  groups,  especially with a short causal chain between cause and 
effect’  have  a  transnational  or  even  universal  resonance   (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.907; Keck 
and Sikkink 1998, p.27). The  literature  on  the  campaign  has  emphasised  how  the  ICBL’s  focus  on  the  
humanitarian impacts of APMs showing that they violated the IHL principles of proportionality and 
distinction contained in CCW Protocol II. The   ICBL   argued   this   made   ‘different   than   any   other  
weapon’  (ICBL 1997g) and made them closer to WMD (Asia Watch and PHR 1991, p.10; 103; HRW 
and PHR 1993, pp.11–15).   Demonstrating   this   involved   foregrounding   the   ‘unnecessary   suffering’  
APMs caused and arguing victim-activation made them inherently indiscriminate; they were said to 
cause  ‘much  more  severe  injuries  than  wounds  made  by  other  conventional  weapons’  (VVAF 1995, 
p.9) and their inability to distinguish civilians from soldiers was emphasised (HRW and PHR 1993, 
p.3). This was backed up statistically with UN, ICRC and US State Department data (HRW and PHR 
1993; VVAF 1995) showing most victims were civilians and discursively by representing victims as 
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women and children (UNICEF 1994; De Larrinaga and Turenne Sjolander 1998, pp.36–7; English 
1998, p.30).  
 
The liberal and liberal-constructivist literature has generally regarded this humanitarian framing as a 
strategically sensible, progressive choice that enabled the ICBL to gain widespread public and media 
support. Only a few critical analyses have argued it achieved this by depoliticising the landmine 
problem (De Larrinaga and Turenne Sjolander 1998) and working within rather than problematising 
existing power structures (Beier and Denholm Crosby 1998; Beier 2011).   The   ICBL’s   humanitarian  
discourse disproportionately represented victims as women and children, even though most were 
adult men (VVAF 1995, p.5) and disseminated images of isolated individual suffering, such as 
gruesome  photographs  of  ‘a  little  Afghan  boy  dying  from  the  effects  of  a  landmine’  and  ‘a child with 
a   pacifier   in   its   mouth   and   its   legs   blown   off’ (ICBL 1994a, p.40, 1995c). Indeed, White and 
Rutherford have complained survivors   ‘were   shown   almost   exclusively   as   “victims”,   many  
photographed  only   in   their  worst  moments  of  pain  and  anguish’,   so   that   the  media  had  assigned  
them  ‘an  aura  of  tragedy  and  helplessness’  (1998, p.108) and that the  ICBL  leadership  “liked  victims  
who  are  also  silent”  (White quoted in Sigal 2006, pp.182–4).  
 
This sort of depoliticisation was a conscious ICBL strategy from the beginning. Suggestions by MI in 
October  1992  to  call  for  a  ban  “within  a  general  disarmament  framework’  and  ‘in  the  context  of  the  
New  World  Order’  were   rejected   by  HRW,   VVAF   and  HI,  with  HRW   arguing   the   campaign   should  
advocate  “for  change  in  international  humanitarian  law  rather  than  entering  the  disarmament  field”  
(quoted in Lawson 2002, pp.102–103).   This   was   despite   the   reference   to   ‘general   and   complete  
disarmament   under   international   control’   in   the   CCW  Preamble.   Likewise,  discussions at the First 
ICBL  Conference  in  London  emphasised  campaign  communications  should  be  “immediately  emotive,  
easy to understand, and non-ideological,  without  the  political  baggage  of  other  disarmament  issues”  
(quoted in Mekata 2000, p.147), while former British military officer and representative of MAG, Rae 
McGrath (1994b),   told   the   Second   ICBL   Conference:   ‘This   is   not   a   crusade   against   war,  nor a 
disarmament issue – there are intrinsic properties specific to  landmines which separate them 
from  other  weapons’.   
 
This depoliticised humanitarian framing was reinforced as a number of large humanitarian INGOs 
like Save the Children and faith groups joined the campaign (Lawson 2002, pp.115–116) and was 
crucial in attracting the support of the ICRC, whose public support from February 1994 (ICRC 1994a; 
Sommaruga 1994) gave   the   campaign   ‘an  entirely  new   level  of  political   legitimacy’  and facilitated 
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endorsements by UN agencies, states and the global media. Canadian diplomat, Bob Lawson (2002, 
p.149), has argued that ‘given   the   ICRC’s   scrupulous   attention   to   its   position of neutrality, it had 
become  increasingly  difficult  to  claim  that  the  ban  movement  had  a  political  agenda  at  all’. 
 
An important depoliticising aspect of this humanitarian discourse that became more apparent as the 
campaign progressed was a gradual de-emphasis of user/producer responsibility, which was the 
third   point   in   the   ICBL’s   original   Call   and  was   strongly   emphasised   in   early   reports   that   identified  
exporting and using states (Asia Watch and PHR 1991; e.g. Middle East Watch 1992; 1993), towards 
depicting landmines themselves as the cause of the humanitarian crisis and more generalised calls 
for international assistance. This sited agency, indiscriminateness and the infliction of unnecessary 
suffering in APMs, rather than those who sowed or supplied them and increasingly let users and 
arms companies off the hook (Beier and Denholm Crosby 1998; De Larrinaga and Turenne Sjolander 
1998, p.380; Beier 2002). Such stigmatisation and even anthropomorphisation of mines is evident in 
ICBL titles like Hidden Death (Middle East Watch 1992) and Hidden Enemies (PHR 1992) and 
pejoratives   like   ‘The   Devil's   weapon’,   ‘scourge’,   ‘evil’.   Sympathetic   elites   used   the   same   framing,  
with two US State Department reports entitled Hidden Killers (1993, 1994a) and  the  ICRC’s  (1992b, 
1993) description   of   APMs   as   ‘the   greatest   violators   or   international   humanitarian   law’   and   ‘the 
most  ruthless  of  terrorists’. 
 
From the outset, user/producer responsibility was a secondary ICBL demand and the language on it 
in  the  ICBL’s  original  Call  was  noticeably  weaker  than  other  aspects  of  the  call.  ‘Countries  responsible  
for  the  production  and  dissemination’  of  APMs  were  merely  asked  ‘to  contribute’  to  a  UN  demining 
fund (ICBL 1993) and no indication was given of how much responsibility users and producers should 
bear, or the nature of their contribution, in particular whether it could be voluntary or should take 
the form of compensation, legal liability or reparations. Moreover, victim assistance was omitted 
entirely   in   the   context   of   opposition   from   HRW   and   was   only   added   after   the   ICBL’s   Second  
Conference in May 1994 at the behest of NGOs involved in it like HI and MI (ICBL 1994c, pp.107–108; 
Williams 1995; Lawson 2002, p.5n5).  
 
Divisions on this issue related to broader political differences in the campaign. When the six 
founders were drafting the opening Call, according to Goose of HRW (quoted in Sigal 2006, p.184) 
his  organisation  opposed  “some  European  NGOs”  who  wanted  to   include  “reparations”  to  victims,  
and he and Williams opposed prioritising victim assistance or user/producer responsibility 
throughout the Ottawa Process (Sigal 2006, pp.182–190). By contrast, the German, Italian and Dutch 
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campaigns (ICBL 1994a, p.46; 61–65; 52; ; CCW 1996a, pp.378–9), MAG (McGrath 1997a, 1997b) and 
the Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) (White and Rutherford 1998) wanted   ‘compensation’   or  
‘reparations’   for   victims   and/or   to   hold   users   and suppliers legally responsible for clearance and 
victim assistance. Several leading Southern campaigns adopted similar approaches, including in 
South Africa, Mozambique and Afghanistan (1994a, p.60, 1995b, 1998a, p.39).  
 
 In   terms   of   specifics,  McGrath   proposed   a   ‘UN-enforced’   levy   on   producing   and   exporting   states  
(1994a, p.70), reserving a percentage of defence budgets for demining and taxing  manufacturers 
(1997b).   In   a   similar   vein,   the   June   1997   ‘Bad   Honnef   Framework’,   agreed   by   demining   and  
development NGOs and the LSN at a conference organised by MI, argued that in accordance with 
the  ‘polluter  pays’  principle,   ‘companies  that  have  profited  from  the  development,  production  and  
sale   of   mines,   could   pay   into   a   reparation   fund’   and   that   states   should   reallocate   military  
expenditure to clearance (German Initiative to Ban Landmines 1997). This echoed the longstanding 
disarmament principle of diverting military spending to development and was backed by campaigns 
in Africa (ICBL 1998a, p.54; 57).  
 
None  of   these  more   radical  demands  appeared   in   the   ICBL’s  new  Call   for  Action   in  October  1996.  
This was announced at the Ottawa Strategy Conference that launched the Ottawa Process alongside 
the  Ottawa  Declaration  and  Chairman’s  Plan  of  Action,  which  were  drawn  up  by  Canadian  diplomats  
in consultation with Williams and Goose (Tomlin 1998, p.15) and endorsed by participating states. In 
contrast to the original ICBL Call for user/producer responsibility for clearance and victim assistance, 
the   new   Call   for   Action   contained   only   a   generalised   request   for   ‘Increasing   funding,   particularly  
from   international   financial   institutions’   (ICBL 1996i). This shifted funding from a justice or 
compensation framework to voluntary or charitable international assistance – the mode of 
hegemonic compromise characteristic of humanitarianism. Questions of state and corporate 
responsibility were thus excluded from the agenda from the outset, even though developing 
countries still maintained a collective position on user responsibility that remained officially 
unchanged   from   the   UN   ‘Remnants   of  War’   resolutions   (G77 and China 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2005).  
The   ICBL’s   model   treaty   distributed   to   states   in   January   1997   subsequently   included   a   clause  
imposing retroactive responsibility on users to clear mines laid in foreign countries (ICBL 1996j Art. 
5.2), but there was no mention of producers, and victim assistance was relegated to a solitary clause 
in the Preamble. The omission of user/producer responsibility from the high profile and political ICBL 
Call for Action is in contrast to its appearance in the Final Declaration of the Fourth ICBL Conference 
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in Mozambique in February 1997 (ICBL 1997f), which was attended mainly by European and African 
NGOs (Wareham 1997a). This reflected  what Naidoo and Heinrich (2000, p.13) refer to as 
‘ideological  differences  between  Northern  participants,  who  wanted  to  focus  on  the  confined  issue  
of banning landmines, and civil society representatives from the South, who regarded the ICBL as 
part of a broader social transformation  framework’.   
 
The   ICBL   leadership’s   gradual   de-emphasis of user/producer responsibility was also reflected in a 
shift   to   a   ‘carrot’   rather   than   ‘stick’   approach   to   states   and  manufacturers,  who  were   praised   for  
adopting ban positions, regardless of their historical contribution to the problem or support for 
demining  or  victim  assistance.  These  states  received  ‘a  general  moral  amnesty’   (Beier 2002, p.316) 
and  the  ‘reward’  of  NGO  legitimisation  or  hegemonic  reinforcement  as  soon  as  they  signed  up.  This  
is illustrated by how HRW   promised   Clinton   ‘He   could   assure   himself a legacy as a great 
humanitarian  if  he  enthusiastically  joins  the  Canadian  initiative’  (Burkhalter and Goose 1996). In this 
way, the mine stigma became associated not so much with users/producers/suppliers as with 
companies and governments that refused to join the Ottawa Process, regardless of whether they 
had  exported  or  used  mines  in  the  past.  The  culmination  of  this  was  apparent  in  the  ICBL’s  (1997h) 
press   release   at   the   start   of   the   final   negotiations   in  Oslo,  which   declared:   ‘The   large   number   of  
nations participating (more than 100, including  major  former  producers,  exporters  and  users)…will  
permit  the  stigmatization  of  those  who  refuse  to  sign  now’.   
Banning  APMs  as  ‘good  military  doctrine’   
The other side of an IHL framework is of course military utility or advantage, against which 
humanitarian  interests  are  supposed  to  be  ‘balanced’.  This  relates  particularly  to  the  proportionality  
principle, which McGrath (1996) described as ‘the  key  to  the   legality,  or  otherwise,  of   landmines’.  
The liberal and liberal-constructivist literature has concentrated on the humanitarian side of this 
‘balance’,  which  was  the  more  public  element   in   ICBL  discourse, and with few exceptions (Petrova 
2010) has neglected how NGOs addressed both sides of this hegemonic equilibrium of consent and 
force   through   ‘liberal’   humanitarian   and ‘realist’   military   utility arguments. Indeed both kinds of 
argument  were  equally  central  to  the  ICBL’s  core  strategy  of  isolating  APMs  as  aberrant  from  other,  
‘normal’  weapons  and  military  practices. 
An initial concession to military utility logic was to exclude AVMs from the ICBL Call. This was a 
significant departure, given the CCW and Remnants of War resolutions had not distinguished 
between APMs and AVMs and neither had The   Coward’s   War   (Asia Watch and PHR 1991). It 
occurred for strategic rather than humanitarian reasons, given AVMs can be detonated by school 
buses or ox-carts as easily as by a tank (Gebauer 2000), because the military consensus was that they 
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had far greater utility (Biddle et al. 1994, pp.68–70; ICRC 1996a, pp.50–51). They were also 
significantly more profitable (US State Department 1993, p.2) and had accounted for the largest 
landmine sales of the early 1990s, including a $500m joint investment by Britain, France and 
Germany (HRW and PHR 1993, p.63). The decision to exclude them was contentious internally, as 
the Belgian,  Australian,  New  Zealand,  Swedish  and  Mozambican  campaigns  followed  the  US’  lead  in  
restricting their demands to APMs, but the more radical Italian, Dutch and German campaigns 
advocated banning AVMs too (ICBL 1994c; German Landmines Campaign 1996; Rutherford 2010, 
p.60).  
 
A similarly pragmatic logic lay behind the exclusion of cluster munitions. These had also potentially 
fallen under the suggestion in The   Coward’s   War   of   a   ban   encompassing   ‘landmines   and   other  
devices  that  detonate  on  contact’  (Asia Watch and PHR 1991, p.103), as they typically leave behind 
large quantities of small unexploded bombs, creating de facto minefields with similar humanitarian 
effects21. Hence, according to Virgil Wiebe of the Mennonite Central Committee, which along with 
Quakers had been clearing US cluster munitions in Laos since the 1970s and petitioned the ICBL 
leadership to class them as APMs (Wiebe 2003, pp.95–97; Borrie 2009, p.41; Wiebe and Peachey 
2009), its refusal to do so was ‘based  more on a pragmatic assessment that including cluster bombs 
under   a   landmine   definition  might  well   scuttle   hopes   of   a   landmine   ban’   (Wiebe 2000, p.158) as 
Western states saw them as more militarily useful (Wiebe 2003, p.91).  
 
HRW had explicitly excluded them from its design-based definition of APMs from the outset, arguing 
that while unexploded cluster munitions could have the same effect as APMs, they were not 
designed for that purpose (HRW and PHR 1993, pp.3–5; 18; 10n15). The same position was adopted 
by the US campaign (Goose 1994, p.82) and HI (Chabasse 1994, p.39). By contrast, the German 
(German Initiative to Ban Landmines 2003, p.2) and British campaigns (Oakes 1994, p.72), including 
particularly Rae McGrath of MAG (1994b), advocated an effects-based  definition  of  APMs  and  ‘mine-
like  weapons’  that  would  capture  any  device  that  could  be  victim-activated, whether designed to or 
not. McGrath (1994b) thus argued as early as the Second ICBL Conference in 1994 that ‘many sub-
munitions used in the past and in use and under development at this time are quite clearly de 
facto anti-personnel  mines’  and  the  Mennonites  (Wiebe 1995, 1996) made similar arguments during 
the CCW review (Wiebe 2003, pp.95–7).  
 
                                                     
21See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of cluster munitions and their similarity to landmines.  
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Having excluded AVMs and cluster munitions largely on grounds of perceived military utility, the 
ICBL also recognised that this  was   ‘the   primary   impediment’   to   a   ban  on  APMs.   The   Second   ICBL  
Conference  thus  agreed  ‘to  make  a  serious  effort’  to  challenge  it  (ICBL 1994a, p.111). This obviously 
accepted state use of force as generally legitimate and argued within the confines of hegemonic 
military logic. It was also a discourse directed mainly at state elites rather than the general public. As 
McGrath (1994c, p.139) put it to a symposium of military experts organised by the ICRC, ‘there  are  
many  more  effective  methods  of  killing  and  maiming  enemy  troops’.  Due to their efforts to win over 
the US, VVAF and HRW were among the strongest NGO proponents of military utility arguments 
(VVAF 1995; HRW and VVAF 1997), but it appeared in ICBL discourse internationally (McGrath 1994c, 
1996; HI 1996d, 1997f), with Swedish NGO, Rädda Barnen, commissioning a multi-country study of 
APMs’  military  utility  for  European  forces  (Rädda Barnen and Von Essen 1996b; Smith 1996). It was 
also discussed repeatedly in Landmines: A Deadly Legacy (HRW and PHR 1993), which served as a 
reference for the ICBL as a whole. VVAF   thus  argued   that  APMs’   ‘cost  outweighs   their   immediate  
utility’,   as   ineffectual,   counterproductive   weapons   that   had   never   been decisive in victory and 
caused almost as many friendly as enemy casualties (VVAF 1995, p.34; 5), including a fifth of US 
casualties in the Gulf War and a quarter in Somalia (VVAF quoted in UNDHA 1996).  
 
Similar arguments were made by the ICRC and supportive elements of Western defence 
establishments.   The   ICRC  held   its   first   expert   symposium  on  APMs’  military   utility   in   1993, which 
instigated a debate in military circles (ICRC 1994b), including two reports commissioned by the 
Pentagon (Biddle et al. 1994, 1996) and an influential ICRC report written by UN demining chief, 
Paddy Blagden (ICRC 1996a). The first   US   report   found   military   utility   ‘need   not   preclude  
consideration  of   any   form  of   landmine  arms   control’   as  APMs  were  of  most  use   in  high-intensity, 
defensive   land   warfare,   rather   than   the   offensive   actions,   ‘humanitarian   interventions’   and  
‘peacekeeping’  (Biddle et al. 1994, pp.iii; 14–18, 68–70)  preferred by the US and its Western allies 
since at least the end of the Cold War. Likewise, the ICRC (1996a, p.80; 7) report reviewed twenty-six 
conflicts  and  found  APMs  ‘usually  had  little  or  no  effect  on  the  outcome’.   
 
Significantly, the Pentagon reports highlighted that APMs disproportionately  ‘benefit  low-technology 
indigenous opposition forces (who often see it as an inexpensive equalizer by which to neutralize US 
advantages)’   (Biddle et al. 1994, pp.23–4). Consequently, even taking the relative advantages of 
‘smart’  APMs  to  Western  forces   into  account,  Landmines: A Deadly Legacy could argue that APMs 
were  ‘probably  of  greater  use  to  US  adversaries’  and  a  comprehensive  ban  could  ‘prove  a  net  benefit  
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for   US   forces’,   especially   when   American   military   doctrine   was   shifting   towards   ‘fighting   lesser  
conflicts  principally  in  the  developing  world’  (HRW & PHR 1993, p.9; 45; 339). 
 
Such arguments ultimately failed to convince the US government, but this was mainly because the 
Pentagon suspected banning APMs could be the thin end of a wedge that might eventually extend to 
more useful weapons (Biddle et al. 1994, p.7; Center for Security Policy 1997b, 1997c; Clines 1997; 
Troxell 2000; Sigal 2006, pp.107–108). However they proved more persuasive in other Western 
countries, and succeeded at least in dividing military opinion, which pro-ban elites in more 
consensually oriented arms of the state like Foreign Affairs could exploit. Even in the US, VVAF 
persuaded fifteen retired military commanders, including Norman Schwarzkopf, to sign an open 
letter to Clinton supporting a ban on military grounds and pointing out it would have no effect on 
AVMs or Claymores (New York Times 1996; Wareham 1998, p.224).  
 
All the arguments used by the landmines campaign, including its apolitical humanitarian discourse, 
thus directly appealed to hegemonic Western military and economic interests. This facilitated the 
key relationship on which  the  campaign’s  success  was  built. 
 
Strategy and Tactics in the Landmines Campaign  
A multi-actor governance partnership between NGOs, small and middle power states, UN agencies 
and the ICRC has been defined as a key element in the success of the campaign and it has been 
argued  that  this  form  of  partnership  ‘is  regarded  as  a  principal,  if  indeed  not  the principal, legacy of 
the landmines campaign, and the most central element of the new template envisioned for 
international law-making’  (Anderson 2000, p.109). The discourse that underpinned the campaign is 
an integral part of the tactics it adopted and consistent with liberal governance theory, all the actors 
involved are assumed to have shared the same goals and to have played complementary roles as 
autonomous agents exploiting synergies of comparative advantage. Aside from the assumption of 
autonomy, this fairly accurately describes the interaction of NGOs, ICRC and supportive state 
strategies from 1996 when the Ottawa Process began and a Core Group of supportive states was 
formed. From this point on, distinguishing the discursive influence of NGOs and supportive states 
becomes even more difficult.  
 
In the early days of the campaign the lead NGOs and most national campaigns had begun with 
insider tactics, leveraging establishment contacts and conducting research aimed at foreign policy 
elites, and only later moving into public campaigning. In this context, the strategic purpose of public 
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campaigning, which operated primarily through passive or routine tactics dependent on media 
support rather than grassroots efforts, was primarily to demonstrate public support in order to 
strengthen pro-ban liberal elites against their more conservative counterparts, rather than to build 
mass campaigns to force a change of policy. The tactical balance varied from state to state however, 
with greater use of outsider tactics in Italy and Germany (Beer 1994; Dentico 1997; Landmine 
Monitor 1999n), where the national campaigns also had stronger positions on various campaign 
issues.  However,  these  were  much  less  influential  on  the  ICBL’s  overall  discourse  and  strategy  than  
the lead US NGOs and Handicap International.  
 
Irrespective of their nationality, supportive elites generally belonged to sections of states and IGOs 
concerned with consensual-hegemonic dimensions of government/IGO policy, such as foreign affairs 
and development; liberal or social democratic parties that discursively emphasise consensual over 
more forcible modes of governance, and private transnational elites that espouse a liberal 
internationalist capitalist ideology, such as the large US foundations and philanthrocapitalists that 
bankrolled   HRW   and   the   ICBL.   The   ICBL’s   impact on government positions therefore differed in 
accordance  with  states’   status   in   the  world  military  order,  their  military  and  economic   interests   in  
APMs, and the incumbency of conservative or liberal/social democratic parties.  
 
The campaign as it emerged had three main phases: an early stage from late 1991 to 1995, when 
most progress came through insider tactics and the ICBL was confined mainly to Western countries; 
the mid-stage during the CCW review from late 1995 to mid-1996, when it began expanding to 
developing countries and outsider tactics played a more significant role than before; and finally the 
partnership phase, lasting roughly from May 1996 to December 1997 when the APLC was signed in 
Ottawa, which was characterised the coordination of passive and routine outsider tactics with the 
Core Group and ICRC.  These are not examined in turn. 
The Early Years: 1991-1995 
The ICBL initially had most impact in the US were it was founded. It relied mainly on insider lobbying 
based on expert research and developed an ancillary outsider dimension only after the US Campaign 
to Ban Landmines (USCBL) was launched in mid-1996 (USCBL 1996a; Wareham 1998, pp.216–218). 
The  US   campaign   took  place   ‘almost  entirely   inside   the  Washington  Beltway’   (Kitchen 2002, p.49) 
and  ‘functioned  mostly  as  a  lobbying  arm  of  Senator  Patrick Leahy’s’  (Sigal 2006, p.15). At this point 
landmines were put on the agenda of the US political elite through the lobbying of Leahy and 
Congressman Lane Evans rather than any public outcry against landmines (Muller 1994a, pp.69–70). 
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From 1992-4,   Leahy   introduced   numerous   bills   on   the   ICBL’s   behalf,   led   Senate   hearings   on  
landmines (US Senate 1994), personally lobbied Madeleine Albright, first as US Ambassador to the 
UN an then as Secretary of State, as well as Clinton and the Secretary of Defense (ICBL 1994a, p.3; 
Sigal 2006, p.15; 22) and helped secure endorsements from Democratic grandees such as Jimmy 
Carter, Edward Kennedy and Cyrus Vance (US Senate 1994, p.98; 9–15; Lawson 2002, p.156). As 
chair of the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee on Appropriations, he also pressured the State 
Department/USAID to prioritise dealing with the problem of landmines supported by a funding 
allocation. Leahy introduced an export moratorium bill into the Senate in July 1992 (HRW and PHR 
1993, pp.319–20), which was passed unanimously by both houses of Congress that October, 
indicating its politically uncontroversial nature even under the then Republican President George 
Bush. The bill also required the State Department to conduct research on landmines, which 
produced many of the statistics (later found to be exaggerated) that were cited by the ICBL (US State 
Department 1993; 1994).  
 
The export moratorium made no distinction between ‘dumb’  and  ‘smart’  mines.  This  seems  to  have  
flown  under   the   radar,  as   the  Pentagon  only  began  agitating   to  except   ‘smart’  mines   in  1993  and 
industry opposition was also initially muted (Wareham 1998, pp.214–215; Sigal 2006, pp.19–20; 
Rutherford 2010, pp.42–43). The moratorium was renewed for three years in 1993 (US Congress 
1993) and the US sponsored a UN General Assembly (1993) resolution that autumn calling on all 
states   to   adopt   export  moratoria   on   APMs   ‘that   pose   grave   dangers   to   civilian   populations’      (UN 
1994, p.139).  This  wording  allowed  major  military  powers  such  as  the  UK  to  exempt  ‘smart  mines’  
(Wareham 1998, p.220; Sigal 2006, p.22) and was the first US-UK attempt to reverse the precedent 
set in the original US  moratorium of placing  ‘smart’  and  ‘dumb’  mines  in  the  same  category.   
 
Also   in   response   to   Leahy’s   lobbying,   President   Clinton   (1994) announced   US   support   for   ‘the  
eventual  elimination’  of  landmines  in  his  speech  to  the  UN  General  Assembly  in  September  1994,  in  
a section negotiated with Leahy, and through him input from HRW (Lawson 2002, p.163n108). 
However,  an  accompanying  press  release  further  qualified  this  by  stating  this  would  occur  ‘as  viable  
and  humane  alternatives  are  developed’  and  prioritising  restrictions  on  ‘dumb’  mines  (Office of the 
Press Secretary 1994). The same caveats reappeared in the 1994 US-backed UN export moratorium 
resolution (UN General Assembly 1994), weakening it sufficiently for it to pass without a vote.  
Notwithstanding   these   evident   limits   to   US   ‘leadership’,   ‘the   ultimate   goal   of   the   eventual  
elimination of anti-personnel land-mines’  was  now  ostensibly  supported  by  all  UN  member  states.  
These early US moves were seen to have kick-started the campaign internationally (Williams and 
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Goose 1998, p.26) and encouraged other states to take action by leveraging   the  US’   international  
influence. Hence, by late 1994, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Britain and Russia among others 
had introduced various kinds of export moratorium. This was obviously significantly easier than 
supporting a total ban, as production and use could continue.  
 
After the Democrats lost control of both houses of Congress in the November 1994 mid-terms and 
hardline Republican Senators, Strom Thurmond and Jesse Helms, became chairs of the Armed 
Services and Foreign Relations Committees (Sigal 2006, p.229), a Democrat/Republican fault line 
emerged on the issue (Priest 1997b). This also undermined the influence of the State 
Department/USAID and President Clinton, who was personally sympathetic, while it strengthened a 
conservative Republican-Pentagon counter-bloc in the ruling elite (Moody 2008, pp.105–6; 238–9). 
Consequently, from late 1994, the US obstructed further progress (Landmine Monitor 1999a). 
 
Most national campaigns largely followed the US pattern, beginning with expert research and elite 
lobbying and mobilising  public  support  mainly  in  the  later  stages.  Campaigners’  first  move  in  France,  
Belgium, Norway and Canada was to lobby parliamentarians or participate in government policy 
consultations (Chabasse 1994, 1998; Warmington and Tuttle 1998; Petrova 2007). One implication 
was that early government support largely depended on low economic or military interests in APMs 
and the incumbency of liberal or social democratic parties with links to NGOs.  France and Britain did 
not become firmly pro-ban until the Socialists and Labour came to power in mid-1997. By contrast, 
in Canada and Norway, as middle power sates with Liberal and Labour governments, shifting the 
government’s  position  was  comparatively  easier  and  Norwegian  officials even evinced interest prior 
to NGO advocacy.  
 
Campaigning in France began with a conference organised by HI at the Senate Palace in May 1992 
(ICBL 1994a, p.38). This led to the distribution of The Coward’s  War to Members of the French and 
European parliaments and two Belgian Senators who were later instrumental in achieving a national 
ban in Belgium (Rutherford 2010, p.34), as well as a ban petition, signed initially by the President of 
the European Parliament and several ex-ministers.  Although  press  reaction  was  ‘modest’,  ‘Contacts  
were established with high-ranking   officials…with   remarkable   ease’   (Chabasse 1998, p.61) and 
lobbying French and European legislators also produced rapid results, including a 1992 European 
parliament export moratorium resolution modelled on the US example (Rutherford 2010, p.38). The 
French  campaign’s  second  major  event  was  a  symposium  in  February  1993  attended by government 
representatives and Senator Leahy (Lawson 2002, p.106).  HI’s  contacts  with  President  Mitterrand’s  
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wife  helped  the  campaign  to  leapfrog  official  channels  and  Chabasse  believes  the  foreign  ministry’s  
‘fear  of  American   leadership’  also  prompted   it  to  act.  Later  that  month,  Mitterrand announced an 
export moratorium and called for the CCW to be reviewed while visiting the former French colony of 
Cambodia (Chabasse 1998, pp.62–3).  
 
HI’s   insider   approach   continued   throughout   the   campaign,   so   that   it   acted   as   a   “permanent   link”  
between   French   “political   leaders   and   high-ranking officials on the one side, the media, public 
opinion and members of Parliament   on   the   other”   (Carstairs quoted in Rutherford 2010, p.34). 
Similar to the US experience, however, this insider approach was less successful after conservatives 
won a majority in the National Assembly in March 1993, constraining the influence of the Socialist 
Party   President.   This   was   accentuated   after   Jacques   Chirac’s   presidential   victory   in   1995   put  
conservatives  in  control  of  both  branches  of  the  executive.  NGOs’  main  elite  ally  from  then  until  mid-
1997 was the Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs, Xavier Emmanuelli, a MSF co-founder and 
‘friend  of  several  NGO  leaders’  who  Chabasse  describes  as   ‘a  very  privileged  contact’   (1998, p.64). 
Emmanuelli supported the campaign but was in a weak position relative to the defence ministry, 
which dominated government policy similar to the Pentagon in the US. Hence, while France 
announced a ban on production and stockpile reduction at the beginning of the CCW Review in 
September 1995, it reserved the right to use APMs for defensive purposes (ICBL 1995d).  
 
HI-Belgium also decided to focus on lobbying parliamentarians early on (Petrova 2007, p.6) and a 
national campaign was not formally launched until March 1994 (Mekata 2000, p.150).   Belgium’s  
main contribution was the first national ban in March 1995, which was the brainchild of supportive 
senators,  particularly  Roger  Lallemand,  whose  ‘political  skills,  contacts  and  influential  position’  in  the  
ruling  Socialist  Party  were  ‘crucial’  to  its  success  (Petrova 2007, p.6). Lallemand has described these 
efforts   as   a   “parliamentary   initiative   rather   than   a   popular  movement”   (quoted in Mekata 2000, 
p.150) and all-party support for a ban by May 1994 when the campaign had gathered a mere 4,000 
supportive signatures (ICBL 1994a, p.34) seems to corroborate this.   However,   Belgium’s   cautious  
diplomatic culture and emphasis on coordinating with other European countries, particularly France, 
meant it did not assume as strong a leading role internationally (ICBL 1994a, pp.35–37; Petrova 
2007) as did Norway and Canada, who were the driving forces behind the Ottawa Process.  
 
Throughout the campaign, Norway was governed by the Labour party, which in line with the 
“Norwegian  model”  of  partially  outsourcing foreign policy to NGOs, had instigated NGO involvement 
in landmines by subcontracting demining to NPA in 1992. Ambassador Steffen Kongstad had also 
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pushed for stronger action at expert meetings preparatory to the CCW Review from early 1994 
‘without  any  NGO  involvement’  and  before  the  Norwegian  campaign  was  established  (Petrova 2007, 
p.20). This was partly motivated by rivalry with Sweden, which had announced its support for a ban 
and formally proposed one during its presidency of the CCW Review Conference (ICBL 1995e; 
Landmine Monitor 1999o; Neumann 2002, p.117).  
 
However, despite being personally sympathetic, Egeland and the Foreign Minister, Bjørn Tore Godal, 
initially thought a ban was unrealistic (Landmine Monitor 1999d; Petrova 2007, pp.21–2). According 
to Petrova (2007, pp.21–4),  Egeland  was  constrained  by  military  opposition  and  ‘the   lack  of  a  very  
strong   NGO   campaign’,   but   movement   by   other   states   and   the   establishment   of   the   Norwegian  
campaign in autumn 1994 (partly with foreign ministry funding) helped to overcome this. The 
Norwegian campaign combined lobbying with public campaigning that attracted significant media 
and   public   support,   but   Petrova   concludes   NPA’s   political   connections   and   the   Foreign  Ministry’s  
already sympathetic  position  meant   the   former   ‘arguably…yielded  best   results’.  Consequently,   the  
public   campaign’s   main   role   was   to   buttress   the   foreign   ministry   against   the   defence   ministry.  
Petrova   thus   notes   that   NPA’s   criticisms   were   targeted  mainly   at   the   defence  ministry, while its 
relationship with foreign ministry remained largely cooperative. Sending and Neumann concur that 
‘the genesis of the Norwegian involvement in the work to ban landmines shows how nonstate actors 
are used to create space for political agency by different parts  of   the   state’   (2006, p.666 original 
emphasis). Consequently, NGOs strengthened the consensual-hegemonic wings of government 
against   the   directly   coercive   sections   and   helped   nudge   the   government’s   stance   along   from   an  
already supportive starting point.  
 
Similar dynamics operated in Canada in the sense NGO advocacy also strengthened the foreign 
ministry against the defence department and began with insider lobbying, although there was a 
more significant role for public campaigning, at least until Axworthy, a natural NGO ally, became 
foreign minister in January 1996. Individual NGOs began raising a ban at a foreign and defence policy 
review initiated by the new Liberal government in 1993 and in their regular meetings with officials 
(Warmington and Tuttle 1998, p.49).  Some  of  these  early  discussions  were  reportedly  ‘acrimonious’,  
with officials citing military utility and credibility with allies as reasons not to support a ban, although 
at  least  one  foreign  ministry  official  thought  the  military  was  “trotting  out  reflex  arguments”.  A  split  
emerged between the foreign and defence ministries, which a foreign ministry staffer ensured was 
perceived  by  NGOs  so  that  they  could  ‘turn  up  the  political  pressure’  on  the  defence  department  by  
leaking it to the media (Cameron 1998, pp.433–434).  
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In anticipation of the upcoming CCW Review Conference, which also marked the phase during which 
the ICBL as a whole made most use of outsider tactics, in summer 1995 the Canadian campaign, 
known as Mines Action Canada (MAC), organised various public activities, including a concert tour, 
documentaries and advertisements (Warmington and Tuttle 1998, p.52). It also began an extensive 
letter-writing campaign and began sending ban petitions in batches of ten thousand to the then 
Foreign Minister, André Ouellet (Cameron 1998, p.433), who eventually responded by unexpectedly 
announcing  his  support  for  a  ban  in  November  1995.  The  foreign  ministry’s  landmines  policy  officer  
Bob Lawson, who had a NGO background himself and became the ICBL’s ‘primary   link   with   the  
Canadian  government’ (Williams 2013, p.200),   faxed  MAC  a   copy  of  Ouellet’s   speech   so   that   that  
they  could  put  out  congratulatory  press  releases  (Kitchen  2002,  p.42).  One  of  MAC’s  leaders,  Celina  
Tuttle promptly “told   everyone   to   write   Ouellet   a   letter   congratulating   him   on   his   courageous  
move…That was the beauty of e-mail.  Within  hours  people  were  patting  him  on  the  back”  (quoted in 
Greenaway 1997), illustrating how one of the main outsider-insider tactics used by the ICBL was to 
confer legitimacy on elites that moved in a pro-ban direction, in effect reinforcing elite hegemony as 
part of progressing towards a ban.  
 
Ouellet’s   move   strengthened   the   foreign   ministry   against   the   defence department, which 
structurally had less influence than in larger military powers like the US, Britain and France. At the 
time it was additionally temporarily weakened by substantial defence cuts and the fallout from the 
so-called   ‘Somalia   Affair’   involving the torture and killing of a Somali civilian by Canadian 
peacekeepers (Neumann 2002, p.130 n17). Canadian leadership took off after Axworthy became 
Foreign  Minister   in   late   January  1996  as  whereas  Ouellet  was   ‘domestically  orientated’  and   ‘more  
politician   than   policymaker’   (Kitchen 2002, pp.41–2),   Axworthy’s   strongly   liberal   internationalist  
interpretation   of   Canadian   interests   and   ‘human   security’-centred foreign policy, meant that like 
Leahy and the Norwegian Labour government he had a similar worldview as liberal NGOs. On 
assuming office, he immediately agreed to suggestions from his diplomats that Canada assume 
leadership on a landmine ban (Mekata 2000, p.157), which no doubt appeared as a cost-effective 
way   to   repair   Canada’s   international reputation and distinguish itself internationally at a time of 
severe cutbacks and when it was also seeking a UN Security Council seat.  
Compared to the other national campaigns, those in Germany and Italy had a more radical approach 
and greater grassroots involvement. The German campaign was led by left-wing development NGO, 
MI, and had a more radical base, a more political approach and made more use of outsider tactics. 
Its initial membership consisted of solidarity, peace and disarmament groups and it only later 
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expanded to the large humanitarian and religious NGOs (Seibert 2000, p.3). Similarly in Italy, the 
campaign involved trade unions and landmine factory workers and was supported by local councils, 
particularly in Castenodolo, home of the large Valsella landmines plant. Active public participation 
was demonstrated by a three-day rally in Castenodolo, which featured a 17-kilometre march 
attended by thousands of people (Dentico 1997; Landmine Monitor 1999n; Sigal 2006, pp.40–2). 
Notwithstanding this, Sigal (2006, p.40) observes   that   the   campaign   ‘would   have   made   little  
headway  without  help  in  high  places,  including  parliament,  the  Vatican  and  the  ministry  of  defence’.  
The leader of the Italian campaign has highlighted how religious arguments were central to its 
approach (Faulkner 2007, p.141 n57) and the Vatican announced its support for a ban from June 
1994 (ICBL 2004). The Italian government announced a unilateral moratorium on production and 
export shortly afterwards; in August 1994, but even with this public pressure it refused to take an 
international lead on the issue. Its Geneva diplomats refused even to support calls to amend 
Protocol II (Sigal 2006, p.42) and it later supported the stalling tactic of moving negotiations on 
landmines to the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD).  
 
Four expert meetings preparatory to the CCW took place from which the ICBL was mostly excluded 
due to opposition from China, but it still had an inside track on developments through its allies in UN 
agencies and the ICRC (Carstairs 1997, p.106; Hubert 2000, p.13; Sigal 2006, pp.66–69; Rutherford 
2010, pp.52–53). These included Stuart Maslen, then of UNICEF (Sigal 2006, p.66), who had been 
working for VVAF up to 1993 (VVAF 1995, p.530) and subsequently attended the Ottawa Process as a 
member  of  the  ICRC’s  delegation  (Maslen and Herby 1998). At that stage, Williams and Goose were 
leading the ICBL delegation and were the only two NGO representatives to attend the second 
experts’  meeting   (Rutherford 2010, p.52n9). Consequently, on the issue of landmines they ‘knew 
long before the Vienna review conference that nothing   of   substance  was   going   to   happen   there’  
(Williams 2013, p.172) and their boycott of the last two expert meetings (Rutherford 2010, p.52n9) 
was  to  be  repeated  in  the  ICBL’s  strategy  towards  the  CCW  review  as  a  whole,  in  that  the  campaign  
alternately   participated   in   the   process   as   insiders   and   criticised   it   from   the   ‘outside’   using   their  
insider knowledge.  
The Review of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW): 1995-6  
The CCW Review Conference itself took place in three sessions: in September-October 1995 at the 
UN in Vienna, and in January and April-May 1996 in the UN headquarters in Geneva. Shortly into the 
first session, a video message from the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, advocating a ban 
was broadcast (CCW 1996b, p.297). A ban was never on the table, however, as the negotiations 
were based on consensus. This favoured a lowest common denominator compromise between non-
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Western states like Russia, China, Pakistan and India that wanted  to  keep  their  ‘dumb’  mines  (ICBL 
1995f, 1995g; CCW 1996a, pp.195; 437–438; 446–447; Beier 2002) and   Western   ‘smart’   mine  
advocates led by the US and the UK (ICBL 1996a, p.1; 7, 1996b, p.1, 1996c; The Herald (Glasgow) 
1996). Chinese opposition had precluded the ICBL from official observer status, so it was unable to 
participate in Working Groups where substantive negotiations took place. NGOs exploited this by 
portraying the conference as exclusionary (Warmington 1996; Carstairs 1997, p.106), with Williams 
and Goose (1998, p.31) claiming   they  were   ‘not   allowed   inside   the  negotiations’.   This   assessment  
has also been reproduced in the academic/participant literature (Hubert 1998, pp.13–14).  
 
However, in practical terms, there was actually substantial NGO access due to support for this from 
Western governments, including the US (ICBL 1994a, p.85), which wanted to use NGOs as a lever 
against China (Sigal 2006, pp.66–69). This meant the ICBL could approach diplomats in the 
conference venues, attend the plenary and some Main Committee meetings (CCW 1996a, p.59; 48), 
and  was  also  granted  its  own  special  plenary  session.  And  in  the  evenings  there  were  ‘never-ending’  
government receptions to which NGOs were invited (Williams 2013, p.173). Nearly seventy NGOs 
and national campaigns participated in the Conferences (CCW 1996c), with HRW, VVAF and HI 
sending numerous representatives. Survivors from Cambodia, Mozambique and Afghanistan also 
addressed the special NGO session (CCW 1996a, pp.367–370) in their first major international 
appearance (White and Rutherford 1998), giving the impression of a global campaign. In addition, 
NGOs  were  represented  on  a  dozen  Western  delegations,  including  Canada’s,  and  had  informants  on  
others (CCW 1996c; Sigal 2006, pp.74–76). All of this gave them an inside track, enabling the ICBL to 
publish a regular conference newsletter, CCW News and distribute it to delegates. This included 
‘Good   Lists’   of   pro-ban states and a   column   called   ‘Overheard   in   the   corridor’   that   compiled  
anonymous, but unflattering, off-the-record remarks by delegates (ICBL 1995h).  
 
The period   of   the   CCW   Review   also   marked   the   acme   of   the   campaign’s   outsider   tactics,   with  
national  days  of  action,  the  construction  of  enormous  ‘shoe  pyramids’   in  France,  Austria,  Germany  
and numerous other countries to symbolise landmine injuries, the presentation of a ban petition 
containing an impressive 2.5m signatures, and the announcement of a boycott of producers (The 
Herald (Glasgow) 1995; CCW 1996a, p.372; 456; ICBL 1996f; The Guardian 1996; Chabasse 1998, 
pp.62–65; Dolan and Hunt 1998, p.401; Rutherford 2010, p.65). NGO language in the media was 
often   confrontational,   with   British   campaigners   condemning   their   government’s   introduction   of  
loopholes  for  ‘smart’  mines  as  ‘absolutely  disgusting’ (OneWorld Online 1995) and  slamming  ‘Cynical  
arguments…used  to  protect  various  countries’  vested  interests’  (McGrath in ICBL 1995i). In addition, 
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survivors   handed   out   roses   labelled   with   victims’   names   to   delegates   on   their   way   into   the  
conference in a sort of emotional blackmail unprecedented at arms control negotiations that 
discomfited diplomats (Rutherford 2010, p.80 n7). Most outsider tactics were of a passive or routine 
nature, however, and were channelled mainly through the media. This strategy was facilitated by 
the  ICBL’s  extensive  media  contacts  and  also  by  the  depoliticised  humanitarian  framing  used  by  the  
campaign that gave it a broad appeal. This is demonstrated by the widespread but undemanding 
public support the campaign enjoyed, as evidenced by ban petitions and opinion polling (Rutherford 
2000b, pp.105–106). On the other hand, there was relatively little active mass or grassroots 
participation and little opportunity for non-NGO professionals to influence its agenda, which had 
basically been set by the six founding organisations in 1992.  
 
The Amended Protocol II (CCW 1996d), agreed in May 1996, introduced additional restrictions on 
APMs but lacked any meaningful verification or enforcement clauses. The bottom line was that both 
‘dumb’  and  ‘smart’  mines  remained  legal  as  a  result  of  compromise  between  developing  countries  
that wanted to keep the former and advanced military powers like the US and Britain who wanted to 
retain the later.  From  the  ICBL’s  perspective,  this  reinforced  the  political  need  for  a  comprehensive  
ban to avoid North-South or East-West divisions, which NGOs had recognised as a potential problem 
from the beginning (HRW and PHR 1993, pp.345–6; ICBL 1994a, p.113). As Rae McGrath argued 
‘many  countries  would  not  sign  on  to a regime that favoured the western and industrialised nations 
through a bias to high-technology  mines’  (quoted in ICBL 1995j). This view was widely shared, so the 
ICBL strongly opposed a limited ban (ICBL 1995k) and   strenuously   refuted  arguments   that   ‘smart’  
mines were superior from a humanitarian perspective. Their indiscriminateness so long as they were 
active was pointed out, as well as failure rates of self-destruct mechanisms of 5-50% that created a 
false  sense  of  security  and  could  encourage  greater  use.  It  was  also  emphasised  that  because  ‘smart’  
mines were usually scatterable or remotely-delivered, they tended to be used in much larger 
quantities than conventional dumb mines that had to be individually buried by hand (Goose 1995).  
The amended Protocol also introduced a new distinction between APMs and AVMs absent from the 
original Protocol, with weaker standards applied to AVMs. This involved new definitions that created 
ambiguity about whether a particular mine was an AVM or an APM, as APMs were defined as mines 
‘primarily designed  to  be  exploded  by  the  presence,  proximity  or  contact  of  a  person’   (CCW 1996d 
Art. 2.3; Herby 1996). This was intended to exclude AVMs with anti-handling devices and Claymores 
(Velin 1996a), which can be either command-detonated or victim-activated and are by far the most 
common   ‘dumb’  mine  possessed  by  the  US   (HRW and PHR 1993, pp.65–66). This was vehemently 
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opposed by the ICBL (1996f) and  the  ICRC,  which  warned  it  could  lead  to  a  new  generation  of  ‘dual-
use  landmines’  designed to elude the APM definition (Herby 1996; Velin 1996a).  
 
The amended Protocol also contained new provisions on user responsibility for clearance, which 
required future users to demine areas under   their   control   ‘Without   delay   after   the   cessation   of  
active  hostilities’  and  if  they  lost  control  of  such  areas  to  provide  ‘technical and material assistance 
necessary   to   fulfil   such   responsibility’   to   the   government   controlling   it   (Arts.   3.2  &   10).   This was 
significant, but there was still no retroactive responsibility for historic mine use – either for 
governments that had used mines or for governments whose territory had been mined by others. 
Producer/supplier responsibility was also omitted.  
 
The ICBL  and  its  elite  allies  denounced  the  outcome.  The  ICBL’s  official  press  release  argued  that  ‘it  
actually encourages the production and use of a new generation of landmine’   (ICBL 1996k), while 
the British campaign   condemned   it   as   “a  mine   layers’   charter”   and   for  HI   it  was   “a   real  betrayal”  
(quoted in AFP 1996; quoted in Bellamy 1996). Leahy was equally critical, decrying the new Protocol 
as   “a   deplorable failure”   (quoted in Crossette 1996), while Boutros-Ghali   expressed   his   ‘deep 
disappointment’ and condemned US and UK policy at the conference of distinguishing between 
different types of mines (UN Secretary General 1996). 
‘Partnership’  and  the  Ottawa Process: 1996-1997 
More positive than the actual outcome of the Protocol negotiations from an NGO perspective was 
the fact that by the end of the process in May 1996, the number of states that had announced 
unilateral measures, such as production/transfer moratoriums, limitations on use, stockpile 
destruction, or national bans, had grown from fifteen to over forty (Velin 1996b) and states declaring 
support for an immediate ban from fourteen to forty-one (ICBL 1996f). Most national measures were 
moderate, however, and many rhetorically pro-ban states had little intention of an immediate 
effective ban.  
 
As   early   as   the   first   CCW   session   in   1995,   the   ICBL   had   called   on   interested   states   ‘to   form   an  
informal working group, with NGO participation, to develop a realistic timeframe to eliminate 
landmines’  (ICBL 1995l) and it reiterated this at the beginning of the second CCW session in January 
1996 (ICBL 1996l).  This  time  governments  on  its  ‘Good  List’  were  invited  to  a  meeting  (Mekata 2000, 
p.157). Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Canada and Switzerland  showed up 
(Williams and Goose 1998, p.34; Mekata 2000, p.157) and follow-up meetings in April and May were 
attended by fourteen and eleven states respectively (Maslen 2004b, p.24 n130). During these, 
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Canada proposed holding a ban conference in Ottawa, and Austria produced the first draft of a ban 
treaty (Ehrlich 1996; ICBL 1996f; Williams and Goose 1998, p.34). At that stage, membership of what 
became   the   ‘Core   Group’   behind   the   Ottawa   Process was still in flux. Canada, Norway, Austria, 
Ireland and Belgium were the only states consistently engaged from the outset, while Switzerland, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Mexico, Philippines and South Africa had joined by the first formal Core 
Group meeting in February 1997 (Lawson et al. 1998, p.167; Rutherford 2010, p.91 n70).  
On the final day of the Review, Canada announced it would hold a meeting in Ottawa for 
governments  and  NGOs  that  favoured  ‘a  comprehensive  ban’   (CCW 1996a, p.436) and held a joint 
press conference  with the ICBL, UN and ICRC (ICBL 1997i; Short 1999, pp.484–486). This was the 
first of many joint events between Ottawa Process host governments, NGOs and international 
agencies, and marked the expansion of the longstanding alliance between NGOs, UN agencies, the 
ICRC and sympathetic governmental and non-governmental elites to a group of mainly Western 
small and middle power governments as a whole. From then on, distinguishing ICBL influence from 
their elite partners’   is   even   more   difficult,   as   each   followed   the   same   script   and   differences   of  
opinion were generally kept diplomatically private. In this third partnership stage of the campaign, 
NGOs again relied primarily on insider tactics, but now research and insider lobbying were 
augmented by direct collaboration and coordination with pro-ban states, so that NGOs acted as the 
public relations arm of the Ottawa Process and the governments organising it. The strategy of 
‘rewarding’  cooperative  states  with  ‘civil  society’  legitimisation  intensified,  alongside  a  new  tactic  of  
leveraging the economic power of Western Core Group states to get mine-affected developing 
countries on board.  
The Ottawa Strategy Conference 
The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) organised the October 
1996 Ottawa Strategy Conference in consultation with local NGOs and the ICBL leadership (DFAIT 
1996a; Carstairs 1997, p.108; Tomlin 1998, pp.14–15; Warmington and Tuttle 1998, p.57) – primarily 
Williams and Goose (1998, p.35), who say the ICBL was ‘consulted frequently on nearly every aspect’  
of it. This produced a programme designed to foreground NGO, ICRC and UN perspectives (ICBL 
1996m, pp.3–6) and rules stipulating states could only attend as full participants if they endorsed the 
suggested final declaration of the conference beforehand (DFAIT 1996a, 1996b). This meant 
agreeing  to  ‘the  earliest  possible  conclusion’  of  a  ban  treaty  (Ottawa Declaration 1996). In the event, 
fifty states participated, with twenty-four observers (DFAIT 1996c).  
 
Canada also encouraged other governments to collaborate with NGOs by allowing them to bring an 
extra NGO delegate (DFAIT 1996b; 1998, p.15).  This  accentuated  NGO  ‘embedding’  on  government  
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delegations begun during the CCW Review, so that around fifteen governments brought NGOs to 
Ottawa (Bridgman 1996; Cameron et al. 1998, p.437; Cameron 1999, p.92). It also contributed to a 
hierarchy  of  NGO  access   involving   ‘three   levels  of  participation’   (MAC 1996): NGOs on delegations 
had   full   access   to   all   sessions   including   ‘closed’   intergovernmental   negotiations;   around   twenty  
official ICBL representatives chosen by the ICBL leadership and Canada comprised the official NGO 
delegation, which was allowed to participate only in some official sessions; and all other NGO 
representatives were restricted to fully public sessions also open to the media. This hierarchy of 
access is generally not mentioned in the literature, hence  Williams  and  Goose’s  (1998, p.35) version 
of   NGO   engagement   in   Ottawa   is   simply   that   ‘The   ICBL was given a seat at the table as a full 
participant’.   
 
The close collaboration between Canadian officials, Lawson and Sinclair, and Williams and Goose 
was also evident in how the four of them sat down at a computer on the last night of the conference 
to   write   the   final   Ottawa   Declaration,   the   Chairman’s   Agenda   for   Action   and   Axworthy’s   closing  
speech (Tomlin 1998, p.17; Williams and Goose 1998, p.35; Sigal 2006, p.158). As mentioned above, 
the  ICBL’s  new  ‘Call  for  Action’  closely  resembled  the  Ottawa  Declaration  and  Action  Plan,  albeit  with  
more emphasis on public  awareness  raising,  given  NGOs’  role  as  the  Ottawa  Process’  public  relations  
arm. All four documents notably excluded user/producer responsibility, effectively effacing it from 
the diplomatic agenda from the outset. At that stage, only nine participating states were from Africa, 
three from Asia and seven from Latin America, in part because Canada had not provided sponsorship 
for states to attend (DFAIT 1996b). The issue was also excluded from all treaty drafts drawn up by 
Austria (Austria 1996, 1997a, 1997b; Ehrlich 1996), despite consistently strong support for including 
it from developing countries (OAU 1995, 1996, 1997; NAM 1997; SADC 1997 & Manila Regional 
Seminar 1997 in Maresca et al. 2000b, p.520; 564). 
 
Encouraged by the enthusiasm for a ban among some participating states, wary of French proposals 
to stall progress by moving the issue to the deadlocked UN Conference on Disarmament, and 
spurred on by diplomatic competitiveness with Belgium, which had already announced a follow-up 
conference in Brussels, Canadian diplomats and Axworthy decided midway through the Conference 
to conclude it by calling on states to return to Ottawa to sign a ban treaty by December 1997 (Sigal 
2006, pp.156–158). This was designed to railroad states into moving much faster towards a goal they 
had all nominally agreed to, but which had safely lacked a timeframe. It was thus by far the most 
significant development at the Conference that had not been agreed in advance. As the Canadian 
Globe and Mail put  it,  ‘Many  countries  would not have sent delegations to Ottawa if they believed 
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the  final  declaration  was  going  to  include  a  timetable  for  establishing  a  global  ban’  (Campbell 1996). 
It  was  also  very  much  Canada’s  initiative,  given  the  ICBL  had  issued  a  press  release  the  previous  day  
with the far less ambitious demand for a ban by 2000 (ICBL 1996n).  
 
Whereas even other Core Group governments were kept in dark (Sigal 2006, pp.158–9; Rutherford 
2010, p.87) or warned only minutes beforehand (Long 2002, p.433 n5), the ICBL, UN and ICRC had 
been given sufficient advance notice for Axworthy to legitimise his stance by citing Boutros-Ghali’s  
support and NGOs were primed to respond with a standing ovation and congratulatory speeches 
(Cameron et al. 1998, p.438; Lawson et al. 1998, p.162; Tomlin 1998, pp.19–20; Rutherford 2010, 
p.87). The USCBL followed this up with an action alert asking members to write Axworthy letters of 
congratulation (USCBL 1996b), indicating how reinforcing the legitimacy or consensual-hegemony  of 
pro-ban governments was a central plank of ICBL strategy throughout the Process. The Conference 
had  opened  with  a   landmine  survivor  expressing  the  ICBL’s   ‘deep  appreciation  and  admiration’  for  
‘the   leadership   that   Canada   has   shown’   and   Axworthy’s   ‘personal   commitment’,   and   praise   of  
Canada’s   ‘visionary   leadership’   and   ‘courage’  was   reiterated   on   numerous   occasions   (ICBL 1996o, 
1996p, 1996q, 1996q). Moreover, the ICBL was already consciously situating the Process as a model 
of cooperative governance partnership between civil society, IGOs and governments, declaring:  
we  believe  this  can  serve  as  a  model  on  other  issues…History  should remember this meeting 
as the point at which NGOs and a large number of governments began working together 
seriously to achieve a common aim (ICBL 1996o).  
 
Core Group governments and UN agencies spoke from the same script. This was particularly true of 
Canada,  with  Axworthy  framing  the  Process  as  a  model  of  ‘soft  power’  and  the  ‘new  multilateralism’  
involving partnership   between   governments   and   civil   society   ‘(Axworthy 1998a, 1998b; Axworthy 
and Taylor 1998).  
 
At the time, Axworthy’s   move   was   regarded   as   a   major   gamble   that   could   seriously   embarrass  
Canada in the event of failure (Cameron 1998, p.438) and many diplomats reacted angrily to the 
breach of etiquette, including pro-ban  states   like  Belgium,  which  was   reportedly   ‘furious’  at  being  
upstaged (Maslen 2004b, p.p34n186),  and  the  US,  which  sent  Canada  a  ‘sharply  worded  démarche’  
and summoned Canadian diplomats to Washington (Wareham 1998, p.227; Sigal 2006, p.159; 
Williams 2013, pp.204–205). Notwithstanding this, the US viewed APMs as a relatively minor issue 
and relegated it to low ranking officials (Sigal 2006, p.240). At the time, it was concerned with more 
pressing geopolitical questions like NATO expansion, the deployment of US troops in Bosnia and the 
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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Sigal 2006, p.171), whereas middle powers and NATO members, 
Canada and Norway, who supported the US on all these major issues, could concern themselves 
more with niche  diplomacy  on  ‘softer’  ‘human  security’  issues  like  landmines.  Moreover,  the  political  
climate for Democrat-linked NGOS like HRW and VVAF had not significantly improved after Clinton 
won his second term in 1996, as the Republicans still controlled both Houses of Congress.  
 
Shortly   after  Ottawa,   the  US   rebuffed   Canada’s   suggestion   of   a   four   protocol   treaty   consisting   of  
separate bans on production, stockpiling, use and transfer (Lawson et al. 1998, pp.163–164), which 
could have led to a very different outcome. Its preferred strategy instead was to stall progress by 
moving negotiations to the slow moving consensus-based UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), 
where each of its 65 members have an effective veto. Britain, France, Australia, Spain, Italy and 
initially Germany, all backed this US proposal (Financial Times 1997; Dolan and Hunt 1998, p.404; 
Landmine Monitor 1999a; WILPF 2010), whose stated rationale was to involve major stockpilers 
and/or exporters like Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Israel (Velin 1997a) that shunned the Ottawa 
Process. This gambit backfired, however, as core state, Mexico, vetoed even adding landmines to the 
CD agenda in June 1997 (Washington Post 1997). That the ICBL had no role in this is confirmed by 
the Canadian diplomats who organised the Ottawa Process (Lawson et al. 1998, p.174). 
 ‘Track II’ for the South 
The   Chairman’s   Agenda   for   Action   and   the   ICBL   Call   for   Action   issued   at   the   end   of   the   Ottawa  
Strategy  Conference  envisaged  what  became  known  as  a  ‘Track  I’  series  of  diplomatic  negotiations  
on treaty  text,  held  in  Europe  and  hosted  by  the  Western  Core  Group  states,  and  a  ‘Track  II’  strategy  
of public awareness raising activities and regional conferences, held mainly in the South with a 
particular focus on mine-affected states. Track II was important as so few developing countries had 
attended the Ottawa conference, potentially undermining the legitimacy of the Process. Hence, in 
holding  regional  conferences  in  the  South,  involving  Southern  states  in  the  Core  Group  as  ‘regional  
champions’     (Lawson et al. 1998, p.167; Hubert 2000, p.21), and targeting mine-affected states for 
legitimisation purposes, the lead Western Core states adopted much the same strategy vis-à-vis the 
South as the Northern-dominated ICBL. Both of them instrumentalised Southern support to 
legitimise an externally devised, essentially Western process that only expanded to developing 
countries once its broad parameters has been established and the language they use to describe it is 
also similar.  
 
Canadian  diplomats  were  thus  conscious  that  ‘All regions of the world would need to feel they were 
helping  to  shape  the  destiny  of  the  Ottawa  Process  rather  than  simply  doing  the  bidding  of  others’  
170 
 
(Lawson et al. 1998, p.169 my emphasis), while according to Williams and Goose (1998, p.24 my 
emphasis),  ‘it  was  clear  to  the  initiators  of  the  campaign  that  in  order  to  hold  together  NGOs  of  such  
diverse interests, these organizations would need to feel an immediate and important part of 
developments’.   Goose   (2008a, pp.95–96) later elaborated the North-South dimensions of this, 
explaining:  
Both the campaign and the core group governments worked hard to ensure geographic 
diversity within the ban movement, and to promote a sense of ownership of the issue 
among regional organizations, especially the Organization of African Unity.  
From a Gramscian perspective, this appears a quintessentially hegemonic strategy, in the sense 
subordinate actors were consciously encouraged to internalise an agenda externally devised by 
elites as representing their own interests.  
 
This was reinforced by the familiar NGO strategy of discursively legitimising cooperative states. 
Hence, the ICBL (1997j) expressed  hope  that  other  African  countries  would  ‘follow the example and 
take   cues   from   the   leadership   shown   by   South   Africa   and   Mozambique’,   who   announced   their  
support for a ban directly before and during the Fourth ICBL Conference in Mozambique in February 
1997. South Africa also joined the Core Group of states organising the Ottawa Process during this 
period.  Likewise,  the  ICBL’s  rhetoric  of  civil  society-government partnership was also transplanted to 
southern Africa. As an ICBL (1997k) press release put it:  
conference  patron,  Graça  Machel,  stressed  that  the  campaign…“is  a  post-Cold War model of 
action where NGOs and government work together to change in humanitarian law by 
banning anti-personnel  landmines”.   
 
Although   variously  organised  by  NGOs,   the   ICRC   and   the   Core  Group,   ‘Regardless  of   the   sponsor,  
each of these conferences was characterized by a high degree of co-operation among the partners in 
the  ban  movement’  (Williams  and  Goose  1998, pp.37–8). The Core Group instructed their embassies 
to coordinate with NGOs and the ICRC (Lawson et al. 1998, pp.166–8); the ICBL continued its 
Southern   expansion,   with   funding   from  Western   Core   states,   to   create   ‘bottom-up’   pressure   on  
Southern governments; the Core Group lobbied them through diplomatic channels; and the ICRC 
organised seminars for military and government officials in Addis Ababa, Harare, Manila and 
Managua (Rutherford 2010, pp.98–99). As no significant ICBL campaigns existed in Latin America, 
the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and large parts of Asia and Africa, support there was 
built mainly through diplomatic/donor pressure and lobbying by the ICRC and UN agencies (Lawson 
et al. 1998, p.174; Long and Hindle 1998, pp.258–259; Hubert 2000, pp.xii–xiii).  
171 
 
 
An important part of NGO-Core Group strategy towards developing countries was to focus minds 
towards acquiescence by conditioning mine action aid on adherence to a ban. In this way, the soft 
power or consensual-hegemonic practices of top-down civil society building, discursive legitimisation 
of cooperative states, and diplomatic lobbying were reinforced by the hard power of economic 
inducement, or in Gramscian terms the hegemonic compromise of international aid underwritten by 
the latent coercion of prospective aid denial. This had been part of ICBL strategy since at least 1994, 
when the Australian campaign  had  planned  discussions   ‘with   international   financial   institutions  re.  
incentives,  penalties,  etc.’   for  mine-affected states (ICBL 1994a, p.31). According to Mekata (2000, 
p.157),  NGOs  had  also  ‘suggested  using  good-governance criteria developed by the World Bank22 or 
International Monetary Fund for demanding bans from developing countries within development 
assistance  schemes’  at   the   first   ICBL-Core Group  meeting   in   January  1996,  so  that   ‘the  creation  of  
regional  “mine-free  zones”  could  be  linked    to  increased  funding    for  mine  clearance’   (ICBL 1996r). 
This was formalised in the new ICBL Call for Action and the Ottawa Strategy Conference Plan of 
Action, both of which recommended increasing funding for regions declaring or establishing mine-
free   zones   and,   in   the   ICBL’s   (1996i) case,   ‘particularly   from   international   financial   institutions’.  
Leveraging donor power and aid conditionality like this was obviously only a feasible tactic for the 
ICBL  now   it  had   ‘partnered’  with  wealthy  Western  states  with   large  aid  budgets.  Norway,  Canada,  
Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland accounted for 39% of international mine action funding 
from 1996-8 and trebled their contribution between 1995 and 1998, which created a financial 
incentive for affected states to join. 
 
Back   in   Europe,   Track   I   experts’  meetings   in   Vienna   and   Bonn   in   February   and April 1997 and a 
second   full  diplomatic   conference   in  Brussels   in   June  developed   the  treaty   text.  The  Core  Group’s  
regionalisation strategy and sponsorship of Southern delegations bore fruit (Lawson et al. 1998, 
p.170; Sigal 2006, p.164), increasing attendance from 74 states in Ottawa to 111 in Vienna, 121 in 
Bonn and 154 in Brussels (Velin 1997a; DFAIT 2008).  
 ‘Track  I’  – The  ‘Experts’  Meet  in  Vienna and Bonn  
Some   of   the  most   important   negotiations   took   place   at   the   Vienna   and   Bonn   experts’  meetings,  
where Austria and Germany limited NGO access to a small group of select NGO representatives. Just 
four NGO delegates, led by Williams and Goose, attended Vienna and only Williams and Goose went 
to Bonn (ICBL 1997l; Goose 1998b, pp.274–275; Short 1999, pp.486–487; 495). In both cases the 
                                                     
22 The World Bank actually did this during the campaign, in conditioning demining aid to  Croatia on no further 
mine use (DFAIT 1997). 
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ICBL officially only made brief statements to the plenary (ICBL 1997m, 1997m, 1997n) at the 
discretion of the Chair (Short 1999, p.486).  Moreover,   in   Vienna   the   ICBL   ‘was   not   permitted   to  
attend  the  working  sessions,  due  to  objections  from  some  governments’, confining it officially to the 
plenary, although they were in constant contact with pro-ban governments and knew what was 
going on (Goose 1998b, p.275; Maslen 2004b, p.31).  This  resembled  the  ‘exclusion’  of  NGOs  during 
the  CCW,  but  in  contrast  to  the  ICBL’s  public  protests  then,  no  conference  newsletter  or  report  was  
published and only a single press release was issued. This publicised a joint press conference with 
Austria, Belgium, Canada and the ICRC and emphasised the number of states present and the 
momentum towards a ban but gave no details on the negotiations (ICBL 1997o). Consequently, there 
was little publicity of the kind NGOs created at the CCW and in Ottawa, so at these crucial stages the 
ICBL relied almost exclusively on insider tactics. 
 
This lack of publicity was significant as the Vienna meeting involved the first substantive multilateral 
negotiations (Maslen 2004a, p.31) on the draft treaty drawn up by Austria (1996) and largely 
decided   the   crucial   question   of   the   APM   definition.   Although   the   offending   proviso   ‘primarily’  
inserted into Amended Protocol II was removed, the new wording had basically the same effect. It 
still excluded Claymores (Sigal 2006, p.65; 163; 166–168), specifically excepted AVMs with anti-
handling devices (Austria 1997b Art. 2) and as it remained design- rather than effect-based also 
potentially excluded dual-use  mines  ‘designed’  to  blow up vehicles but capable of killing pedestrians 
(McGrath 1997c). At the time, manufacturers were increasingly reclassifying mines as submunitions, 
developing very small AVMs and attaching anti-handling devices to them, in part to circumvent APM 
regulations (McGrath 1994b, 1997c; Velin 1996a; HI and Observatoire des transferts  d’armements  
1997; Gebauer 1998b). The exemption of anti-handling devices was of particularly concern to 
demining NGOs like HI and MAG, as it directly endangered their staff. All these exclusions had been 
vigorously opposed by the ICBL and the ICRC during and after the CCW review.  
 
Notwithstanding this, the campaign had long been divided as to how to deal with these definitional 
problems. HRW had always used a design-based approach modelled on the original CCW definition 
(HRW and PHR 1993, pp.3–5), whereas MAG and the British campaign (McGrath 1994a, pp.5–7, 
1994b; Oakes 1994) had long advocated an effects-based approach that would capture all victim-
activatable anti-personnel munitions, regardless of their ostensible design. The proposed definition 
in   the   ICBL’s  model   treaty,  published   in  December  1996  after  a  week  of   campaign  meetings   (ICBL 
1996h, p.14), was essentially the same as the definition HRW proposed to the CCW Expert Meetings 
back in 1994 (quoted in Lawson 2002, p.167). It was design-based, but worded to include Claymores 
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in victim-activation mode and contained an additional clause expressly including AVMs with anti-
handling devices (ICBL 1996j Art. 3).  
 
The ICBL leadership, again principally Williams and Goose, acquiesced to the exclusion of these 
weapons in Vienna, seemingly for largely pragmatic or politically expedient reasons (Short 1998; 
Sigal 2006, pp.166–167). AVMs with anti-handling devices, Claymores or other hybrid mines were 
stockpiled and/or manufactured by numerous important European countries, including core states 
Belgium, Germany, Norway and Austria, and Britain, France, Spain, and Sweden (ICBL 1995m; 1999b, 
1999d, 1999f, 1999h, 1999i, 1999j, 2003; Sigal 2006, p.166) and so could compensate them for lost 
military  capacity.  This  made  it  ‘significantly  easier’  for  them  to  join  the  APLC   (Kuchenmeister 2000, 
pp.2–3). 
 
According   to   Short,   the  definition   ‘was   changed with no intra-NGO  discussion’   (1998), so that the 
ICBL   leadership’s   apparent   compliance   ‘allowed   for   the   appearance   of   widespread  
acceptance…without  genuine  dialogue  among  NGOs  as  to  the  practical   impact  of  textual  changes’.  
Consequently,  the  ICBL  leadership’s  insider  status  ‘may  have  dampened  NGO  reaction’  (1999, p.492) 
and  in  her  view  the  ICBL  may  have  achieved  a  stronger  definition  if  it  had  situated  itself  ‘outside’  the  
process and used more outsider tactics, as it had during the CCW review (1998). Subsequent 
objections by MAG (McGrath 1997c) and Medico and the suggestion by an academic adviser to VVAF 
that the ICBL should come out strongly against the definition (Sigal 2006, pp.166–167; 201) had little 
discernible effect on ICBL strategy. Divisions on this continued throughout the Process, as evidenced 
by the effects-based definition promulgated in the  ‘Bad  Honnef  Framework’  adopted  at  a  conference  
of  mine  action,  development  and  survivors’  organisations  organised  by  the  German  campaign  during  
the Brussels Conference in June 1997 (German Initiative to Ban Landmines 1997). The ICBL 
essentially fudged the issue, tacitly accepting the design-based definition in the Austrian draft and 
trying to improve it with additional wording, while also calling for an effects-based definition23 at the 
final negotiations in Oslo.  
 
As in Vienna, NGOs also limited themselves to insider  tactics  at  the  Bonn  experts’  meeting,  where  a  
light touch approach to treaty compliance (Velin 1997a, 1997b), characteristic of human rights and 
international humanitarian law was emerging (Williams 1997b), as opposed to the more stringent 
verification of arms control treaties. This was an important concession to developing countries, 
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many of whom were enthusiastic ban supporters so long as it was not rigorously enforced and 
opposed stronger verification as interference in their internal affairs (Goose 2008b, p.110). This time 
Williams and Goose (1998b, p.275) were   treated   as   full   participants,   ‘able   to   attend   and   make  
interventions  at  all  sessions’,  where  they  supported  Canada  and  other  core  states  (Williams 1997b; 
Rutherford 2010, p.92) in promoting this shift (ICBL 1997m, 1997n). Again, this was mainly for 
political reasons, particularly as the emphasis on verification by ostensibly core state Germany 
(1997a, 1997b; Landmine Monitor 1999j), which mirrored the US position, was suspected as a 
wrecking strategy to stall the negotiations and sow North-South divisions (Long 2002, p.431). 
Indeed, packs handed out to campaigners at the final  negotiations  in  Oslo  warned  of  ‘concern  that  
some nations will use the verification issue to bog down negotiations thereby preventing conclusion 
of  the  treaty’  (ICBL 1997d).  The ICBL made the best of the situation by stressing that the core of the 
new treaty would be a new international norm (1997m, 1997n, p.5; 11), which would seemingly 
render intrusive verification unnecessary.  
The Penultimate Conference in Brussels  
As a large diplomatic conference aimed at generating wider support like the opening Ottawa 
Strategy Conference, the Brussels Conference was similarly organised. On the one hand, the agenda 
highlighted NGO perspectives and the Core Group facilitated a large NGO presence, including 
through a $63,000 grant from Belgium to HI to organise NGO activities and sponsor attendance by 
SNGOs and victims (Landmine Monitor 1999f). On the other, NGOs were excluded from the 
substantive negotiations during the first two days when the closing Brussels Declaration that set the 
tone for the final negotiations in Oslo was decided (HI 1997g; Goose 1998b, p.275) unless they were 
on a government delegation. Eight governments, including Austria, Belgium, Canada, France and the 
Netherlands, brought NGO delegates, with HI joining both the Belgian and French delegations. This 
gave rest of the ICBL an inside track on developments too, albeit through the prism of these trusted 
NGOs. In addition, an official ICBL delegation led by Williams and Goose and with just four24 other 
members (Brussels Conference 1997a) had somewhat better access than the rest of the campaign, 
which organised public awareness raising activities and   held   days   of   action   to   exert   ‘external’  
pressure (Dolan and Hunt 1998, p.401; Short 1999, pp.486–7).  
 
The ICBL continued to discursively legitimise supportive governments, congratulating Belgium in its 
opening   press   release   for   ‘its   continued   leadership   to   resolve   a   global   humanitarian   crisis’   (ICBL 
1997p). By then, however, an important additional aspect of ICBL strategy was to stigmatise the US 
                                                     
24 Alex Vines (HRW); Lou McGrath (MAG); Tun Channareth, a survivor, from the Cambodian campaign; and the 
head of the Afghan campaign and the Mine Clearance Planning Agency, Sayed Aqa. 
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for not supporting an immediate ban (Maslen 2004b, p.37). In addition to pressuring the US, this 
helped bind the pro-ban bloc of states and was particularly effective in Africa, where the Core Group 
and  the  ICBL  used  US  opposition  ‘as  a  foil’  to  encourage  others  to  join   (Sigal 2006, p.181). Framing 
the   US   as   the   ‘bad   guy’   was more a form of diplomatic theatre than a serious challenge to US 
dominance,  however,  given  the  ICBL’s  ongoing  efforts  to  persuade  the  US  that  supporting  a ban was 
in   its   military   interests   and   the   Core   Group’s   alliance   with   the   US   on   more   important   issues.  
Occasional   ‘US-bashing’   is   a   recurrent   feature   in   the   political   discourse   of   overwhelmingly  
dependable US allies like Canada, where it goes down well with domestic and international 
audiences but usually has little substance.  
 
The US had not participated in the Process since the Ottawa Strategy Conference and had attended 
Vienna only as an observer (Moody 2008, p.202 n55; 204 n57). In Brussels, it shunned the 
conference venue and summoned delegations to its hotel to sound out support for various 
exceptions (Maslen 2004b, p.37; Sigal 2006, p.174). Other delegations reportedly perceived this as 
arrogant, especially as US representatives seem not to have bothered to construct any plausible 
arguments beyond American self-interest. The ICBL (1997c) issued a press release condemning the 
US  for  ‘testing  the  waters  to  see  how  many  holes  can  be  shot  in  the  treaty’  and  also  sought to exploit 
diplomatic competitiveness  between  Western  states  by  framing  the  US  stance  as  ‘in  stark  contrast  to  
the  announcements  by  France,  the  UK  and  Italy  that  they  are  supporting  the  Ottawa  Process’.   
 
An important development in Brussels was that changes of government had prompted Britain (UK 
1997) and France to participate (ICBL 1997q). Both the French Socialist Party (Chabasse 1998, pp.63–
64) and   ‘New  Labour’   in   Britain   (The Herald (Glasgow) 1996; Bowers and Dodd 1998) were more 
sympathetic to the issue than their conservative rivals and had promised to support a ban while in 
opposition. The momentum of the international process and lack of progress at the CD prior to its 
final collapse in June (Washington Post 1997) would  also  have  played  a   role.   France  and  Britain’s  
participation encouraged members and prospective members of the EU and NATO to follow suit 
(Long and Hindle 1998, p.260), which combined with the Core Group-ICBL-ICRC regionalisation 
strategy, meant 97 states associated themselves with the Brussels Declaration. This included all of 
Western Europe apart from Finland and Cyprus, much of Central and Eastern Europe, thirty states 
from Africa and twenty-eight from Latin America and the Caribbean (Brussels Conference 1997b). 
This left the US and Japan as the only G7 nations outside the Process and Greece, Turkey and the US 
as the only NATO non-participants. In the end, 91 states participated in the final negotiations in Oslo, 
with thirty-eight observers. Most full participants were from developing countries (Oslo Conference 
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1997; Velin 1997b; ICRC 1998, p.4) and supported strong ban language – so long as it was not too 
rigorously enforced.  
 
This Southern majority was strategically important, as the rules of procedure devised by the Core 
Group stipulated substantive decisions would be taken by two-thirds   majority   ‘in   cases   where  
consensus  proved  impossible’  (Maslen and Herby 1998; Maslen 2004b, p.42). This was intended to 
prevent the US or other major powers from exercising a veto, in contrast to the consensus-based 
decision-making of the CCW and CD, and placed developing countries in an unusually powerful 
position by giving them a collective casting vote. Normally, they only enjoy this status in deliberative 
fora with budgets controlled by the North, like the UN General Assembly, but while this appeared to 
give them an unusual amount of influence, the Core Group had designed the Process this way in 
order to use them as leverage over the larger Western powers. Moreover, they had delimited its 
parameters so as to exclude aspects  seriously  threatening  to  their  own  and  their  allies’  interests,  so  
that sophisticated AVMs with anti-handling devices were excluded from the definition and 
user/producer responsibility was off the agenda from the start – illustrating the agenda-setting or 
‘non-decision-making  power’  (Bachrach and Baratz 1962) of the lead Western states organising the 
Process.  
 
A partial exception was the last minute addition of victim assistance. This had been mentioned in the 
Ottawa Declaration and Action Plan, but was omitted from all the draft texts devised by Austria from 
April 1996-September 1997 (Austria 1996, 1997a, 1997b; Ehrlich 1996)  as  well  as  Belgium’s  (1996) 
alternative  text.  Indeed,  even  the  ICBL’s  (1996j) model convention had relegated it to the Preamble 
and the ICBL leadership was reluctant to push the issue for strategic reasons. During the Brussels 
Conference,  Belgium,  which  had  been  a  major  exporter,  ‘refused  to  add  any  new  language on victim 
assistance’   to   the   Brussels   Declaration   (Maslen 2004b, p.38),   a   fact   omitted   from   the   ICBL’s  
uniformly glowing account of its role   in   the  Ottawa  Process   and   ‘real,   constructive   collaboration’  
with the Belgian campaign, in particular HI, which was included on the government delegation 
throughout (Landmine Monitor 1999f). This went down badly with African delegations particularly 
South Africa, which threatened to withdraw its support if victim assistance was not included (White 
and Rutherford 1998, p.111; Maslen 2004b, p.38; 177).  
 
Maslen (2004b, p.38n193) describes   this   as   ‘particularly   embarrassing’,   given   the   Core  Group  had  
chosen South African Ambassador, Jacob Selebi, to chair the final negotiations to make them appear 
less Northern-dominated (Dolan and Hunt 1998, p.410; Sigal 2006, p.203). The impasse was resolved 
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by inserting some non-binding victim assistance language between Brussels and Oslo (Gebauer 
1997). This was supported by Canada, Norway and Ireland, who according to White and Rutherford 
(1998) were more helpful on the issue than the ICBL leadership.  
 
Facing international isolation and following a row between the State Department and the Pentagon, 
the US decided at the last minute to go to Oslo (White House Press Secretary 1997). Williams and 
Goose (1998, p.43) attribute this to public opinion, but international momentum and promises of 
“flexibility”  and  “ingenuity”   from  Axworthy  and   the  Canadian  Prime  Minister,   Jean  Chrétien, were 
equally important (quoted in Dolan and Hunt 1998, p.408; Sigal 2006, pp.169–170; 192–3). The US 
arrived  with  a  package  of  ‘non-negotiable’  demands  that  would  have  vitiated  the  treaty,  including:  a  
clause allowing withdrawal  during  conflicts;  excepting  ‘smart’  APMs  used  in  conjunction  with  AVMs;  
a geographical exemption for Korea; strong verification measures anathema to many developing 
countries; and a nine-year transition period (US 1997a; Wareham 1997b; Rutherford 2010, p.110).  
 
The question of what stance to take towards US participation had contributed to a bitter split 
between Muller of VVAF and Williams (Bandler 1998). Goose and Williams – and much of the 
campaign internationally – favoured stigmatising the US and influencing it through international 
pressure, whereas Muller and some other US NGOs preferred a more conciliatory, domestically-
oriented approach (Sigal 2006, pp.201–202). The divergence was less about insider versus outsider 
tactics, than domestic versus international insider strategies, however, as whereas Williams and 
Goose had acquired insider status with the Core Group, Muller remained focused on the Clinton 
Administration and the Pentagon, working his extensive elite contacts and spending upwards of 
$100,000 on Republican-affiliated lobbyists (cited in Bandler 1998; VVAF 1998c; Sigal 2006, pp.201–
2).  
The Endgame of the Campaign  
A  serendipitous  element  in  terms  of  achieving  a  strong  treaty  was  Princess  Diana’s  death  days  before  
the Oslo Conference started. This increased an already high level of media coverage, from an 
average of 33 articles a day from August 1st-30th (with 40% mentioning Diana) to 270 during the 
first three days of the negotiations (with 89% mentioning Diana)25.  Headlines  like  ‘US  move  may  end  
Diana’s   landmines   dream’   (AP 1997) made it harder for Britain, and possibly other states, to 
backslide (Maslen 2004b, p.41 n204), as did the opening of the Conference by the Norwegian 
Foreign   Minister   with   a   minute’s   silence   in   Diana’s   honour   (Godal 1997). The UK development 
minister called for a   ban   as   a   ‘lasting   tribute’   (Koch 1997) and a prominent French politician 
                                                     
25 Based on Major World Publications in Lexis Nexis database. 
178 
 
suggested naming the treaty in her honour (Koch 1997). Kofi Annan (1997b) addressed delegates a 
few days later, giving the Ottawa Process the official UN stamp of approval and praising the UN-
NGO-ICRC  partnership  that  brought  it  about  as  ‘a  model  of  international  cooperation  and  action’.   
 
The  main  development  at  the  talks  was  the  US’  withdrawal after more than a fortnight of high-level 
pressure, involving telephone calls from Clinton to Jean Chrétien, Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and 
Nelson Mandela, regular contacts between Axworthy, Albright and US national security adviser, 
Sandy Berger, and bilateral consultations with NATO members (Sallot 1997; Short 1997; Sigal 2006, 
p.214; Cobb 2007). The ICBL responded with press releases condemning the American proposals as 
“killer  amendments”  that  “would  gut  the  treaty”  (Williams in ICBL 1997r) and made it clear it would 
not support a treaty incorporating US demands (1997r, 1997s). Moreover, they attacked President 
Clinton personally, with Williams quoting herself saying he “should  behave  like  Commander  in  Chief  
of the U.S. Armed Forces and act like  a  statesman”  and  “should  be  ashamed  that  he  is  willing  to  kill  
this   treaty   simply   to   save   face”   (ICBL 1997r, 1997t). This confrontational, personalised language 
horrified Muller  and  contributed  to  Williams’  dismissal  from  VVAF  shortly  afterwards  (Bandler 1998) 
and illustrated the significance of her personal role in the campaign at this particular point.  
 
The ICBL was not lacking in elite support, however, given that after the US had decided to participate 
in August, several  Core  Group  governments  had  urged  the   ICBL   leadership  “to  go  after  the  United  
States  as  hard  as  possible”  (Goose quoted in Rutherford et al. 2003, p.105). The ICRC, UN agencies 
and influential liberal elites like Leahy also remained strongly supportive (Leahy 1997a, 1997b; 
Lawson et al. 1998, pp.178–179; Cobb 2007) and by that stage most of the participating states were 
unwilling to give in to US demands at the last minute when they had publicly committed themselves 
to a ban for so long. Moreover, developing countries in particular saw an opportunity to get one 
over on the US on a relatively minor issue unlikely to provoke severe reprisals, especially given the 
leading Western states in the Core Group had already proffered themselves as alternative aid 
donors. France was also reportedly relishing the chance to embarrass their more powerful ally at 
relatively little cost (Sigal 2006, pp.202–203).   
 
The  ICBL’s  ire  was  not  limited  to  the  US,  as  Germany,  Canada  and  some  other  core  states  were  now  
competing to craft a compromise for the US (Short 1997; Velin 1997b; Dolan and Hunt 1998, 
pp.408–413; Sigal 2006, pp.169–170; 192–3; 205; 211–214). Canada was at the forefront, ostensibly 
because US participation would encourage Russia and China to join, but largely because of the 
diplomatic glory of getting the Americans on board (O’Neill   1997a). According to Dolan and Hunt 
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(1998, p.409),  Canada  viewed  US  approval  as  ‘worth  a  few  of  the  treaty’s  teeth’  and  its  efforts  to  act  
as   a   ‘go-between’   (Koring 1997), in particular by suggesting a 24-hour suspension of the talks to 
facilitate last minute US bargaining (Sallot 1997; Cobb 2007),   indicate   a   reversion   to   ‘routine’  
middlepowermanship   from   its   earlier   ‘heroism’   (Michaud and Belanger 2000). Germany played a 
similar role. As mentioned above, it had long supported US insistence on strong verification and in 
the closing stages drafted a compromise in US interests and raised the question of military 
‘interoperability’  in  NATO  if  the  Americans  were  left  out.  This  was  not  persuasive  at  the  time  (Short 
1997), but became a major issue during the implementation of the treaty and the cluster munitions 
negotiations a decade later.  
 
The main concessions Canada and some others were willing to make included a lengthy transition 
period and a geographic exception for Korea (1997a, 1997b; Sallot 1997; Velin 1997b; Cameron et al. 
1998, p.438; Sigal 2006, p.211). Norway expressed flexibility on a transition period only, as long as it 
was  not  ‘excessive’  (Egeland  quoted  in  O’Neill  1997b). In the context of the endgame, this seems to 
have meant a token concession of five to seven years subject to additional constraints that would 
have made it largely useless to the Pentagon (Sigal 2006, pp.2113–215). This is borne out by Maslen 
(2004b, p.42 n213), who was on the ICRC delegation, and says Norway, Ireland and especially South 
Africa were seen as the most dependable Core Group states from an ICBL/ICRC perspective.   
 
Williams   responded   by   publicly   accusing   Canada   of   “carrying   the  water”   for   the   US   and   giving   it  
“time  to  try   to  see   if   it  can  torpedo  the  treaty”   (and Sallot 1997; quoted in Dolan and Hunt 1998, 
p.413),  while  the  Canadian  campaign  warned  of  “massive  disappointment  and  anger”  if  it  succeeded  
in securing a transition period for the US (Tuttle   quoted   in  O’Neill   1997a). At this point, the ICBL 
organised  protests  outside  the  Canadian  embassy  in  Oslo  and  the  US  delegation’s  hotel  (Head 1997), 
with  banners  asking  “When  Did  Canada  Become  the  51st  State?”  and  shouts  of  “No  backroom  deals”  
as diplomats walked past (Cobb 2007). Letters were also sent to the foreign ministers of Germany, 
other Core Group states and Britain  and  France,  with  Germany  warned  that  ‘It  would  be  a  shame  to  
have to point out to world public opinion that the countries that had the courage to respond to the 
Canadian  challenge  to  ban  this  weapon,  gave  in  to  the  U.S.  in  the  final  moments’  (ICBL 1997c).  
 
Such contentious tactics demonstrate NGO autonomy from the endgame positions of the US, 
Canadian and German governments vis-à-vis the final outcome of a process they had designed with 
Core Group. However, for the ICBL to get to that position in the first place had required strong elite 
connections, a shared discourse and agreement on broad ideological parameters with elites. Indeed, 
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their government counterparts would probably have reacted similarly in their place and vice versa. 
That the ICBL was able to take a strong stance reflected the momentum built up by the Ottawa 
Process, the support of developing countries temporarily empowered by voting rules devised earlier 
by  the  Core  Group,  and   intense  media  attention   in   the  wake  of  Princess  Diana’s  death.  Combined  
with the longstanding promotion of the lead Western states in the Core Group as leaders on 
landmines, this made it politically difficult for them to renege on the final agreement without a 
major loss of face.  
 
An additional factor was that riven by elite divisions between Republicans and Democrats and the 
State and Defence departments and having left it to the last minute to fully engage (Sigal 2006, 
p.215), the US negotiating strategy appears to have been inept. The head of the US delegation has 
said   he   was   “embarrassed”   by   instructions   to   propose   rewriting   the   definition   to   exempt   APMs  
‘near’   AVMs,   which   “basically   provoked   laughter”,   and   according   to   another   US   diplomat,   the  
delegation  was  seething  with  “active  hatred”  at  Washington’s  incompetence  (quoted in Sigal 2006, 
p.211).  The  US’  heavy-handed  package  of  ‘non-negotiable’  demands  and  bilateral  approaches  only  to  
‘important’  governments  also  did   it no favours with neglected delegations. These included most of 
the African countries (Short 1997), who were there to make up the numbers but now controlled a 
third of the votes and opposed all the US demands. Even normally dependable allies like the British 
were  relatively  unreceptive,  in  part  due  to  the  publicity  around  Diana’s  death,  (Sigal 2006, p.205).  
 
Ultimately, the US realised it had left it too late to influence entrenched positions in a process it had 
largely neglected, and which were by now so institutionalised that even its Canadian instigators had 
relatively little room for manoeuvre. Many US officials maintain that if higher-level attention had 
been paid earlier they could have achieved most of their objectives, which seems plausible given 
Canada’s   initial   proposal   for   a   four   protocol   convention.   Goose   also   agrees   the   US   “could   have  
gotten  a  lot  more”  and  could  even  have  limited  the  ban  to  dumb  mines  if  it  had  seized  the  initiative  
early on (Sigal 2006, pp.238–240).  However the US withdrew and the remaining participants agreed 
the convention by consensus.  
 
Goose’s  (1998b, p.279) description of the ICBL reaction gives a sense of how the campaign and the 
Ottawa Process immediately began to acquire their dominant meaning as a celebration of the 
efficacy and progressiveness civil society participation in the new multi-actor  global governance: 
the diplomats were cheered, perhaps for the only time in their diplomatic lives. The 
campaign representatives in the negotiating room stood and clapped for the treaty and for 
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the process that made it possible. As delegates filed out of the conference, other 
campaigners were at the door and the cheers and hugs and chants did not end until the last 
delegate had left the room.  
Earlier   disagreements  with   Core  Group   states  were   quickly   shelved,   as   the   ICBL’s   final   statement  
reverted to framing the Process as a harmonious model of civil society-government partnership and 
glossed over the exclusions from the APM definition:  
Governments have responded to the demands of civil society and have come together with 
unprecedented speed and produced a treaty that unambiguously bans all antipersonnel 
landmines…Together,   we   have   shown   that   there   can   be   a   new   way   of   conducting  
international diplomacy in the post-Cold War period. This accomplishment is perhaps as 
important as the treaty itself and should embolden us to cooperatively attack other 
problems on the international scene (ICBL 1997v). 
 
The UN and Core Group governments sang enthusiastically from the same hymn sheet. As Kofi 
Annan (1997c) put   it   at   the   Ottawa   Signing   Conference   in   December   1997:   ‘The   international  
community  of  the  future…is  a  union  of  governments,  civil  society,  and  international organizations. It 
is   a   union   of   one   voice’,   while   Axworthy   (1997c) praised the process in quintessential liberal 
governance   language   as   showing   that   ‘a full partnership between States and non-governmental 
organizations   can   produce   results   that   neither   side   can   achieve   alone’,   where   both   ‘bring   their  
comparative  advantages  and  particular  capacities  to  the  process’.   
The Implementation of the Treaty and its Impact  
The overwhelming consensus among NGOs, governments, IGOs and academics is that the APLC has 
been a huge success. According to Landmine Monitor (2004, p.5), the semi-official outsourced 
monitoring body established in 1998 by the ICBL with funding from the leading states in the Ottawa 
Process Core Group (2006a, pp.83–84, 2008a, pp.51–52),   ‘The marked drop in the use of 
antipersonnel mines around  the globe since the mid-1990s is without question one of the great 
achievements   of   the   Mine   Ban   Treaty   and   the   movement   to   ban   antipersonnel   mines’.   This  
perception that the treaty resulted in declining use and lower casualties is widespread, but the 
reality is more complex.  
 
The APLC bans production, stockpiling and transfer of APMs as defined, which excludes AVMs, 
whether equipped with anti-handling devices, or not, and Claymores in command mode (Article 2). 
Parties are to clear mined areas under their control within ten years and destroy stockpiles in four, 
but can apply for an unlimited number of extensions (Articles 5 & 4). Victim assistance is voluntary, 
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as neither affected states nor donors are legally obliged to provide it and there is no mention of 
user/producer responsibility for demining either. Consequently, legal responsibility for clearance 
attaches only to mine-affected states and international funding is conceived exclusively in terms of 
voluntary   ‘International  Cooperation  and  Assistance’  (Article  6).  Only  states   ‘in  a  position  to  do  so’  
are to provide this – a   ‘deliberately   vague’   formulation   that   avoids   legal  obligation   (Arms Control 
Association 1997; Goose in Sigal 2006, p.184).  
 
The treaty came into force with unusual speed in March 1999, after an intensive ratification 
campaign by the Ottawa Process partnership. At the end of the Oslo Conference, the ICBL (1997w) 
had announced a new Plan of Action geared towards entry into force before the year 2000 and a 
joint  ‘Program  for  Mine  Action’  also  involving  the Core Group, ICRC and UNICEF was announced at 
the treaty signing conference in December 1997. Its success is usually ascribed primarily to the moral 
taboo established by the treaty and ICBL, ICRC and government diplomatic efforts, but donor power 
was key, given Canada and Norway alone announced plans to donate $100m each to mine action 
over the next five years (Ottawa Treaty Signing Conference and Mine Action Forum 1997) and 
signatory developing countries received significantly more mine action aid.  
 
An account by a Canadian official illustrates the habitual downplaying of economic inducement, 
attributing  the  ‘domino  effect’  in  Africa  and  the  Americas  to  ‘a  moral  norm  rejecting  anti-personnel 
mines’  and  ICBL,  ICRC  and  government  lobbying  efforts,  before  mentioning  the  cash  on  offer  (Smith 
2008, pp.69–74). This also helps to explain why larger non-Western powers, such as Russia, China, 
India, Pakistan and Iran, which are less dependent on international aid, including from Northern 
NGOs, have not joined. As of August 2012, the APLC had 160 parties out of a possible 196 (ICBL 
2012a), significantly more than the 91 parties to Amended Protocol II (UN 2012), but fewer than 
many human rights and IHL treaties26, although the APLC is more recent and may gain more support 
over time. Contrary  to  Landmine  Monitor’s  (2011a, p.3) claims  of  ‘near-universal  acceptance’,  many  
of the largest   and   most   militarily   powerful   states,   representing   more   than   half   the   world’s  
population, have not signed and most of the largest historic users, producers and stockpilers have 
also not joined. Consequently, around two-thirds of the 1999 stockpile remains in the hands of 
thirty-five non-parties – particularly China (110m), Russia (24.5m), the US (10m), Pakistan (6m) and 
India (4-5m) (Landmine Monitor 1999a, p.8, 1999p, 2004, p.21, 2009a, pp.1066–1067, 2011b, p.4; 
                                                     
26 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Optional Protocol on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Convention on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.  
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13). Besides this, states with serious ongoing security concerns joined in much smaller numbers, 
prompting a VVAF  spokesperson  to  observe  in  1999  that  “all  the  countries  most  likely  to  fight  a  war  
in  the  next  20  years”  had  not  signed  the  treaty  (quoted in Newsweek 1999).  
 
According to Landmine Monitor, the number of governments using APMs fell from thirteen to 
sixteen in 1998/9 to three in 2010/1, with a smaller but still significant decline in the number of 
countries where APMs were used by insurgents. Casualties also appear to have fallen significantly – 
to 5,000-10,00027 annually, although the original estimate of 26,000 probably included casualties 
from other types of unexploded ordnance. Exogenous factors have likely accounted for much of this, 
most notably the dramatic fall in major armed conflicts28 and wars since the 1990s (Harbom and 
Wallensteen 2005, p.627) and declining conflict intensity. On the other hand, mine use is still 
common in armed conflict. Landmine Monitor cites confirmed or credible allegations of use by 
governments or armed groups in 25 of the 32 countries where major armed conflicts took place 
between March 1999 and 2010, a period in which there have been twenty-four definite and five 
probable government users and forty-seven countries where use by governments and/or armed 
groups has been reported. These are substantial tallies given most states have not experienced 
minor   or   major   armed   conflicts   on   their   territory   since   1999,   undermining   Landmine   Monitor’s  
(2005, p.14, 2007, p.11, 2009a, p.9) claims   that   ‘Use   of   antipersonnel   mines,   especially   by  
governments,   has   become   a   rare   phenomenon’.   In this context, it is worth noting that Landmine 
Monitor’s   simultaneous   function   as   advocacy   material   and   the   ICBL’s   strategy   of   portraying   the  
existence of a strong norm incentivises portraying mine use as aberrant. This helps to explain why it 
has not contextualised declining use in terms of the fall in armed conflict.  
 
On the other hand, the threshold for use has been significantly raised, even for non-Western states, 
who are likely to prefer other weapons, if possible, to avoid negative publicity. Access to factory-
made mines has also been restricted for actors without their own stockpiles or production capacity, 
but major non-Western stockpilers, Russia, India and Pakistan, have used APMs in large quantities 
when the need arose. India and Pakistan laid more than two million along their border in 2001/2 
(Landmine Monitor, 2004: 14; 18), while government forces in Afghanistan and Iraq used APMs 
extensively during the 2001 and 2003 invasions. By 2010, new APM use was occurring in around half 
the countries experiencing major armed conflicts and belligerents benefited from existing minefields 
in several other countries, including India, Pakistan, Turkey and Cambodia. Use and treaty violations 
                                                     
27 There were approximately 4,000 recorded casualties in 2009 and 2010, so estimated casualties are derived 
from ratios used by Landmine Monitor (2002, p.40, 2007, p.39; Goose et al. 2008, p.5).   
28 As defined by SIPRI.  
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have also recently increased. Non-state parties, Syria, Libya, Israel and Burma have all reportedly 
used APMs since 2010, as have state parties, Yemen, Sudan, Turkey (ICBL 2012b) and Cambodia, 
which had all supposedly destroyed their stockpiles under the treaty. Non-Western armed groups in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have also made extensive use of improvised APMs, or victim-activated IEDs, 
which have caused a similar proportion of US deaths as during the Vietnam War. This indicates the 
limitations  of   the   ‘norm’  against  APMs  given   their  continuingly  high  military  utility  as   ‘weapons  of  
the  weak’.   
 
By contrast, Western forces have mainly been engaged in offensive actions, peacekeeping, 
humanitarian interventions and asymmetrical counterinsurgency, where APMs are of limited use 
(Croll 2009, p.171).  Military expert, Mike Croll, thus concludes:  
There is no doubt that mine use is much less than it was two decades ago, but in large 
measure this is because the changing nature of warfare has reduced the need for mines, 
rather than the treaty inhibiting their use.  
 
Although APMs would have been useful for defending Western bases in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
negative PR would have outweighed the relatively minor military gains, and Claymores in command 
mode,   which  were   the  most   common   ‘mine’   in   US   arsenals   in   any   case,   have   been used by the 
Americans in Afghanistan (Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2011) to  fulfil a similar military 
function. This highlights how the availability of substitutes has been another important factor in non-
use by Western states. Sensitive personnel-activatable AVMs and AVMs with anti-handling devices 
have thus become increasingly common (Gebauer 1998b; German Initiative to Ban Landmines and 
Landmine Action 2001, p.5). Although twenty-five state parties have since declared that AVMs with 
very sensitive anti-handling devices or fuses come under the APLC and Canada, Norway and 
Germany have modified their stocks accordingly, major military powers, Britain and France, and 
Japan, Denmark and the Czech Republic have all stated the APLC has no application to AVMs 
whatsoever (Goose 2008b, p.119). In addition, in the late 1990s and early-mid 2000s, the boundaries 
between  APMs  and  new,  or  merely  reclassified,  ‘area  defence’,  ‘fragmentation’  or  cluster  munition  
weapons became increasingly blurred. In one instance, the same weapon was classified by the US as 
an APM and by Germany as a submunition (Gebauer 1998b), while several ICBL NGOs also suspected 
that states were deliberately substituting  cluster munitions for APMs (HI 2004a; Actiongroup 
Landmine.de 2005, p.12; Weidacher et al. 2005, p.31),   knowing  many  would   ‘fail’   to   explode   on  
contact  and  create   ‘“de   facto  minefields”   (HI-Belgium 2007, p.136) with a similar military utility to 
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scatterable APMs. These outstanding issues were addressed by NGOs in different ways and are 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
The other major impact of the treaty and the ICBL has been large increases in international mine 
action funding, which amounted to $4.27 billion from 1997-2008.  However as of August 2011, 
seventy-two out of an initial ninety states remained mine-affected (Landmine Monitor 2011a, 
pp.17–18) and none of the states that had completed demining had a severe problem to begin with. 
Although contamination has also decreased in many countries, by July 2012, thirty states had 
received or were seeking extensions to the ten-year clearance deadline (Landmine Monitor 2011a, 
pp.22–23; GICHD 2012). Landmine Monitor  (2009b; 2011) reports   extensions   are   ‘becoming   the  
norm’  and  have generally been granted with little fuss, including to wealthy countries with minor 
mine problems such as the UK29 (Landmine Monitor 2011a, p.23).  
 
A   final   indicator   of   the   treaty’s   humanitarian   impact   is   funding   for   victim   assistance.   This   is   less  
subject to exogenous factors than reductions in use or increases in demining funding as it is less 
strategically beneficial. Unlike demining, it does not allow access for occupying forces and other 
foreign personnel, free up land for productive use or significantly facilitate commerce. Landmine 
Monitor’s  ten-year  review  found  ‘the  least  progress’  in  this  area,  ‘with  funding and action falling far 
short’.  Government   funding   from  1999-2003 amounted to only $143m and by 2009 a mere $44m 
was being provided for around half a million survivors globally (2007, p.39, 2009a, p.1, 2011a, p.ix). 
Along with disproportionate allocation of demining funding to strategically important states, such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq, this illustrates the implications of omitting user/producer responsibility, in the 
sense funding has been allocated according to donor interests rather than responsibility for the 
problem or humanitarian need and so reinforces rather than undermines unequal international 
power relations in this area. It also means that states with a large share of the responsibility for the 
problem, through exports or foreign use, have not contributed proportionately to mine action30.  
 
All the above problematises claims that the treaty – and the ICBL – have had as significant an impact 
on the humanitarian problem as commonly believed. This is not to say their impact has been 
                                                     
29 In the Falklands 
30 For instance, Italy, Belgium and France ranked 13th, 15th and 18th respectively in terms of mine action 
donations from 1992-2009 far behind countries like Norway, Japan and Sweden with little or no responsibility 
for the problem. Contributions from non-parties, Russia and China, have been negligible (Landmine Monitor 
2010, p.44).  
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insignificant,  however,  as  contrary  to  the  campaign’s  claims  of  political  neutrality,   its  main  impacts  
have been political rather than humanitarian.   
Conclusion  
The  ICBL’s  central  significance  from  a  Gramscian  perspective  has  been  the  central  role  it  has  played 
in   constructing   and   reinforcing   hegemonic   liberal   discourses   relating   to   the   role   of   ‘global   civil  
society’  in  a  new  multi-actor system of global governance and an emerging hegemonic discourse of 
human security. This is the context in which NGOs exercised influence, which worked primarily 
through forming hegemonic alliances with sympathetic elites with compatible perceptions of their 
long-term hegemonic interests. These then competed for recognition as an optimum hegemonic 
governance strategy against more conservative interpretations of hegemonic interests framed in 
terms  of  ‘national’  rather  than  ‘human’  security.   
 
This has legitimised wider hegemonic liberal governance narratives in two main ways. First, the ICBL 
is seen to demonstrate liberal claims of a progressive power shift to global civil society and/or small 
and middle power states in the post-Cold War era and second, it is said to demonstrate the efficacy 
of partnership between civil society and states in collaboratively solving shared governance 
problems,   now   that   the   ideological   disputes   of   the   past   are   over   and   ‘we’   can   all   work   together  
towards common goals, in a relatively overt cooptive narrative of civil society engagement in (global) 
governance. The ICBL and its lead NGOs, supportive elites and liberal academics alike have all 
promoted   variants   of   this   hegemonic   governance   narrative   as   ‘lessons’   to   be   drawn   from   the  
campaign and have generally downplayed the admittedly limited role of contentious outsider tactics 
in moving government positions along. 
 
Supportive elites from Western small and middle powers (English 1997; Lawson et al. 1998) and 
IGOs (Annan 1997c) articulated  the  same  themes.  Axworthy’s  speeches  encapsulate  this  best:   
What I am talking about is a full working partnership between governments and civil groups, 
both of which bring their comparative advantages and particular capacities to the process 
(1997c)…the  involvement  of  civil  society  and  the  information  technology  revolution  – are the 
foundations  on  which  a  profound  democratization  of  international  politics  is  being  built…this  
is another   kind  of   “globalization”…one   can  no   longer   relegate  NGOs   to   simple  advisory  or  
advocacy roles in this process. They are now part of the way decisions have to be made 
(Axworthy 1997b). 
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Annan (1997c) was equally on message at the signing conference, claiming governments had been 
‘moved  by   the   groundswell   of   public  opinion’   and  become   ‘partners’  with  NGOs   ‘in   a   remarkable  
expression   of   the   “new   diplomacy”’.   All   of   these   themes   have   been   reproduced   in   the   liberal  
literature. Regardless of whether its proponents sincerely believe this or not, from a Gramscian 
perspective, the mere repetition of such hegemonic ideas reinforces hegemonic power relations. As 
Gramsci (1971, p.340) argues, hegemonic ideologies must be constantly repeated to continuously re-
imprint  them  on  the  popular  consciousness,  so  the  hegemonic  class  must  ‘Never…tire  of  repeating  
its  own  arguments’.   
 
The   ICBL’s   impact   on   the   international   security system and the world military order has been 
similarly hegemonic in the sense that it has paradoxically reinforced rather than undermined it. This 
has occurred through the conscious delinking of the ICBL from a wider peace or disarmament 
agenda. Moreover, after the treaty was agreed, the two lead US NGOs advocated that the US 
develop sophisticated alternative weapons (HRW 2000a, p.4) and VVAF even published a detailed 
war plan of how the US could defeat North Korea without APMs (Rossiter 2000).  
 
Taking into account the wider hegemonic effects for Western states allows for a more critical 
Gramscian interpretation of the nature and political significance of the NGO influence that helped 
bring them about. Persuading capitalist state elites to reconceptualise their long-term hegemonic 
interests was central to ICBL strategy, meaning genuine differences among elites as to where their 
hegemonic interests lay in relation to APMs were key to its success. This included disagreement over 
the military utility of APMs even among military experts. Petrova (2010) argues   APMs’   lack   of  
military utility was constructed by the ICBL and it is certainly true that NGOs helped to persuade 
Western elites of this, but it is also true that the parameters of such construction are not unlimited, 
but  delimited  by  real  material  interests  that  cannot  be  negated  by  an  alternative  ‘construction’.  For  
instance, Petrova does not address the realist argument that the key consideration for states in 
international agreements, particularly in relation to security, is relative rather than absolute gains, 
which vis-à-vis banning APMs as defined in APLC appear to have rested with advanced militaries 
rather than developing countries. 
 
From  a  Gramscian  perspective,   the   fact   that  banning  APMs  did  not   ‘touch   the  essential’   (Gramsci 
1971, p.183) as it did not seriously impinge on the military or economic interests of Western states 
rendered  it  a  ‘possible’  concession  to  subordinate  groups,  at   least  in  terms  of  how  the  interests  of  
mine-affected populations were represented by the ICBL. By the same token, the limits of 
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construction were reached in the exclusion of AVMs, Claymores and cluster munitions. In this 
context, the ICBL achieved its delimited aims by forming a hegemonic alliance with supportive 
sections of elites that competed with a rival hegemonic alliance composed of more conservative 
elite elements. The ICBL-ICRC-UN-Core Group hegemonic alliance incorporated some military 
supporters, but was primarily based on foreign affairs/development departments and compatible 
consensual international UN agencies, the ICRC and representatives of liberal/social democratic 
parties, as opposed to defence departments and conservative parties. This can be related to the 
consensual or coercive functions of different arms of states and elite disagreement as to optimum 
governance or hegemonic strategies. On the one hand, supportive individuals like Leahy, Axworthy 
and Egeland favoured a more consensual mode of international security governance, with a strong 
emphasis on ideological legitimation through universalising liberal hegemonic ideas like 
humanitarianism and hegemonic compromises to subordinate groups like international mine action 
aid, both of which double up as consensual supports for the broader use of military force. On the 
other, more conservative elites, often with closer ties to defence departments, emphasised the 
direct maintenance of coercive capacity over its ideological legitimisation, and relied for consensual 
justification more on traditional national security discourses, while also offering mine action aid. The 
latter approach ultimately dominated in the US, where Clinton (1997) cited the safety of American 
soldiers as the main reason for not signing the treaty and attempted to compensate through millions 
in demining aid.  
 
Significantly, both the liberal and conservative hegemonic alliances, including the lead NGOs, 
stressed that their position on landmines coincided with broader support for the general 
maintenance of international security and the military capacities of states. Both sides also settled for 
a voluntary international assistance approach to demining and victim assistance, thereby keeping 
the outcome firmly within the limits of hegemonic interests even as the combination of the 
consensual   and   coercive   elements   of   hegemonic   governance   varied.   In   this   context,   the   ICBL’s  
dependence on donor funding suggests it could only mount a campaign that at least some elite 
donors viewed as in their long-term hegemonic interests. This meant NGOs could get funding from 
foreign affairs departments and private foundations even as military and defence departments 
opposed a ban and seems reinforced by how the content of the final treaty most closely reflected 
the demands of moderate ICBL NGOs closest to international elites such as HRW.  
 
The campaign can therefore be interpreted from a Gramscian perspective as having reinforced an 
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states, that from the perspective of supportive elites was also in the long-term interest of the US as 
the most powerful state in the Western bloc, whose dominance was not challenged by the Process 
or  the   ICBL   in  any  real  way.  The   ‘lesson’  of   the   ICBL  would  therefore  appear   to  be  that  NGOs  can  
exercise influence when their demands are perceived as in the long-term hegemonic interests of at 
least some sections of elites and can serve a legitimising or hegemonic function for the achievement 
of elite objectives. As lead Canadian diplomat, Robert Lawson (1997a, p.23) has argued, NGO 
participation   in   the   Ottawa   Process   provided   a   ‘dramatically   expanded   diplomatic   tool-kit for 
officials developing strategies to  influence  key  decision  makers  at  state,  regional  and  global  levels’.  
This also had a major impact on how the unfinished business of cluster munitions was subsequently 
dealt with.  
Chapter 6 – The Cluster Munitions Campaign: Historical 
Context and Material Base 
 
The Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC) was a direct successor of the ICBL and was consciously 
modelled on it (Moyes and Nash 2011a, p.11). Cluster munitions were considered by many ICBL 
NGOs as unfinished business from the landmines campaign and were framed in terms of a similar 
humanitarian discourse. In addition, many of the same NGOs were involved and, as was a multi-
actor partnership with UN agencies and mainly Western middle and small power states. This time 
Norway was the lead state, with Ireland, Austria, New Zealand, Mexico, Peru, and the Holy See 
making up  the  rest  of  the  ‘Core  Group’ (CMC 2008a; Borrie 2009, p.141; 162).  NATO’s use of cluster 
munitions   in   its   ‘humanitarian   intervention’   in  Yugoslavia,  US  and  UK  use   in  Afghanistan  and   Iraq, 
and, finally, Israeli use in Lebanon in 2006 all helped to propel the issue up the international agenda 
and in 2006 a standalone diplomatic process on cluster munitions, known as the Oslo Process, was 
launched. This produced the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) (Convention on Cluster 
Munitions 2008), which bans cluster munitions as defined and contains similar stockpile destruction 
and clearance obligations as the landmines treaty, with more detailed provisions on victim 
assistance. It entered into force on August 1st 2010 and as of September 2013 had eighty-four state 
parties and 113 signatories (CMC 2013).  
 
The  campaign  has  been  portrayed  as  evidence  the  ICBL’s  success  had  indicated  a  more  permanent  
shift in the influence of civil society in global governance and the international system. The CMC 
Coordinator, Thomas Nash, and one of the three CMC Co-Chairs,  Richard  Moyes,  argue  that   ‘Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and other civil society organisations have become important 
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actors  in  national  and  international  politics’  and  situate the CMC in terms of the academic literature 
on  ‘”global”  or  “transnational  civil  society”  and  Keck  and  Sikkink’s  transnational  advocacy  networks  
(Moyes and Nash 2011b, p.8). Other articles by Nash cite the same liberal-constructivist literature 
(Bolton and Nash 2010; Nash 2012) and  reference  Kaldor’s   (2003b, p.6; 12) concept of global civil 
society  as  ‘horizontal  transnational  global  networks’  demanding  ‘global  rule  of  law,  global  justice  and  
global  empowerment’.  The previous two chapters have demonstrated the gaps in that argument by 
highlighting the dominance of the landmines campaign by a small core of well-connected, Northern 
NGO professionals and its lack of autonomy from Western hegemonic elites, the following two 
chapters now examine whether and how the CMC resembled or deviated from that model  of  ‘global  
civil  society’  influence.    
 
This chapter begins by examining the issue-specific and wider historical context of the campaign, 
analysing how the shifting geopolitical and international security environment of the late 1990s and 
early-mid 2000s,   including   the   ‘War   on   Terror’, influenced state approaches to cluster munitions. 
Particular attention is given to Norway and Canada, as the two leading government supporters of 
the landmine ban, but who adopted divergent positions on cluster munitions. It then examines the 
origins, financial, personnel and organisational basis of the CMC and assesses its material autonomy, 
laying the basis for analysing the discourse and tactics that emerged from this historical-material 
basis, the outcomes of the campaign, and the nature and conditions of NGO influence in Chapter 7.  
The Context of the Campaign 
Cluster munitions have been a controversial weapon since they were first used by the US to carpet-
bomb Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and efforts were made to 
ban them during the same international negotiations that led to the CCW in 1980 (Krepon 1974; 
Prokosch 1995). In addition to their indiscriminate mine-like after-effects, cluster munitions are also 
usually   used   indiscriminately   at   the   time   of   attack.   Composed   of   a  mother   bomb   or      ‘munitions    
container which  breaks open in mid-air and disperses smaller  munitions  or  submunitions’  (Wiebe 
and Peachey 1997, p.2),  they  are  categorised  as  ‘area  weapons’   (UK 2005, p.1) and scatter smaller 
bombs  over  a  ‘target  area’  as  large  as  several  football  fields  (HRW 1999b). The military purpose can 
be to destroy several targets at once, or one or more targets that are moving or whose precise 
location is unclear (HRW 2003b, p.55; UK 2005, p.2), meaning they are designed to indiscriminately 
cover a target area (McGrath 2004a, p.3). Delivered by aircraft or artillery, they can explode in mid-
air, on impact, with a time-delay (Foster 1999; HI 2003, p.7), or through victim-activation – whether 
by  ‘design’  in  the  case  of  cluster  mines,  or  by  effect  if  they  fail  to explode as designed (Actiongroup 
Landmine.de 2005, p.4). The number of submunitions per container can be up to several hundred 
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(HRW 2003c, pp.3–4) and the humanitarian impact generally increases in accordance with the 
number of containers and submunitions used. 
 
By the late 2000s, the US was still by far the largest historical user, followed by Israel, the UK and 
Russia, although not necessarily in that order (HRW 2010). Thirty-six countries or territories were 
affected by unexploded cluster munitions (CMC 2010a), but Laos, Iraq, Vietnam, Afghanistan, 
Lebanon and Russia/Chechnya were by far the worst hit (HI-Belgium 2007, p.148; Landmine and 
Cluster Munition Monitor 2010, p.33). Estimated global casualties range from 55-100,000 since 
records began (HI-Belgium 2007, p.136; Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2010, p.32), 
meaning their humanitarian impact had been much smaller than APMs. On the other hand, because 
cluster munitions are designed to kill rather than maim (CMC 2008a) and unexploded (sub)munitions 
are generally malfunctioning rather than operating as designed, they create deadlier and more 
unpredictable ordnance and are costlier to remove (HRW 2002b, p.9; HI 2005a, p.4; Bryant 2006, 
pp.48–49; 2006a, p.3; 42).   ‘Failure   rates’   of   individual   submunitions   range   from   under   1%   in   test  
conditions with newer models, to 25-40% under battle conditions when older stocks are used (Beach 
2001, p.4; Nash 2006a, p.38). This is not hugely dissimilar to the rate of unexploded ordnance 
generally, which averages around ten percent (MAG 2000; MacDonald and Mendez 2005, p.3) but 
because  so  many  submunitions  are  used  and  small  unexploded  ‘bomblets’  are  much  harder to see 
than  bigger  bombs,  a  single  attack  can  create  ‘“de  facto  minefields”’  (HI-Belgium 2007, p.136).  
 
Following the end of the Cold War, cluster munitions did not reappear on the international agenda 
until   NATO   used   them   in   its   ‘humanitarian   intervention’   in   Yugoslavia   in   1999   (HRW 1999b) and 
further international discussions about them took place in the changed international conditions 
post-9/11 after they were used in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
Military Interests and Cluster Munitions  
By the 2000s, cluster munitions accounted  for  “over  80%  of  [US]  Army  fire  support  capability”,  “the  
bulk of Marine Corps artillery   munitions”   (quoted in HRW 2008c) and ‘approximately   20   to   40  
percent  of  combined  [NATO]  fire  support  holdings  delivered  from  the  air’  (US Mission NATO 2008). 
But whereas in the 1970s, they had been a cutting edge weapon mainly possessed by the major 
military powers (McGrath 2000b, p.6), the status of most models in advanced arsenals was changing 
to that of back up for more expensive precision weapons (HRW 1999f). As production costs declined, 
cluster munitions were purchased by smaller powers and developing countries and the more 
advanced  military  powers  were  even  offloading  older  models  ‘at  little  or  no  cost’  (HRW 2005a, p.4). 
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This meant they were stockpiled by 85 states (CMC 2010a) and  had  become  ‘one  of  the  cheapest  air-
delivered  weapons   available’   (McGrath 2000b, p.6). This reduced their relative technological and 
military advantage to advanced Western military powers, leading to the development of more 
technologically  advanced  ‘smart’  models,  designed  to  be  more  accurate  and  reliable   (Weidacher et 
al. 2005, p.35; 43).  
 
This characteristic arms product cycle (Prokosch 1995, p.176) was accelerated by a particularly sharp 
trade-off  between  cost  and  military  effectiveness,  given  ‘The  side-effect of keeping the expense of 
individual  bomblets  low  is  a  significant  dud  rate’  (HRW 1999f). Early NGO reports acknowledge this 
technological gap and its potential to create similar North-South   issues   as   ‘smart’   mines   (Goose 
2004a, p.15; Weidacher et al. 2005, p.4). For this reason, unless developing states stockpiled cluster 
munitions and therefore opposed any ban at all, most developing countries demanded a ban on all 
cluster   munitions   including   advanced   ‘smart’   weapons   (Borrie 2009, pp.257–258). These were 
claimed by manufacturers and advanced military powers to have a lesser humanitarian impact 
because they contained far fewer submunitions, had lower failure rates, and could be more precisely 
targeted. Compared to developing countries, attitudes towards cluster munitions differed for 
advanced military powers like the UK (2005, pp.3–4), which argued early on that in light of 
technological  developments,    ‘The present type of cluster munitions will eventually cease to be the 
most effective way of engaging area targets  as  precision  weapons  become  more  available’,  but  that  
‘this  change  is  not  imminent’  and  in  the  meantime  cluster  munitions  were  ‘essential’.   
 
The   claim   to   be   able   to   conduct   ‘surgical   strikes’   that   minimised   ‘collateral   damage’   became   an  
increasingly important part of legitimising Western military interventions (Beier 2011) and by the 
time the   CMC   was   launched   in   2003,   the   shift   towards   ‘smart’   cluster   munitions   by   Western 
militaries was also ineluctably intertwined with the interests of Western arms capital.  
 
Economic Interests in Cluster Munitions 
Although thirty-one other countries have produced cluster munitions at some point (CMC 2010a), 
the US, Russia and China were by far the largest producers (Goose 2004a, p.5).  The only other states 
described  as   ‘major’  producers  are   Israel,   India,  Pakistan,  and  Brazil,  while      the  number  of  historic 
exporters was even smaller at only around twenty states, with the US again the largest, followed by 
Russia/USSR and China (Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2010, pp.15–16). Other interested 
states included Israel, South Korea (HRW 2007a, p.34; Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2010, 
p.223),   and   Germany,   France   and   Sweden,   which   exported   guided   ‘smart’   cluster  munitions   that  
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were ultimately permitted under the treaty (HRW 2009a, p.3; Landmine and Cluster Munition 
Monitor 2010, p.71).  
 
By the 2000s, low-tech,  ‘dumb’  submunitions  without  guidance  or  self-destruct systems cost as little 
as $3-$60 (McGrath 2000b, p.6; Weidacher et al. 2005, p.43) and   as   with   ‘dumb’   APMs   were  
becoming a cheap commodity manufactured by export-dependent third tier arms producers (Krause 
1995, pp.31–2).   By   2008,   few  Western   companies   were   still   producing   ‘dumb’   cluster   munitions 
without self-destruct mechanisms or guidance systems (Hiznay 2008, p.44), but Brazil, Russia,  India, 
China, South Korea, Slovakia and Turkey had all recently exported them and Pakistan and Singapore 
were offering them for sale (HRW 2005a, 2007a; HRW and Landmine Action 2009). By contrast the 
most   sophisticated   ‘smart’   cluster  munitions  with   individual   ‘sensor-fused’   submunitions  and self-
destruct mechanisms were prohibitively expensive for all but the most advanced military powers at 
$25,000-$35,000 per submunition (Weidacher et al. 2005, p.44). Governments and arms industries 
in those countries therefore had an economic and military interest in preserving their legality. It was 
with these weapons in mind that NGO  warned  early  on  that  cluster  munitions  were  ‘a  growing  multi-
billion dollar enterprise at the core of national military strategy and military-industrial research, 
development,   and   production’   (Wiebe 2000, p.161) and that the CMC   would   ‘face   determined  
opposition   from   the  commercial   as  well   as  military   and  political   sectors’   (McGrath 2004b, p.5). In 
spite of this, in an unexpected outcome, the CCM   ultimately   banned   not   only   ‘dumb’   cluster  
munitions but also the vast majority of advanced cluster munitions.  
 
Unexploded cluster munitions resembled landmines in endangering Western troops, deminers, and 
aid workers and were already ‘costing  the  international  community  millions  in  direct  costs’  (McGrath 
2000b, p.9). This potentially made using them appear similarly irrational from the perspective of 
many Western development and foreign affairs departments, especially for states with little military 
or economic interests in the weapons. The same UN humanitarian and development agencies were 
also supportive (IASC 2003; CMC 2007a; Borrie 2009, pp.235–248), with UNDP the most centrally 
involved (Moyes and Nash 2011a, p.80; Nash 2012, p.131). By contrast, defence establishments 
were again primarily concerned with maintaining their military capacity and although the dangers of 
unexploded munitions encouraged some defectors to the pro-ban camp, this happened less than 
with APMs. Reinforcing these conflicting material interests was the political context of cluster 
munitions  use,  which  shaped  states’  perceptions  of  their  utility.   
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Political interests, Cluster munitions and the Responsibility to Protect 
Initial moves to restrict cluster munitions in the late 1990s and early 2000s emerged in the context 
of an increased emphasis on humanitarian justifications for Western military interventions, which 
from a Gramscian perspective have become perhaps the principle consensual-hegemonic 
justification for the use of force in international relations. While these had played a role in 
legitimising interventions in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia (Kaldor 2007b, pp.19–22; 
Bellamy 2010, pp.360–1), they acquired a new prominence vis-à-vis   NATO’s   bombing   of  
Kosovo/Serbia in 1999, which lacked UN authorisation as well as host government consent. In the 
process,   the   concept   of  military   ‘humanitarian   intervention’   became   integrated into an emerging 
hegemonic  discourse  of  ‘human  security’.  First  popularised  by  the  1994  UNDP  Human Development 
Report, this had initially been a broad, developmentally-oriented concept, focused more on 
‘freedom   from  want’   than   ‘freedom   from   fear’   (Bajpai 2000; Krause 2007), but its amalgamation 
with  ‘humanitarian  intervention’  militarised  the concept and  in  a  sense  ‘re-securitised’  it.   
 
This   shift   is   clearly  discernible   in  Canada’s  human  security  policy.  When  Canada   first   incorporated  
human   security   into   its   foreign   policy   in  1995,   it   followed   the  UNDP’s   broad   freedom   from  want’  
approach   in   citing   ‘disease, environmental degradation, population growth and the widening gap 
between  rich  and  poor’  as  human  security  issues  (DFAIT 1995b). However, following its leadership of 
the   landmine   ban   and   its   enthusiastic   participation   in   NATO’s   ‘humanitarian   intervention’   in  
Yugoslavia (Leblanc 1999; Bashow et al. 2000; Martin and Fortmann 2001, p.70), it switched to a 
narrower,  ‘freedom  from  fear’  approach  (DFAIT 1999) that emphasised traditional security concerns 
like arms control and foregrounded military intervention (Bajpai 2000; Duffield 2007, pp.119–126; 
Kaldor 2007b, pp.182–4; Krause 2007, p.4; Hynek and Bosold 2008; Osler Hampson 2008, pp.230–2).  
 
This harder approach was   closer   to   the   emphasis   on   ‘new   security   threats’   in   the   Clinton  
Administration’s  National  Security  Strategies   (1995, 1996, 1997b) and cited the potential need for 
‘coercive   measures,   including   sanctions   and   military   force,   as   in   Bosnia   and   Kosovo’   as   the   first 
foreign policy implication of  a  human  security  ‘template’.  Reflecting  this,  Canadian  foreign  minister,  
Lloyd Axworthy, (1999) described the NATO   intervention   as   ‘a   defining  moment’   ‘from   a   human  
security  perspective’  and  this framing seems to have succeeded politically, given public approval was 
higher in Canada than several other NATO countries (BBC 1999; Martin and Fortmann 2001, p.71). 
Canada’s   2002   policy,   Freedom from Fear, confirmed   the   shift,   declaring   ‘military   action   — to 
address egregious threats to human security is an integral, if controversial, element of the human 
security  agenda’  (DFAIT 2002, p.5).  
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One   of   Axworthy’s   last   acts   as   Foreign  Minister   was   to   launch   the   International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2000), which rebranded humanitarian intervention as the 
‘Responsibility   to   Protect’   (R2P)   following   its rejection at the April 2000 South Summit (G77 and 
China 2000). Initially, even this more emollient version was rejected by developing countries 
concerned about its imperialist implications, especially in light of the Iraq War (Bellamy 2009, pp.68–
72), but following several years of discussions it was subordinated to UN Security Council approval 
(High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004; Annan 2005) and secured agreement at 
the 2005 World Summit (UN General Assembly 2005, para.138–139).  
 
International acceptance of the R2P marked the culmination of years of advocacy by a liberal 
interventionist coalition of mainly Western states and NGOs, UN agencies, US foundations and 
liberal academics, policymakers and politicians, many of whom have also been strong backers of 
‘humanitarian   arms   control’   including   the   landmine   ban.   As   Rieff   (2007, p.127) observes, 
humanitarian   and  human   rights  NGOs  have   been   ‘some  of   the  most   fervent   interventionists’   and  
their pleas for military protection to secure access to warzones have contributed significantly to the 
emergence of le  droit  d’ingèrence, ever since it was first popularised by MSF co-founder and future 
Governor of Kosovo and French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, in the 1980s (Seymour 2008, 
p.172).  
 
This also applies to many of the leading NGO actors in the landmines campaign, including  the ICBL 
Coordinator, Jody Williams  (2008, p.285), who headed a UN High-Level Mission to Darfur that called 
for stronger military intervention (Nobel  Women’s   Initiative   2007,   pp.25–7) and has criticised the 
version  of  R2P  agreed  at  the  2005  World  Summit  as  ‘watered  down’,  suggesting that like HRW she 
supports unilateral Western military interventions without UN Security Council approval. Likewise, 
Oxfam, which has been prominent in the UK landmines and cluster munitions campaigns and the 
Control Arms Campaign behind the Arms Trade Treaty, led an influential project to drum up civil 
society support for the R2P after the Iraq War (Bellamy 2009, pp.71–72) and has joined with HRW, 
other  NGOs  and  ‘leading  figures  in  government  and  academia’  in  co-founding the Global Centre for 
the Responsibility to Protect  (2010).  
 
Norway   also   contributed   to   NATO’s   intervention   in   Yugoslavia   and   has   emerged   as   a   strong   R2P  
supporter. Former Labour Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland served on the UN High-level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004, pp.199–203) that first integrated R2P into UN discourse, 
and Norway is a major donor to the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Syed 2008) as 
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well as a member of   the   ‘Friends   of   the   R2P’   group   at   the  UN   (Syed 2008). This was chaired by 
Canada until 2010, when this role was taken over by the Netherlands (Netherlands Advisory Council 
On International Affairs 2010, p.58) – another member of the Ottawa Process Core Group and 
participant in the Kosovo intervention that like Norway and Canada is one of those middle powers 
widely   regarded   by   liberal   theorists   as   a   ‘good   international   citizen’   or   ‘Global Good   Samaritan’  
(Brysk 2009).  
 
Against   this  backdrop  of  elite   support   for   ‘humanitarian   intervention’/R2P  and  humanitarian  arms  
control, the   landmine   ban   has   become   integral   to   a   liberal   interventionist      ‘freedom   from   fear’-
oriented human security discourse (Axworthy 1998a; Krause 2007; Osler Hampson 2008; Martin and 
Owen 2010), which Western NGOs, liberal/social democratic politicians, particularly in Western 
middle power states, and liberal academics and other international elites have played a key role in 
promoting.   This   emphasises   ‘hard’   ‘law   and   order’   approaches   over   the   original   development  
framing of human security and usually includes military intervention/R2P as a key component. Jody 
Williams’   situation   of   humanitarian   intervention   as   ‘an important element of a fully functioning 
human   security   paradigm’,   alongside   banning   APMs   and   cluster   munitions   (2008, pp.288–290) 
exemplifies this approach.  
 
A   significant   side   effect   of   the   militarisation   of   ‘human   security’   this has involved has been 
heightened scrutiny of the means of Western military interventions against their professed 
humanitarian objectives (Borrie 2009, pp.330–1). Consequently, the increasing justification of 
Western military interventions on humanitarian grounds has made the ability to portray military and 
humanitarian goals as compatible more important politically. This has reinvigorated the hegemonic 
relationship between consent and force at the core of IHL, seen from a critical Gramscian 
perspective primarily as a means of legitimising and facilitating, rather than limiting, the use of force. 
Partly as a result, the incongruity between cluster bombing civilians and the humanitarian motives 
cited  for  NATO’s   intervention   in  Kosovo  and  later  the  US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
attracted widespread media coverage31. This returned cluster munitions to the international agenda 
in a manner amenable to humanitarian/human rights NGO campaigning that was difficult for 
Western governments simply to dismiss. This was reinforced by the generally increased government 
support for involving these kinds of NGO in foreign policy processes in tandem with their role in 
outsourced service provision. Support both for human security narratives and NGO involvement was 
                                                     
31 Based on analysis  of  articles  mentioning  “cluster  bombs”  in  major  world  publications  in the LexisNexis 
database over eight month periods, beginning the month before the interventions in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  
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particularly common among the Western liberal/social democratic governments of the late 1990s 
that subscribed to similar brands of ‘Third  Way’  or  ‘“social”  neoliberalism  (Cerny 2008) and favoured 
similar hegemonic discourses of humanitarianism, human rights and democracy promotion (US 
1995, 1996, 1997b, 1999) to legitimise the West’s  use  of  force  (Anderson 2002).  
 
Like   the  US  Democrats   and   the   Canadian   Liberals,   New   Labour   in   the  UK  with   its   ‘ethical   foreign  
policy’  was  much  closer to NGOs than its conservative predecessors and began formally including 
NGO staff in foreign policy deliberations on development, humanitarianism and human rights issues, 
massively increased NGO funding, including for advocacy and communications to propagate shared 
discourses, and established a new ministry for the Third Sector (Wheeler and Dunne 2004, p.17; Boin 
et al. 2009, p.5; Jones 2009). This gelled with broader Post-Washington Consensus hegemonic 
discourses around ‘partnership’  and  the  democratising  role  of  civil  society  in  global  governance,  and  
as in other Western countries a select group of large, trusted and ideologically compatible NGOs 
emerged  as  the  preferred  ‘partners’  of  governments   (Wallace 2003a, pp.5–6; 15; Boin et al. 2009, 
p.4; 8–9).  
 
It was against this evolving and intertwined hegemonic backdrop of humanitarian legitimisation of 
force and outsourcing to NGOs that cluster munitions re-emerged as an international issue in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s.  This  was  initially  driven  by  NATO’s  use  of  cluster  munitions  in  Yugoslavia, 
and led to a debate in the ICBL on extending the campaign and the APLC to cluster munitions (ICBL 
Ethics and Justice Working Group 2000; Wiebe 2000, p.158, 2003, pp.106–8; MAC 2001). This 
approach was favoured by many of the more radical ICBL NGOs and some national campaigns in the 
South, who also wanted to take a more political approach to the landmines problem, whereas 
several  NGOs  on  the  ICBL’s  expanded  and  renamed Coordinating Committee (ICBL 1998b) wanted to 
focus on implementing and monitoring the landmines treaty and getting more governments to 
adopt it. At the First Review Conference of CCW Amended Protocol II in December 1999, HRW 
suggested addressing cluster munitions in the CCW (HRW 1999d) – rather than under the landmine 
treaty. This position partly reflected a diplomatic backlash from the US and the Non-Aligned 
Movement after the landmine ban (Cave 2006, pp.66–7), and even many of the states that 
supported the landmines ban were determined to keep cluster munitions in the CCW. Wiebe (2003, 
p.102) identifies ‘a  palpable  fear’  of  a  repeat  of  the  Ottawa  Process  and  moving the negotiations on 
cluster munitions to the CCW functioned as a stalling device, which delayed ban negotiations until 
after the Third CCW Review Conference in November 2006. This allowed for a further seven years of 
cluster munitions use and continued technological development of more advanced models.  
198 
 
  
The successful delimitation of discussions on cluster munitions in the CCW from 1999-2003 to post-
conflict remedial measures applicable to all forms of unexploded ordnance, or Explosive Remnants 
of War (ERW) indicated states had learned how to better pre-empt NGO campaigning (McGrath 
2004b, pp.9–11; Cave 2006, pp.64–65). These produced a fifth CCW protocol in November 2003 that 
excluded any specific binding measures on cluster munitions as well as user responsibility for past 
ERW. Contrary to the apparent linguistic  similarity  to  the  ‘Material  Remnants  of  War’  resolutions  of  
the 1970s and 1980s, user responsibility was sidelined from the outset, despite the efforts of the 
ICRC (Maslen 2001b; HI 2003, p.24) and the UK branch of the ICBL, now known as Landmine Action, 
which made legally binding user responsibility for clearance its main focus during the talks 
(Landmine Action 2001a, p.5, 2001b, p.2, 2001c, p.5, 2002, p.8, 2003a, 2003b).  
 
The Impact of the ‘War on Terror’ 
The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 precipitated a shift in US foreign policy, towards a 
hegemonic strategy more openly based on hard military power and legitimised by a revitalised 
‘national  security’  discourse  that  incorporated  aspects  of  human  security  and  military-humanitarian 
discourse. As Perry Anderson (2002, p.13) has  argued,   ‘These  are  not   incompatible  motifs’  but  the  
order of emphasis has shifted. At the time, the governments of states that had supported the 
landmine ban had shifted towards more conservative administrations in Europe, including in Norway 
(2001-2005); Austria (1999-2006); the Netherlands (2002-); Italy (2001-6); Denmark (2001-); and 
France (2002-).   In   the  US,  Bush’s  presidency  had   replaced   the  Democrats   and  drastically   curtailed  
the influence of liberal NGOs like HRW. In these circumstances the US was determined to protect 
cluster munitions and its main focus once the Oslo Process began was on preventing any future 
treaty from constraining its freedom to use cluster munitions in joint military operations.  
 
President   Bush’s   declaration   of   ‘War  on   Terror’   and  Manichean   ‘with   us  or   against   us’   ultimatum  
(Bush 2001a) also placed huge pressure on US allies to demonstrate their loyalty by contributing to 
the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and discouraged actions that might be seen as 
contradicting US policy. US emphasis on counter-terrorism thus filled the international policy space, 
forcing  middle  powers  like  Canada  and  Norway  ‘back  into  their  corners’  (Henrikson 2005, p.74). Even 
before then, there had been a backlash   in   Canadian   foreign   policy   circles   against   Axworthy’s  
handling of the Ottawa Process, with complaints he had over-emphasised soft power and damaged 
relations with the US, not only on landmines but by supporting the International Criminal Court and 
a ban on child soldiers (Hampson and Oliver 1998; Nossal 1998; Wallace 1998; Bernard Jr. 2006). His 
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replacement, John Manley, was on the centre-right of the Liberal Party (Coyne 2008) and on taking 
office in October 2000 set the tone by announcing he would prioritise improving the US relationship, 
which  he  described  as  Canada’s  “bread  and  butter”  (quoted in Sallot 2000). This foreign policy shift 
continued under the next two Liberal Foreign Ministers and accelerated in an even more realist 
direction after the Progressive Conservatives won the 2006 elections. 
 
Support for military intervention in Afghanistan initially had majority public support in Canada32, 
Norway, the US, UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands (Gallup 2001, p.2001; ICM Research 
2001; Newport 2001),  which all participated in the intervention and declared their support for the 
‘War  on  Terror’.  Factors  included  sympathy  for  the  US  after  9/11,  rapid  UN  and  NATO  authorisation  
on the basis of a claimed right to self-defence, and justification of the invasion in terms of 
humanitarianism  and  human  and  women’s  rights,  as  well  as  counterterrorism  (Bush 2001a, 2001b; 
US State Department 2001).  This  indicates  how  the  ‘military  humanism’  of  the  1990s  was  not  simply  
superseded by national security narratives, but   rather   was   incorporated   into   ‘War   on   Terror’  
discourse as a useful ancillary consensual-hegemonic narrative.  
 
In Norway, military involvement was supported by both the Conservative-led coalition that had 
come to power the previous month33 and Labour (Aftenposten 2001a; 2001, 2002; Tisdall 2001), 
now in opposition. US cluster munitions use proved significantly more controversial, however, given 
the   humanitarian/human   rights   justification   of   the   intervention   and   Norway’s   official   pro-ban 
position. NPA protested both the bombing and US cluster munitions use (Bjøreng 2001; Kjell 2001; 
McNamara 2001) and there was pressure within the ruling coalition from the smaller Christian 
Democratic Party for Norway to raise its opposition to cluster munitions with the US (Aftenposten 
2001b, 2001c). As demonstrated by a newspaper headline – ‘Yes  to  the  bombing,  but  no  to cluster 
bombs’  (Bonde 2001) – the  government’s  formal  opposition  to  cluster  munitions  and  decision  not  to  
use them in supporting the US-led attack (Aftenposten 2001b; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2002) helped  defuse  opposition  to  Norway’s  participation.  A  similar  consensual-hegemonic function 
was served by the Conservative Foreign  Minister’s  emphasis  on  humanitarian  and  development  aid  
to  Afghanistan,  whilst  assuring   the  US  of   ‘unconditional Norwegian support for the war on terror’  
                                                     
32 Canada sent the third largest contingent in its largest combat deployment since the Korean War (Parsons 
2001). Support was stronger in Canada, where 74% supported the intervention five weeks into the bombing 
compared to only 58% support for Norwegian participation before the attacks even started (Gallup 2001, 
p.2001; Washington Post 2001). 
33 The Conservatives were the largest party in the coalition with 38 seats and held the foreign ministry 
portfolio. Prime Minister Bondevik was a member of the smaller coalition party, the Christian Democratic Party 
(22 seats), while the Liberal party was the smallest coalition partner with only two seats.  
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(Morten 2001). Similar dynamics played out in the UK, where the three major parties supported the 
war (Scotto et al. 2010, p.4).  
 
NGOs active on cluster munitions responded in different ways. Landmine Action and its main funder, 
the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund (Diana Fund), urged the British government to lobby the 
US to stop using cluster munitions in Afghanistan and take responsibility for clearance (Landmine 
Action 2001c, p.2). By contrast, HI issued a statement in French that accused the US of aggravating 
the problem of unexploded ordnance and described cluster munitions as having the same effect as 
mines (HI 2001b, 2001c), but did not make any specific demands, while HRW (2001b, p.1; 7–8) 
reiterated an earlier call for a global moratorium, technical improvements and a ban on use in 
populated areas, but stressed cluster munitions were different from mines because they were not 
‘designed’  to  be  victim-activated. It also made no reference to user responsibility for clearance.  
 
These  differences   in  emphasis  were   reflected   in   the   ICBL’s   lack  of   a  position  on   cluster  munitions 
during the invasion, when it focused on lobbying NATO not to use APMs and did not raise the cluster 
munitions issue (ICBL 2001a). It eventually issued a statement backing a moratorium on cluster 
munitions at the CCW Second Review Conference in December 2001 (ICBL 2001b), after more 
protracted internal debate (Wiebe 2003, pp.102–106), but still declined to campaign on the issue. 
This essentially remained its position until after Norway instigated the Oslo Process, as it only added 
cluster munitions to its mandate in December 2006 (Borrie 2009, p.144).  
 
In contrast to the broad initial consensus to attack Afghanistan, after eighteen months of militarism 
and unilateralist rhetoric, the US invasion of Iraq provoked the deepest schism in the transatlantic 
elite  consensus  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War.  ‘Disarming’  Iraq  of  WMD  and  counter-terrorism were 
the main justifications cited, but Bush and Blair also appropriated the consensual-hegemonic 
discourses of human security and military-humanitarianism to legitimise their use of force (Bush 
2002a, 2002b; US 2002; Blair 2003, 2004).  Bush  thus  declaimed  that  the  US  ‘must  stand  up for our 
security  and  for  the  demands  of  human  dignity’  by  attacking  Iraq   (Bush 2002b), while Blair framed 
the  invasion  as  a  continuation  of  New  Labour’s  ethical  foreign  policy  (Wheeler and Dunne 2004) and 
even  inferred  that  the  war,  by   ‘Ridding     the    world     of     Saddam    would     be    an     act     of     humanity’  
(Blair 2003).  
 
This invocation of humanitarian and human rights motives was lamented by liberal interventionists 
as undermining the wider plausibility of humanitarian intervention embodied in the R2P (Weiss 
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2006, pp.749–750; Bellamy 2009, pp.68–69), which fuelled opposition to the war amongst certain 
liberal elites.  Opposition was much broader than that of course, extending to a huge global anti-war 
movement and even to Russia, China, France and Germany (BBC 2003), which to varying degrees 
attempted to assert themselves vis-à-vis the US. This placed Western middle and small powers like 
the Netherlands, Canada, Norway and Ireland in an awkward position. On the one hand, 
international opposition was mirrored in strong anti-war sentiment at home (Everts and Isernia 
2005), with millions of people participating in the largest coordinated anti-war demonstrations in 
history (Leupp 2003). On the other, the Bush administration was keen to harness the perceived 
legitimacy   of   such   ‘good   international   citizens’.   This   rationale   is   illustrated   by   leaked  US   embassy  
cables, which note that ‘Despite   its  small  size,  when  Norway  participates in security actions, other 
countries  are  encouraged  to  join  in,  and  find  it  helpful’  and  cite  its  importance  as  ‘a  “swing  country”  
in  defense  issues’  (US Embassy Oslo 2007a).  
 
Responding to these conflicting pressures, the conservative-led coalition in the Netherlands overtly 
supported  the  US’  ‘Coalition  of  the  Willing’ (White House 2003), despite strong public opposition34, 
and although it did not actually send troops until 2006 (Hummel 2007, pp.26–28), it was rewarded 
with the appointment of its then Foreign Minister, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, as NATO Secretary-
General the following September (Crouch 2003). Norway, Canada and Ireland responded by playing 
a double game; publicly opposing the war but materially assisting it.  
 
Faced with the largest protests in Oslo since 1917 (Sandven 2003), the centre-right coalition in 
Norway refused to participate in the invasion on the basis it lacked a UN mandate – as did the 
Liberal government in Canada (Narum 2003a; Gollom 2008). This was popular domestically, with 
opinion polls showing 78% of Norwegians and 71% of Canadians approved this stance (Harper 2003; 
Narum 2003b).  At  the  same  time,  both  governments  quietly  supported  the  US  war  effort.  Canada’s  
contribution of three ships and a hundred officers via exchange programmes with the US and UK 
amounted to the fourth largest contingent in the invasion and its most senior military officer, and 
later its chief of defence, personally participated in planning the invasion and led ten brigades of 
over 35,000 soldiers (Gollom 2008).  
 
Likewise, Norway supplied the US with satellite intelligence via its radar facility in the far north 
(Aftenposten 2005; United Press International 2005) and also rented ‘Artillery   Hunting   Radar’   to  
                                                     
34 Public opinion was consistently against the war, although less strongly than in France and Germany (Everts 
and Isernia 2005).  
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British forces during the invasion (Johansen 2006). Moreover, both the conservative coalition 
government and the opposition Labour party supported sending troops to Iraq in July 2003 
(Aftenposten 2003a) immediately after the so-called  ‘combat  phase’  of  the  war   (Narum 2003a). At 
the time, the Labour leader and future Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, cited clearing mines and 
cluster  munitions  as  justification  for  Norway’s  presence (Aftenposten 2003a), while the government 
similarly claimed the troops had a humanitarian purpose (Rudberg Elstad 2003). This did not 
convince   a   large   section   of   the   public,   whose   opposition   to   Norway’s   presence   in   Iraq,   with   or  
without a UN mandate,  was  a  major  factor  in  the  Socialist  Left’s  first  ever  entry  into  government  in  
September 2005, in coalition with Labour (Berglund 2001; Aftenposten 2003b, 2003c; Narum 2003c) 
– which    precipitated  Norway’s  leadership  of  the  Oslo  Process on cluster munitions. Ireland played a 
similar double game, publicly opposing the war (Hummel 2007, pp.22–23), but allowing hundreds of 
thousands of US troops to use Shannon airport as a pit stop en route to Iraq (US Embassy Dublin 
2006).  
 
This facilitation of the US and UK in using the largest quantity of cluster munitions since the Gulf War 
by these ICBL partner governments might have been expected to damage relations with NGOs. On 
the contrary, cooperation with Ireland, Canada and the Netherlands was instrumental in founding 
the CMC, suggesting it served a diversionary or at least a mitigatory function for the states 
concerned. In April 2003, as US planes passed through Shannon on their way to cluster bomb Iraq, 
the Irish government co-hosted an international conference on ERW with Pax Christi in Dublin (Cave 
2006, p.58; HRW and Landmine Action 2009), on the sidelines of which the CMC was founded, while 
the Netherlands was the main funder of the CMC launch in November 2003 and Canada sponsored 
NGO attendance at it (Pax Christi Netherlands 2004, p.3). Scheffer, the outgoing Dutch Foreign 
Minister and already the Secretary-General-elect of NATO, was also invited to give the opening 
address, again allowing NATO states to pose as part of the solution to a problem they had helped to 
create.  
 
Scheffer reiterated that the Netherlands would not support user responsibility for clearance, or a 
moratorium  on  cluster  munitions,  on  the  grounds  that  ‘even  a  provision  on  technical  specifications  is  
too far-reaching  in  the  eyes  of  some  other  countries  at  this  point’  (quoted in Pax Christi Netherlands 
2004, pp.35–38).  In  light  of  this,  the  Netherlands’  intention  in  funding  the  CMC  seems  to  have  been  
to promote Protocol V, the negotiation of which was being presided over by Dutch diplomats and 
resulted in only very weak provisions on cluster munitions. However, as soon as NGOs actually began 
campaigning   specifically   on   cluster  munitions,   Dutch   ‘leadership’   evaporated   and   during   the   Oslo  
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Process,  its  main  concern  was  ‘interoperability’  in  NATO,  or  its  ability  to participate in joint military 
operations where the US was using cluster munitions. Consequently, the Netherlands participated in 
a group of fifteen to twenty mainly Western states closely militarily allied with the US, whose 
conflicting military, economic and political interests in relation to cluster munitions prompted them 
to participate in the Oslo Process with the aim of watering it down in various ways and, ideally, 
diverting negotiations back into the CCW  (CMC 2007b, 2007c; US Embassy Canberra 2007, 2008a, 
2008b;  Harrison  2008a;  O’Dwyer  2008a;  US  Embassy  Bern  2008;  Borrie  2009;  Rappert   et al. 2011, 
pp.309–310). Diplomatically referred  to  as  the  ‘like-minded’  (France et al. 2008; Borrie 2009; Mayne 
2010, p.3; 8),  these  states  are  referred  to  here  as    ‘Minimisers’.  The  most  prominent  were  the  UK,  
France, Australia, Germany, Japan and Canada (US Embassy Canberra 2007; US Embassy Tokyo 
2007a, 2007b; CMC 2008b, 2008c, 2008d; Borrie 2009, p.173).   
 
The Cluster Munitions Coalition 
Conferences on ERW in April 2003 in Dublin, sponsored by the Irish Government, and in November 
2003 in the Hague, sponsored by the Dutch government, marked the birth of the CMC as a separate 
campaign to the ICBL. After the Dublin conference, ten NGOs formed an Interim Steering 
Committee, including: HRW, Landmine Action, HI and MAC; three small Western NGOs, namely the 
Mennonite Central Committee, Pax Christi and Austrian Aid For Mine Victims/CMC-Austria; and 
three or four non-Western NGOs, including Protection, an Egyptian mine action NGO; International 
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) Russia; and the Nepalese landmine campaign 
(CMC 2003a; Wiebe and Peachey 2009, p.21 n56). Following the early addition of DanChurchAid, a 
large international development NGO in late 2003/early 2004 (CMC 2004a; DanChurchAid 2004a, 
p.62), the core of the Steering Committee remained largely intact until the treaty was agreed in May 
2008. The most significant changes were the addition of NPA in 2006 (CMC 2006a), the ICBL in 
February 2007 (ICBL 2008, p.21), followed by the Landmine Survivors Network (LSN 2008, p.5), 
Austcare (2008, p.12), and Action Aid Australia, towards the end of the Oslo Process in late 
2007/early 2008 (ANZCMC 2008a, p.93; 101; CMC 2008e, 2009a, pp.13–14)35. Four lead NGOs can 
be identified: Landmine Action, HRW and HI, which played this role from the establishment of the 
campaign in 2003 and, NPA, which played a leading role from 2006 (CMC 2006b), when the new 
Labour-Socialist Left-Centre  Party  coalition  declared  Norway’s  support.   
                                                     
35 Various small NGOs also joined and left, including the Lebanon Resource Centre, which joined after Israel 
used cluster munitions in the 2006 Lebanon War. By that stage, the Nepal campaign was no longer on the 
Committee (CMC 2006a) and Austrian Aid for Mine Victims also left shortly afterwards (CMC 2006a). The only 
other change prior to May 2008 was the official recognition of IPPNW Zambia as a Steering Committee 
member alongside IPPNW Russia (CMC 2008f). 
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Landmine Action was a network organisation of around fifty British NGOs that developed out of the 
UK branch of the ICBL (Landmine Action 2003c, 2005, 2010). Initially a loose member network, it 
incorporated as a separate non-profit corporation in December 1999 and established its own office, 
operations, budget and staff. It had coordinated NGO involvement in the CCW and Protocol V 
negotiations (Frerks 2009, p.17), but was initially unable to coordinate the CMC due a temporary 
financial crisis caused by legal action against the Diana Fund (Landmine Action 2003d; Vasagar and 
Hollingsworth 2003). It subsequently hosted the CMC headquarters and bank account from 2005 
and employed the CMC Coordinator, Thomas Nash (Landmine Action 2006a, p.3; Nash 2012, p.126) 
and also published more reports on cluster munitions than any other NGO  (McGrath 2000b; Moyes 
and Nash 2005; Rappert 2005, 2006, 2008; Nash 2006a; Moyes 2007; Crowther 2008; Maslen and 
Wiebe 2008). In addition, it had good lobbying access to the UK government (Wiebe 2003, p.106), 
whose support as the only one of the top four largest historical users to participate in the Oslo 
Process was seen as particularly important (CMC 2007d). Landmine Action was ultimately one of the 
most influential NGOs, but it did not call for a ban until February 2006, after Belgium had introduced 
the first national ban (Conway 2006a; Nash 2006b, p.37).  
 
HRW had accumulated extensive issue-related expertise and international political connections 
during the landmines campaign and was the second largest source of campaign research (HRW 
2003b, 2003c, 2005a, 2007a; Docherty et al. 2008). It played a particularly key role at the CCW and in 
the Oslo Process, where Steve Goose was again one of the leaders of the NGO delegation, along with 
Simon Conway of Landmine Action and Grethe Østern of NPA, who were also appointed CMC co-
Chairs in early 2007 (NPA 2007a; Borrie 2009, p.145). HRW was one of the most tactically and 
politically cautious NGOs on the CMC Steering Committee. Long after other lead NGOs were calling 
for  ban  and  significant  government  support  had  been  secured,   it   insisted  on  sticking  to  the  CMC’s  
opening strategy of calling for a moratorium and restrictions (Nash 2006b, p.37; Borrie 2009, p.147).  
 
HI had supported calls for a moratorium and user responsibility since late 2001 (MCC et al. 2001) 
and highlighted US cluster munitions use in Afghanistan (HI 2001b, 2001c). It advocated a much 
stronger ban position than HRW or Landmine Action and also placed more emphasis on victim 
assistance, which had been omitted as a binding obligation from the APLC. HI-Belgium launched a 
petition calling for a ban as early as March 2003 (Petrova 2007, p.9) and  although  HI’s  analysis  of  
other NGO positions subsequently led to a recommendation a call for moratoriums and restrictions 
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as more realistic (HI 2003, p.27), this position was never enthusiastically adopted and was jettisoned 
completely when the entire HI network formally adopted a ban position in February 2005.   
 
HI had expanded significantly since the landmines campaign, with activities in 60 countries, but HI-
France ran the head office of the HI network and remained by far the largest section (Aidwatch 
2003;  Mège  2005,  p.2;  Observatoire  de  l’action  humanitaire  2011). In France, it led one of the largest 
and  most  politically   important  national  campaigns,  given  France’s  perceived  status  as  a   ‘key’  state  
(CMC 2007d) that had used cluster munitions and was also a member of both NATO and the UN 
Security Council. HI-Belgium coordinated survivor involvement through the Ban Advocates Initiative 
(Mayne 2010) and again helped to bring about the first domestic ban law in February 2006 (HI 
2006a) while HI sections in Germany, the UK and Switzerland were also prominent in national 
campaigning.  
 
The fourth lead NGO, NPA, produced  some  of  the  CMC’s  most  influential  research  (King et al. 2007; 
NPA 2007b), including a report based on tests of the high-tech M-85 submunition (King et al. 2007), 
carried out in partnership with the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. This was facilitated by the fact 
that  NPA’s  Mine  Action  Unit,  which  is  ‘the  world's  largest  humanitarian  mine  clearance  organisation’  
(NPA 1997), was substantially staffed by former Norwegian military officers. This section of the 
organisation has provided an increasingly large share of its overall revenue (Neumann 2002, pp.112–
113; NPA 2012, p.25) and frequently clashed with the more left-wing development section (Norad 
2007, pp.19–21; 31).  
 
As   the  Norwegian   ‘labour  movement’s   humanitarian   organisation   for   solidarity’   (NPA 2006a, p.2), 
NPA has historically occupied the radical end of the international development NGO spectrum, but 
has also had a symbiotic relationship with the Labour Party (Aidwatch 2009a), Norway’s  governing  
party for most of the period since the Second World War. However,   NPA’s   largest   donor   after  
Norway is the US, so it is also directly involved in implementing US foreign policy. This duality mirrors 
Norway’s   supportively critical stance towards US foreign policy (Aidwatch 2009a) and these 
conflicting  dynamics   as  well   as   the   tensions  between  NPA’s   solidaristic   and  humanitarian  motives  
are also illustrated   by   NPA’s   policy   towards   Iraq.   On   the   one   hand,   it   was   prominent   in   the  
Norwegian anti-war movement prior to the invasion (Leer-Salvesen 2002; Christensen 2003; 
Universitas 2003), but left it soon afterwards to begin clearing unexploded ordnance in Baghdad, 
where   its  arrival   in   July  2003  coincided  with  Norwegian  troops’   (Aidwatch 2009b; NPA 2011). NPA 
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received substantial US funding for this work and later argued against rapid troop withdrawal on 
human security grounds (Bjoreng in Hammer 2004).  
 
NPA had argued at the CMC launch meeting that it should campaign for a total ban on all cluster 
munitions (Pax Christi Netherlands 2004, p.30), but it moderated this position in early 2006 to 
exclude  ‘the most advanced new cluster munitions in order to win the support of the MOD [Ministry 
of   Defence]’   (Petrova 2007, p.27) and so began calling for ‘a   ban   on   all   cluster   munitions   with  
submunitions which are not individually guided/target seeking and which do not have empirically 
proven and reliable self-destruction  mechanisms’  (NPA 2006b). The justification cited was that such 
weapons would not have the same humanitarian effects (Nash 2006b, p.37; 2007a, 2007c, p.3; 11; 
Borrie 2009, p.83; 146).  
 
These strategic differences between the four lead NGOs and the ten NGOs that founded the CMC 
shaped  the  content  of  the  CMC’s  opening  ‘Call’,  agreed  in  June  2003  (HI 2003, p.26). Its main points 
were:   
 No use, production or trade of cluster munitions until their humanitarian problems have 
been resolved; 
 Increased resources for clearing cluster munitions and other unexploded ordnance, and 
assisting victims; 
 Users of cluster munitions and other munitions that become an ERW problem to accept 
special responsibility for clearance and victim assistance (CMC 2003a).  
 
These   demands   resembled   the   ICBL’s   opening   Call, with some important differences: victim 
assistance was included from the outset, whereas producer responsibility was omitted, and in 
contrast   to   the   ICBL’s   singular   focus   on   APMs,   there   was   reference   to   other   forms   of   exploded  
ordnance. ERW and legal user responsibility  had  been  Landmine  Action’s  main  demand  during  the  
Protocol V negotiations, but had not been a priority for HRW (HI 2003, p.23; 26–27), which resulted 
in the  compromise of a familiarly vague demand for some form of user responsibility, without 
specifying it should be legally binding.  
 
The   most   important   difference   from   the   launch   of   the   landmines   campaign   was   that   the   CMC’s  
primary demand was for a  moratorium  until  cluster  munitions’  humanitarian  problems  ‘have  been  
resolved’,   rather   than  a  ban.   This  wording  was  derived   from  HRW’s  1999  moratorium  call   (Goose 
2008c, p.223 n14) and similarly implied regulations on use, technical improvements and limited bans 
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of certain kinds of cluster munitions might suffice – which was the approach initially taken by the 
CMC (2004b) in the CCW. This reflected a lowest common denominator compromise between 
founder NGOs like the Mennonites and HI-Belgium that had already called for a ban, and those, such 
as HRW, Landmine Action and MAC, which insisted the CMC adopt a more cautious moratorium 
position (Borrie 2009, p.54).   The   same   caution   was   evident   in   the   name,   ‘Cluster   Munitions  
Coalition’,  which  unlike  the  ICBL  did  not  demand  a  ban  or  even  call itself a campaign, and reflected 
how the CMC was in general more cautious in its approach. The CMC retained this rather timid 
opening call until the beginning of the Oslo Process in January 2007, when there was already 
significant state support for a ban. CMC leaders, Nash and Moyes (2011a, p.20) of Landmine Action, 
allude  to  the  constraints  this  imposed,  remarking  that  a  ‘call  can  be  used  to  constrain  or  discourage  
approaches that fall outside of this formulation – setting boundaries to the   coalition’s   remit’.   By  
contrast, Goose apparently regarded the ambiguity of the Call, which included retaining ERW as a 
campaign issue and the vagueness of the moratorium call, as keeping open government doors that 
might otherwise have closed (Borrie 2009, p.59n79). The next section discusses if this cautious 
approach as well as the ultimate decision to call for a ban can be related to the material basis of the 
campaign, specifically to the dependency of the main NGOs on government funds and their 
personnel connections with political elites. 
 
The Material Basis of the Cluster Munitions Coalition 
Funding 
In addition to the greater availability of funding data relative to the landmines campaign, the book 
on global civil society coalitions by Moyes and Nash, and the chapter by Nash (2012) in the 2012 
Global Civil Society yearbook provides useful insights into the process and mentality behind financing 
the  CMC.  Moyes  and  Nash  state  as  read  that   ‘Funding   for  NGO  coalition  work  has  generally  come  
from…Trusts  and  foundations…Individual  NGOs…and  Governments’  (2011a, p.37), rather than public 
fundraising or individual member contributions, and despite referring to funding from member 
NGOs, there is no suggestion NGO campaigns can be entirely or mainly self-financed. Moreover, they 
assume one of the first tasks of any NGO coalition will be to pitch itself to external donors (2011a, 
chap.4).  
 
Consequently,  despite  acknowledging  some  of   the   ‘constraints’   imposed  by  the   inevitable  external  
dependency this produces (2011a, p.39), external dependency per se is taken for granted: 
The focus of the coalition will have a major impact on whether funding can be found or not. 
In part this will reflect how easy the issue is to communicate and sell and how realistic the 
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chance of success is considered to be. However, funding can also be limited if the issue 
under scrutiny is one around which donors have political sensitivities (2011a, p.37). 
This suggests, rather unsurprisingly, that campaigns with limited, problem-solving goals compatible 
with hegemonic governance discourses and which are not regarded as politically controversial will 
attract  more   funding.   These   constraints   shape   the   campaign   as   ‘a   first   funding   proposal   is   also   a  
chance  to  develop  how  the  coalition  represents  itself’  (Moyes and Nash 2011b, p.36).  
 
However, Moyes and Nash address donor dependency primarily as an image problem, as if a 
campaign   is   seen   as   too   dependent   on   a   single   state   donor,   it   ‘can   have   an   impact   on   how   the  
coalition   will   be   perceived’   and   may   limit   its   authority   if   ‘it   is   seen   as   a   mouthpiece   for   certain  
states’.  They  argue  that  the  solution  is  to  spread  dependency  among  ‘multiple  donors’,  which  holds  
out  the  additional  bonus  of  creating  ‘a  positive  indication  of  buy-in  to  the  coalition’s  agenda’  (Moyes 
and Nash 2011b, p.37). This section now examines the central CMC budget, which for most of the 
campaign was based at Landmine Action, followed by the funding base of the other lead NGOs, and 
finally the ICBL, which became a significant funding conduit after it finally added cluster munitions to 
its mandate in December 2006.   
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland had all been ICBL supporters and also 
contributed significantly to the CMC, creating an earlier dependency on government funding. In 
addition, the campaign received significant funds from foundations, particularly the Diana Fund and 
the MacArthur Foundation. In the early years, funding was very tight, but the situation improved 
after a long-running legal action against the Diana Fund was resolved in late 2004 (BBC 2004; Wood 
2004),  which  enabled  the  Landmine  Action  to  host  the  CMC  headquarters.  Later  on,  the  campaign’s  
financial situation was completely transformed once Norway began to take the lead on achieving a 
ban and began cooperating with NGOs from early 2006 (CMC 2006c),  announcing   its   intention   ‘to  
work  closely  with  interested  states,  humanitarian  organisations  and  other  relevant  actors’   (Norway 
2006a) 
Funding for the CMC head office/Landmine Action 
In addition to being the  main  financial  supporter  of  Landmine  Action’s  cluster munitions work from 
2003-5, the Diana Fund had a track record of advocacy with Landmine Action on landmines and 
cluster munitions, including joint press releases and letters during the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq 
and  a   ‘Clear  Up!’  campaign   launched in February 2003 just before the invasion of Iraq (BBC 2001; 
Diana Fund 2001a, 2001b, 2003; Landmine Action 2001c, p.2; Purkis and Lloyd 2001; Landmine 
Action and Diana Fund 2003). This had called for a moratorium and aimed to pressure the UK to 
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clear cluster bombs it was about to drop, as well as influence the Protocol V negotiations (Borrie 
2009, p.55 n77). The Diana Fund was also involved in founding the CMC a month later and was a 
prominent member of the campaign in its own right (Anheier and Leat 2006, pp.65–67; Borrie 2009, 
p.51n63; DP Evaluation 2012), as well as providing Landmine Action and the CMC head office with 
£2.4m in funding from 2005 onwards (DP Evaluation 2012, p.2). The Diana fund has a public funding 
base, which distinguishes it from most other foundations, but its board has an elite composition and 
several of the trustees were still ‘relatives  or  close  friends  and  associates  of  the  princess’   (Anheier 
and Leat 2006, p.65). In addition, it has received   ‘generous’   contributions   from   Princess   Diana’s  
brother  ‘throughout  its  lifetime’  (The Diana Fund 2013).  
The  Diana  Fund  has  been  Landmine  Action’s  primary  benefactor  since  the  latter’s  inception36, having 
funded its establishment in 1999 (Diana Fund 2013a) and provided two-thirds of its income in its first 
year of operation (Landmine Action 2001d), including part-financing its initial cluster munitions 
research (McGrath 2000b, p.2). During the campaign proper, it provided 12-30% of its overall 
funding each year from 2005-8 and a significantly greater percentage of its cluster munitions 
expenditure. As mentioned above, Landmine Action would have coordinated the CMC from the 
beginning, were it not for the legal action against the Diana Fund that led it to freeze all grants from 
July 2003 to November 2004 (The Guardian 2003; Wood 2004). This led to MAC temporarily 
coordinating the campaign after the Second CMC International Meeting in March 2004 (2004, p.11; 
Borrie 2009, p.55). Like the ICBL head office, MAC had become significantly more government-
dependent once the treaty was agreed, with 69-83% of its annual income coming from governments 
from 1999-2004/537 and two-thirds to three-quarters from Canada, which supplied 71% of its overall 
budget in 2004/5 (MAC 2005, p.15) 
The only other significant donor funding during this period was for ERW research, (McGrath 2004b, 
p.2), which helps explain the inclusion of ERW in the CMC Call. Landmine Action had already been 
funded  by  the  British  government  and  other  ‘Landmine  Monitor  donors’  for  an  initial  global  survey  
on unexploded ordnance (Borrie 2003, pp.2–3), which John Borrie of UNIDIR had carried out on its 
behalf. In 2004-5, an additional £300,000 was obtained from the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Canada, Finland, New Zealand and the European Commission (Landmine Action et al. 2005; 
Landmine Action 2006a, p.4) for a follow-up report, carried out jointly with the Canadian and 
German campaigns. €100,000 of this came from the Dutch government (Frerks 2009, p.19). Both the 
                                                     
36 Based on Landmine Action Annual reports and Financial Statements 2000-8 and Diana Fund grant data.  
37 Based  on  MAC’s  annual  accounts  and  reports  and  Canada’s  Public  Accounts  1999-2004/5, available at 
http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/201/301/public_accounts_can/pdf/index.html (accessed 4/12/2013).  
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future CMC Coordinator, Thomas Nash, and future CMC Co-Chair, Richard Moyes, were initially 
employed on this project; Nash  as  MAC’s  ERW  Research  Coordinator  and  Moyes  as  the  lead  research  
coordinator at Landmine Action (MAC 2004, p.11; 5, 2005, p.5; Borrie 2009, p.55). The lack of 
funding   for   cluster  munitions  work   during   this   period   severely   hampered   the   CMC’s   impact,  with  
Borrie (2009, p.56) describing 2004-5  as  ‘wilderness  years  for  the  CMC’  due  to  ‘lack  of  government  
leadership and the lack of funding to  work  on  cluster  munitions’. Likewise, Petrova (2007, p.12) finds 
that  ‘CMC  had  hardly  made  any  difference  in  terms  of  campaigning  or  policy  impact’  prior  to  2006  
(although she does not link this to funding).  
 
This began to change somewhat following the settlement of the Diana Fund legal case, which 
included a £1.8m four-year  ‘broad  grant’  to  Landmine  Action,  beginning  in  March  2005.  This allowed 
it to resume coordinating duties and employ the CMC Coordinator (Moyes and Nash 2011a, p.16; DP 
Evaluation 2012, p.2; Diana Fund 2013b).   As   a   result,   around   a   fifth   of   Landmine  Action’s   overall  
budget in 2005 came from the Diana Fund, two-fifths from the EU, 15% from governments and 
around ten percent from other NGOs, amounting to an overall donor dependency of over 75% 
(Landmine Action 2006). During this period, Switzerland sponsored the CMC website (CMC 2005a, 
2005b), and UNICEF  the  CMC’s  Third  International  Meeting  in  Paris  in  October  2005  (CMC 2005c).  
 
Despite this financial improvement,   ‘the  CMC   remained  under-resourced’  until   2006   (Borrie 2009, 
p.123). Its central budget for 2005 was only £75,000 (Frerks 2009, p.19), but its fortunes and 
campaigning capacity were transformed once Norway began to take the lead in mid-2006 and began 
funnelling cash to the CMC to bolster its diplomatic efforts (Borrie 2009, p.123; 56; Nash 2012, 
p.138). This  transformed  Landmine  Action’s  funding  base,  so  that  Norway  went  from  providing  less  
than two percent of its total budget in 2005 (Landmine Action 2006a, p.8; 11), to roughly a quarter 
in  2006.  An  additional  30%  came  from  the  Diana  Fund,  but  only  2%  from  public  donations.  Norway’s  
support included a £413,000 grant for cluster munitions work, which by itself was more than five 
times the CMC budget for the previous year. According to the CMC Coordinator, most Norwegian 
support  was  for  core  funding  and  so  could  be  used  as  the  Coalition  wished  ‘within  a  broadly  agreed  
framework’   (Nash 2012, p.138). Landmine  Action’s  annual  accounts  show  that  all  CMC  head  office  
activities in 2006 – from international campaigning, to UK campaigning, advocacy, and parliamentary 
work, and policy and research – were funded by Norway and/or the Diana Fund, and that only policy 
and research received additional funding from other donors, namely Austria, New Zealand, Ireland, 
the Netherlands and Oxfam (Landmine Action 2007, pp.14–19; 31).  
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CMC funding sources in 2007 were similar, but at £1.44m in total, the amounts received were much 
larger (Figure 6.1), and contributed to an overall financial dependency of Landmine Action on 
Norway  of  42%.  The  breakdown   in  Landmine  Action’s  annual  accounts   (2008, p.32) shows 97% of 
cluster munitions funding came from just six donors: core states, Norway (59%), Austria (3%) and 
Ireland (3%); the Diana Fund (19%); the MacArthur Foundation (8%); and UNDP/UNOPS38 (4%), 
reflecting UNDP’s   role   as   the   CMC’s  main  UN   partner   (Moyes and Nash 2011a, p.80; Nash 2012, 
p.131). By contrast, total funding from NGOs and the general public was less than 3% – with 2% of 
this from Oxfam (Diana Fund 2008, p.15; 38; Landmine Action 2008).  
 
This cash injection enabled the CMC to hire another two full-time staff in 2007, on top of the 
coordinator and contractor employed in 2006, including a campaign officer and media specialist 
(Landmine Action 2007, p.18, 2008, p.9; 18; Nash 2012, p.135), which as Borrie (2009, pp.189–190) 
observes  ‘made    a    big    difference    to    what    the  CMC  and    its    members    could    do’.  Staff  numbers  
peaked at six or seven during the final negotiations (Frerks 2009, p.31; DP Evaluation 2012, p.2), 
when  donor   attention  was   also   at   its   height.   This   also   fuelled   the   CMC’s   international   expansion,  
particularly to non-Western countries, and helped finance its first Global Day of Action in November 
2007, Civil Society Forums at Oslo Process conferences, media work and disseminating campaign 
materials. As part of this, the Diana Fund gave Landmine Action £250,000 for a small grants scheme 
and some core support (Diana Fund 2013c), which supported sixty-eight local NGOs and survivors 
organisations, mainly  in non-Western countries where a little funding goes a long way (Stalker 2008, 
p.17; 6).  
 
The lower level of CMC head office funding in 2008 reflected the conclusion of the Oslo Process in 
May 2008, but followed a largely similar pattern of sources (CMC 2009a), with Norway again 
providing  over  a  quarter  of   Landmine  Action’s  overall budget. The only major difference was that 
Ireland contributed significantly more (17%) in a year when it hosted the final treaty negotiations 
(Figure 6.2). Norway (59%) and the Diana Fund (19%), which gave another £100,000 in small grants 
for campaigns in other countries (Diana Fund 2013c), remained the two largest donors, Hence, 
together with the MacArthur Foundation, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Belgium, these seven 
donors provided 99% of CMC head office income in 2008.  
 
                                                     
38 UN Office for Project Services. Although this is recorded in the accounts only as UNOPS funding, UNOPS is a 
UNDP implementing partner vis-à-vis cluster munitions (UNOPS n.d., p.2) and both UNOPS and UNDP are 
credited as funders in a subsequent Landmine Action report (Crowther 2008, p.2). 
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Figure 6.1 CMC Head Office Funding 2007 
Total  = £1.44m (US$2.86m) 
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Figure 6.2 CMC Funding 2008 
Total = £1.24m (US$1.8m) 
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Lead NGO Funding  
Also relevant to the economic base of the CMC are the general funding profiles of the other lead 
NGOs and the sources of their expenditure for cluster munitions work. HI had the largest cluster 
munitions budget of all the lead NGOs and was also the only one that raised significant income from 
the general public. NPA, like Landmine Action/CMC, was largely dependent on funding from Norway, 
while HRW was also largely dependent on donor funding, but had a different, private finance base. 
Figure 6.3 compares the overall budgets of the lead NGOs for 2003-8.  HI’s  and  NPA’s  are  much  larger  
than   Landmine   Action’s   and   HRW’s,   given   their   status   as   major   international  
humanitarian/development NGOs with large field programmes.  
 
 
 (Sources: NGO Annual Reports, tax returns and secondary sources (Observatoire   de   l’action   humanitaire  
2011). Comparisons are rough due to variations in exchange rates and tax years) 
Handicap International  
HI is an international federation with a complicated funding structure, whereby national sections pay 
into pooled funds for operational programmes, such as humanitarian projects and landmines/cluster 
munitions campaigning, but the French head office also subsidises most of the other sections (HI 
2007, p.20, 2008, p.26, 2009, p.27). The main exception was the Belgian branch, which financially 
separated from the French section in 1997 and was the only other section to also run its own 
operational programmes (Aidwatch 2003; Mège  2005,  p.2;  HI  2009,  p.27;  Observatoire  de   l’action  
humanitaire 2011). As discussed in Chapter 4, the two sections have quite different funding bases. 
Over two-thirds of HI-France income came from non-governmental sources, with approximately half 
from the general public39 (HI 2007, p.17, 2008, p.22, 2009, p.23), whereas HI-Belgium had an 
opposite government/IGO-dependency ratio of 61-88% (Observatoire  de  l’action  humanitaire  2011). 
                                                     
39 Corporate sponsorships, foundations, and donations from other NGOs accounted for around 5-6%.  
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HI-France remains much the largest branch, but the smaller sections have also grown significantly 
(Figure 6.4),  with government dependency ranging from 17-22% at the Swiss branch to 5-14% in 
Germany and fluctuating from 14-64% in the UK (Observatoire  de  l’action  humanitaire  2011).  
 
 
(Observatoire  de  l’action  humanitaire  2011) 
 
This   relatively   independent   funding   base   was   reflected   in   the   financing   of   HI’s   cluster  munitions  
work and its stronger ban position. Its accounts record a combined budget for landmines/cluster 
munitions campaigning of around $3.5m in 200540 (HI 2007, p.17), which appears to have been 
mainly dedicated to banning-g cluster munitions (HI 2006b, p.16), and increased expenditure of 
$2.4m on cluster munitions campaigning in 2006, out of an overall budget for landmines/cluster 
munitions campaigning of $6m (HI 2007, pp.22–23). Similar totals of $6-6.5m are shown for 2007 
and 2008 when the campaign was at its height (HI 2008, p.22; 28, 2009, p.23;28), indicating a 
significantly larger expenditure than the CMC head office. On top of this, HI also benefited from free 
campaign  advertising  worth  nearly  €2.3m  in  2004-5 (HI 2006b, p.16). 
 
This generous financial base enabled HI to play the largest role in national campaigning of all the 
lead NGOs. It set up its own campaign websites in eight Western countries41 and five different 
languages; published a regular campaign newsletter; led major national campaigns in France and 
Switzerland; and participated in national campaigning in the UK, Germany and Canada from early on  
(CMC 2005d). Towards the end of the campaign, its branches in Bosnia, Kenya and Thailand also 
joined the CMC (CMC 2009b). Most of the funds for this were independently sourced, given 84-98% 
                                                     
40 HI had a similar budget for landmines/cluster munitions campaigning in 2004 (HI 2006b, p.7), but did not 
launch a major coordinated campaign on cluster munitions until 2005.  
41 France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Germany, the UK, US and Canada ( see: 
http://www.clusterbombs.org/ for details) 
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of  HI’s  funding  for  ICBL/CMC  work  from  2006-8  came  from  ‘pooled  funds’  from  the  various  sections.  
2008 was the only year government funding made up a significant proportion – at 16% (HI 2009, 
p.28). Interestingly, despite this generous financial base, HI did not contribute to the CMC head 
office but reserved its funding for its own ban campaign. 
 
Norwegian  People’s  Aid  (NPA)  
NPA’s   overall   dependency   on   government/IGO   funding   averaged   81%   from   2005-8, but its 
dependency for international activities was even higher, at 90-95% in 2005-6 (NPA 2006a, p.23, 
2007c, p.12). 11-19%  of its overall income came from the State Department/USAID, which is mainly 
for   NPA’s   work   in   South   Sudan   (NPA 2006a, p.21). However, the   vast   majority   of   NPA’s   overall  
budget, at 49-71%, came from Norway. The same dependency is evident in the area of mine 
clearance, which accounts for  nearly  30%  of  NPA’s  overall   income   (NPA 2008, p.16) and has  also 
been largely financed by the Norwegian government (HRW and Africa Watch 1994, p.73; 81; VVAF 
1995, p.105; 147–8; 231; Landmine Monitor 1999d, 1999l, 1999q), with NPA receiving over half of 
Norway’s  mine  action  budget  every  year.  This   translated   to  around  $10m  a  year   from  1998-2001, 
$12.5-17.5m from 2002-2006, and a record $25m in 2007 (Norad 2009, p.15; 20), accounting for 
50%-70%  of  NPA’s  mine  action   funding   in  2006-7 (NPA 2008, p.16). Much of the rest comes from 
other large government donors, including the US, which has remained the largest donor to mine 
action globally (Landmine Monitor 2010, p.44).  NPA provides no information on how it funded its 
cluster munitions campaigning, aside from acknowledgements in its two major campaign 
publications (King et al. 2007, p.2; NPA 2007b, p.7), both of which were fully funded by Norway. A 
government report also shows that NPA received a grant of $1.28m for policy work on mines and 
cluster munitions in 2007 (Norad Evaluation Department 2009, p.19) , which must have accounted 
for a sizeable chunk of its budget.  
 
NPA’s  high  level  of  dependency  on  the  Norwegian  government  is  typical  of  Norwegian  development  
NGOs and both  NGOs  and  government  officials  defend  it  as  unproblematic.  NPA’s  Secretary-General 
from 2000-6, Eva Bjøreng, has denied  any  problems  with  NPA’s  role   in   the   ‘Norwegian  model’,  on  
the grounds government policy guidelines are reasonable and NPA has never had any objections to 
them. Similar attitudes exist on the government side, with one foreign ministry official asserting that 
“in  this  idealistic  endeavour,  ordinary  rules  of  independence  have  not  been  seen  to  apply”  because  
“we   are   all   in   the   same  boat”   (in Toje 2011, pp.10–11; 18). This indicates the close compatibility 
between   NPA’s   activities   and Norwegian foreign policy objectives and reflects its role as a civil 
society   component  of  Gramsci’s   integral   state.  While  not   specifically   arguing   from  this   theoretical  
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perspective, numerous Norwegian scholars have critiqued the relationship between NGOs and 
government   in   Norway   as   one   of   ‘corporatism’   and   ‘state   capture’   (cited in Petrova 2007; Tvedt 
2009; Toje 2013).  
 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
As HRW does not accept  government   funding,   its   ‘donor  community’  differed   from  the  other   lead  
NGOs and consisted of similar US foundations and capitalist elites as during the landmines campaign. 
It has somewhat geographically extended its funding base since the 1990s, with the share of US 
funding falling from 90% in 2002 to around 75% in 2009 and funding from Europe increasing by an 
equivalent amount. Of course, this means funding from the rest of the world has remained at less 
than one percent – despite   efforts   to   ‘diversify’   by   canvassing   elite   support   in   the   Middle   East  
(Gordon and Berkovitch 2006, p.5; HRW 2009b).   Besides   this,   an   increasing   proportion   of   HRW’s  
income appears to be coming from broad grants for general organisational support and financial and 
equity investments, the latter of which grew from 3% of its overall revenue in 1999/2000 (HRW 
2000b, p.1) to 11-20% from 2003-7 (HRW 2008d, p.10). This unrestricted funding base gives HRW a 
freedom of action less trusted, less elite, and less liberal NGOs would envy, but makes it more 
difficult to identify where funding for specific activities like cluster munitions comes from.  
By 2008, HRW had accumulated an endowment of $85m (HRW 2008d, p.10), based on a $7.2m 
endowment grant from the Ford Foundation (2001, p.36) and an accompanying fundraising drive 
that netted $35m from just ten foundations and wealthy individuals (HRW 1999e) and $10m from 
around forty others (CCS - Fund Raising, Development, Consultants 2010). In 2000/1 (the last year 
this   information  was  publicly  available),  69%  of  HRW’s   income  came   from   just   twelve  donors,   the  
smallest of which gave almost $400,00042 (HRW 2001a, p.1; 26). Combined with its investment 
income, this meant only around 10-20% of  HRW’s  revenue  came  from  donations  smaller  than  this.  
Many are far larger, with approximately 12% of its income from 2004-8 coming from donors of 
$3.8m or more (HRW 2009c, p.15), such as the MacArthur Foundation (2013), which donated $7.6m 
from 2002-8. The OSI has also remained a major funder, donating around $3.7m from 2002-843, 
including $2m in unrestricted general support, while the Diana Fund contributed £1.8m from 
2004/05-2008/9  for  ‘emergency  researchers  in  crisis  areas’  and  HIV/AIDS  work (Diana Fund 2013b). 
Acknowledgements  in  HRW’s  annual  reports indicate a substantial pool of wealthy supporters, with 
                                                     
42 This was not a one-off  as  in  1999/2000,  60%  of  HRW’s  income  came  from  sixteen large donors, with the 
smallest giving over $500,000 (HRW 2000b, p.1; 15–16) 
43 OSI Form 990 tax returns, 2002-8. 
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ninety-two donors of over $100,000 in 2008 alone (HRW 2008c, p.49). The nature of this funding 
base   is  perhaps  best   illustrated  by  HRW’s   largest   individual  donors   from  2003-8, Herb and Marion 
Sandler (Nocera 2008; HRW 2012b), who pledged the organisation $15m over five years in 2004, on 
top of $15m in donations in previous decades. The Sandlers were the CEOs of subprime mortgage 
lender, Golden West Financial (Cimilluca 2008; Foust 2008; Moss and Fabrikant 2008; Stempel 2008), 
and were subsequently included in Time magazine’s   list   of   ‘25   people   to   Blame   for   the   Financial  
Crisis’   (2009). This   illustrates  how  HRW’s   rapid   financial   growth (Figure 6.5) and temporary hiatus 
during the 2008 financial crisis mirrored the fortunes of the financial markets and the fractions of 
the capitalist class and associated elite intellectuals whose interests it represents.   
 
Although  HRW  Arms  Division’s  annual  budget   from 1999-2005 was only around $1m (HRW 1999f, 
p.20, 2001a, p.20, 2002a, p.44, 2003a, p.34, 2004a, p.47, 2005b, p.54)44, it  had a major impact on 
the framing of cluster munitions during these formative years of the campaign, when it was 
responsible for the majority of NGO research (1999b, 2001b, 2002b, 2003b, 2003c, 2005a, 2005c). It 
also produced the second largest chunk of CMC research from 2006-8 (2006a, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; 
Docherty et al. 2008; HRW and IHRC 2008a, 2008b). Although much of the  Arms  Division’s  activity  
was devoted to cluster munitions, particularly after MAC took over as the lead NGO for Landmine 
Monitor in 2005 and the CMC also began to pick up steam, it has also remained on Landmine 
Monitor’s  editorial board and still carries out much of the research and editing of the annual reports. 
Mainly as a result, one of its largest donors is the ICBL, from which it receives well over $100,00 a 
year (ICBL 2002b, p.18, 2003, p.13, 2009a, p.27; HRW 2004a, p.55, 2005b, p.63, 2006b, p.62, 2008e, 
p.51). Exact figures were only available for 2001, 2002 and 2008, when the ICBL accounted for a 
                                                     
44 This  breakdown  is  unavailable  for  subsequent  years,  as  the  Arms  Division’s  budget is amalgamated with 
‘Other  Programmes’. 
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quarter  to  a  third  of  the  Arms  Division’s  annual  revenue.  This  may  help  to  explain  HRW’s  reluctance  
to disrupt the ICBL’s  relations  with  partner/donor  governments  and  undercuts  HRW’s  (2013b) claim 
to   accept   ‘no   government   funds,   directly   or   indirectly’,   given   ICBL/Landmine   Monitor is almost 
entirely government-funded. 
 
In   terms  of   the  Arms  Division’s  cluster  munitions  work,  some  funding   information  was  available   in  
HRW’s  annual  reports and in the acknowledgements of some publications, which indicate financing 
by a familiar range of US-based foundations as well as a few European ones. The MacArthur 
Foundation was again a prominent donor, part-financing two early reports (HRW 2002b, 2003b) and 
donating $250,000 specifically for cluster munitions campaigning in 2007 (HRW 2008e, p.51; 
MacArthur Foundation 2008, p.37), which helped finance a third report (Docherty et al. 2008). As 
from this, no other funders are   acknowledged   for   HRW’s   later   cluster  munitions   research, which 
suggests   they   were   financed   through   core   funding.   Acknowledged   funding   for   HRW’s   influential  
early research on cluster munitions in Afghanistan and Iraq (HRW 2002b, p.51, 2003b, p.141) mainly 
came from broad grants for general human rights monitoring of  the  ‘War  on  Terror’/Afghanistan  and  
the Iraq war. Funders of this included: the Rockefellers Brothers Fund (2002, p.21, 2004, p.41); the 
Carnegie Corporation (2013); and the Ford (2002, p.72); Overbrook (2004, pp.31–32) and Oak 
Foundations (2004, p.31). Established by Alan Parker, (Oak Foundation 2011a; 2011b; O'Leary 2008, 
pp.305–306), the Oak Foundation is one of the several European foundations that have become 
some of the largest donors to HRW in recent years (HRW 2013c). The Overbrook Foundation is 
another US family foundation based on banking wealth (Krebs 1981; The Overbrook Foundation 
2013), which granted around $3m to HRW from 2002-8 (Form 990s). Vincent McGee, co-Chair of the 
Arms  Division’s  Advisory  Board,  is  a  director, while the other co-Chair, David Brown, (HRW 2003d), 
donated his own  money   to   the   Iraq   report.   This   illustrates   HRW’s   continued   practice   of   granting  
directorships to wealthy benefactors, which helps to account for the unusually large proportion of 
core funding it receives and also ensures that influence within the organisation is limited to elites, 
given the compulsory nature of such support45.  
 
ICBL  
A final important conduit of funding for cluster munitions work in the last two years of the campaign 
was the ICBL, which received 31% of its overall income in 2007-8 from Norway, and 90% from all 
                                                     
45 See Chapter 4. This also emerges in the termination of a member of the Middle East/North Africa board, 
officially for failing to donate $10,000 to the organisation (Birnbaum 2010).  
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governments and IGOs combined46. After it finally added cluster munitions to its mandate in early 
2007, its revenue grew by $1.5m over 2007 and 2008, with around half of the increase coming from 
Norway (38%), Austria (8%), Ireland (5%), and most of the rest from member NGOs (43%), to which 
it also made grants. Funding from Norway in particular almost doubled, from $623,000 in 2005 to 
$1.18m in 2008, enabling the ICBL to hire a full-time cluster munitions Advocacy Officer in early 2007 
(Borrie 2009, p.144). As with the CMC head office, this massive funding influx greatly enhanced the 
ICBL’s   campaigning   capacity,   allowing   it   to   play   an   active   diplomatic   role   in   the  Oslo   Process   and  
assist in building national campaigns (ICBL 2009b, pp.20–29).  
Based on the above information, NGO spending on cluster munitions can be estimated at over 
$20m47 – a considerable sum for an NGO campaign. HI (excluding HI-Belgium) accounted for around 
half of this, and the other lead NGOs, the ICBL and HI-Belgium the rest. This more or less divided the 
campaign into two financial halves: the HI half, which was relatively financially independent vis-à-vis 
its cluster munitions campaigning, if not its wider funding base; and another half consisting of the 
CMC head office, the other lead NGOs and the ICBL, which was heavily donor-dependent. The top 
contributors to this side of the campaign included: Norway, the Diana Fund, the MacArthur 
Foundation, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands.  
In respect to the first group, the most striking finding was the level of dependency on Norway, which 
appears to have donated at least $4m for cluster munitions campaigning to Landmine Action, NPA, 
and the ICBL from 2006-8. It was also by far the largest overall donor to NPA, as well as to the ICBL 
and Landmine Action in 2007 and 2008 (Landmine Action 2009, p.32), in addition to being a major 
sponsor of cluster munitions work by all these NGOs and HI-Belgium. Most importantly, it was the 
main donor to the CMC head office from 2006-2008 and contributed nearly 60% of its income in 
2007-8, and helped finance six major NGO publications in 2006-8 (HI-Belgium 2006a, 2007; Nash 
2006a; King et al. 2007; Moyes 2007; NPA 2007b).   
 
Norway’s  reasons  for  financially  supporting  the  CMC  were  pragmatic,  as  the  NGO  campaign  was  an  
important part of its diplomatic strategy (Petrova 2007, p.28). On assuming leadership of the issue in 
2006,  Norway’s   lead diplomat, Steffen Kongstad,   recognised   ‘the  CMC  needed   strengthening’   and  
that ‘A   big   obstacle…was   that   unlike   in   the   Ottawa   process,   a   strong   international   civil   society  
campaign  was   lacking’.  Consequently,   ‘adequate financial and other resources including   the  “right  
                                                     
46 ICBL Annual Accounts 
47 This takes into account double counting of funds given to the CMC head office and redistributed to member 
NGOs. 
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people”  would  be  essential’   (Borrie 2009, p.129; 82). Likewise, the CMC Coordinator has stated it 
was  logical  for  Norway  to  consider  the  CMC  ‘as  an  important  and  powerful  tool  in  the  achievement  
of  this  political  objective’  (Nash 2012, p.138). This contrasts with how at the start of the campaign 
CMC  NGOs  had  expressed  the  view  it  was  ‘important…not  be  tight  [sic]  to  one  single  funder  because  
we  want  to  maintain  independent  identity  and  voice’,  when  raising  coalition  funds  from  the  public  
had also been suggested (Pax Christi Netherlands 2004, p.43). Without such sponsors as Norway, the 
CMC is unlikely to have pursued as strong a pro-ban line and may have continued to make relatively 
little international  impact, as had been the case in 2004-5 (Petrova 2007, p.12; Borrie 2009, p.56). 
Campaign Personnel  
The   analysis   of   the   campaign’s   personnel   basis   initially   focused   on   those   individuals   that   played  
relatively prominent roles in the campaign. Of forty-nine people identified, twenty-one had worked 
for Western donor states or IGOs, many of them in related military, arms control, humanitarian or 
foreign policy areas, and another five have moved onto such roles since. This is a significantly greater 
proportion than the ICBL and reflects the increased professionalisation in the NGO sector and their 
expert status, as reflected in an  external  evaluation  of  the  CMC,  which  found  it  ‘became  recognised  
as   an   unavoidable,   but   also   respectable   partner’ based   on   its   ‘expert   knowledge   and  
professionalism’   (Frerks 2009, p.35). Only five of the prominent individuals identified lived in non-
Western countries, two of which were survivors and were also the only non-NGO employees.  
Both a high level of professional circulation and Northern dominance were particularly marked 
among the individuals that Borrie (2009, p.206) refers   to   as   the   CMC’s   ‘front   bench’.   These   five  
individuals,  who  were  all  from  the  North,  were  the  CMC’s  lead  negotiators  during  the  Oslo  Process  
and also its principle spokespeople (ANZCMC 2008a, pp.93–94; CMC 2008g, pp.1–2), and were often 
the only NGO representatives allowed into informal negotiations with states on treaty text48. They 
included, the CMC Coordinator, Thomas Nash, the three CMC co-Chairs from Landmine Action, NPA, 
and HRW, and  Landmine  Action’s  Director of Policy and Research, Richard Moyes, who took over as 
its Co-Chair after the Dublin conference (CMC 2008g, p.1, 2008h, p.2). Four of the five had previously 
worked in a military or arms control capacity for Western states, including Nash, who had worked 
for the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Unit of the Canadian Foreign Ministry directly prior to 
joining MAC in 2003, and before that for the Disarmament Mission of core state, New Zealand. 
Similarly, the Co-Chair for NPA, its Cluster Munitions Policy Advisor, Grethe Østern, had been a Press 
Officer for the Norwegian army at NATO headquarters in Kosovo shortly after the bombing (Borrie 
2009, p.46; 54; 75); the Director of Landmine Action, Simon Conway, was a former British army 
                                                     
48 Personal observation at Dublin Conference.  
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officer (ANZCMC 2008a, p.93); and as explained in Chapter  4,    HRW’s  Steve  Goose,  had  been  an  arms  
control expert for the US Senate. Finally, Moyes, had written reports on ERW for two IGOs – the 
Geneva International Humanitarian Centre on Demining (GIHCD) and UNIDIR (Moyes and Tinning 
2005; Moyes and Vannachack 2005), as part of his role as a Landmine Action researcher earlier in 
the campaign.  
This circulation of personnel also worked the other way around, as several leading figures in the 
early stages were of the campaign were working for Western governments or IGOs by the end of it, 
or  shortly  afterwards.  This  included  Landmine  Action’s  Director  from  2002-2005, Richard Lloyd, who 
like many senior NGO staff under New Labour passed through the revolving door to government 
(Quarmby 2005) and became a senior strategic communications adviser to Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown in April 2008 (Prince 2008), shortly before the final CCM negotiations. Likewise, Landmine 
Action’s  initial  Policy  and  Advocacy  Co-ordinator, Rosy Cave, moved to UNIDIR in 2005 to become its 
Project Manager and Lead Researcher on ERW (Cave 2003, p.ii; Cave et al. 2006, p.ix), while the 
head of HI-Belgium’s   Policy   Unit   and   CMC   Steering Committee member, Stan Brabant (ANZCMC 
2008a, p.101), moved to UNDP-Laos after the treaty was agreed (CMC 2010b), and its Research and 
Victim Assistance Coordinator went to work for UNOCHA (Maes 2013).  
 
During the campaign, several leading staff at these key supportive UN agencies also had an NGO 
background themselves, in closely related areas. Both UNIDIR’s   Deputy   Director   and   the head of 
UNDP’s  Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP-BCPR) had been leading NGO members of 
the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), while the head of UNOCHA from 2003-6 
was former Norwegian Labour Party Development Minister and ICBL supporter, Jan Egeland, who 
had come to the role following a stint calling for a ban in Norway as head of the Norwegian Red 
Cross (Spokesman for the UN Secretary-General 2001). Østern had worked for him there in her 
previous position prior to joining NPA. On top of all this, another two UNDP-BCPR staff on its 
delegation to the Oslo Process had recently joined the organisation from NPA and HI (Appendix 6.1). 
This illustrates the close collaborative relationships between NGOs and IGOs in the 
humanitarian/development/mine action sector and the high level of personnel circulation and 
shared interests and perspectives among NGOs like NPA, HI and Landmine Action and related UN 
agencies. This facilitated what Nash (2012, p.131) describes as a ‘particularly  strong  bond’  between  
the   CMC   and   the   UNDP,   in   which      ‘interpersonal   relationships   were   very   tight,   with   information  
shared on a daily basis ensuring a coordinated  approach’.   
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Professional backgrounds of CMC personnel were broadly similar to the ICBL and coincide with 
Gramsci’s  categories  of  traditional  and  capitalist  organic  intellectuals,  as  lawyers (HRW), doctors (HI), 
military officers (NPA, HRW and Landmine Action), academics, and marketing/PR professionals, were 
all strongly represented. This was also consistent with a wider strategy of forging partnerships with 
influential  elites,  such  as  ‘parliamentarians,  faith  leaders,  academics,  journalists,  and other interest 
groups’.   Related   to   this,   what   little   ‘grassroots’   campaigning   took   place   was   organised   mainly  
through professional associations, like the Soroptimists (HI-UK 2005, p.13; AOAV 2013), Engineers 
for Social Responsibility (CMC 2005d) and IPPNW Russia/Zambia, which was one of only four non-
Western NGOs among the sixteen organisations that served on the  Steering Committee from 2003-
May 2008.  
 
The CMC also had a strong religious basis from the beginning, with Pax Christi and the Mennonites 
involved in founding the campaign. Yet even religious involvement seems to have been more 
institutionalised than was the case with the ICBL, when local church groups had been more active. 
This is illustrated by the official participation of the Vatican in the Core Group of states and the 
membership first of the Church of England´s Public Affairs Unit and later the whole institution in the 
UK campaign (CMC 2005d, 2007e).   This   was   facilitated   by   the   Diana   Fund’s   connections   to   the  
Anglican hierarchy, via its executive director from 1998-2005, Andrew Purkis OBE, who had 
previously  been  the  Archbishop  of  Canterbury’s  public  affairs  secretary  (Debrett’s  2013).  
 
In addition to this, lead NGO in-house media and communications staff were supplemented with 
external communications and consulting agencies (ANZCMC 2008a, p.5; CMC 2008i; Stalker 2008, 
p.13; Wareham 2008b; DP Evaluation 2012, p.6; Principle Consulting 2013a). Some of the agencies 
used   had   been   set   up   by   former   NGO   personnel   and   specialised   in   ‘charity   advocacy   services’  
(Principle Consulting 2013b) and   PR   for   ‘public   private   partnerships’   (Incite | Insight 2013), for 
example the initial contact people for the CMC (Pax Christi Netherlands 2004, p.44), Micha 
Hollestelle   of   Pax   Christi,   left   in   2005   to   set   up   his   own   consulting   firm   that   provides   ‘strategic  
communications’   and   corporate   social   responsibility   and   ‘Business   Intelligence   for   investors,  
specialising  in  extractive  industries’  (Hollestelle 2013).  
 
Chief Executives and Board Memberships  
Examining  CEOs  and  directors  of  the  lead  NGOs  gives  a  further  insight  into  the  CMC’s  personnel  and  
social basis and elite connections. But whereas chief executives generally have a strong influence 
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across an organisation, board influence varies from an advisory or even rubber-stamping role, to 
more active involvement. Yet regardless of the level of direct influence on specific policy positions, 
board composition is  a  significant  indicator  of  an  NGO’s  political  orientation  and  connections and the 
ideological parameters within which it operates, as are the backgrounds and remuneration levels of 
chief executives. NGO CEO salaries are generally in the top income decile and ranged from around 
$125,000 at NPA (VG Nett 2010) to $400,000 at HRW (BBB Wise Giving Report 2009) placing them in 
an elite socio-professional stratum. Government, political and donor community connections were 
also a feature of lead NGO boards, whose engagement ranged from the relatively direct involvement 
of  HRW’s  Executive  Committee,  discussed  in  Chapter  4,  to  the  more  passive  role  of  NPA’s  board,  at  
least vis-à-vis international policy (Norad 2007, pp.17–18). In all cases, board selection appears 
motivated by considerations of financial and political patronage, with a strong orientation towards 
donors, liberal/social democratic parties and other elites. 
Of   HRW’s   thirty-three directors in 2008, twenty-one were wealthy businesspeople, corporate 
lawyers,  or  their  ‘human  rights  activist’  wives  and  thirteen had donated over $100,000 in that year 
alone. The three vice-chairs included former CEOs of Phillips-Van Heusen Corp (which owns Calvin 
Klein and Tommy Hilfiger); MCA (which owns Universal Pictures); and a former Deputy Chairman of 
Morgan Stanley International (HRW 2008e, p.40; 51). Other directors during the campaign with 
direct links to Western foreign policy establishments and IGOs included: Lloyd Axworthy; the last US 
ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann; the director of Radio Free Europe, Paul Goble 
(Herman and Peterson 2005, n.6); and the first Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Richard Goldstone (UN Human Rights Council 
2009).   
Despite its greater reliance on public fundraising, HI and HI-Belgium’s  (2006b) boards had a similarly 
elite composition, reflecting their political respectability and mainstream cross-party appeal, more 
than specific policy influence. HI’s   Chair   since   2006  was   Jacques   Tassi   (HI 2007, p.13, 2008, p.31, 
2009, p.31), a former deputy-managing partner of Ernst and Young France, and co-founder of a 
corporate social responsibility organisation (HI-US 2011), who was one of four directors or associate 
directors   involved  in  the  corporate  social  responsibility  sector.  This  reflects  HI’s  many  partnerships  
with French multinationals, such as BNP Paribas, Crédit Lyonnais and Société Générale (HI 2007, 
p.24, 2008, p.30, 2009, p.30). Foundations, senior professionals, and politicians were also amply 
represented, including a Socialist Party Deputy Mayor of Paris, and the mayor of Lyons, who was a 
member  of  President  Sarkozy’s  party.  
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Befitting   its   status   as   a   network   organisation   dominated   by   large   UK   INGOs,   Landmine   Action’s  
(2008, p.4) fourteen directors during the campaign were mainly current or former senior NGO 
personnel,   including   Anna   MacDonald,   the   director   of   Oxfam’s   Control   Arms   Campaign;   and   ex-
Christian Aid and Save the Children staff. Kate Moore MBE of the Soroptimists, the owner of an 
Outplacement   Consultancy   specialised   in   ‘redundancy counselling and job search programmes 
during  factory  closures’  (Moore 2013), was another long-time director, besides several others with 
ties to donors via the British and Norwegian states, foundations and IGOs. This included two 
representatives of the Diana Fund, and Christian Ruge, another ex-NGO director of a political 
communications agency (Retina Consulting 2008), who was a Senior Adviser to the Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry throughout the Oslo Process (ANZCMC 2008a, pp.85–86; Borrie 2009, p.80; 163; 
279). Ruge was on leave from the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies (Conflux 2007), a 
largely government-funded Labour-linked think tank (Fafo 2013a, 2013b), which was the only other 
CMC member in Norway besides NPA and where Ruge had been main Norwegian CMC point of 
contact (CMC 2004c, p.53; DanChurchAid 2004a, p.44). Before that again, Ruge had been NPA’s  
mines policy advisor and served on the ICBL board until 2001 (Ruge 1997; Borrie 2009, p.80; Spoke 
2011).  
Unsurprisingly, the same porosity of civil and political society and between lead NGOs and their 
donors  was  evident  in  NPA’s  board  (NPA 2007c, p.13), which consisted mainly of Labour Party-linked 
trade union leaders and was chaired from 2003-2007  by Grete Faremo, then the Director of Legal 
and Corporate Affairs at Microsoft Norway, but previously a Labour Minister for Development 
Cooperation   and   from   2009  Norway’s   Defence  Minister   (Norway 2011). Again, these connections 
indicate broad ideological parameters more than direct policy influence, given that a 2007 
government evaluation found the board is generally more interested in local or national than 
international  issues  and  ‘is  more  a  recipient  of  information  from  the  International Department than 
an  important  body  for  consultation,  strategic  discussions  and  decision  making’  (Norad 2007, pp.17–
18).  
 
The Organisation of the Campaign: Membership and Decision-Making in the CMC  
 
Although  the  CMC  claims  to  have  ‘made  a  particular  effort  to  ensure  diversity  in   its representation, 
including…geographic  diversity  and  the  engagement  and  leadership  of  those  directly  affected,  such  
as  survivors’  (CMC 2009a, p.5), in practice it followed a similar, but less extensive, pattern of North-
South expansion to the ICBL. It began as a project of mainly NNGOs, was headquartered first in 
Ottawa and then in London, only later expanded to non-Western countries, survivors were again 
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brought in at a late stage and did not have strategic or leadership roles, and its leadership remained 
Northern-dominated.  
 
NGO membership of the coalition grew slowly but steadily until October 2007, when Norway began 
sponsoring NGO engagement in the Oslo Process and its growth greatly accelerated. Membership 
outside the North had remained largely flat since 2004, with most growth taking place in the North. 
Total membership grew from approximately 80 organisations in November 2008 to approximately 
180 in March 2007, jumping to 240 by October 2007. In January 2004, 35 non-Northern NGOs were 
associated with the campaign and by March 2007, this figure had only risen to 39. Following the 
injection of funding by Norway this figure rose to 72, or 30% of the total membership, by October 
2007.  
 
This Northern dominance was also reflected in NNGO participation at international meetings and 
conferences,  which  ranged  from  73%  at  the  CMC’s  First   International Meeting alongside its launch 
(Pax Christi Netherlands 2004, pp.48–49), when Canada sponsored SNGO attendance, to 87% at the 
CMC’s  Second  International  Meeting  in  2004,  93%  at  the  Oslo  Conference  in  February  2007,  and  72%  
at the final negotiations in May 2008, when SNGO attendance was again sponsored by donors 
(DanChurchAid 2004a, pp.43–4; Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions 2007a; CMC 2008j). The low 
level of SNGO participation, its dependency on donor funding, and the marked increase at the very 
end of the Oslo Process suggest SNGOs mainly functioned to make up the numbers and legitimise an 
existing, Northern-led process through making it appear more globally representative.  
 
The CMC created few new national campaigns of its own and where national campaigns existed they 
mainly reflected activity by national branches of the ICBL. But this form of participation was also less 
widespread due to the institutionalisation of the ICBL and the entrenchment of partnership 
relationships between the former national campaign organisations and governments, as illustrated 
also by the outsourcing  of   treaty  monitoring   to   the   ICBL’s   Landmine  Monitor.  According to Borrie 
(2009, p.143),   ‘the  CMC’s   relative   lack  of   grassroots  national   campaigns’  was   seen  as   its   ‘greatest  
weakness’  by  some  of  the  ICBL  veterans involved in the campaign and the same view appears in an 
external evaluation of the Ban Advocates Initiative, which reports ‘Limited  public  mobilisation’  and  
‘limited  national  advocacy’  as  two  major  weaknesses  cited  in  interviews  with  campaign  participants  
(Mayne 2010, p.7). This relative lack of NGO/civil society participation was also evident in how the 
CMC was never able to hold large international NGO Conferences in the South, as the ICBL had done 
in Phnom Penh and Mozambique.  
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Indeed, whereas when the Ottawa Process was initially announced in May 1996, national landmines 
campaigns existed in dozens of countries, including in the South, at the corresponding point in the 
CMC in November 2006, hardly any new national campaigns on cluster munitions had been 
established and there were also far fewer national landmines campaigns involved. One major 
exception was in France, where HI, and the French section of the Control Arms campaign, led by 
Amnesty   International   and  Oxfam’s   French  affiliate,  Agir   Ici,   had   launched  a  national   campaign   to  
ban cluster munitions with numerous other French NGOs in 2005 (Agir Ici 2005). Aside from this, 
even in countries like Belgium, Norway and Austria, where national bans or government support had 
been secured, domestic lobbying was mainly carried out by individual ICBL NGOs/campaigners, while 
in the UK and Canada, campaigning occurred mainly through the institutionalised national network 
organisations on landmines. The only major counters to this trend after the Oslo Process started, 
was the founding of Aotearoa/New Zealand CMC in March 2007 (ANZCMC 2008b) to build for the 
Wellington Oslo Process Conference the following February (2008c) and the foundation of the 
Australian CMC in January 2008, the week before the Wellington Conference (CMC Australia n.d.; 
CMC 2008j).  
 
The main aims of these new national campaigns, including the Irish CMC, were around drawing 
public and media attention to the diplomatic process. CMC-Austria consisted of one or two people 
for most of the campaign, with some interest from other NGOs only towards the end of the Process 
when it was funded to organise civil society events around the December 2007 Vienna Conference 
(Breitegger 2010b). Similarly, the Irish campaign nominally had fourteen member NGOs (CMC 
Ireland 2008), but was launched only two months before the final negotiations in Dublin (HRW and 
Landmine Action 2009, p.94) and prior to then had basically consisted of Pax Christi Ireland. This lack 
of national campaigning was even more pronounced in developing countries, where the dominant 
mode of civil society involvement was again through survivors, reproducing the North/South, 
saviour/victim   dynamic   of   the   ‘humanitarian   fairy-tale’   that   had   been   a   feature   of   the   landmines  
campaign (Chandler 2001, p.690). 
 
As with the ICBL, although survivor involvement increased over time, it had a limited impact at a 
strategic or policy level. No survivors were involved in founding the campaign and during the early 
stages when agendas, tactics and discursive approaches were established, their participation was 
limited to photo opportunities, personal testimonies and occasional diplomatic interventions. After 
HI’s  Ban  Advocates  Initiative  was  set  up  in  September  2007  (Mayne 2010, p.4), survivors participated 
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in a more organised way (Borrie 2009, p.180), but they remained mainly focused on symbolic 
interventions at diplomatic conferences and media appearances. An external evaluation found that 
while  they  ‘received  useful  training  in  advocacy  and  communication  skills’,  they  ‘were  not  involved in 
the  strategic  design  or  planning  of  the  Oslo  Process  or  the  civil  society  campaign’.  At  least  some  of  
them would have preferred a more central strategic role, with one survivor explicitly saying they 
‘should  have  been  on  the  Steering  Committee’  (Mayne 2010, pp.8–9; 12).  
 
The lack of widespread strategic or policy engagement by SNGOs and survivors can also be 
connected to financial dependency on donor funding, distributed via NNGO intermediaries as it was 
only at a late stage that most such monies became available through HI-Belgium’s  Ban  Advocates’  
Initiative and the aforementioned Diana Fund/Landmine Action Local Voices, Global Ban grant 
scheme. This also opened for applications in September 2007 (Stalker 2008, p.6), nearly four years 
into the campaign, and entailed detailed conditions requiring applicants to carry out prescribed 
activities and produce specified outputs (Stalker 2008, pp.13–14). This sort of centralised control 
also characterised the approach of ICBL and CMC head office staff, which reviewed strategy on a 
country-by-country  basis  ‘to determine objectives and related strategy and advocacy efforts for the 
CMC   in   those   countries’   (ICBL 2008, p.24).   It   is   also   evident   from   the   CMC’s   2008   Report, which 
states that local   campaigners   lobbied   governments   ‘using   CMC  Action   Alerts   and   lobbying   guides  
with global campaign messages drafted by CMC staff and approved by the Steering   Committee’  
(CMC 2009a, pp.4–6), in the detailed instructions and uniformity of messaging in lobbying guides 
distributed for major conferences (CMC 2007f) and   in  head  office  plans   for   the  CMC’s   first  Global  
Day of Action in November 2007 prior to the Vienna Conference (CMC 2007a). All of this tallies with 
complaints  of  ‘a  somewhat  “top  down”  coordination  style  by  the  CMC’  (Mayne 2010, p.7) and was 
reflected in its greater centralisation and formalisation, including the acquisition five staff by the 
time of the final negotiations in 2008 (CMC 2009a, p.14). Related to this and reflecting and 
reinforcing the lack of vibrant national campaigns, CMC staff played a much more direct role in 
organising activities internationally, so that along with the Steering Committee, and in particular the 
three Co-Chairs appointed in early 2007, they comprised its effective leadership.  
 
According to Moyes and Nash (2011a, p.79),  the  Steering  Committee  was  ‘the  decision  making  body  
for   the   coalition’,   which   ‘took   a   hands-on approach to decision-making on policy, strategy and 
communications’’  (Nash 2012, p.131) and met  at  least  three  times  a  year  to  decide  ‘strategy,  policy  
and  general  management’   (CMC 2009a, p.14). Although early on, some of the founder NGOs had 
aspired  towards  a  more  expansive  network  that  would  ‘prevent  the  steering  committee  form  looking  
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like  a  “ICBL  Two”  by  involving  more  SNGOs  and  even  reaching  beyond  the  NGO  sector  to  other  civil  
society groups (Pax Christi Netherlands 2004, p.6; 33; 43), the Interim Steering Committee of seven 
Northern and three non-Western NGOs quickly became the Steering Committee. Its sixteen NGO 
members over the course of the campaign fairly accurately represented the distribution of power 
within the CMC with only four small non-Western NGOs49 represented. This Northern dominance 
was reinforced by the appointment of the three NNGO co-Chairs in early 2007.  It also seems 
significant that the membership of the Steering Committee remained relatively stable, despite the 
campaign’s   substantial   numerical   and   geographic   growth,   which   again   suggests   newer   members  
lacked significant influence within the campaign. This lack of democratic participation is also borne 
out by the available information on the CMC’s   internal   decision-making and how the leadership 
related to the wider membership  
 
There appears to have been relatively little substantive input from the wider membership into CMC 
strategy, especially as only two general meetings were held between the CMC launch in November 
2003 and May 2008 – in Copenhagen in March 2004 and Geneva in November 200650 
(DanChurchAid 2004a; CMC 2009c). Moreover, although campaigners also met during the Oslo 
Process, important strategic decisions were taken by the Steering Committee, rather than the 
broader membership. Changes to the CMC Call were decided by the Steering Committee at meetings 
in January and February 2007 and in discussions over email, rather than at the General Meeting the 
previous November and the final wording of the Call for the remainder of the Oslo Process was 
drawn  up  by  the  CMC  Coordinator  and  HI  France’s  Director-General, Jean-Baptiste Richardier, and 
emailed to the membership (Borrie 2009, pp.146–7; 166–7). Moreover, according to  Moyes’   own  
account, the CMC leadership decided its bottom line for the final negotiations without informing or 
consulting  the  membership  in  advance,  as  it   ‘basically  decided  that  we  were  the  people  that  knew  
what  we  should  think”  (quoted in Rappert et al. 2011, p.315). Overall, the organisation of the CMC 
mirrored North-South structural inequalities, resource differentials between member organisations 
and inequalities of access to donor funding and political elites. Nash (2012, p.137) acknowledges 
that  ‘the  fact  that  member  organisations  in  the  north  had  more  money  and  resources,  and  therefore  
time, to devote   to   the   campaign  made   it  easier   for   them  to   take  up  key   leadership   roles’,   but  he  
appears  to  accept  this  as  inevitable,  remarking  this  is  ‘likely  to  be  a    point  of  tension  for  any  global  
civil  society  coalition’. 
                                                     
49 Protection, IPPNW Russia/Zambia, Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines and Lebanon Resource Center. 
50 A meeting initially billed as a CMC General Meeting was held in Paris in October 2005, but seems to have 
been downgraded at some point (CMC 2005c).  
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Conclusion  
 
Contrary to the expectations created by liberal theories of the globalisation of ICT and the 
development of global civil society, the CMC was neither horizontal nor non-hierarchical. In fact, it 
was more centralised and formally hierarchical than the landmines campaign had been.  This can be 
partly attributed to increased professionalisation in the NGO sector since the 1990s – in turn linked 
to the accumulated impact of the ongoing outsourcing of government functions – as well as to 
deliberate organisational decisions that maintained central control by a small core of well-connected 
moderate NNGOs. Hence, while the appearance of global and public support was again created in 
order to increase the campaign's political legitimacy, it had a smaller public support base than the 
landmines campaign, fewer NGOs were involved and it was even more financially dependent on a 
narrow range of likeminded Western donors, in particular Norway as the lead state backing the Oslo 
Process and bankrolling the CMC. Given the relatively small scale of the cluster munitions problem 
even compared to APMs, attracting broader and stronger public support would have required 
addressing wider structural issues related to the world military order. Given their Western elite-
dependent material base, the lead NNGOs chose to avoid this and instead constructed cluster 
munitions as an apolitical, single-issue humanitarian problem. The next chapter analyses this choice 
of discourse and the predominantly insider tactics NGOs used to pitch it to policy-makers and 
persuade them that agreeing a ban treaty in 2008 was in their long-term hegemonic interests.  
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Chapter 7 – The Cluster Munitions Campaign: Discourse, 
Tactics and Outcomes 
This chapter examines the CMC’s  discourse and tactics and assesses the relevance of the campaign’s  
main outcome – the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) – for the argument of the thesis. As 
with Chapter 5 on the landmines campaign, one of its main aims is to assess the level of discursive 
and tactical autonomy the lead NGOs in the campaign had from hegemonic  Western elites, in 
particular Norway, as the lead state supporting a ban and backing the Oslo Process. It then analyses 
the process and outcomes of the final treaty negotiations in Dublin in 2008, in light of these 
dynamic, before assessing the content of the CCM and its likely practical impact. Finally, it discusses 
to what extent NGO influence helped produce these outcomes and the degree to which NGOs acted 
as autonomous agents.  It  concludes  by  considering  the  campaign’s  overall  relationship to hegemonic 
ideas and practices, and the wider implications for the hegemonic role of global civil society in global 
governance at national, international and global levels. 
The Discourse of the Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC) 
The literature on the CMC generally presents it as a continuation of the landmines campaign that 
extended the re-framing of weapons as a humanitarian rather than arms control issue (Borrie 2008, 
2009; Goose 2008c; Borrie et al. 2009; Bolton and Nash 2010; Petrova 2010; Nash 2012), thereby 
contributing   to  what  UNIDIR  calls   ‘disarmament  as  humanitarian  action’   (Borrie 2005; Cave 2006). 
Aside from one article by Cooper (2011), there has been almost no critical analysis of the arguments 
it made or how they related to elite interests. This section addresses that gap by examining the 
discourse the CMC used to argue for restrictions on cluster munitions under four main headings: the 
relationship of cluster munitions to ‘smart’   weapons; military   utility   in   a   ‘human security’  
framework; the problematisation of cluster munitions; and the North-South dimensions of CMC 
discourse. 
 
Cluster Munitions and ‘Smart  Weapons’ 
As the major  Western  military  powers  were  upgrading  to  ‘smart’  cluster  munitions  with  self-destruct 
mechanisms and guidance systems for military reasons (Weidacher et al. 2005, p.35; 43) and had an 
interest in retaining these weapons for reasons of military and economic advantage, a technical 
discourse emerged early in the campaign that contrasted low-tech cluster munitions with more 
advanced weapons.  For example, one of HRW’s  main  early  arguments  was  that  reducing  the   ‘dud  
rate’   was   ‘a   place   where   military   necessity   and   humanitarian   concern   coincide’   (Goose 2003d, 
p.111). It therefore suggested improving cluster munition reliability by mandating a failure rate of 
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‘less  than  1%’  (HRW 1999d, 2001b, 2003b, p.117, 2005a, p.10, 2006c; Goose 2004b) and introducing 
a  limited  ban  on  ‘“worst  offenders”— those cluster munitions known to have especially high failure 
rates (Goose 2004a, p.9). However, not all NGOs influential in this area agreed with this approach. It 
was publicly supported by Landmine Action until early 2006 (Nash 2006b, p.37), whereas NPA 
advocated a ban in Norway and HI would also have preferred  an unequivocal ban position. As a 
result, the CMC Call devised in 2003 remained limited to a moratorium on cluster munitions until 
January 2007 (Borrie 2009, p.146n59). It employed a deliberately ambiguous phrasing, which implied 
technical solutions or a limited ban, rather than comprehensive prohibition, would resolve the 
problem. Consistent  with  this,  the  CMC  established  a  ‘worst  culprits’  Sub-Group, to draw up a list of 
the most objectionable cluster weapons (Goose 2004a, p.10, 2004b, pp.25–6). Some NGOs warned 
of ‘sending   an   implicit   message   that   if   some   cluster   munitions   are   worse   than   others, then by 
extension some cluster munitions are  better’  (in DanChurchAid 2004b, p.59).  
The strength with which some NGOs made the distinction between advanced cluster munitions and 
others   is   demonstrated   by   their   endorsement   of   some   ‘smart  weapons’,   and  by   implication   their  
manufacturers. HRW cited US  development  of  guided  ‘smart’  munitions  as an example of ‘Positive  
Policy  and  Practice’  (2005a, pp.8–9) and  Goose’s  description  of  the  weapons  was  so  complimentary  
that US firm, Textron Defense Systems, quotes it as a product endorsement (Goose, 2004a, p.14, 
quoted in Textron Defense Systems 2011a). Pax Christi Netherlands  argued that the German 
manufacturer of the SMArt-155 munition had replaced  ‘quantity  by  effectiveness’  and  opined  that  
‘military  operations   likely   to  be  encountered  today  actually  demand  reliable  and  precise  weapons,  
not unreliable area-attack cluster weapons’   (Weidacher et al. 2005, p.42; 47). In this way, cluster 
munitions were portrayed as cheap old weapons that advanced militaries should replace with high-
tech weapons on military as well as humanitarian grounds. HRW (2003b, p.114) quoted a description 
of cluster munitions in a US military presentation  as   “a  Cold  War   relic”,  while Pax Christi cited an 
arms   company’s   description   of area   weapons   in   general   as   “obsolescent”   because   “Modern  
“asymmetric”  threats  require  precise  point-weapons” (Weidacher et al. 2005, p.51). 
As the campaign progressed, however, Landmine Action and NPA increasingly discredited the 
possibility of improving failure rates through technical fixes.  In December 2007, NPA published a 
joint report with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, which used Norwegian military 
tests to disprove the low failure rates claimed by manufacturers for the M85 – one of the most 
advanced  ‘smart’  munitions  ever  used (King et al. 2007). It showed self-destruct mechanisms often 
failed to work even under test conditions, alongside field research from Iraq and Lebanon that 
showed they were even less reliable in combat (Nash 2006a; King et al. 2007; Moyes 2007).  
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Although Landmine Action and NPA differed from HRW on the question of the failure rates of cluster 
munitions, their stance on the  issue  of  ‘accuracy’  was  very similar. Landmine  Action’s  Simon  Conway  
tacitly  endorsed  the  concept  of   ‘smart’  weapons   in  a  CMC  press  release,  stating  that  “In  my  view,  
smart  means  precision  guided”  (CMC 2007g) and although HI decided to demand a total ban on all 
cluster munitions in February 2005 (HI-Belgium 2006c, p.35), its effective acquiescence to the 
exclusion   of   guided   ‘smart’   cluster   munitions   from   the   Belgian   ban   set   an   important   precedent.  
Consequently, even after the CMC switched from the demand for a moratorium to a ban position in 
early 2007 (CMC 2007h; Borrie 2009, p.146), it did not insist that the most advanced ‘smart’  guided  
munitions be included  (CMC 2006d, 2007d, 2007i, 2007i, 2008l, 2008m, p.9). Instead, it argued that 
as a new and unproven technology, the precautionary principle should apply, whereby  ‘the  burden  
of   proof’   of   ‘safety   or   acceptability…rests   with   those   producing   risks’   (Rappert and Moyes 2004, 
pp.5–6; Rappert 2006, pp.27–8). A mixture of pragmatism and strategy lay behind this, as the 
intention was to paint states into a corner by encouraging them to try to prove that their weapons 
would  not  cause  ‘unacceptable  harm  to  civilians’   (Rappert et al. 2011, pp.306–309). This would be 
difficult with any weapon, including the latest   guided   ‘smart’   cluster  munitions,  which had hardly 
been used yet in combat (McGrath 2008). It also helped secure the participation of technologically 
advanced Western states like Germany and Norway (Petrova 2007, p.28), by suggesting NGOs would 
acquiesce to excluding some high-tech weapons from the definition of cluster munitions to be 
banned by the treaty.  
Military Utility in a Human Security Framework  
The CMC (2006e) explicitly situated itself as a human security campaign, describing itself  as  ‘a  group  
of people committed to the protection of civilians in armed conflict and to democratic processes to 
promote   human   security’.   Nash   (2012, p.130) also emphasises this, explaining its approach ‘was 
consistent with the concept of human security focused on protecting the lives of people and 
communities, rather than  traditional  security  focused  on  protecting  the  nation  state’.  Similar to the 
ICBL,   the   CMC’s   main   legitimising   frame   in   this   context   was   humanitarianism   and   IHL,   but   such  
discourse   was   now   explicitly   linked   to   the   dominant   ‘freedom   from   fear’   paradigm of human 
security, which legitimises itself primarily in terms of humanitarianism, IHL, and civil and political 
rights, rather than development or economic and social rights.  
 
The   CMC’s   humanitarian   discourse   was   very   similar   to   the   ICBL’s,   focusing   again on de-
contextualised individual suffering and child victims in press releases51 and campaign imagery52. This 
                                                     
51 Based on analysis of twenty-four CMC press releases from July 2006 to May 2008. 
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disproportionate emphasis on children served to portray cluster munitions as indiscriminate and 
disproportionate weapons, whose humanitarian impacts outweighed their military benefits and so 
should be illegal under IHL. It was  exemplified  by  the  use  of  cluster  munitions’  physical  resemblance  
to toys as the main hook of a joint advertising campaign with the UN and the Diana Fund (CMC 
2007j), even though research by HI-Belgium (2006a, 2007), which collated all cluster munitions 
casualty data for the first time, found two-thirds of victims were adults (2006a, p.44). This also 
reflected a continuing paternalistic framing, consistent with the exclusion of survivors from strategic 
decision-making, which sought public sympathy through simplistic, emotive appeals to humanitarian 
sentiments. This lowest common denominator approach was characteristic of CMC communications 
aimed at the general public and appealed to pre-existing hegemonic understandings of the world 
that would resonate immediately without the need for reflexive critical engagement – in contrast to 
the more complex IHL and military utility arguments NGOs directed at elites.  
 
NGOs again framed these in terms of the IHL principles of distinction and proportionality (McGrath 
2000b, p.11; Wiebe 2000; Rappert 2005; CMC 2006e, 2008l). As previously argued, these are core 
aspects of how IHL legitimises the broader use of force, in legitimising the killing of civilians so long 
as they are not targeted as such and their deaths   are   ‘proportionate’   to  military   aims. Fidelity to 
these principles actually helped to constrain the CMC from calling for a ban for several years due to 
HRW’s  belief  that  not  all  cluster  munitions  were  illegal  according  to these norms (Nash 2012, p.37). 
Consequently, HRW (2004b, p.8) declared  early  on  that  it  favoured  ‘a  CCW  protocol  that  regulates,  
but  does  not  completely  prohibit,  all  cluster  munitions’. Moyes’  comments  that  he  “got  sucked  into”  
this approach for a while, “Partly…because  the  people  shouting  ‘ban  cluster  bombs’  didn’t  engage  at  
all  with  IHL  arguments”  (in Rappert et al. 2011, p.306), also illustrates the perceived need for NGOs 
to frame their arguments in terms of IHL norms that legitimise the broader use of force and are 
accepted by Western states in order to be taken seriously.  
 
This persisted after the Oslo Process began, as the concepts of discrimination and proportionality 
were  embedded  in   its  stated  goal  of  a  ban  on  ‘cluster  munitions  that  cause  unacceptable  harm  to  
civilians’   (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007a). This infers   the   possibility   of   ‘acceptable  
harm   to   civilians’,   or   in   other   words   a   legitimate   level   of   ‘collateral   damage’.   This   also   set   the  
parameters  of   the  CMC’s  approach,   so   that   the   second  version  of   the  CMC  Call  agreed   in   January  
                                                                                                                                                                     
52 HI-Belgium’s  reports  contain  16  photographs  with  children  in  them  and  13  with  adults.  However,  in  nine  
cases the adults are accompanying children and are not the primary focus of the image. Six out of eight 
photographs of visibly injured survivors depict children.  
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2007   demanded   ‘a   prohibition   on   cluster   munitions   that   cause   unacceptable   harm to civilians’  
(quoted in Borrie 2009, p.146),  a phrase already used by Norway (2006b) in its invitation letter to 
the Oslo Conference. Although the CMC removed the phrase from a third version of the campaign 
Call a few months later, it continued to use it to articulate its own demands (CMC 2006f, 2006g, 
2007d, 2007f, p.1, 2007j, 2007k, 2007l, 2007m; HRW 2006d, 2007d; ICBL 2007, p.19) and 
commissioned a film called Unacceptable Harm (Anderson 2007). This illustrates how framing NGO 
demands in this respect did not ‘move[d]  beyond  IHL’ as Nash (2012, p.125) has claimed, but actually 
reinforced its fundamental hegemonic purpose of legitimising the use of force.  
 
Three additional aspects of CMC arguments also served a similar consensual-hegemonic function by: 
a) taking the claimed humanitarian and human security objectives of military interventions by 
Western states at face value and assessing the military utility of cluster munitions against these 
‘freedom  from  fear’-based  aims;  b)  accepting  the  claimed  unintentionality  of  ‘collateral  damage’  and  
politely avoiding connecting humanitarian harm directly to states; c) isolating cluster munitions as 
aberrant from the normally civilised military conduct and compliance with IHL this depiction 
assumes; and related to this, avoiding any wider criticism of state security/military practices.  
 
An important aspect of CMC discourse was the acceptance at face value of the claimed humanitarian 
and/or human security motives of Western military interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and to a 
lesser extent Iraq. Former British army officer and CMC Co-Chair Simon Conway of Landmine Action 
thus habitually situated  cluster  munitions  in  a  ‘freedom  from  fear’  human  security  context  (Conway 
2006b, 2007; cited in CCW 2007, p.4; and WILPF 2008a, p.11). His repeated claim was whereas 
cluster  munitions  were  originally  designed  for   ‘a   last  ditch  defence  of  democracy’  against   invading  
communist armies (2006b, p.3),  the  nature  of  conflict  had  now  changed,  so  that  ‘The  wars  that  we 
fight   now   be   it   in   Kosovo,   Iraq   or   Afghanistan’   are   ‘wars   to   impose   order’,   so   that   ‘political   and  
economic   measures   can   take   hold’   (2007, p.9 my emphasis). The same arguments about the 
supposedly changed nature of war and the same identification with hegemonic Western interests 
were evident in a CMC video press release, where Conway argued: 
The  nature  of  war  and   the  wars   that  we   fight  have   changed.  We’re   talking  about  wars  of  
intervention in places like Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, where  what  you’re   fighting   for   is   the  
will of the people and you’re  fighting  amongst  the  people (CMC 2008n).  
Likewise,  the  chapter  on  Afghanistan  in  HRW’s   (2003e) 2003 World Report opens by asserting that 
‘2002  was  a  landmark  year  for  human  rights  in  Afghanistan’  and  claims  that ‘For  the  first  time  in  over  
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twenty years, Afghans had realistic hopes for stable peace, legitimate governance, increased 
development assistance, and new respect  for  human  rights  norms’.   
 
Similarly, the address, spreadingourvalues.com, chosen for Landmine Action’s  UK  campaign  website  
mildly  subverted,  but  ultimately  reinforced,  Tony  Blair’s  (1999, 2004) famous use of that terminology 
to justify military intervention in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq as a way of globalising liberal 
democracy and free market capitalism.  This emerges clearly in a speech by the CEO of the Diana 
Fund,  which  asserted  that  Blair’s  argument  that  ‘“the  best  defence  of  our  security  lies  in  the  spread  
of  our  values”…is  undoubtedly  right’,  but  that  using cluster munitions undermined this (in Landmine 
Action 2006b). The same logic lay behind repeated CMC arguments that the military utility of cluster 
munitions was limited in the context of the new human security goals of Western military 
interventions, in  which  killing  people  and  winning  “hearts  and  minds”  are  equally   important.  CMC 
representatives used that phrase on numerous occasions (HRW 2002b, p.17; McGrath 2004a, p.3; 
Nash 2005a, p.5; Rappert 2006, p.31; HRW and IHRC 2008b, p.12), arguing that ‘In   the   battle   for  
hearts and minds, large numbers of civilian casualties and ERW-contaminated land stemming from 
the  use  of  cluster  munitions  risks  undermining  strategic  objectives’   (CMC 2007n). HRW bemoaned 
that bombing civilians undermined military goals by alienating local populations and undermining 
counter-insurgency  (HRW 2002b, p.17; HRW and IHRC 2008b, p.12; cited in WILPF 2008a, p.9), while 
the  ‘Product  Recall’  campaign  launched  in  October  2006  by  the  CMC,  Landmine  Action  and  the  Diana  
Fund (2006a) in  the  UK  warned  that  in  Iraq  ‘Using  internationally  condemned  weapons  risks  turning  
those  people  against  us’.   
 
That such arguments not only failed to challenge hegemonic discourses around Western military 
interventions but actively reinforced them is evident in how they mirrored the discourse of 
supportive political elites. CMC founder NGO, Pax Christi Netherlands (Weidacher et al. 2005, p.8), 
could    quote  from  a  House  of  Commons  report  on  Kosovo  stating  that  cluster  munitions’  “reputation  
as an indiscriminate weapon risks international condemnation,  undermining  popular  support”,  while  
the   Austrian   campaign   claimed   the   European   Defence   Agency’s   Long-Term Vision (EDA 2006) 
contained ‘powerful   statements   against   the   use   of   CM   [cluster   munitions]   in…multinational  
operations, since military   successes   achieved   through   the   indiscriminate   targeting  of   civilians…will  
not serve the overall political purposes of ESDP [European Security and Defence Policy] crisis 
management   operations’,   meaning   ‘the  military   utility   of   cluster   bombs…was   expressly   doubted’  
(Breitegger 2010b, p.34).  
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CMC arguments that   using   cluster   munitions   undermined   Western   states’   ‘political   capital’   and  
winning “hearts and minds”   and   the  extent  of   identification   in this with the interests of Western 
states emerges even more clearly in Conway’s (2007, p.9) argument  that  ‘We  need  weapons  that  hit  
the  right  targets  and  kill  the  right  people…Let’s  stop  losing  wars.  Let’s  stop  killing  civilians.  Let’s  ban  
cluster  bombs’’.  This  adopts  the  perspective  of  Western  militaries,  openly  supports their victory in 
war, and presents all this as a reason to ban cluster munitions.  
 
All of this   illustrates   the  compatibility  of  NGO  arguments  with   the  militarised   ‘freedom  from   fear’  
human security discourses favoured by Western small and middle powers and helps to explain what 
Nash (2012, p.138)  describes as the CMC’s  ‘very  close  political  alignment’  with  Norway  on  ‘human  
security’.  Maintaining Western legitimacy to use force was presented as a motive for banning cluster 
munitions, whereas using cluster munitions was portrayed as damaging to hegemony both 
internationally and domestically. Global public opinion and target populations might lose confidence 
in   the   benevolence   of   Western   intervention   and   cluster   bombing   would   also   provoke   ‘public  
condemnation’   and   harm   ‘political   capital’   at   home,   indicating   the   differential but parallel 
significance of hegemonic discourses at national and international levels.  
Problematising Cluster Munitions 
From the outset, the CMC highlighted that cluster munitions posed a humanitarian problem both 
because of unexploded ordnance and their indiscriminate area effect at time of use. But this carnage 
was largely   framed   as   accidental   or   ‘collateral   damage’,   enabling   the   CMC   to avoid accusing user 
states of deliberate IHL violations. This accepted and mirrored the claims of Western states to have 
acted in good faith, whereas an intentionalist framing would have been far more politically 
contentious. Initially, although all the lead NGOs emphasised that unexploded cluster munitions had 
a similar impact to landmines, there were differences of opinion as to whether this was an intended 
result or an unfortunate side effect. The German campaign (Actiongroup Landmine.de 2005, p.12) 
and HI were among the few that framed this as a deliberate outcome, whereas HRW (HRW 1999b; 
Goose 2008c, p.219), MAC, Pax Christi (Weidacher et al. 2005, p.4), Landmine Action and the CMC 
head office all accepted state assurances that unexploded ordnance was unintended and 
undesirable.  
 
Reflecting these differences, early HI (2004a) materials described the high failure rate of cluster 
munitions as a ‘  “malfunction”  planned  by  the  military’,  who continued to use them because they 
had the effect of landmines. By contrast, others argued that cluster bombs presented this problem 
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despite their design, while with APMs it occurred because of their design (HRW  1999b, MAC 2001, 
p.2) The same approach also underlay HRW (1999d, 2002b, p.5, 2003c, 2007d, p.1) and  the  CMC’s  
habitual framing of unexploded cluster munitions as an issue of unreliability (CMC 2006d, 2006h, 
2007h) rather than deliberate actions by states. This argument was used by states themselves. For 
example, the UK government claimed  that,      ‘while  a  mine  will  constitute  dangerous ERW precisely 
because it is doing what it is designed to do, unexploded ordnance poses a danger because it has 
failed  to  perform  as  intended’  (Greenwood 2002, p.5).  
 
This avoidance of accusing (Western) states of deliberate IHL violations is even clearer vis-à-vis  the 
area effects of cluster munitions, in other words how they were designed to explode over a wide 
area, which are more difficult  to  frame  as  ‘accidental’,  given  they  are  a  central  design  feature  of  the  
weapons.   In  spite  of   this,  the  CMC  supported  states’   framing  of   the  humanitarian  harm  caused  by  
cluster munitions at time of attack as unintended. Pax Christi asserted that ‘Their   use   in   past  
conflicts has caused significant un-intentional  damage  during  attacks’  (Weidacher et al. 2005, p.4). 
Similarly, HRW’s  reports Fatally Flawed and Off Target (2002b, 2003b) dealing with cluster munitions 
use in Afghanistan and Iraq, made the overall assessment of the US bombing of Afghanistan as 
having   ‘caused   significant numbers of civilian casualties due to technical failures, human error 
(including  misidentification  of  targets)’,  and  lastly  and  only  ‘in  some  cases’,  ‘weapons  selection  and  
targeting  decisions  that  were  inconsistent  with  international  humanitarian  law’ (HRW 2003e). In the 
same   vein,   the   ‘Product   Recall’   campaign   in   the   UK   portrayed   cluster  munitions   as   ‘faulty’   (CMC 
2006i),  rather  than  operating  according  to  their  design  as  area  weapons.  Its  tagline  was  that  ‘[E]very  
year hundreds of consumer products are recalled because of the risk that they present to the public. 
It is time to do the same with our faulty weapons’   (Landmine Action et al. 2006b). This subtly 
depoliticised   the   issue   and   reinforced   the   concept   of   ‘collateral   damage’   by   framing   predictable 
civilian casualties as accidental. Around the same time, Landmine Action also began to publicly 
articulate a somewhat more critical discourse, by accusing states of a  ‘failure   to  protect’   civilians  
(2006, 2008; Rappert and Moyes 2009) by accurately assessing the balance between military utility 
and humanitarian considerations (Rappert 2005) and  preventing  ‘Foreseeable  Harm’ (Nash 2006a).  
Yet this approach still only implied negligence by Western forces, rather than highlighting the 
deliberate use of cluster munitions to target civilians and civilian objects as a way of forcing 
opponents to surrender, which according to several commentators had occurred during NATO’s  
‘humanitarian  intervention’  in  Yugoslavia  (Woodward 2001, p.332; 342; Herman 2002).  
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As part of this discourse, cluster munitions were defined  as  ‘inaccurate  and  unreliable  weapons’,  a 
line that appears to have originated with HRW (HRW 2003b, p.61, 2005c, p.15; Goose 2004b) and 
was adopted by the CMC (2006d, 2008l), including in the definition of cluster munitions in the final 
version of the CMC Call (2007h) before the treaty negotiations. This framing was sufficiently 
depoliticised for the UN Secretary-General (2006) and the ICRC (Spoerri 2006) to adopt it, and the 
ICRC (2007) eventually mimicked HRW’s   call   for   a   ban   on   ‘inaccurate   and   unreliable   cluster  
munitions’.   
 
A related aspect of how the CMC depoliticised the issue in order to attract government and elite 
support was to isolate cluster munitions as uniquely aberrant from the normal civilised conduct of 
Western militaries and their general compliance with IHL. Lead CMC strategists have recognised that 
‘deﬁning  what  is  illegitimate  is  inextricably  tied  to  afﬁrming  what  means  and  methods  for  killing  and  
injuring are legitimate’,   so   that   ‘attempts   to   restrict   particular   technologies   may   be   seen   as  
unintentionally sanctioning other forms of violence or even providing tacit acceptance of wider 
patterns  of  conﬂict’  (Rappert et al. 2013, p.766). Whether intentional or not, this was precisely what 
happened in how cluster munitions were stigmatised by the CMC.  
 
This was illustrated in HRW’s (2004b, p.6; 8)  claim that   cluster   munitions   were   ‘unlike   other  
weapons’  because   ‘even states that generally follow IHL cause disproportionate civilian harm with 
cluster munitions’ and the CMC’s   (2008l) insistence that   ‘Cluster   munitions   are   qualitatively   and  
quantitatively different from unitary bombs and   other   weapons’   and   so   should   be   treated  
‘differently’  (Nash 2005b). Moreover, it claimed that ‘Armed  forces  have  invested  a  lot  in  precision-
guided weapons to avoid killing and injuring civilians. The use of cluster munitions belies that 
commitment  to  civilian  protection’  (CMC 2006d).  
 
This  portrayal  of  Western  militaries  as  otherwise  ‘responsible’  purveyors  of  force  was  also  evident  in  
the Austrian  campaign’s  assertion that the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan had 
refrained from using cluster  munitions  because  of   the   ‘need   to   reduce   civilian   casualties’,  despite 
‘operating   in   a   very   diﬃcult   security   environment’   and   being   ‘compelled…to   engage   in   combat  
operations’  due  to  ‘Increased  insurgent  attacks’. In addition, it cited entirely uncritically the claim of 
‘a  senior  Dutch  air  force  commander’  that  ‘his  biggest  worry  during  high-risk close support missions 
was  causing  harm  to  innocent  Afghan  civilians’  (Breitegger 2010b, p.34n93).  
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Isolating cluster munitions in this way as uniquely humanitarianly problematic also meant the 
proportion of humanitarian harm they caused was sometimes exaggerated. For instance, the  CMC’s  
(2006d, 2008l) website asserted that  
individual reports from specific conflicts where cluster munitions were used indicate that 
they make a significant portion of the civilian casualties in these conflicts. For example, 
Human Rights Watch reported in 2003 that cluster munitions used by Coalition Forces killed 
hundreds of civilians in Iraq.  
Given estimated direct and indirect civilian deaths in Iraq run into tens and hundreds of thousands 
respectively, this grossly exaggerates the relative humanitarian impact of cluster munitions and 
massively understates the overall carnage. HRW’s  overwhelming  concentration  on  Coalition  forces’  
cluster munitions use in its report on the opening months of the Iraq War further inferred that clean 
hands might otherwise have been possible and in focusing on such a small aspect of the overall 
humanitarian problem, minimised the overall humanitarian impact of the war. Given cluster 
munitions caused less than 6% of direct civilian deaths and a negligible proportion of total civilian 
deaths, starting the war was the main ‘humanitarian’  problem,  rather  using cluster munitions during 
it. Notwithstanding this, HRW portrayed Coalition cluster munitions use in Iraq as aberrant from 
their general compliance with IHL, claiming that ‘U.S.-led Coalition forces took precautions to spare 
civilians’   (2003b, p.5), but that cluster munitions use was an exception to this rule, owing to the 
inherent difficulty in using them responsibly. The context of this was that the co-author of HRW’s  
report on   Iraq,   Marc   Garlasco,   had   been   head   of   “high-value   targeting”   at   the   US   Defense  
Intelligence Agency (Birnbaum 2010; Kennedy 2012, p.31). In perhaps the ultimate expression of 
HRW’s  insider  tactics,  he had travelled to Iraq a mere  ten  days  afterwards  as  a  ‘human  rights  activist’  
to  examine  ‘the  effects  of  his  own  targeting’  and  ‘investigate collateral damage from the airstrikes 
he had helped plan’,  including  an  attack  killing  seventeen  civilians  he  had  ‘cheered’  from  inside  the  
Pentagon (Ferguson 2008, pp.10–14; White 2008; Birnbaum 2010).  
 
In   general,   Landmine  Action  and  HRW’s (2003f) stance of taking no position on the Iraq War and 
focusing solely on how it was conducted was representative of the generally depoliticised approach 
of humanitarian and human rights/IHL NGOs towards Western conflicts. Landmine Action (2003e), 
which was not part of the anti-war  movement  against   the   imminent   invasion,   ‘warned’   the  British  
government   that   using   ‘cluster   bombs   would   fatally   undermine   the   credibility   of   claims   that  
“collateral  damage”  was  being  minimized’  and  implored  it  ‘to  exercise  strong  leadership  in  stopping  
the  use  of  indiscriminate  weapons’.  In  a  similar  vein,  HRW  confined  itself  to  a  legalistic  assessment  
of proportionality and discrimination in individual attacks, thereby situating the conduct of war as 
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the problem, rather than the war itself. By way of justification, it claimed judging the legality of 
individual   conflicts  would   compromise   its  neutrality   in   assessing  belligerents’   compliance  with   IHL  
and  ‘require  political  and  security  assessments  that  are  beyond  our  expertise’  (HRW 2003f).  
 
In contrast to HRW and Landmine Action, NPA and HI opposed some of the conflicts where Western 
forces used cluster munitions, but this fact was omitted entirely from their cluster munitions output. 
Hence, despite having initially opposed the Western interventions in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq, 
NPA made no mention of this in its materials on cluster munitions published during the campaign, 
including its Yellow Killers report on cluster munitions in Serbia (NPA 2007b). Consequently, its CMC 
output did not draw any connection between the use of these weapons and the nature of those 
wars,  which   it  had  perceived  at  the  time  as   illegitimate  to  varying  extents.   Instead,   it  took  NATO’s  
stated humanitarian aims at face value, so that, retrospectively, it treated the intervention in much 
the same manner as HRW.  
 
Likewise, despite having initially opposed both the Iraq War (Leer-Salvesen 2002; Christensen 2003) 
and the deployment of Norwegian troops in June 2003 (Rudberg Elstad 2003), NPA rapidly withdrew 
from the anti-war movement (Sandven 2003; Peace Initiative 2011) to join the international aid 
effort and undertook clearance and reconstruction projects in Iraq funded by the US, Norway and 
the EU (NPA 2011). NPA’s  subsequent  analysis  of  cluster  munitions  use  in  Iraq  makes  no  mention  of  
opposing the war and adopts an entirely technical and humanitarian perspective (King et al. 2007). 
Similarly, a 2003 report by HI on cluster munitions made no political arguments about the Iraq war, 
even though it had opposed the war on the grounds that peaceful disarmament was still possible (HI 
et al. 2003). This was uncontroversial domestically, given France had opposed the war for much the 
same  stated  reasons.  Nevertheless,  as  a  ‘neutral’  humanitarian  organisation  involved  in  post-conflict 
humanitarian operations in Iraq (HI-Belgium 2004), HI was not actively involved in the anti-war 
movement.  
 
A   similar   depoliticisation   was   evident   in   the   campaign’s   humanitarian   framing,   which   de-
contextualised individual human suffering, with only two of twenty-three survivor accounts in HI-
Belgium’s   (2007, p.10) report identifying the state responsible and none the manufacturer. This 
avoided repeatedly linking tragic tales of personal loss directly to Western governments, which 
might  have  embarrassed  the  reports’  funders,  particularly  Norway,  which  was  the  sole  funder  of  the  
original research and Belgium and Germany, which part-funded the final report and, like Norway, 
had supported the cluster bombing of Yugoslavia and Afghanistan by their NATO allies. A similar tact 
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is discernible in CMC press releases, which hardly ever directly   connected   cluster   munitions’  
humanitarian impact to Western states, for instance captioning pictures of victims and unexploded 
submunitions  with  the  cluster  munition  ‘responsible’  rather  than  the  state  or  manufacturer.  The only 
exception in 55 CMC press releases from July 2006 to May 2008 was one press release in January 
2008 release, which criticised US cluster munitions policy and quoted Branislav Kapetanovic saying 
he   had   “lost   all  my   limbs   and   received   severe   damage   to  my   sight   and   hearing   after   a  US-made 
cluster  bomblet  exploded  in  my  face”  (CMC 2008o). The rarity of such bluntness and its direction at 
the Bush administration, which was never likely to join the Oslo Process, suggests NGOs deliberately 
avoided embarrassing users like the UK and the Netherlands in the same way. The same tact was 
evident in how NGO reports funded by user governments generally did not specifically name them 
as responsible for negative humanitarian effects (Borrie 2003; Weidacher et al. 2005), whereas users 
were mentioned in two reports funded by NGOs’ home governments involved in joint military 
operations where its allies had used cluster munitions but they had not (HI 2003, p.14; NPA 2007b, 
p.56).  
North-South Dimensions of CMC Discourse 
In  contrast  to  the  CMC’s  appeals  to  Western  military  and  political  interests,  there  was  relatively  little  
consideration in this regard for non-Western   states,   as   demonstrated   by   the   CMC’s   support   for  
various expensive technical fixes, its stoking of Western fears about weapons proliferation to the 
South, and contribution to the shifting of responsibility for the problem from users and producers 
onto affected states.  
 
It was widely recognised in the CMC that the cost of ‘technical   fixes’   to   improve  the  accuracy  and  
reliability was likely to be high and only available only from manufacturers in the industrialised west, 
thereby placing them out of reach for the poorest countries, who would likely to refuse to sign a 
treaty that obliged them to make these modifications (HI 2005b, p.5, McGrath 2004a, pp.8–9,  
Goose 2004a, p.15; Weidacher et al. 2005, p.4; 36). Despite this, and in   contrast   to   the   ICBL’s  
framing   of   ‘smart   mines’   as   a   North-South issue, the CMC generally ignored these North-South 
dimensions of the issue and only made limited reference to it in two press releases towards the end 
of the Oslo Process,   when   developing   countries’   support was needed (CMC 2008p, 2008q). The 
prospect   that   the   highest   tech   ‘smart’   guided   cluster munitions would be excluded predictably 
provoked opposition from developing country stockpilers (Borrie 2009, pp.257–258), with South 
Africa, Brazil and Egypt arguing it would discriminate against developing countries and widen the gap 
with wealthier nations (Chrispin Marin 2008; HRW and Landmine Action 2009, p.155; 198).  
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A related approach, adopted by several developing states, including Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina and 
Vietnam, a severely affected state, was to frame banning cluster munitions in terms of the 
longstanding official UN arms control framework of progress   towards   ‘general   and   complete  
disarmament  under  international  control’  (UN General Assembly 1959, 1961). The CMC viewed this 
as a recipe for stalemate, given it needed to attract the support of the major Western military 
powers. NGOs, UN agencies, and the Core Group alike consequently rejected this framing of cluster 
munitions as a disarmament issue in favour of a humanitarian approach (Borrie 2009, p.281). While 
this enabled progress towards a ban, it suited Western states in excluding from the agenda 
questions related to the North/South, West/non-West, military balance, while allowing the retention 
of  advanced  ‘smart’  weapons  judged to be less damaging from a humanitarian perspective.  
 
An additional way the CMC ignored the interests of developing states, and actually exploited 
conflicts of interests with Western powers, was by stoking fears of future proliferation (Nash 2006b, 
p.42; Rappert 2006, p.10). HRW highlighted  ‘potential  future  danger  of  widespread  proliferation’  as  
one of three main reasons to regulate cluster munitions and linked this to acquisition by developing 
states,  voicing   ‘concern’   ‘that   the  number  of  countries  capable  of  producing  cluster  munitions  will  
continue to grow as production know-how is licensed and technology transferred, and that countries 
will increasingly offer out-of-date,  surplus  cluster  munitions  to  less  advanced  military  allies’  (2005a, 
p.2, 2007a, p.1).  Likewise  Landmine  Action’s  Simon  Conway  argued  in  a  CMC  (2007o) press release 
that   “The   Oslo   Process   will   prevent   a   new   arms   race   across   the   developing   world”,   while   the 
Austrian  campaign  warned  parliamentarians  in  2006  of  ‘the  necessity  to  destroy  existing  stockpiles  
of  CM  to  prevent  them  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  unreliable  regimes’   (Breitegger 2010b, p.12). 
For similar reasons, the CMC devoted disproportionate attention to   Hezbollah’s   use   of   a   small 
number of cluster munitions in the 2006 Lebanon War53, which was described by CMC-Austria as an 
illustration  of  cluster  munitions  ‘falling  into  the  wrong  hands’  (Breitegger 2010b, p.12).  
 
This problematisation of possible proliferation was mirrored in an under-emphasis of user and 
producer responsibility for the existing humanitarian problem and its portrayal as a problem shared 
by all states, even though culpability for the problem was concentrated among a few, mainly 
Western, advanced military powers. The US was by far the largest of the top four historical users, 
which also included the UK, Israel and Russia (HRW 2010). Moreover, all the affected states were 
                                                     
53 47 separate items on the CMC website (as of 4/8/2010) referenced  Hezbollah’s  use,  which was always 
mentioned in  the  ‘Questions  and  Answers’  attached to press releases. According to Israeli figures, two civilians 
were killed and twenty-four injured – compared to UN figures of twenty-four deaths and 183 injuries from 
Israel’s  cluster  munitions  use  (HRW 2007b, p.46; 6).  
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non-Western countries that had mainly been attacked by the US and/or its allies with weapons 
produced by Western arms manufacturers. This included five of the six worst affected states – Laos, 
Iraq, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Lebanon54 (HI-Belgium 2007, p.148; Landmine and Cluster Munition 
Monitor 2010, p.33).  
 
User responsibility was the third demand in the first two versions of the CMC Call (CMC 2003b; 
quoted in Borrie 2009, p.146), but it was downplayed over time, while producer responsibility was 
omitted entirely. Activism vis-à-vis the arms industry was instead directed at investment in cluster 
munitions   production,   perhaps   due   to   NGOs’   lack   of   success   in   pursuing   compensation   from  
landmines manufacturers. The disinvestment angle was used more as a publicity tactic in various 
national campaigns, however, and was not a central aspect of CMC discourse or a core campaign 
demand. Reflecting this, it was not mentioned in official CMC press releases and despite having 
earlier advocated a ban on investment as part of the treaty ban on assistance with prohibited acts 
(CMC 2007p, p.1; 9, n.d.), the CMC had effectively downgraded the issue by the final negotiations 
and omitted it from Policy Papers distributed in Dublin (CMC 2008m). 
 
With respect to user responsibility, the CMC de-emphasised it and formally deleted it from the third 
version of the Call in April 2007 (CMC 2007h). Consequently, although it continued to support user 
responsibility at Oslo Process conferences (CMC 2008r; WILPF 2008a, p.22), it had signalled its 
flexibility on the issue to user states, in particular the UK. User responsibility was also assigned a low 
priority in the CMC’s  Treaty Principles, first developed for the May 2007 Lima Conference, framed as 
a   vague   call   for   ‘special   responsibility’   repeated   for   the Dublin Conference 2008 (CMC 2007m, 
2007q), (CMC 2008s). However, it continued to be emphasised by many Southern states (2008a, 
p.22, 2008b, p.22).   Benin   argued   producers   should   have   to   ‘compensate’   affected   states   (Dublin 
Conference 2008a, p.3) and   Laos   hoped   the   treaty   would   create   a   new   norm   ‘for   placing  
responsibility on user States  to  address  the  consequences  of  the  use  of  cluster  munitions’,   (Dublin 
Conference 2008b, p.7, 2008c, p.1). This position was also supported by Venezuela, which argued 
‘[T]here  should  be  no  loophole  allowing  user  States  to  transmit…responsibility  to  States  affected  by  
cluster   munitions’   (Dublin Conference 2008b, p.1). According to a senior Austrian disarmament 
official, African   states   believed   the   proposed   agreement   ‘would give richer states a technological 
advantage, while still burdening them with the responsibility for dealing with the aftermath of CW 
[cluster  weapon]  use’  (Marschik cited in US Embassy Vienna 2008).  
 
                                                     
54 Russia/Chechnya was the only one cluster bombed by a non-Western state. 
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CMC’s   position   was   that   ‘International support should be provided for victim assistance efforts, 
while recognizing that the primary responsibility for developing national victim assistance programs 
lies  with  affected  States’  (Harrison 2008b, p.20n6). In tandem  with  replacing  the  CMC’s  opening  Call  
for special user responsibility with a request for ‘all  States’ to   ‘commit  resources  and  capacities  to  
assist  communities  and  individuals  affected  by  cluster  munitions’   (CMC 2003b, 2007h), this shifted 
responsibility away from mainly Western user states and arms producers and towards affected non-
Western states. Consistent with this, NPA’s  welcoming  address  on  behalf  of  the  CMC  to the parallel 
civil  society  forum  of  a  conference  of  affected  states  in  Serbia  declared  it  was  “important  to  draw  a  
line between conflicts of the past that have caused cluster contamination, and the current need for 
financial  assistance”,  whilst  urging  ‘donors’,  including  cluster munition users  like  the  US  and  UK,  ‘to  
review donations to the clearance of cluster munitions in countries that have not adopted 
moratoria’,  thereby  ‘conditioning  financial  support  on  the  future  non-use  of  cluster  munitions’.   
 
All these different aspects of CMC discourse – from the emphasis on technical fixes 
disproportionately available to advanced Western militaries;  to accepting their humanitarian 
justifications for military interventions; to portraying cluster munitions as an exceptional aberration 
from the otherwise civilised Western way of war and avoiding wider political criticisms; to suggesting 
and/or acquiescing to solutions that took little or no account of the military interests of non-
Western states and transferred responsibility for the problem onto affected states – combined to 
produce a form of bounded criticism of Western states that portrayed banning cluster munitions as 
in their enlightened or hegemonic long-term interests and explicitly presented maintaining Western 
legitimacy to use force as a motive for banning cluster munitions. On one level, many of these 
arguments were strategic, as states would be forced to defend the use of cluster munitions against 
their own declared aims, but on another it reflected a level of acceptance, endorsement and 
reinforcement of these aims.  
 
For some of the lead NGOs and CMC strategists, in particular HRW and Landmine Action, this formed 
part of a wider agenda of supporting the concept of humanitarian intervention/R2P, and/or 
strengthening IHL more broadly. Leading UK CMC strategists thus claimed to have significantly 
strengthened IHL, particularly in relation to proportionality, by reversing the burden of proving the 
acceptability of cluster munitions onto states (Rappert and Moyes 2009, 2010; Moyes and Nash 
2011a, p.16). That the CMC confined itself within these hegemonic discursive boundaries and indeed 
actively sought to strengthen them, while rejecting or de-emphasising alternative frameworks 
preferred by developing countries, reflects a lack of discursive autonomy from Western elites, 
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consistent with its close personnel relationships with Western states and UN agencies, its financial 
dependency on them as well as private foundations. The end result was an essentially hegemonic 
discourse. This was also reflected in the increasing shift from demands for user responsibility to 
‘ownership’  of  the  problem  by  affected  states  and  increased  aid  for  clearance  and  victim  assistance, 
which were also compatible   with   the   CMC’s   humanitarian   approach.   This   inherently   entails   a 
charitable model of voluntary international assistance, which once again proved more palatable than 
legal responsibility to users and donors. This analysis is supported by Cooper (2011, p.152) and Beier 
(2011, p.170) who  argue that  the campaign was successful because it adopted the same discourse 
as  Western  States  on  military  intervention  and  on  ‘new’  weapons  development.   In this way, NGOs’  
framing of the issue fitted into hegemonic governance narratives and did not question wider North-
South power structures, or the wider military and economic practices of Western states and arms 
manufacturers, and was ultimately perceived as acceptable because it proffered solutions 
compatible  with  Western  interests.  The  campaign’s  financial  dependency  and  close  personnel links 
with supportive elites also predicated a predominantly insider tactical approach and a concomitant 
strategy of partnership with states and international organisations.  
Campaign Tactics and Strategy 
From the outset, the CMC mainly relied on insider tactics (Borrie 2009, pp.142–3), the core plank of 
which was forming a  partnership  with  likeminded  states.  This  was  the  primary  ‘lesson’  drawn  from  
the landmine campaign by NGOs, states, UN agencies and academics alike and the  CMC’s  eventual  
success in implementing it has therefore been regarded as evidence of the continuing efficacy of 
multi-actor partnerships between NGOs, UN agencies and middle and small powers (2010, 2007; 
Bolton 2008; Borrie 2008, 2009; Goose 2008c; Borrie et al. 2009; Frerks 2009; Bolton and Nash 2010; 
Nash 2010, 2012; Rappert et al. 2013). Creating such a partnership with governments initially proved 
difficult for reasons discussed in the previous chapter, including the diplomatic backlash that 
followed the Ottawa Process and the changed international security environment of the War on 
Terror, which resulted in  a  ‘discernible  swing  back  toward  national  security  and  defence  positions  by  
many   governments’   (Cave 2006, p.63) and was reinforced by the swing towards conservative 
governments in the early 2000s.  
 
Against this backdrop, early NGO efforts were constrained by their existing partnerships on 
landmines with Canada, Norway and other Western governments, which had rendered the ICBL 
financially dependent on those states. As MAC’s   then   Chair   has   since   explained,   the   fear   ‘that  
formally linking a cluster-munitions initiative to the landmine campaign would threaten partner 
governments’   (Collins 2006) contributed to the ICBL’s  decision  not   to   add   cluster  munitions   to   its  
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mandate. This discouraged wider NGO participation as had the ICBL taken on the issue, it would 
immediately have acquired a higher public profile given its still relatively recent success in banning 
landmines, the huge amount of media and academic attention that had attracted, and its remaining 
network of national campaigns. Without it, the new coalition was unable to fully exploit the ICBL 
‘brand’,  or  what  remained  of  its  national  campaign  infrastructure, and had to build a name for itself 
from scratch.  
 
In the absence of official ICBL support, only a handful of NGOs, including HI, Landmine Action, MAC 
and Pax Christi, which all participated in government delegations, and HRW, attended the CCW 
Review and Protocol V negotiations up to November 2003. Their small numbers and insider 
approach (Cave 2006, pp.65–66; Rappert et al. 2013, p.769) helped establish a pattern of heavy 
dependency on insider tactics that persisted throughout the cluster munitions campaign. Indeed, 
tactically speaking, the CMC emerged more from these early insider efforts and the institutionalised 
ICBL,  than  from  the  landmines  ‘campaign’  as  an   international network of national NGO campaigns. 
According to Goose, this relative lack of wider involvement was the reason for calling the CMC a 
Coalition,  as  “Campaign  implies  that  we’ve  got  lots  of  organizations  very  active  on  it  on  a  daily  basis”  
(quoted in Borrie 2009, p.52).  
 
These  circumstances  contributed  to  the  CMC’s  cautious  opening  Call  for  a  moratorium, even though  
supporters in some countries were already calling for a ban (ABM AMRO 2004, Garden & 
Ramsbotham 2003). This foreshadowed the subsequent constraints placed on CMC activity by 
financial dependency and the nature of the campaign. In the early years, this necessitated 
maintaining cordial relations with governments not yet committed to meaningful action and forced 
the Coalition to survive on very little funding. This largely remained the case until firm support was 
secured from Norway and other supportive states in 2006. While this massively financially benefited 
the Coalition, it would have reinforced the tendency to limit CMC discourse to bounded criticisms 
and discouraged contentious outsider tactics.  
From the CMC launch to the launch of the Oslo Process: November 2003-November 2006 
After the Protocol V negotiations ended and the CMC was officially launched in 2003, what little 
government funding was available was earmarked for the more politically palatable subject of ERW, 
which the CMC had included in its Call largely for this reason (Borrie 2009, p.55). Consequently, it 
was still devoting significant attention to ERW and calling on states to ratify Protocol V (HI 2004b, 
p.4). This hobbled NGO campaigning on cluster munitions and forced the CMC to concentrate on 
expert research on ERW targeted at policy-makers (Moyes and Nash 2011a, p.16). Its other main 
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areas of activity from 2003-4 were also largely insider-focused, including lobbying diplomats in 
Geneva, government officials, and the European Parliament to support a new negotiating mandate 
on cluster munitions at the CCW (CMC 2004d, 2004e; HI 2004b, 2004c; Frerks 2009, pp.17–18). Even 
by this early stage, NGOs were also already seeking a partnership with likeminded governments. This 
was  discussed  at  the  CMC’s  First International Meeting in November 2003 (Pax Christi Netherlands 
2004, p.28) and Steve Goose (2004a, p.19) also  publicly  promoted   it   in  HRW’s  high-profile annual 
World Report in January 2004 and again in his speech at the CMC’s  Second International Meeting 
that  March,  when  he  declared  to  the  government  officials  and  parliamentarians  present  that  ‘A  key  
challenge  for  NGOs  is  to  promote  a  Core  group  of  governments  that  can  provide  leadership’  (2004b, 
p.28).  
 
The CMC attracted very little media attention55 during this period, in part because cluster munitions 
were no longer being used in Afghanistan and Iraq, which had largely settled into low-intensity 
counter-insurgencies, and were not used again until a new high-intensity conflict broke out in 
Lebanon in 2006.  Other factors were the lack of public campaigning at the national level, even in 
Norway or Belgium (Petrova 2007, p.24; 9), in part due to a lack of donor funding, and the 
preoccupation of leading ICBL figures such as Goose and Paul Hannon of MAC with ICBL/Landmine 
Monitor in the run-up to the First Review Conference of the APLC in November-December 2004 
(Borrie 2009, p.56). The   CMC’s lack of a proper website until June 200556 (CMC 2005b) further 
illustrates both the   campaign’s lack of donor funding and its neglect of public communications. 
Under these conditions, it made very little progress, leading Petrova (2007, p.12) to conclude that 
‘for  a  couple  of  years  CMC  had  hardly  made  any  difference  in  terms  of  campaigning  or  policy  impact’  
partly because of the vagueness of its campaign Call.  
 
Against this backdrop, tensions developed vis-à-vis campaign strategy, with HRW and Landmine 
Action preferring to concentrate on research (Borrie 2009, p.61), whereas HI was more oriented 
towards public campaigning. Another issue was that whereas HRW and MAC viewed the ambiguity 
of   the  campaign’s  Call   for  a  moratorium  as  useful   for  attracting  government   support  and   funding,  
the newly appointed CMC Coordinator, Thomas Nash, saw it as ‘a  growing  obstacle,  since  it  was  not  
self-evident what it meant at a time when the CMC to trying to attract NGOs to its banner and begin 
to  build  relationships  with  states’  (cited in Borrie 2009, p.57). McGrath (2004a, 2004b) argued that 
                                                     
55 Lexis Nexis  records  only  three  articles  referencing  the  “Cluster  Munitions  Coalition”  and  823  mentioning  
“cluster  munitions/bombs”  in  2004.  The  2005  figures  are  similar  at  2  and  670  respectively.     
56 Prior to this, it had a very limited website on a web hosting service, which has not been updated and is still 
accessible at http://homepage.eircom.net/~cmcinternational/home/index.htm (Accessed 20/12/2013) 
248 
 
the CMC should move away from a limited ban and technical fixes, and instead call for an outright 
ban – as HI and NPA had advocated from the outset. Meanwhile, Rappert and Moyes (2004, pp.5–6) 
set out their strategy of reversing the burden of proof onto states to demonstrate that cluster 
munitions complied with IHL, which also inferred a tactical shift away from advocating technical 
fixes. HI was the lead NGO that most strongly favoured a change in strategy. In the absence of 
agreement among the lead NGOs and the wider CMC Steering Committee and with threats from HI 
field staff to resign if there was no change (Nash 2006b, p.10), the entire HI network decided in 
February 2005 to launch a public campaign explicitly calling for a ban (HI-Belgium 2006c, p.35). This 
was  facilitated  by  HI’s  substantial  public  fundraising  base  and  large ICBL/CMC budget (HI 2007, p.17), 
which  meant   it   had  more   resources   and   less   reason   to   be   concerned   about   donor   governments’  
reaction than some other Steering Committee NGOs, such as the still under-resourced Landmine 
Action, or MAC, which was heavily financially dependent on the Canadian government.  
 
HI proceeded to mobilise its branches and launched a public campaign with numerous other NGOs in 
France that called for a ban without making any distinction between different types of cluster 
munition (Agir Ici 2005). This involved a national advertising campaign of posters, TV and radio ads, 
celebrity endorsements, and routine outsider tactics with some participatory elements, including a 
petition launched in June 2005 that had gathered over 100,000 signatures by that September, and a 
postcard campaign targeting politicians (HI 2005b, p.3). HI was also involved in the relatively large 
public campaign in Germany57, where Actiongroup Landmine.de had long advocated a ban on all 
mines and all ‘mine-like  weapons’  including  cluster  munitions,  but  did  not  to  join  the  CMC  until after 
it switched to a ban position (Actiongroup Landmine.de 2007).   
  
Despite all this public campaigning, there was little movement in government positions in France or 
Germany, which are both relatively large military powers with sizeable arms industries. HI secured a 
commitment from Nicolas Sarkozy to support French participation in an international process to ban 
cluster munitions when he was a Presidential candidate in 2006, as well as signatures on its ban 
petition   from   Sarkozy’s   future   Defence   Minister,   centrist   Hervé   Morin,   and   the   future   Foreign  
Minister, Bernard Kouchner, who had been a Socialist minister in previous governments. 
Notwithstanding  this,  France’s  position  did  not  immediately  change  when  the  new  government  took  
office in June 2007 (CMC 2007r). In the end, it required several more months of international 
                                                     
57 See HI-Germany’s  ban  campaign website at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050306010321/http://www.streubomben.de/ (accessed 20/12/13).  
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momentum, an internal review that concluded most of its stockpile was of limited use, and some 
endgame concessions to its interests for France to agree to the treaty (Borrie 2009, pp.251–252).  
 
The first major breakthrough came in Belgium, which again produced the first national ban. Due to 
its small size and dependence on larger NATO allies for defense, Belgium lacked significant security 
interests in cluster munitions, so a ban faced virtually no opposition from the military, and the 
smallness of its arms industry meant opposition from that quarter was less politically influential than 
in great powers like the US. Under these conditions, once a ban was raised through NGO lobbying 
and media efforts, activist social democratic parliamentarians and the general public readily 
supported it. HI-Belgium began its ban campaign by appealing to the Senate and followed up with 
media briefings and a joint call with HRW and Netwerk Vlaanderen for banks and private companies 
to divest from cluster munitions. This attracted significant press coverage and led to swift denials of 
interest from two Belgian arms companies (HI-Belgium 2006c, p.35; Petrova 2007; Borrie 2009, 
p.66).  
 
The President of the Socialist Party group in the Senate, which was then a member of the ruling four-
party Flemish-Francophone social democratic-liberal coalition, responded by rapidly introducing ban 
legislation. Rather than arising from public pressure as such, the Senate adopted the ban bill (HI 
2005b, p.1) largely due to the efforts of individual senators and media attention. The bill was also 
initially politically uncontroversial given it passed unanimously (Borrie 2009, p.68). Public opinion 
subsequently played more of a role in getting it through the Chamber of Representatives, as strong 
opposition emerged from the arms industry (Bodeux 2006a, 2006b; Campioli 2006; CMC 2006j; HI-
Belgium 2006c, p.35; Petrova 2007, pp.10–12), which cited  HRW’s  technical  fix  approach  of  a  limited  
ban (Belgian Security and Defence Industry 2005; Sudpresse.be 2006) and highlighted how this 
differed   from  HI’s   total   ban   position   (Nash 2006b, p.37n14). HI-Belgium responded with a letter-
writing campaign and a petition that gathered 300,000 signatures. Media attention and international 
pressure from the CMC also helped maintain parliamentary support (Petrova 2007, pp.11–12; Borrie 
2009, pp.68–69). However HI-Belgium did not have the support of arms industry workers, which 
meant the only significant public demonstrations opposed prohibition and were organised by trade 
unions and arms industry workers worried about potential job losses (Bodeux 2006c; Petrova 2007, 
pp.11–12; Borrie 2009, pp.68–69).  
 
A national ban became law in February 2006, but was qualified immediately afterwards by an 
additional bill agreed by the four coalition parties. This excluded  guided  ‘smart’  munitions  the  arms  
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industry was developing, but was also sufficiently vague for NGOs to interpret more restrictively 
(Petrova 2007, pp.11–12; Borrie 2009, pp.68–69). HI-Belgium was consulted on its content (Petrova 
2007, p.12) and appears to have acquiesced. NGOs in the CMC continued to refer simply to 
Belgium’s  ‘ban  on  cluster  munitions’  (HI 2006c, p.1; 3, 2006d, p.3; HI-Belgium 2006c, p.1; 6; 11; HRW 
2006d) – which Nash (2006c, p.8) rather  disingenuously,  but  technically  accurately,  described  as  ‘the  
strongest   possible   action’.   HI’s   (2006a, p.3) framing   of   the   second   law   as   ‘strengthening the 
prohibition  through  a  more  precise  definition’  was  even  more  misleading,  given  it  was  supported  by  
the   arms   industry   whereas   the   first   law  was   not.   This   foreshadowed   the   CMC’s   response   to   the  
concessions to Western military and economic interests in how cluster munitions were defined in 
the CCM, which was broadly similar to the amended Belgian legislation (Borrie 2009, p.69).  
 
The CMC Steering Committee had already decided to focus more on national campaigning at its 
November 2004 meeting (Frerks 2009, p.18). The result was an increased emphasis on consensual 
and routine outsider tactics, with the CMC (2005e) citing ban petitions of over 100,000 signatures in 
France and Germany and plans to make the public aware of government positions in a statement to 
the CCW in August 2005. However, such tactics remained   ancillary   to   the   CMC’s   predominantly  
insider approach and its ongoing efforts to secure elite support and government partners that would 
take a lead on the issue. In 2005, this included an IHL questionnaire for states distributed at the CCW 
and several expert research publications (HRW 2005a; Landmine Action et al. 2005; Moyes and Nash 
2005;  Observatoire  des  transferts  d’armaments  et al. 2005; Rappert 2005; Weidacher et al. 2005). In 
addition, there was the annual informal meeting hosted by the Netherlands prior to the CCW 
sessions, which in March 2005 was attended by HRW, Landmine Action, MAC, Pax Christi 
Netherlands, the UN  Mine Action Service (UNMAS), ICRC and prospective government partners, 
which then included Canada, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland (Petrova 2007, p.25; 
Borrie 2009, p.60).  
 
A  second,  related  effect  of  HI’s  Belgian  success  was  to  push  the  CMC  more  towards  a  ban  position  
(Petrova 2007, p.12). HRW and MAC were still opposed (Borrie 2009, p.146), however, reportedly 
due  to  ‘institutional  identities’  (Moyes in Rappert et al. 2011, p.306) related  to  HRW’s  IHL  framework  
and belief not all cluster munitions were illegal according to this approach (Nash 2006b, p.37). Lead 
NGOs at this point favouring a ban position included HI, NPA and Landmine Action, which demanded 
a ban for the first time in a February 2006 letter to UK parliamentarians right after the Belgian ban 
law (Conway 2006a; Nash 2006b, p.37). Rappert, Moyes and Nash appear to have become 
increasingly  frustrated  with  HRW’s  intransigence,  with  Nash  eventually  arguing  publicly   in  UNIDIR’s  
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Disarmament Forum in November 2006 that differences in the campaign were giving ammunition to 
opponents (2006b, p.37n14).  Moyes  has  also   inferred   that  HRW’s  obstinacy  on   this  point  delayed  
the UNDP from publicly calling for a ban, which it had wanted to do from as early as June 2005 
(Borrie 2009, p.240n35; in Rappert et al. 2011, p.306). Borrie (2009, p.237) explains UN agencies 
were reluctant to adopt a more radical position than leading NGOs like HRW, so had the CMC 
adopted a ban position earlier, this would likely have helped UNDP in winning over more 
conservative UN agencies, such as the Office for Disarmament Affairs, which was institutionally 
invested in the CCW as the official UN arms control forum (Borrie 2009, pp.235–248).  
 
In this period, electoral shifts and the incumbency of liberal/social democratic parties facilitated 
governments in several middle and small powers in assuming a leadership role on cluster munitions. 
Such parties generally profess more human security-oriented framings of security policy, 
distinguishing them from more conservative parties, from which they otherwise differ little, 
particularly on economic fundamentals. In New Zealand, which joined the Core Group, the pro-ban 
Labour Party was in office throughout the campaign until November 2008, whereas in the 
Netherlands, which did not, various conservative/Christian Democrat coalitions were in office from 
2002 onwards and support came mainly from opposition parties (Frerks 2009, p.33). For most of the 
campaign, this included the Labour Party, which eventually joined the government in November 
2006, but only as a junior coalition partner. Likewise, Sweden was one of the most supportive states 
during the preparatory meetings of the Third CCW Review, but this changed once a conservative 
government came to power in October 2006  (Goose 2008c, p.226; Borrie 2009, p.83).  
 
In Austria, a coalition between the Social and Christian Democrats that took office in January 2007 
was significantly more favourably disposed to a ban than the previous conservative/Christian 
Democrat-far right coalition. Prior to this election, CMC-Austria (a small insider-focused 
organisation) had successfully lobbied two of the leading opposition parties to adopt a pro-ban 
position (Breitegger 2010b), but was only able to carry out significant public campaigning,  with 
government funding, after support from the new government was secured (CMC-Austria 2008, n.d.; 
Breitegger 2010b). Once the new government was in office, it rapidly introduced a national 
moratorium (Breitegger 2010b, pp.17–19) and went on to play one of the most important roles in 
the Core Group of States, including hosting an important Oslo Process conference in Vienna.  
 
In Norway, a Labour-Socialist Left-Centre Party coalition took over from the previous Conservative-
led government in September 2005 and radically   altered   that   country’s attitude to the campaign. 
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Promoting an international ban on cluster munitions was included in its October 2005 programme 
for government (Red-Green Alliance 2005, p.9) and it quickly began to implement this, working 
behind the scenes with likeminded states and NGOs to form a Core Group and hammer out a 
common strategy (Borrie 2009, p.127). Norway followed up with a moratorium on use in June (CMC 
2009c, p.2) and declared in the CCW the same month that it would immediately start working for a 
‘ban  on  cluster  munitions  that  cause  unacceptable  humanitarian  problems’  ‘with  interested  states,  
humanitarian  organisations  and  other  relevant  actors’  (Norway 2006a).  Once the Third CCW Review 
Conference in November 2006 again failed to agree a negotiating mandate on cluster munitions, 
Norway (2006c) announced  it  would   invite   ‘countries that have expressed an interest and a will to 
take   urgent   action’,   relevant   UN   organisations,   the   Red   Cross   and   NGOs   to an international 
conference   in   Oslo   to   launch   a   standalone   process   ‘to prohibit cluster munitions that cause 
unacceptable  humanitarian  harm’.   
The Oslo Process: 2006-2008 
The language used in this announcement was crucial and a variation of it became a central plank of 
the Oslo Process. Norway’s   invitation   letter   to   the   opening  Oslo   Conference   initially modified the 
wording to ‘an   international   ban on those cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to 
civilians’   (Norway 2006b), thereby excluding combatants from humanitarian consideration and 
implying some cluster munitions would be excluded. However, the Oslo Declaration agreed at the 
February 2007 Oslo Conference, which set the parameters of the Oslo Process and which states had 
to sign to participate, tweaked this wording again to describe its goal as a legally binding prohibition 
on ‘cluster  munitions  that  cause  unacceptable  harm  to  civilians’  by  2008  (Oslo Conference on Cluster 
Munitions 2007b).  The  removal  of  the  word  ‘those’  provoked  some  concern from Minimisers such as 
the UK, as it could conceivably entail a ban on all cluster munitions, but it remained enough of a 
fudge to create a constructive ambiguity about the scope of an eventual ban (Borrie 2009, p.154).  
 
Which  cluster  munitions  did,  or  did  not,  cause  ‘unacceptable  harm’  became  the  nominal  focus  of the 
negotiations, reinforcing the image of states of humanitarian actors, while the real diplomatic game 
consisted of competition among states to secure an optimal balancing of their political, military and 
economic interests. The ideal scenario for many Western stockpilers would have been to benefit 
politically from being seen to sacrifice weapons for humanitarian purposes that they were phasing 
out anyway, while excluding as many of their advanced weapons as possible, again on ostensibly 
humanitarian grounds that would legitimise their wider use of force. This possibility of a win-win 
outcome incentivised states to engage by appearing to leave much to play for.  
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The CMC sought to lockdown this dynamic within the structure of the definition of cluster munitions 
in  the  treaty  from  early  on,  arguing  at  the  second  Oslo  Process  conference  in  Lima  that  ‘the  proper  
approach to a definition is to start with the assumption that all cluster munitions pose unacceptable 
harm to civilians and leave it up to governments to prove that the cluster munitions they wish to 
retain  do  not  harm  civilians’  (WILPF 2008a, p.28). This approach suited the Norwegian Government 
and was reflected in how NPA had scaled down its initial demand for a total ban, when in writing to 
MPs in February 2006 it had requested ‘a  ban  on  all  cluster  munitions with submunitions which are 
not individually guided/target seeking and which do not have empirically proven and reliable self-
destruction  mechanisms’   in   line  with  the  Belgian   legislation   (NPA 2006b). In modifying its position 
like this, NPA  acquiesced  to  proposals  from  the  military  to  exempt  guided  ‘smart’  cluster  munitions  
(Petrova 2007, pp.26–9).  
 
A political motivation in Norway was that the second  largest coalition party, the Socialist Left, had 
effectively renounced its longstanding opposition to Norwegian membership in NATO and presence 
in Afghanistan in order to enter into government (US Embassy Oslo 2006a, 2006b) and so was in 
need of compensatory  foreign  policy  measures.  Norway’s  ability to take a more independent line on 
selected   issues   for  domestic  political   reasons  was   facilitated  by  Norway’s  oil  wealth,   international  
prestige due to its large aid programme, and its non-membership of the EU, all of which give it a 
middle power status out of proportion to its small population and much greater freedom of 
movement on foreign policy issues than other similarly-sized states. This helped ensure the 
dominance  of  a  ‘human  security’  perception  of  Norway’s  hegemonic  interests  in  relation  to  cluster 
munitions, alongside the concession to the military of excluding the most advanced  guided  ‘smart’  
munitions.  
 
Having   established   these   broad   parameters   of   the   Oslo   Process,   Norway’s   lead   diplomat   Steffen  
Kongstad, who had been working with NPA in Norway for some time, recognised the campaigning 
weakness of the CMC and the need for them to firm up their position (Borrie 2009, p.129; 82). The 
stasis in the CMC reflected a deadlock among the lead NGOs, as HRW and MAC still believed that 
calling for an ostensibly limited ban  on  ‘inaccurate  and  unreliable’  cluster  munitions  would  be  more  
persuasive to states, whereas NPA, Landmine Action and HI favoured a ‘define  and  ban’  approach,  
based on a simple ban call (Borrie 2009, p.146). It took considerable negotiation to reach a 
consensus among these lead NGOs and the wider Steering Committee (Rappert et al. 2011, p.315; 
Rappert in Nash 2012, p.134). The first attempt at a solution was made in January 2007 prior to the 
Oslo   Conference   and   simply   tacked   a   demand   for   ‘a   prohibition   on   cluster  munitions   that   cause  
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unacceptable   harm   to   civilians’   onto   the   original   CMC   Call   (quoted in Borrie 2009, p.146), which 
made  NGOs’  main  demand  virtually   identical   to  what   states   signed  up   to   in   the  Oslo  Declaration.  
This was seen as unsatisfactory by Nash, Landmine Action, HI and NPA, who wanted the CMC to pull 
in front of states, rather than adopting a diplomatic fudge as their own main objective.  
 
By  contrast,  HRW  and  MAC  were  concerned  that  changing  the  Call  again  so  soon  might  risk  NGOs’  
‘credibility’   and   attract   criticism   from   states.   Five   weeks   of   negotiations   eventually   produced a 
second compromise wording (Borrie 2009, pp.166–7), which remained the CMC (2007h) Call for the 
duration of the negotiations. Like the Oslo Declaration, this called for a ban by 2008 and dispensed 
with   the   CMC’s   opening   call   for   ‘special   responsibility’   by   users   in   favour   of   urging   ‘all   States’   to  
commit more resources to assisting affected communities and individuals, in effect shifting 
responsibility away from users and producers and onto affected states and donors in general. 
Finally,  it  replaced  the  vague    ‘unacceptable  harm’  language  – and compromised with HRW and MAC 
– by demanding a ban on cluster munitions defined as  ‘inaccurate  and  unreliable  weapons  that  are  
prone to indiscriminate use and that pose severe and lasting risks to civilians from unexploded 
submunitions’.   The   ‘define   and   ban’   strategy contained in this compromise wording, which 
demanded  a  ban  on  ‘cluster  munitions’  while  reversing  the  burden  of  proof  onto  states  to  show  that  
their particular weapons   were   not   ‘cluster   munitions’,   but   also   anticipated   that   ‘smart’   guided  
cluster munitions would probably not be included, was not widely shared beyond the CMC 
frontbench. According to Nash (2012, p.137),   only   the   CMC   staff   and   ‘certain   members   of   the  
coalition’s   Steering   Committee’   were   ‘apprised   of   the   nuanced   strategic   and   tactical   decisions   at  
play’  (Nash 2012, p.134).  
 
Following this, Norway and to a lesser extent other Core states also  addressed   the  CMC’s lack of 
campaigning capacity through large cash injections that enabled it to substantially intensify its 
activities, including by hiring new staff and carrying out more research. This also allowed greater use 
of consensual outsider tactics like media and advertising campaigns, which aimed to create the 
impression of widespread public support to buttress NGO lobbying efforts and the diplomatic 
process. In this context, the CMC in some ways became even more insider-oriented, due to the 
fruition of its longstanding partnership strategy. By the time the Oslo Process began, its leadership 
had gained the trust of supportive government and IGO elites and become ‘a   respectable   and  
recognised  partner  at  all   levels’  (Frerks 2009, p.35). Consequently, according to Nash (2012, p.131) 
‘the   coalition   leadership  was   included   in   a   group  of   key   individuals   from   states   and   international  
organisations  very  early  on’,  with   ‘A  particularly   strong  bond’,   ‘both   institutionally  and  personally’  
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between  the  CMC,  Norway,  the  UNDP  and  ‘key  political  leaders’,  involving  daily  information-sharing 
and  ‘ensuring  a  coordinated  approach  to  problems  and  opportunities’.  Rappert (in Nash 2012, p.134) 
has acknowledged that ‘with   the   initiation   of   the   Oslo   Process,   overt   criticism   of   states   arguably  
became  bounded  by  the  requirement  to  keep  mutual  respectful  dialogue  between  those  involved’.  
In  this  context,  what  he  describes  as  governments’  ‘ungrounded  claims’  and  ‘gross  failings of political 
responsibility’  vis-à-vis  cluster  munitions’  humanitarian  effects   ‘were  rarely  mooted’  because   ‘As  a  
matter of diplomacy between a group of individuals, those partaking in the discussions adopted 
diplomatic (read: bounded) kinds of criticisms of each other – at  least  in  public’.   
 
The   campaign’s  partnership  approach,   lack  of   a  mass  base,   and  external  dependency   for   financial  
and political support all reinforced this perceived need for tactful discretion, as NGOs believed they 
could only succeed by maintaining insider relationships with supportive elites and assisting them in 
their internal battles with opposed elites. As an anonymous CMC strategist has put it, “We  as  NGOs  
were   often   trying   to   help   one   part   of   a   government   against   another…’   (quoted in Rappert et al. 
2011, p.310). This was reflected in CMC tactics during the Oslo Process, which evinced an 
internalised consideration of the potential interests of various elite constituencies inside and outside 
the formal apparatuses of Western states that delimited  or   ‘bounded’   its tactical and strategic, as 
well as discursive approach.  
 
In this context, the   CMC’s main emphasis remained on insider tactics, including expert research, 
lobbying and leveraging contacts with governments, IGOs and other elites. Second in importance 
were slick media and PR campaigns and ban petitions that created the impression of widespread 
public support. The only exceptions were some protest-style events towards the end the Oslo 
Process and a brief outbreak of contentious outsider tactics at the February 2008 Wellington 
Conference, which Borrie (2009, chap.7) describes as its ‘crunch   point’.   A   CMC   chronology  
corroborates this tactical distribution, with only nine of 44 actions listed up to May 2008 related to 
public mobilisation and most of the rest involving research or lobbying (CMC 2009c). Similarly, the 
largest item by far in the CMC (2009a, p.15) head  office’s  2008  budget  – at 40% – is   ‘Civil  Society  
Participation  in  International  Meetings’. 
 
NGOs’   pre-existing insider status was strengthened by how the Core Group organised the Oslo 
Process. Norway used NGOs and supportive international agencies to set the tone at the February 
2007 Oslo Conference, which was based on a background paper (Oslo Conference on Cluster 
Munitions 2007c) drawn up by Norway and Borrie and Cave at UNIDIR, with input from the CMC, 
256 
 
HRW and ICRC (Borrie 2009, p.147n62). The opening session was introduced by Goose of HRW 
alongside the ICRC58 and UNDP (Borrie 2009, pp.237–242), and two of the five remaining sessions 
were addressed by NPA and HI (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007b). NGOs were also 
guaranteed excellent access to the other Oslo Process conferences – in Lima (May 2007), Vienna 
(December 2007), Wellington (February 2008) and Dublin (May 2008), as well as to ‘Track II’ regional 
and thematic conferences. Most of the latter were again held in non-Western countries and included 
a special conference of affected states in Belgrade in October 2007, alongside regional conferences 
in Livingstone, Mexico, Bangkok, which were all held in April 2008 just before the end of the 
negotiations (CMC 2008t, 2008u, 2008u). As with the Ottawa Process, organisation was co-ordinated 
between NGOs, the Core Group and international agencies, with the ICBL and CMC co-organising the 
Bangkok conference (CMC 2010b). CMC delegations participated in all these global and regional 
meetings, with over 100 representatives in Oslo (Moyes and Nash 2011a, p.64), 140 from fifty 
different countries in Vienna (Frerks 2009, p.21) and 274 at the final negotiations in Dublin (CMC 
2008j). However, of these CMC representatives, only twelve pre-selected delegates in Oslo were 
allowed to access the actual conference room (Moyes and Nash 2011a, p.64), while in Dublin a 
maximum of fourteen NGO rotating representatives could observe the plenary. An even smaller 
number of four or five trusted NGO representatives were permitted to intervene in informal 
negotiating sessions in Dublin. Irish diplomats privately reassured the Americans that ‘Only  a  handful  
of   NGOs  will   be   allowed   to   observe   the   negotiations’   and   that   the   CMC  was   ‘led by well-known, 
credible,  and  serious  individuals’  and  ‘was  ably  coordinating  NGO  input’  (US Embassy Dublin 2008a). 
Informal access   to   diplomats   was   another   important   bonus   of   NGOs’   insider   status,   with   even   a  
more  combative  Australian  campaigner  blogging  that   ‘The  cocktail  circuit,  as   repulsive  as   it   is,   is  a  
great  opportunity  to  lobby’  (Rodsted 2008). The Diana Fund also organised several such receptions 
and dinners, with the aim of providing “lobbying   opportunities  where   campaigners   could   directly 
access  government  delegates”  (DP Evaluation 2012, pp.4–5).  
The Role of Outsider Tactics: A Subordinate Strategy  
Once  the  Oslo  Process  began,  one  of  NGOs’  main roles was to serve as its public relations arm. This 
led to an increase in consensual outsider tactics, such as advertising, media and PR work, which 
‘drew   on   the   media   and   public   relations   techniques   of   successful   political   and   commercial  
campaigns’  (Borrie 2009, p.143). As discussed in the previous chapter, much of this was carried out 
by external consultancies, as well as in-house professionals, reflecting the professionalisation of 
                                                     
58 The  ICRC’s  position  was  more  complex.  It  basically  supported  the Oslo Process but did not publicly advocate 
a  ban  until  October  2007  and  then  only  on  ‘inaccurate  and unreliable cluster munitions’  (ICRC 2007) 
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NGOs since the 1990s (Nash in Borrie 2009, p.143). Another significant characteristic was that much 
of this was  ‘strategic  media  work  that  targets  decision-makers  at  key  moments’ (Nash 2012, p.135), 
rather than aimed at the general public as such. This included a Landmine Action campaign in 2007 
involving a large ad  at  Westminster  tube  station  demanding  that  cluster  munitions  be  ‘Milibanned’,  
which was expressly aimed at the then British Foreign Minister (Nash 2012, p.135). This seems to 
have worked, given UK diplomats cited the ads during the Dublin negotiations the following year as a 
reason  why  the  government   ‘needed  to  be  seen  cooperating  with  the  process  and  “could  not   just  
walk  away”’  (US Embassy London 2008).  
Likewise, in Dublin during the final negotiations, strategically located billboards and bus-stop 
advertisements for protest-style events were directed more at delegates than the general public to 
give the impression that cluster munitions were   ‘the  most   important   issue   in   town’   (Nash 2012, 
p.135), while CMC-Austria’s   government-funded national advertising campaign took place around 
the December 2007 Vienna Conference (CMC-Austria 2008, n.d.; Breitegger 2010b, p.92). Media 
work in Dublin was also particularly intense, involving a satellite link that provided broadcast-quality 
conference footage for news media (Borrie 2009, p.260). All of this was obviously costly and 
required significant donor support. A similarly targeted approach was adopted vis-à-vis exhibitions 
and videos produced by professional photographers and filmmakers, which were displayed at 
diplomatic conferences as well as public events (Landmine Action 2009, p.16).  
The relative lack of celebrity   endorsements   was   another   indication   of   the   CMC’s   lesser   public  
orientation compared to the landmines campaign and meant it attracted far less media coverage 
and far fewer signatures for its ban petitions despite the massive expansion of Internet access which 
would have made gathering them much easier than in the mid-1990s.  The  CMC’s  final  tally  of   just  
under 705,000 pro-ban signatures (Boer 2008) was therefore still impressive, but much smaller than 
the 2.5m signatures gathered by the ICBL as early as the first CCW Review Conference in 1995-6.  
As the campaign progressed, more publicly-oriented outside tactics were used, but two-thirds of the 
public mobilisation-type activities listed in a campaign chronology running up to June 2009 occurred 
after the treaty was agreed (CMC 2009c). This inverted the classic social movement trajectory from 
mass mobilisation to institutionalisation, and indicates such tactics were mainly added later on, to 
give the appearance of public support and instrumentalise public opinion in support of pre-defined 
CMC objectives. The CMC’s   first   ‘Global  Day  of  Action’  was held in November 2007 (CMC 2007s), 
four years into the campaign, and coincided with an important CCW meeting, while the second was 
in April 2008 (CMC 2008v), just before the final negotiations.  Much of the activities that took place 
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centred around lobbying and media work and even the public mobilisation-style actions has been 
designed by the CMC head office with the help of PR and marketing agencies and professionals. The 
end result was a sort of ersatz simulacrum of grassroots protest. The  “Lie  Down”  protest  “concept”  
rolled in Wellington, Dublin and other cities had been devised with the help of a PR firm (Wareham 
2008b), as had the use of silhouette imagery, matching branded t-shirts bearing the CMC logo, and 
professionally printed CMC placards emblazoned with pre-approved campaign messages (CMC 
2007a). Diplomats were also encouraged to participate (Wareham 2008b) in what were highly 
centrally pre-planned and coordinated events. The CMC head office informed members of the 
concept and messages beforehand and offered to  ‘ship  ready-to-use  silhouettes’  as  part  of  ‘A  Global  
Day of Action pack [that] will provide information on how to participate as  well  as  tools  to  use’  (CMC 
2007a).  
Some more genuinely contentious outsider-style tactics made a brief appearance during the pivotal 
Wellington Conference, when tensions between states were at their highest and CMC rhetoric was 
also at its most confrontational. A tougher approach was also evident in CMC press releases, which 
identify France, Germany, Japan and the UK as trying to  weaken   the   treaty   ‘to   protect   their   own  
stockpiles’  ‘Rather  than  protecting  civilian  populations’,  and  suggest  they  should  commit  to  a  ban  or  
‘opt  out’  (CMC 2008n). Statements made at this time were by far the most critical statements ever 
released by CMC and were subsequently swiftly removed from its website59. Some  activists  ‘decided  
of   their   own   accord’   to   picket   the   conference   and   target   Minimiser   delegates   with   accusatory  
homemade placards (Borrie 2009, p.217).  From the perspective of most of the CMC leadership and 
staff, however, such contentious tactics were counterproductive to their careful negotiating and 
lobbying  work  and  meant  the  campaign  was  sending  ‘mixed  messages’  (Borrie 2009, pp.222–5). This 
reflected the hostile reaction from the targeted states, who by the end of the Conference were also 
annoyed   at   New   Zealand   Chair’s   refusal to incorporate their exclusions into the draft definition, 
which was left largely unchanged since Vienna, or incorporate their concerns on interoperability. 
Speaking   on   their   behalf,   France   expressed   disappointment   at   ‘the   conditions   in   which   the  
conference  was  held’   and   the  under-representation of the views of states who wanted a minimal 
ban in the conference document (France et al. 2008). Similarly, the head of the Canadian delegation 
condemned  NGO  tactics  as  “demeaning  and  counterproductive”,  complaining  that  “Countries  such 
as  my  own,  and  several  close  allies  have  been  vilified  in  press  interviews  and  in  press  releases”.  He  
went  to  warn  that  NGOs’  “currency  in  this  process  is  diminished  by  some  of  the  tactics  employed”  
(quoted in Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2009). The UK (2008) made similar comments, 
                                                     
59 Numerous less critical press releases from before and after Wellington remain available at: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/media/press-releases/ (accessed 31-12-2013) 
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remarking  ‘NGOs are not governments and do not have the same responsibilities that governments 
have  for  ensuring  international  peace  and  security  and  for  funding  international  development’.   
This collective rap on the knuckles and lobbying of Ireland by some Minimiser States to exclude 
NGOs from informal negotiating sessions (Borrie 2009, p.206) appear to have influenced NGO 
behaviour   in  Dublin.  The  CMC   leadership  concluded   ‘an  even  tighter  single  coordination  structure’  
was needed to prevent any recurrence of spontaneous protest and devised  ‘a  detailed  game  plan  for  
campaigners in Dublin that leveraged their various skills, and did not leave even a single campaigner 
waiting  around’   (Borrie 2009, p.225). The CMC leadership also seems to have promised Ireland to 
tone down its act, given a US embassy cable dated May 8th records Irish diplomats saying that ‘So  
far, the NGOs have been compliant with Irish Government rules, such as a ban on emotive posters of 
children  who  have  been  crippled  by  explosive  remnants  of  war’,  that no large demonstrations were 
expected, and that Ireland  ‘intended  to  keep  a  tight  lid’  on  civil  society  activities  at  the  Conference  
(US Embassy Dublin 2008a). In addition, survivors, who had been involved in the more contentious 
tactics in Wellington and also made several hard-hitting statements (Habib 2008; Kapetanovic 
2008a; Vuckovic 2008), were disbarred from speaking during the formal negotiations and from 
participating in Working Groups on treaty texts60 (Brabant 2010, p.4; Mayne 2010, p.9). 
 
The Endgame: The Final Negotiations in Dublin  
By the time the final negotiations started in Dublin in May 2008, the main remaining issues were the 
exact   definition   and   ‘interoperability’.   The   CMC’s  media   strategy  was   to   create   an   expectation   of  
broad support for a strong ban treaty and portray States who opposed this as out of step with this 
humanitarian consensus (Bolton and Nash 2010, p.180).   It   also   depicted   the  US   as   the  main   ‘bad  
guy’,  which  was  ‘bullying’  states  “negotiating  in  good  faith  here  in  Dublin  to  ban  these  indiscriminate 
weapons”   (Conway quoted in CMC 2008w). This capitalised on the unpopularity of the Bush 
administration,  which  was  nearing  the  end  of  its  second  term.  These  tactics  perpetuated  the  CMC’s  
hegemonic approach of bounded critique by framing participating states as motivated by 
humanitarianism and the actions of states such as the US as inconsistent with this general 
humanitarianism of the international community – as well as their own generally well-meaning 
humanitarian   intentions.   The   strategy  was      to   appeal   to   states’   desire   to  maintain domestic and 
international   legitimacy,   which   implied   a   ‘successful’   outcome   would   bolster   their   domestic  
hegemony and legitimise the international system more broadly.  
                                                     
60 Kapetanović’s  statement  (2008b) during the Opening Ceremony seems to have been the only exception. 
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The Core Group of States promoting the process, were uniformly publicly praised, even when they 
engaged in sharp negotiating practices and made concessions to Minimiser States that contradicted 
CMC goals. Reciprocally, the Core Group resisted demands by some Minimisers to exclude NGOs 
from informal negotiating sessions (Borrie 2009, p.206), given their participation was central to Core 
Group strategy.  
During the Conference, the CMC engaged in consensual outsider and insider tactics, presenting a 
ban petition on the opening day (Dublin Conference 2008d, p.3), conducting an opinion poll in 
Britain (Norton-Taylor 2008), and exploiting its insider access, within acceptable limits. A few public 
demonstrations were held, but again were more a simulacrum of protest, similar to the sanctioned 
events at Wellington. They included      another   “lie-down   stunt”,   a   small   protest   outside   the   US  
embassy, and a march attended by approximately 200 people – fewer than the number of NGO 
delegates at the conference (Holland 2008; CMC 2009a, p.6). All three events were attended almost 
exclusively by NGO employees in CMC-branded  clothing  and  were  described  by  the  CMC  as  ‘media  
highlights’   and   ‘stunts’,   indicating   their   purpose   of   attracting   media   attention   rather   than   mass  
participation (CMC 2009a, p.11; 6; 9).  
The negotiation of the treaty: definitions, interoperability and state responsibility 
Midway through the first week, Mexico, Lebanon, Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Palau 
and Uruguay submitted a formal proposal to delete Article 2(c), which was to list exclusions from the 
definition (Argentina et al. 2008), this was supported by many developing states who continued 
opposed exclusions until the end of the Conference (Borrie 2009, p.298). By contrast, the CMC 
frontbench indicated in its opening statement that NGOs would support a cumulative approach to 
exclusions (CMC 2008x). This also seems to have been the endgame position for Western states in 
the  Core  Group  (but  not  Mexico  or  Peru),  given  Austria’s  lead  disarmament  diplomat  informed  the  
US  it  was  open  to  ‘a  combination  of  a  high  reliability  standard  plus  technological  fixes  (sensor  fusing,  
self-destruct mechanisms) that would allow for the retention of the most modern weapons (US 
Embassy Vienna 2008, p.Marschik in).   The  CMC’s   rationale   for   adopting   a   similar   stance  was   that  
simply  insisting  on  no  exclusions  ‘would  marginalise  them  from  the  negotiation’  and  that  attempting 
to limit exclusions through detailed arguments and suggesting alternative text would be more 
constructive (Borrie 2009, p.273).  
It was already clear by the second day that there would be exclusions and that these would be 
cumulative, rather than requiring only the presence of self-destruct mechanisms or guidance 
systems. This would mean banning all cluster munitions that had so far been used, including non-
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guided   ‘smart’   munitions,   a   position   that   was   supported   by   the   CMC   leadership.   However   this  
position outraged much of the wider CMC membership who pointed to the glaring contradiction 
with   the   campaign   slogan,   which   recycled   the   ICBL   refrain   of   ‘No   exceptions,   No   delays   and   No  
loopholes’   (CMC 2008i, 2008y). This reaction was particularly common among SNGOs, many of 
whom had been lobbying their governments for months to adopt a ban position and who were 
attending the Oslo Process for the first time on CMC grants (Borrie 2009, pp.274–5). Even Nash 
(2012, p.137) acknowledges  ‘this led to a tense 24 hours in which the coalition risked being divided, 
with   campaigners   unwilling   to   advocate   the   negotiating   group’s   suggested   messages   to   states’.  
Although  the  CMC   leadership’s  bottom line was known to the 61 participating States and could be 
discerned from a careful reading of policy documents, but had not been communicated – much less 
debated or agreed – with the wider membership. Campaign Co-Chairs Moyes and Nash responded 
by meeting with   campaigners   ‘to   absorb   the   full   force   of   their   criticism’   (Borrie 2009, pp.274–5). 
However, this produced only nominal changes to campaign statements and CMC strategy remained 
basically unaltered.  
The reasons the Minimiser States acquiesced to cumulative criteria for exclusions were complex and 
involved several factors, including: the dynamics of the negotiating process, which combined 
disunity among the opposing states with a strong bloc in favour of a ban and processual 
manipulation by the Core Group; additional special exemptions for their highest-tech weapons; and 
public/media attention during the final negotiations. The latter seems to have featured quite 
strongly in France (US Embassy Paris 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008), where HI led a large, well-funded 
national campaign, and in Japan (US Embassy Tokyo 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d), where there was 
relatively little NGO activity but lots of media attention (Borrie 2009, p.306). Japanese journalists 
made up a disproportionately large share of the Dublin media contingent (personal observation) and 
the level of media interest in Japan was such that a documentary about the lead Norwegian 
diplomat, Steffen Kongstad, was broadcast on national television (Borrie 2009, p.156). Such concerns 
also   helped   shift   Britain’s   position.   Following   a   heavy   Labour defeat in a by-election during the 
negotiations, Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2008), who had recently employed former director of 
Landmine Action and CMC co-founder, Richard Lloyd, as one of his main spin doctors, personally 
intervened to announce on May 28th Britain  would   ‘support   a  ban  on  all   cluster  bombs,   including 
those  currently  in  service’.  This  finally  settled  a  longstanding  row  between  the  defence,  foreign  and  
                                                     
61 For  instance,  New  Zealand  diplomats  had  told  the  Americans  prior  to  the  Conference  that  ‘Although  NGOs  
continue  to  call  for  no  exceptions…there  would  likely  be  some  level  of  flexibility’  in  relation  to  ‘high-tech 
cluster munitions with better guidance systems and self-destruct mechanisms (US Embassy Wellington 2008a). 
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development ministries and allowed UK diplomats to back down on blanket exclusions for non-
guided  ‘smart’  munitions.   
Germany, France and Sweden secured exemptions  for  guided  ‘smart’  munitions  only  they  produced,  
and the German made Smart-155, which had not yet been used in combat, was one of only four 
existing cluster munitions permitted under the treaty. Another permitted cluster munition, BONUS, 
was co-produced by Sweden and France (Observatoire  des  transferts  d’armaments  et al. 2005, p.6; 
13). The clinching factor for French agreement appears to have been a deal it did with Norway prior 
to the Dublin Conference (Borrie 2009, pp.251–2), which allowed it to keep BONUS and its Apache 
‘Kriss’  anti-runway cluster munition and this was the only cluster bomb the French airforce actually 
had in service (Observatoire  des  transferts  d’armaments  et al. 2005, p.14; Borrie 2009, p.252; 272). 
From a military-industrial perspective, these exceptions and exemptions could be seen as benefiting 
Germany and France over the UK, by leaving it the odd man out among the European great powers 
without   its  own  guided   ‘smart’   cluster  munition.  However,  Britain  had  already  ordered  Smart-155 
from Germany and managed to obtain a separate exception  for  munitions  ‘designed  exclusively  for  
an  air  defence  role’  (Article  2.2a)  that  exempted  its  ‘Starstreak’  cluster  missile  system.   
 
That the treaty’s  definition of cluster munitions leaves the door open to developing new weapons to 
circumvent its provisions was recognised at the time (editorial, The Independent (London) 2008). 
Neither   Britain’s   exemption   for   munitions   ‘designed   exclusively   for   an   air   defence   role’   nor the 
upper weight limit of 20kg demanded by the French is subject to the cumulative criteria on which 
the CMC frontbench was focused, and create the potential for similar weapons to be exempted. This 
has  already  happened  with  Textron’s  Clean  Area  Weapon  (CLAW),  which  is  marketed  as  ‘Permitted  
under   international  cluster  munition  treaties  due  to   its  weight  and  performance’   (Textron Defense 
Systems 2011b, 2011c). Despite being at least as indiscriminate at time of attack as older cluster 
munition, CLAW is excluded from the ban because each submunition weighs more than 20kg.  
Despite this, the CMC claimed that the   treaty   bans   ‘all   existing   and   future   cluster   bombs’      (CMC 
2008z),  was  ‘future  proofed’,  and  had  ‘no  exceptions  for  individual  nations’  own  particular  types  of  
cluster  munitions,  which  would  have  weakened   the   treaty   severely’   (2008a, 2008z, 2008aa). HRW 
additionally lambasted the belief   that   ‘Negotiating   states   crafted   the   Convention’s   definition   of  
cluster  munition  to  protect  their  own  arsenals’  as  a  ‘fallacy’  (HRW 2009a). 
Apart from the question of definition, interoperability was the main unresolved issue and the US 
exerted enormous pressure to exempt military cooperation with non-state parties from the ban on 
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assistance with prohibited acts in Article 1c of the treaty draft. It contacted over a hundred countries 
(US Embassy Tokyo 2008),   visited   capitals,   spoke   with   officials   at   ‘the   highest   level’   in   Dublin  
(Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2010a, p.261 n626), and was rumoured to have threatened 
developing countries with aid cuts (Cobb 2008). In response, New Zealand and Ireland worked 
behind the scenes to accommodate US interests.  
New   Zealand   had   promised   the  US   in   April   to   seek   ‘to   develop  more   specific   language   regarding  
interoperability’   so  as   to   facilitate   its  own  participation   in  US-led security operations (US Embassy 
Wellington 2008b) and duly supported this in Dublin (Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2010, 
p.95).  Likewise,  Irish  diplomats  requested  ‘language  that  would  address  interoperability  issues’  from  
the Americans prior to the Wellington Conference  and  inferred  that  Ireland  believed  ‘the  draft  text  
must  be  changed  to  deal  with  interoperability  problems  if  the  Oslo  Process  is  to  move  forward’  (US 
Embassy Dublin 2008b).   Subsequent   US   embassy   cables   comment   that   ‘True to the Irish view of 
themselves in the world’,  government  officials  ‘portrayed  Ireland's  intended  role  in  the  Conference  
as  one  of  an  honest  broker  striving  for  reasonable  consensus’  and ‘We are convinced that the Irish 
will   make   a   determined   effort   to   achieve   a   workable   consensus’   (US Embassy Dublin 2008a).  
Afterwards, Irish diplomats bragged to US officials about successfully achieving an interoperability 
clause,  which  they  said  had  been  one  of  Ireland’s  two  main  objectives  for  the  final  negotiations  and  
had  required  ‘considerable  behind-the-scenes arm-twisting’  (US Embassy Dublin 2008c). 
Norway still opposed a permissive interoperability clause. US officials viewed its stance as 
‘unyielding’   and   described   Kongstad   as   ‘dogmatic’   ‘rude’,   ‘unprofessional’   and   ‘brazen’   (2007b, 
2008). Consequently, his desire to chair the interoperability negotiations in Dublin (Borrie 2009, 
pp.284–5) was deeply unpopular with the US and states supporting this position, whose 
exasperation with Norway was obvious in Dublin (O’Dwyer  2008a). The Irish organisers supported US 
interests and Kongstad was relegated to the lower profile stockpile destruction talks, while Christine 
Schraner from Switzerland, whose government was unconcerned about interoperability given Swiss 
neutrality, was chosen to chair the interoperability discussions instead (Borrie 2009, p.79).  
Those discussions were organised in a way that ensured the interests of the US and its supporters 
would dominate. Initially, they took place in a ‘Small  Group’  format  with   limited  access  to  a  select  
number of states, with HRW also in attendance (Borrie 2009, p.288), and even when they were 
opened up to more states later on they continued to be held in a small room, with HRW seated in 
the middle beside Britain, Australia, Canada and Japan and a few other states, and standing room 
only for the rest (personal observation). The lack of microphones made it difficult for states outside 
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this inner circle to follow proceedings (O’Dwyer  2008b;  WILPF  2008b), especially as no interpreters 
were provided. In addition, many of the sessions clashed with negotiations on other issues, 
inhibiting smaller or poorer states with small delegations from participating. Partly as a result of this 
processual manipulation, diplomats supporting a strong ban, especially those from non-Anglophone 
developing countries, were not always sure what was going on and had to rely on briefings from 
UNDP and the CMC (Borrie 2009, p.270).  
The CMC contributed suggestions for restrictive interoperability text, placing it in a more moderate 
position than some states, which continued to oppose any clause outright. The final wording allows 
states to participate in planning cluster munitions strikes with non-parties to the treaty and even to 
call  in  strikes,  so  long  as  the  choice  of  munitions  used  is  not  ‘within  its  exclusive  control’  (Article  21)  
– which it never would be during a joint military operation. This was widely recognised as a loophole 
at the time (O’Dwyer   2008a) and British military lawyers later told the US that it allowed 
involvement  by  ‘personnel  in  the  chain  of  command  or  headquarters  positions’  in  cluster  munitions  
strikes  and   for   ‘UK  pilots  embedded   in  U.S.  units’   to   fire   cluster  munitions’   (US Secretary of State 
2009). In other words, it allowed intentional assistance with cluster munitions use, which an editorial 
in the CMC newsletter  had  opined  ‘would  make  a  mockery  of  the  treaty’  (CMC 2008ab). Moreover, 
as recently as the Wellington Conference, the CMC (2008ac) had listed   ‘deleting   or   seriously  
compromising  the  prohibition  on  assistance’  as  a  proposal  that  ‘would  cause  the  CMC  to  withdraw  
its  support  for  the  treaty  and  the  Process’.   
The CMC reneged on this threat and also failed to publicly criticise Ireland and New Zealand for 
manipulating the interoperability negotiations and supporting an interoperability clause. Its initial 
response (CMC 2008a) to the final treaty draft simply praised each of the Core Group of States and 
its   review   of   state   policies   the   following   year   maintained   Ireland   bore   ‘a   great   deal   of   the  
responsibility  for  the  successful  outcome  of  the  negotiations  and  the  strength  of  the  convention’.  Its  
allusion   to   ‘concern among NGOs that Ireland was not taking a strong enough position against 
proposals   to  add  treaty   language  to   facilitate  “interoperability”’   (HRW and Landmine Action 2009, 
pp.92–6) was slight, given that by Ireland’s own account it had  ‘arm-twisted’ to have such proposals 
included.  
 
Moreover, even   this  minor   criticism   is   omitted   from   subsequent   NGO   accounts   of   Ireland’s   role,  
published after the US embassy cables were leaked. Despite widespread CMC citations of other 
cables to criticise US policy, no mention is made of their embarrassing contents vis-à-vis Ireland, no 
doubt  helping  to  preserve  the  CMC’s  role  as  a   trusted  partner   in  receipt  of  significant  amounts  of  
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Irish financial and political support (Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor 2011, 2012, 2013). 
Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor’s   (2013) latest account of Irish policy approvingly quotes 
Ireland’s   praise   of   “the   close   and   valued   relationship   between   States   and   our   partners   in   civil  
society”   as   vital   to  making the   convention   and   its   assertion   that   this   “model   of   cooperation…still  
holds  much  potential.”   
 
The  CMC’s  (2008a) initial response to the final treaty draft described the interoperability clause as 
‘the   only   stain  on   the   fine   fabric   of   the   treaty’   (downplaying   the   exceptions   for   the   latest   cluster  
munitions)  and  warned  it  would  ‘be  watching  very  carefully  to  ensure  that  no  state  party  engages  in  
deliberate assistance  with  prohibited  acts’.  Notwithstanding  this,  HRW  later  branded  the  notion  that  
the  interoperability  clause  would  ‘fundamentally  undermine  the  Convention’  as  a  ‘fallacy’,  claiming  it  
was   ‘unlikely   to   have   a   negative   humanitarian   effect   by   promoting or facilitating ongoing use of 
cluster  munitions’   (HRW 2009a). This directly contradicted its assertion during the informals that 
“what’s  important  is  what  the  legal  language  allows”  (O’Dwyer  2008c) and ignored how some states 
had argued for the clause on the basis that ‘in  the  short  to  medium  term,  many…non-State parties 
will  continue  lawfully  to  produce  and  use  cluster  munitions’  (Australia et al. 2008).  
 
HRW’s  downplaying  of  the  impact  of  interoperability  was  consistent  with  the  CMC’s  denial  that  the  
definition contained exceptions. Once the treaty was agreed, it immediately began claiming that a 
total  ban  on  cluster  munitions  had  been  achieved  that  ‘exceeded  all  expectations’  and  would  also  
prevent future production, use and transfer by non-parties. Nash claimed that 
Here in Dublin we have consigned cluster bombs to the dustbin of history and stigmatised 
their use. With this historic agreement cluster bombs can never be used, produced or 
transferred  again”  (quoted in CMC 2008ad) 
 
As regards the rest of the treaty, reflecting how binding user responsibility was effectively a non-
runner well before the final negotiations, international assistance with clearance and victim 
assistance   is  entirely  voluntary   for   ‘Each  State  Party   in  a  position  to  do  so’   (Article  6)  and  no   legal  
obligations are placed on users. The only reference to user responsibility is that former users are 
‘strongly  encouraged’   to  provide  assistance  with   clearance   (Article   4.4),   but  not   victim  assistance.  
That  Lebanon   threatened  at   the   last  minute  to   renounce   the  treaty  unless   the  adjective   ‘strongly’  
was included shows how politically important user responsibility was for affected states, although 
the change was only a face-saving measure that made no legal difference (Borrie 2009, p.302).  
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In contrast, affected states are legally obliged to clear contaminated areas within ten years (Article 
4.1a) and fulfil a long list of victim assistance duties (Article 5). The CMC had effectively supported 
this  unbalanced  outcome  in  arguing  that  ‘The  formulation  “in  a  position  to  do  so”  is  appropriate  only  
to assistance and cooperation from other states, not the actual provision of victim assistance by a 
state  to  its  own  population’  (CMC 2007p, p.5). Afterwards, it praised the victim assistance clauses as 
‘excellent’,   ‘historic’,  a   ‘monumental  triumph’  and  a   ‘shining   light’,  and  the  clearance  provisions  as  
‘very  good’  (CMC 2008a, 2008aa). Vietnam, which is one of the six worst affected states, has cited 
the  fact  that  ‘the  convention  places  more  responsibility  on  the  affected  states  than  it  does  on  those  
states  that  used  the  weapon’  as  a  reason  for  not  ratifying  (Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 
2010, p.268).  
 
As of September 2013, 84 states had ratified the treaty and another twenty-nine had signed it (CMC 
2013). This compares favourably with other arms control treaties, such as Protocol V or the CCW, 
which has only 67 parties (ICRC 2010) however eight of the top fifteen62 military spenders, which 
together account for two-thirds of global military expenditure, have not joined, three of which - the 
US, Russia and China – which together hold around ninety per cent of the global stockpile. This 
means many of the states most likely to use cluster munitions have not joined, including the US and 
Russia, which have actually used cluster munitions since the treaty was agreed. Since the treaty has 
been signed the US has undermined it by exporting banned cluster munitions (Landmine and Cluster 
Munition Monitor 2013) and have continued to pressurise states not to sign (US Embassy Sofia 2008; 
US Embassy Sanaa 2010; US 2009). It has also continued to use cluster munitions with devastating 
civilian casualties (Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2010, p.263).  While the treaty ultimately 
reinforces the military dominance of Western states it is likely to have the additional impact of 
increasing arms spending as countries feel under pressure to update their arsenals (Landmine and 
Cluster Munition Monitor 2011), reinforce trends towards costly high tech weapons and speed up 
the arms production cycle (Weidacher et al. 2005, p42).  
 
A Gramscian perspective requires addressing the wider effect on the world hegemonic power 
structures, however, from which standpoint banning a largely low-tech, cheap category of weapons, 
while leaving higher-tech weapons untouched, appears as highly significant and a major explanatory 
factor  as  to  why   ‘cluster  munitions’ as  defined  could  be  deemed   ‘inhumane’  and  banned,  and  the  
                                                     
62 The top fifteen based on 2010 figures were: US (46.5%), China (6.6%), France (4.2%), the UK (3.8%) and 
Russia (3.5%) , Japan (3.3%), Germany (3%), Saudi Arabia (2.7%), India (2.4%), Italy (2.3%), Brazil (1.7%), South 
Korea (1.6%), Canada (1.3%), Australia (1.2%) and Spain (1.2%) (Perlo-Freeman et al. 2010, p.203). The US, 
China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, Brazil and South Korea have not joined.  
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limitations and repercussions involved in this. Essentially, its structural effect is to increase the 
relative military advantage enjoyed by advanced military powers, especially those that secured 
exemptions for their own high-tech weapons, while disadvantaging already militarily weaker states. 
Given the disadvantages of this were recognised by weaker developing and other non-Western 
countries, the advantages would also have been perceived by the more advanced military powers, 
which  means  that  the  capacity  to  ban  ‘cluster  munitions’  as  defined  to  a  significant  extent  depended  
on its being at least potentially relatively militarily advantageous for more advanced powers.  
 
If this is to set the parameters within which arms control can take place, on the one hand it raises 
troubling   questions   for  NGOs’  whole   approach,   as   conditioning   the   possibility   of   arms   control   on  
military advantage for advanced states would appear structurally likely to generate a 
counterbalancing effect, fuelling further arms races – and raising wider societal and structural 
questions of military expenditure that contemporary arms control campaigns are loath to examine 
at a time of historically high military expenditure.  
 
On the other hand, recognising these wider system-reinforcing effects of the cluster munitions ban 
fits perfectly with a Gramscian understanding of arms control and IHL as a hegemonic practice, 
whose fundamental purpose is not to limit the means of violence but to legitimise them and thereby 
reinforce existing hegemonic power structures through perpetuating the institutionalised use of 
force. This function is further demonstrated in how banning cluster munitions was framed to 
Western states as a way of enhancing the political legitimacy of Western military interventions, such 
that the overall effect of the ban is also to bolster the humanitarian credentials of military 
interventions, thereby encouraging the use of force and generating greater consent to it.  
 
Conclusion  
Given the CMC reproduced the strategy, organisation, funding base and much of the discourse of the 
landmines campaign, analysing it has clarified the conditions required to replicate that model and its 
limitations. As with the ICBL, there is no doubt the CMC played a central role in bringing about a ban. 
The questions addressed here are why did the members of the CMC choose to do this and how were 
they able to do it?  
The close ties between the lead NGOs, Western Core Group states, and sympathetic sections of 
other Western states that eventually supported a ban, reflected how CMC arguments were bounded 
by and also resonated within hegemonic parameters shared by elite intellectuals in civil and political 
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society. This enabled the lead NGOs to find allies within sections of Western states and international 
agencies with similar functions and/or in mainstream political parties, particularly liberal or social 
democratic parties that shared similar political-ideological perspectives.  
There was a particularly strong resonance between the lead CMC NGOs and Western small and 
middle powers, as they share a similar consensual-hegemonic function in the international system of 
generating consent to hegemonic economic compromises and legitimising the use of force, in the 
context of a world hegemonic system still predominantly coordinated by US military power. This is 
similar to the way in which civil society performs this function vis-à-vis the state’s  coercive apparatus 
at the national level. This helps to explain the affinity of these states with liberal human rights, 
humanitarian and development NGOs like those involved in the CMC and ICBL.  
This affinity was a  necessary  component  of  the  CMC’s  self-defined success, given its overwhelming 
dependency on the Core Group of states, particularly Norway, for the financial and political support 
needed to produce its discourse and effectively implement its tactics. Without this material base, it 
would never have achieved its goals, an assessment supported by the contrast between  the  CMC’s  
lack of impact prior to 2006 (Petrova 2007, p.12; Borrie 2009, p.56; Bolton and Nash 2010, p.179) 
and the major increase in its activity, visibility and the clarity of its demands following   Norway’s  
announcement of the Oslo Process. At the same time, the CMC’s  goals emerged in the context of 
shared politico-ideological frameworks that produced compatible policy goals among the segments 
of state elites from which it drew support.  
 At a national level, this process of partnership between NGOs and governments illustrates both the 
integration of hegemonic civil and political society in the integral state through alliances of 
intellectuals in civil society and political society and elite interpenetration. This phenomenon is 
particularly apparent in consensual, corporatist societies like Norway and has been accentuated by 
the ongoing outsourcing of government functions to NGOs since the 1980s, but exists too, in varying 
forms, in the relations between the other lead NGOs and their home states. The CMC illustrates the 
extent to which such relationships are increasingly transnationalising and have become overlapped, 
so that it, in effect, became an element of the Norwegian extended state, while remaining 
integrated with supportive consensual-hegemonic elements of the UK state as well. Rappert (2011, 
p.320) touches  on  such  dynamics  in  acknowledging  that  ‘[W]hile  governments  and  members  of  civil  
society notionally occupied distinct roles and often held oppositional policies, in practice, such 
distinctions  were  blurred’. 
 
269 
 
The hegemonic effect of this was crystallised in the exchanges of mutual legitimation that 
accompanied the conclusion of the treaty, in which the bounded differences raised between civil 
society and governments were subsumed in a chorus of reaffirmation of the international 
community, the benefits of partnership, and the humanitarian intentions of all concerned. State 
after state praised the role of civil society in the Oslo Process, including not only the Core Group, but 
also Minimisers like the UK and Japan. Core state Ireland proclaimed  the  Process  ‘had  been  based  on  
an exemplary partnership of States, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross  and  civil   society’   (Dublin Conference 2008e),  while   the  CMC  reciprocally   invoked  a   ‘dynamic  
and   powerful’   partnership   with   international   agencies and   ‘committed   states’   based   on   ‘mutual  
friendship,  respect  and  trust’  (Moyes 2008). A similar universalising consensual-hegemonic function 
was  evident  in  the  CMC’s  closing  statement  at  the  Signing  Conference  in  Oslo:   
At this conference government ministers have stood side by side with women and men who 
have been wounded and impoverished by cluster munitions, united in their commitment to 
take   action…Yesterday,   the   distinguished   delegate   of   Liberia   described   this   group as 
“countries  of  conscience” (Moyes 2008).  
 
This ultimately was the wider hegemonic context of the campaign, which entailed reaffirming the 
legitimacy of the international system and the notion of states and their militaries as responsible 
humanitarian actors. Indeed, it was this that enabled the CMC to   succeed   in   banning   ‘cluster  
munitions’ as defined in the treaty.  
 
Overall, the CMC provides further evidence of the international influence of some NGOs on some 
issues and of a delimiting set of conditions that enabled NGO influence in these cases, but 
circumscribe the wider potential for ‘global   civil   society’   influence   on   global   governance.   The  
evidence of the CMC suggests this influence is largely dependent on elite support, particularly from: 
political parties with compatible hegemonic governance strategies; sections of government tasked 
with similar functions to NGOs; and Western middle powers with compatible interests and 
legitimising functions within the international system. This consensual-hegemonic function is 
discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter, which compares the broader significance of the 
landmines and cluster munitions campaigns for the nature of NGO influence in global governance 
and the implications for the relationship of states and civil societies. 
 
270 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis began by critically analysing liberal and constructivist claims that NGOs have become 
more significant international  actors  that  can  ‘make  a  difference’   in  world  politics  and  are  thereby  
contributing to the emergence of a progressive transnational or global civil society that can 
democratise global governance or even transform it. By applying an original Gramscian theoretical 
framework to the landmines campaign, which is generally seen as an archetypal demonstration of 
this liberal narrative, and its closest successful successor, the campaign to ban cluster munitions, this 
dominant framing of NGO influence in the civil society and global governance literature has been 
problematised as proceeding from faulty premises and leading to flawed conclusions.  
 
The liberal-constructivist literature on NGOs, global civil society and global governance and analyses 
of the landmines and cluster munitions campaigns within that academic tradition contain valid 
observations insofar as they recognise a real phenomenon whereby NGOs, particularly when 
working in concert with small and middle powers, appear to be able to exert more international 
influence than previously. It also identifies an interesting apparent paradox, whereby this influence 
appears to have been achieved without NGOs seeming to possess substantial material power 
resources. This has led liberals and constructivists to theorise NGO influence as rooted in soft and 
ideational power and to identify as the main ways NGOs exercise influence the construction of 
arguments and frames convincing to policy-makers, leveraging moral and expert authority, and 
working  in  ‘partnership’  and  transnational  advocacy  with  small  and  middle  powers  and  international  
agencies. All of this is then presented as amounting to a significant power shift to international civil 
society that is democratising the international system and challenging great power influence.  
 
What the liberal and constructivist literature fails to adequately address, primarily due to its 
inattention   to   class,   are   the   links   between   NGOs’   soft   and   ideational   power   and   the   hard   and  
material power of other actors. In part, this is because in interpreting the increased prominence of 
NGOs as a democratising power shift, liberal-constructivist theories of NGO influence and the role of 
global civil society in global governance generally assume, implicitly or explicitly, that NGOs are 
autonomous actors, that civil society is a meaningfully autonomous sphere, and that ideas and 
material interests can and should be separated.  
Consequently, this literature views civil society as oppositional to the state and non-governmental 
organisations as oppositional to governments, while paradoxically simultaneously viewing civil 
society as the basis of the democratic state. This proto-dialectical understanding of the relationship 
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between civil society and the state is then unsatisfactorily resolved: either through a theoretical 
idealist Hegelian notion of the state as representing universal rather than particular interests; or a 
negative understanding of the state as tending towards an overbearing bureaucracy that must 
continuously be democratically  checked  ‘from  below’  by  civil  society.   
 
As a result of this assumed opposition between civil society and states, the material and political 
dependency of influential NGOs on financial and political support from state agencies, political 
parties, wealthy elites whose interests are disproportionately represented by states, and state-
funded international organisations, all of which, unlike NGOs, possess significant hard power 
through the direct control of economic and/or governmental resources, is mentioned only in 
passing, treated as ancillary, or ignored altogether. Another facet of the same phenomenon is 
inattention to the class, personnel, and social basis of NGOs and the high level of elite circulation 
between NGOs, governments, political parties, and international agencies. This latter point further 
belies the dominant dichotomous view of civil society and states, NGOs and governments.  
 
The same criticisms apply to most of the literature on the landmines and cluster munitions 
campaigns, which has also concentrated overwhelmingly on discursive elements like framing, while 
neglecting   the   campaigns’  material   bases   and   the  wider   historical   and   political   contexts   in  which  
they took place, apart from references to the dominant liberal narratives of the end of the Cold War 
and globalisation. This includes analyses by NGO participants, which, when they situate NGO efforts 
in a theoretical context, have chosen similar liberal-constructivist theories of global civil society, 
middle powers (Bolton and Nash 2010), transnational advocacy networks (Moyes and Nash 2011b, 
p.8), soft power (Bolton and Nash 2010, p.173), and framing (Rappert and Moyes 2009; Bolton and 
Nash 2010; Rappert et al. 2013), while downplaying material aspects like funding.  
 
This participant literature also unproblematically links the bans on landmines and cluster munitions 
to pre-existing IHL norms, without critically analysing their wider political implications or the 
historical context of their development and acceptance by powerful states. This separation of soft or 
ideational power from its material basis and historical-material context is also evident in the official 
book on the landmines campaign, whose six chapters by NGO participants omit how the campaign 
was resourced (Chabasse 1998; Stott 1998; Wareham 1998; Warmington and Tuttle 1998; White and 
Rutherford 1998; Williams and Goose 1998). Likewise, the material basis and structural limits of 
NGOs’   soft   power   are   neglected   in   Rappert,   Moyes   and   Nash’s   (2013, p.769) identification of 
‘information   gathering’,   ‘analysing’,   ‘framing’,   ‘redeﬁning’   and   finally   ‘communicating   and  
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representing63’  as  the  ﬁve  key  roles  civil  society  has  played  in  developing  ‘humanitarian  standards’,  
with little attention to how and why such activities are materially resourced, or the limitations 
imposed by framing issues so as to connect them to pre-existing norms in a manner that will appeal 
to policy-makers. 
 
These assumptions and lacunae in the liberal-constructivist literature have hindered a full 
conceptualisation of the conditions, nature, and significance of NGO influence, in the landmines and 
cluster munitions campaigns, and also the changes in domestic and international political structures 
in which those campaigns took place. The structural parameters within which NGO influence 
operates, and hence its limitations, and the possibility that NGOs, which appear to lack substantial 
material power bases of their own, may have achieved international influence through their 
dependence on elites rooted in the political and civil societies of Western states have therefore been 
overlooked. To overcome this, the autonomy of NGOs needs to be assessed rather than assumed 
and this assessment was a central, critical part of the case studies.  
 
Viewed from a Gramscian perspective, the case studies demonstrate that NGO influence flowed 
from their lack of autonomy from elites. In the end, their influence was that of dependent actors, 
integrated into Western-dominated international governance systems, and was more akin to the 
influence of a government agency on state policy than that of an external social movement. 
Consequently,   the   cooperation   or   ‘partnership’   between   NGOs,   small   and   middle   powers   and  
international agencies like the UN and ICRC during the landmines and cluster munitions campaigns 
did not represent a significant power shift, either from states to NGOs, or from great powers to 
middle powers. Rather, it involved processes of elite competition that resulted at most in a limited 
reconceptualisation of Western  states’   long-term security and foreign policy interests – or in other 
words slightly modified hegemonic governance strategies – and ultimately reaffirmed hegemonic 
power structures.  
 
In contrast to the liberal and constructivist approaches that have dominated the literature on this 
topic, a Gramscian approach starts from an opposite set of interlinked assumptions. Because all 
social relationships are seen as shaped by class relations rooted in the economic base, which set the 
limits of ideas and action in the political and ideological superstructures, soft and hard, material and 
ideational power are seen as inseparable, mutually constitutive elements of hegemonic power and 
                                                     
63 ‘Representing’  refers  primarily  to  how  issues  are  represented  rather than representation in a democratic 
sense, which is only briefly referenced vis-à-vis cluster munitions survivors.  
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civil and political society as complementary, mutually constitutive elements of integral states. 
Related to this, rather than assuming civil society influence is generally democratising in a positive 
sense, it is instead thought to be generally dominated by the same hegemonic class interests that 
dominate  political  society  or  the  ‘state  proper’,  so  that  civil  society  normally  reinforces  rather  than  
opposes the state, of which it is an integral element. As a result, civil society autonomy cannot be 
taken for granted and must be assessed rather than assumed. Consequently, in order to assess the 
nature and conditions of NGO influence from a Gramscian perspective, the case studies were 
structured to enable an examination of the discourse and tactics of the campaigns within the 
delimiting context of their material economic, class and organisational basis, and of the level of 
autonomy of all these aspects from elite interests.  
 
For Gramsci, one of the main ways hegemony is constructed is through the role of intellectuals (in 
his extended sense of intellectuals as all those who play a leading or organisational role in society), 
in linking political and civil society with class interests rooted in the economic base through 
processes of political-ideological representation and organisation.  Just as with the ideas and 
institutions of civil society, Gramsci argues that for a variety of reasons intellectuals will generally 
gravitate towards identifying with and representing the interests of the dominant fundamental class 
and associated elites, rather than the subordinate fundamental class. Hence, not only organic 
capitalist  intellectuals  like  George  Soros,  but  also  ‘traditional  intellectuals’  working  in  political  or  civil  
society as government officials, military officers, politicians, academics, charity/NGO workers, or 
journalists will generally tend to identify, consciously or not, with elites, while displaying hostile 
and/or paternalistic attitudes towards subordinate groups.  
 
In the case studies, this was exemplified in the close relations among NGO leaders and supportive 
government and IGO elements,   their   attitude   towards   such  Western   elite   allies   as   ‘partners’   and  
internalisation   of   ‘partnership’   concepts,   sycophantic   praise   of   supportive   elites,   and   habitual  
articulation of shared interests with their government and IGO counterparts. This contrasted with 
their generally paternalistic treatment of survivors – the   campaigns’   subordinate   groups,   as  
manifested in their infantilisation in ICBL-CMC discourse; primarily symbolic and objectificatory 
involvement as poster children for the problem, mainly in the latter phases of the campaigns when 
their parameters had already been established; and their lack of involvement – unlike Core Group 
governments and IGO staff – in agenda-setting or strategic decision-making.  
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According to Gramsci, intellectuals link political and civil society with the economic base in part 
through  ‘intellectualising’  in  universal,  ideological  terms  the  material  interests  of  the  dominant  class  
and associated elites rooted in the economic base. In general, this does not occur in a monolithic 
way, but through the theorisation, organisation and competition of varying hegemonic alliances and 
governance projects that disproportionately represent the particular interests of different fractions 
of the hegemonic class and consensually appeal discursively and through hegemonic economic 
compromises to different support bases among elite intellectuals and subordinate groups, while 
coercing other subordinate groups. In practical terms, this occurs at the national level of hegemony 
through competition between political parties and allied civil society groups, such as religious 
groups, trade unions and NGOs, and internationally and transnationally, through competition 
between such hegemonic alliances, whether mediated through the interstate system, IGOs, or multi-
actor transnational advocacy networks. In the case studies, this dynamic was reflected at the 
national   level   through  the  campaigns’  almost  universally  closer  affinity   to   liberal/social  democratic  
than conservative political parties, as well as to sections of Western states with similar functions. 
Internationally, it took the form of alliances with Western small and middle powers, UN 
development and humanitarian agencies and the ICRC, and later the larger Western powers.  
 
Southern states were much less centrally involved in agenda-setting from the outset and were 
mainly brought in to make up the numbers in the later phases of the campaigns, including through 
hegemonic concessions in the form of promises of extra aid if they signed up to a ban, or, 
conversely, through coercion via threats of aid denial. In both cases, the ICBL and CMC supported 
these consensual and coercive hegemonic strategies towards Southern states and thereby leveraged 
the hard material power of their Western elite allies. The limited nature of hegemonic compromise 
in both cases was illustrated by the substitution of NGO demands for user responsibility by requests 
for increased voluntary international assistance as the campaigns progressed.   
 
Against this backdrop, the relationships of the lead NGOs with capitalist states and other capitalist 
elites was predominantly cooperative, in the sense it operated through their willing absorption into 
hegemonic   alliances   and   governance   strategies,   referred   to   by   NGOs   as   ‘partnership’. This was 
manifested  by  the  bounded  nature  of  NGO  criticisms  of  Western  governments  and  the  campaigns’  
preference for insider tactics and to a lesser extent consensual outsider tactics, often oriented 
towards strengthening the hand of supportive elites towards opposed elites within government 
apparatuses or competing political parties.  
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In this context, what conflict occurred between NGOs and Western states took place within the 
bounds of a generally cooperative relationship, which was also an unequally interdependent one, 
given   NGOs   were   the   dependent   ‘partner’   in   terms   of   financial   and   political   support,   whereas  
government and political elites were politically dependent on NGOs for public legitimisation to a 
much lesser extent – a dynamic that was significantly more relevant for the more high profile 
landmines campaign than the CMC. This condition of NGO dependency was one of the main 
empirical findings of the case studies, which showed that materially, discursively, and tactically, the 
autonomy of the lead NGOs and the campaigns as a whole was generally weak.  
 
The   available   information  on   the   ICBL   and  CMC’s   central   funding   shows  dependency   of  well   over  
60% on the Western donor community, including supportive Western small and middle powers that 
formed the Core Groups of the Ottawa and Oslo Processes, sympathetic humanitarian or 
development sections of other Western states and the UN, and foundations operated by liberal 
capitalist elites. In addition, there was a high level of personnel circulation and similarities of 
professional background between NGOs and these supportive elite institutions, marked discursive 
similarities, and a predominance of insider tactics.  
 
The  campaigns’  relative  lack  of  autonomy  along  all  these  key  indicators  was  manifest  in  hegemonic 
discourses and direct and indirect outcomes that reinforced existing power structures. The 
hegemonic functions of the campaigns related to all three forms of hegemonic compromise 
including: endorsing limited hegemonic economic compromises through de-emphasising demands 
for user/producer responsibility as the campaigns progressed and instead endorsing the financing of 
clearance and victim assistance through voluntary international aid; reinforcing universalising 
hegemonic  ideas  like  the  ‘international  community’,  ‘global  civil  society’,  and  global  governance  as  a  
benign  partnership  of  responsible,  progressive  states,  IGOs  and  ‘global  civil  society’;  and  legitimising  
the wider use of force by the West through exploiting, but simultaneously reinforcing, Western 
states’  self-portrayal as responsible users of force motivated by humanitarian concerns.  
 
Because the campaigns were centrally concerned with security and International Humanitarian Law 
issues, their discourses had a particular bearing on consensual-hegemony in the sense of legitimising 
or  generating  consent  to  force,  which  lies  at  the  very  heart  of  Gramsci’s  concept  of  hegemony  and  
hegemonic power as a dialectical unity of force and consent, of hard and soft power. In both cases, 
NGOs tried to persuade states that banning landmines and cluster munitions would reinforce the 
unquestioned   legitimacy   of   their   otherwise   ‘civilised’   use   of   force   and   also   made   sense   from   a  
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directly  military  perspective,  given  those  weapons’  propensity  to  ‘friendly  fire’  and/or obsolescence 
as  primitive  old,  ‘faulty’  armaments  outmoded  by  the  latest  technological  developments.  The  CMC  in  
particular   worked   off   discourses   around   ‘smart’   weapons,   while   arguing   that   particular   cluster  
munitions  did  not  qualify  as  ‘smart’.  The  ICBL avoided  this  to  an  extent  by  insisting  that  ‘smart’  anti-
personnel mines also be banned, but within the context of banning a category of weapons generally 
understood  as  a  ‘weapon  of  the  weak’.  Both  campaigns  singled  out  a  class  of  weapons  that  primarily  
consisted of cheap, low-tech weapons that were relatively more important to less advanced military 
forces.  
 
This indicates a clear hegemonic limit to this type of campaigning that would appear to preclude 
banning the most advanced and militarily useful weapons. Such strategies were also consistent with 
how NGOs engaged with Western fears of weapons proliferation to the South, again appealing to 
the hegemonic interests of Western elites and implying that unlike them, Southern actors were 
inherently irresponsible, illegitimate wielders of force. The  ICBL  and  CMC’s  emphasis  on  preventing  
proliferation to the South represented a significant departure from the discourse of arms control 
during   the   Cold   War,   which   was   framed   in   terms   of   progress   towards   ‘general   and complete 
disarmament   under   international   control’   (UN General Assembly 1959), whilst balancing the 
interests of the Eastern, Western and non-aligned   blocs   so   that   ‘at   no   stage…could   any   State   or  
group  of  States  gain  military  advantage’  (UN General Assembly 1961). While that framework would 
in   theory   preserve   the   existing   military   balance,   at   least   until   the   notional   goal   of   ‘general   and  
complete  disarmament’  was  reached,  today’s  arms  control  perceives  the  South  as  the  central  locus  
of arms control and de-problematises Western military expenditure (Cooper 2011). Brought to a 
logical conclusion, this could only deepen existing disparities of military power and ensure the 
continued military advantage of Western states.   
 
With   respect   to   the   universalising   hegemonic   concept   of   ‘global   civil   society’,   neither   campaign 
approached the global liberal democratic ideals implied by such a concept, nor operated according 
to the egalitarian implications of a transnational civil society, or transnational advocacy networks, 
conceived  in  terms  of  ‘horizontal’,   ‘decentralised’  networks.  Rather,  both  campaigns  were  directed  
from the North by a small core of professional intellectuals with good elite connections, many of 
whom had a background in comparable roles in donor states and IGOs, or went on to such positions 
afterwards. Both campaigns were marked by strong North-South disparities of influence that 
reflected wider patterns of power in the interstate system and global economic structure and 
neither campaign was internally democratic.  
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Interestingly, in contrast to predictions prevalent among liberal theorists in the 1990s and early 
2000s that the globalisation of communication technologies would help to attenuate such disparities 
of influence over time, the later cluster munitions campaign was more centrally coordinated and had 
less Southern involvement than the earlier landmines campaign. This was perhaps best illustrated by 
the   division   that   emerged   between   the   CMC’s   Northern   leadership   and   the   wider   Southern  
membership at the final negotiations, when it was clear most SNGOs were unaware of the 
campaign’s  endgame  strategy,  and  had  definitely  not  participated   in  developing   it.  This  was  partly  
due to the nature of the issue, which had had less of an impact on developing countries than 
landmines, but was also a function of the instrumentalist attitude of NGO leaders towards the 
participation of SNGOs and survivors as providers of legitimacy and numerical support, which 
mirrored Core Group strategies towards involving Southern states in the Ottawa and Oslo Processes.  
 
As Beier and Denholm Crosby (1998, p.273) have argued in a Gramscian analysis of the landmines 
campaign, both campaigns therefore represented global civil society in a reformative, passive 
revolutionary  mode,  whereby  ‘the forces of the status quo emerged with their interests essentially 
uncompromised,   or   indeed   reinforced’.   The   argument   here   goes   further   in   positing   that   the  
landmines and cluster munitions campaigns were able to achieve influence precisely because they 
served a hegemonic function and constructed arguments that sections of elites could find in their 
long term hegemonic interests. Consequently, their influence was a hegemonic influence, which was 
not a mere by-product of their campaigning practices, but a defining element of the campaigns and 
the most important reason for their success.  
 
Practical considerations such as the costs of clearing landmines and unexploded ordnance and losses 
of Western military and aid personnel were also an important factor in elite support, as they meant 
that while the landmines and cluster munitions problems were small relative to other international 
development issues such as poverty or disease, they directly impinged on the security and 
developmental interests of donors and other international actors by endangering the life and limbs 
of international aid workers, peacekeepers and hindering economic development. In the case of 
landmines, the technological superiority of Western states, as well as the type of military 
interventions in which they were engaged, also meant they no longer considered anti-personnel 
mines a necessary or particularly militarily useful weapon.  
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Notwithstanding these directly material considerations, hegemonic reinforcement was the most 
valuable  ‘reward’  offered  by  the  campaigns  to  Western  states  and  their  constituent  elites.  It  seems  
unlikely that either campaign could have achieved what influence it did, had it not appealed to 
hegemonic interests in this way, or had more radical demands, discursive critiques, or contentious 
outsider tactics been central to its practices. Evidence of this abounded, from the ways in which 
aspects of the problems that could have more seriously impinged on the material interests of 
Western elites, such as the concept of user/producer responsibility, or banning anti-vehicle mines or 
the highest tech guided cluster munitions, were either excluded from the agenda entirely or 
progressively de-emphasised. In addition to this, the perspectives of more critical NGOs were 
marginalised within the landmines campaign and were almost non-existent in the cluster munitions 
campaign, while contentious tactics were rapid shelved on the rare occasions they emerged. For 
example, the spontaneous contentious tactics that briefly emerged in the cluster munitions 
campaign towards the end of the Oslo Process provoked a strong negative response from states and 
resulted in a noticeable toning down of NGO tactics and greater centralised control at the final 
negotiations. Likewise, protests during the final negotiations of the landmines treaty were quickly 
forgotten in the avalanche of mutual legitimation that followed its conclusion.  
In general, the type of hegemonic reinforcement NGOs offered was more appealing to sections of 
states with similar functions, such as development and foreign affairs departments that already 
funded them to carry out government foreign policy, and also the liberal/social democratic parties 
for whom humanitarian ideas are more central to their hegemonic projects/governance strategies. 
Consequently, NGO success in persuading governing elites to support the campaign was strongly 
related to how close their general perspectives and goals were to begin with – as shown by the 
greater receptivity to NGOs of liberal elites, Western small and middle powers, and government 
departments with similar political dispositions, interests and functions, for whom allying with NGOs 
strengthened their hand against competing elites nationally and internationally.  
 
For Western governments and political parties, the purpose of adopting such humanitarian politics is 
strategic in a double sense. On the one hand, it serves to legitimise the wider foreign and security 
policies of states by enabling them to point to humanitarian aid or humanitarian weapons bans as 
evidence of their generally good intentions. On the other, for liberal-social democratic parties it is a 
means of product differentiation from more conservative parties from which they otherwise differ 
little, particularly in relation to economic fundamentals. In this sense, supporting more human 
security/human rights-based approaches to foreign policy serves a similar function to liberalism on 
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social issues for social democratic parties that no longer engage with class politics, and has led to 
policy convergence between liberals and social democrats.  
 
An interesting finding in the case studies in this respect is that while liberal-constructivist global civil 
society and global governance theorists and NGOs alike are quite open about the perceived need for 
partnership with IGOs and states, and in particular small and middle powers, to achieve results, the 
same point is not usually made vis-à-vis political parties, even though lobbying them was at least as 
important   an   element   of   NGO   tactics.   This   can   be   related   to   NGOs’   self-presentation   as   ‘non-
political’   and   the   general   antipathy   towards   political   parties   in   contemporary   liberal   civil   society  
theory, which likes to present NGOs as a horizontal, networked alternative to putatively outmoded, 
vertical and hierarchically organised political parties, rather than as a subordinate complement to 
them.  
 
The analytical implication of this anti-party bias is that it overlooks how hegemonic alliances are still 
organised in large part through the formal political system, and how the type of reformist NGO 
activity that the campaigns represented still had to gain the support of mainstream political parties 
to achieve its aims. This further undercuts   the   notion   of   a   ‘power   shift’,   as   policy   change   still  
required mainstream political parties with compatible interpretations of hegemonic interests, and 
ideally for them to be in government.  
 
Notwithstanding all this, liberal analysts are correct that NGO involvement in foreign policy 
processes represents a significant temporal change in foreign policy formation. The explanation 
suggested  in  Chapter  2  and  illustrated  in  the  case  studies  is  that  NGOs  have  emerged  as  ‘influential’  
international actors since the 1980s in large part because government functions in the fields of 
humanitarian aid, development and foreign policy have been outsourced to them, in an 
internationalisation of neoliberal modes of governance also implemented domestically. This first 
passive revolution, or reform of the structures of established Western capitalist states, was rapidly 
accompanied by a second passive revolution in the form of a historically unprecedented geographic 
expansion of capitalism following the end of the Cold War, whereby Western NGOs and the new 
model of outsourced governance rapidly penetrated the East and South. This also involved a massive 
increase in funding for international NGO activities from liberal foundations operated by wealthy 
capitalist elites, as well from donor governments and IGOs. This has led to NGOs increasingly playing 
a   similar   hegemonic   role   transnationally   and   ‘globally’   as   they   do   at   the   national   level   as   part   of  
integral states. In this sense, there has been a globalisation of civil society, or at least of its 
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hegemonic elements, which has occurred in a profoundly uneven way and reflects disparities of 
power in the interstate system and global economic structure.  
 
When the landmines campaign began in the early 1990s, this outsourcing of government functions 
to NGOs and its expansion to the South were still relatively new phenomena for international 
humanitarian and development NGOs, which had been much more financially independent in the 
1970s and 1980s. By the time of the CMC, it was institutionalised – both for NGOs generally and 
particularly the lead NGOs in the ICBL/CMC, which were mostly the same organisations and involved 
some of the same individuals. Consequently, the idea such NGOs were reasonable, trustworthy 
expert partners who could safely be listened to had become institutionalised among states, but what 
elements of outsider influence NGOs had still had during the landmines campaign had diminished, 
resulting   in   the   CMC’s   increased   reliance  on   insider   tactics.   Against   this  backdrop, NGO influence 
was essentially contingent on NGO integration in Western-dominated international governance 
networks, in part as a result of outsourcing, and was facilitated by the existence of shared ideas and 
values between NGOs and liberal-social democratic elites in political parties in Western states, the 
UN and other international agencies like the ICRC. 
 
To present this type of NGO influence as a power shift is misleading, as it cannot be seen as a 
meaningful power shift in the sense of the empowerment of subordinate groups, but is more 
representative of a re-organisation of governance. This has occurred through an alteration in the 
balance between civil and political society in integral Western states through the outsourcing of 
governance functions to NGOs, which has led to a closer integration of NGOs as arms of 
government, including in relation to foreign policy.  
 
Particularly for smaller and middle powers, aspects of foreign policy have increasingly been 
delegated to internationalised civil society components of integral states, as a means of increasing 
those   states’   international   influence   and   enabling   them   to   ‘punch   above   their   weight’.   The  
‘Norwegian  model’  is  a  particularly  conscious  example  of  this  foreign  policy  strategy,  as  is  Canadian 
diplomats’   reference   to  NGOs   as   an   increasingly   useful   part   of   their   ‘diplomatic   tool-kit’   (Lawson 
1997a, p.23). Of course, this is not an entirely novel development, given it has been an element of 
Western   states’   foreign   policy   at   least   since   the   role   of   religious   groups   in   colonialism,   but   it   has  
intensified in recent decades in the context of neoliberal governance trends towards privatisation 
and outsourcing.  
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Liberal-constructivist theorists have interpreted this development in terms of a power shift from 
states to civil society, whereas from a class-based Gramscian perspective, it appears more that 
similar governance functions and social interests are being represented in a somewhat different 
way. In the process, governance functions formerly carried out directly by government agencies 
have been outsourced to NGO and professional intellectuals that would previously been employed 
by states or joined political parties in the days of mass membership and are now working for NGOs, 
carrying out similar functions in a privatised and more depoliticised capacity. From the perspective 
of a Gramscian understanding of intellectuals as secondary hegemonic subjects that theorise and 
organise   hegemonic   ideas   and   projects   on   the   part   of   the   dominant   class,   such   ‘leadership’   can  
originate   ‘from’   positions   in   civil   society,   so   long as the ideas involved are compatible with the 
fundamental interests of the dominant class, domestically and internationally.  This closer 
integration of NGOs into state-dominated national and international governance systems helps to 
explain the campaigns’  dependency  on   insider   tactics  and  the  bounded  nature  of   their  discourses,  
which did not, and indeed could not, have challenged the nature of the governance system within 
which they were embedded as it was this system itself that gave NGOs resources and influence and 
constituted them as actors.  
 
Another way in which presenting NGO influence as reflective of a power shift is misleading is that in 
respect of the multi-actor partnerships or transnational advocacy networks involved in the 
landmines and cluster  munitions  campaigns,  it  implies  NGOs’  small  and  middle  power  partners  have  
fundamentally different interests to their great power allies, and would seek to meaningfully 
challenge international hegemonic power structures, rather than serving a complementary, 
legitimising  role.  Historically,  middlepowermanship  has  taken  the  form  of  acting  as  a   ‘helpful  fixer’  
for larger powers in assisting the smooth running of the international system, a role still apparent in 
Canada  and  Ireland’s  behaviour  during  the  final negotiations of the landmines and cluster munitions 
treaties. Latterly, it has also involved a more pro-active  ‘heroic’  role  (Michaud and Belanger 2000), in 
which small and middle powers promote new international norms that may be opposed by larger 
powers – as also occurred in the landmines and cluster munitions campaigns.  
 
What   liberal  analyses  of  such  ‘heroic’  behaviour  tend  to  overlook   is  the  extent  to  which  small  and  
middle powers promoting these norms endeavour to persuade larger allies they are in its long-term 
hegemonic interests and that of Western hegemony at the international level generally. That this 
was  not  an  ‘unreasonable’  argument  is  suggested  by  the  ready  support  of  individual  liberal  elites  in  
the US and other great powers, such as Senator Patrick Leahy and George Soros, who could perceive 
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banning these weapons as   in   their   countries’   enlightened   long-term, or hegemonic, interests. 
Consequently,  appeals  to  US  hegemonic  ‘leadership’  were  at  the  core  of  Leahy’s  (1997a) arguments 
for why the US should support the landmines ban , just as they were for the lead US NGOs (Muller 
1994b, pp.69–70). That this has not so far proved persuasive to the US does not invalidate the 
compatibility of the bans with US interests, as it could sign to both of them without appreciably 
affecting its overwhelmingly military dominance and such a decision would merely represent a 
change in hegemonic strategy. This suggests NGO intellectuals, small and middle powers, and IGOs 
can  ‘lead’  within  certain  parameters,  so  long  as  their  demands  do  not  ‘touch  the  essential’  (Gramsci 
1971, p.161) limits of hegemonic politics. 
 
In this respect, an explanation for the emergence of partnerships between NGOs, international 
agencies like the UN and ICRC and Western small and middle powers allied with the US is that all of 
them play similar consensual-hegemonic roles vis-à-vis the international system and global 
governance,  but  only  ‘material’  middle  powers  like  Canada  and  Norway,  as  opposed  to  smaller  states  
like Ireland or New Zealand that merely aspire to behave like middle powers, appear capable of 
leading the sort of standalone diplomatic processes in which the landmines and cluster munitions 
treaties were negotiated.  For their part, NGO/civil society participation and acclamation gives the 
international system and individual states a democratic veneer that policy input from different 
government departments does not, creating another advantage to outsourcing foreign policy 
formation to NGOs additional to its lower cost and the potential benefits of distancing certain 
activities, such as demining from direct state responsibility. With respect to the international system, 
small and middle powers play a similar legitimising role for reasons of both domestic and 
international hegemony.   
 
Maintaining their domestic hegemony depends in part on maintaining the legitimacy of the 
international system of which they are a part, which in the case of Western small and middle powers 
such as Canada and Norway has historically meant   promoting   ‘liberal’   interpretations   of  Western  
international hegemony that sections of other Western states with consensual-hegemonic functions 
also often see as in their domestic hegemonic interests, but which have historically proved more 
persuasive   in  weaker  military   powers.   As   a   Canadian   strategic   policymaker   once   put   it,   “We   talk  
about  the  rule  of  law  because  we  don’t  have  aircraft  carriers”  (quoted in Brysk 2009, p.92).  
 
The explanation of the nature and conditions of NGO influence that emerges from these case studies 
is that the soft power of NGOs is derived from the material power of supportive elites, which, 
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consistent  with  Gramsci’s  Marxist  concept  of  base  and  superstructure,  delimited  NGO  practices,   in  
the sense of their aims, discourse and tactics. In both cases, there was a clear correspondence 
between the material base of the campaigns – externally dependent on Western elites, both 
financially and in personnel terms and organised in such a way as to reproduce wider inequalities in 
the interstate system and the global economic structure – their discursive and tactical practices and 
the direct and indirect outcomes they produced, which were system-reinforcing, rather than system-
challenging.  Hence,  in  this  way  the  campaigns’  ‘superstructures’  reflected  their  material  base  in  the  
bounded criticisms made by NGOs of government policy.  
 
In conclusion, the landmines and cluster munitions campaigns span a period of significant change in 
the international system. The liberal optimism, evident in the academic literature, which 
characterised the immediate post-Cold War period, appeared to many as justified in light of the 
success of the landmines campaign. But although by the beginning of the 21st century significant 
changes had occurred in how states and civil society interacted in the international system 
compared to a decade earlier, this did not amount to a power shift from states to civil society, or an 
incremental democratisation of global governance. Rather, the analysis of the cluster munitions 
campaign in this thesis demonstrates that trends evident in the landmines campaign, which were 
indicative of a changing international system, have since solidified. In essence, both the landmines 
and cluster munitions campaigns demonstrate that NGOs as part of civil society are inextricably 
linked with and support specific state elites, the corollary of which is that they have less close 
engagement with, or are in opposition to other elite groups within the state. This reflects a wider 
shift in the international system due to an increased transnationalisation of elite competition within 
and among states at the levels of both political and civil society. 
 
  
284 
 
Bibliography 
Abrahamsen, R. (2000) Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in 
Africa, Zed Books. 
Actiongroup Landmine.de (2005) Cluster Bombs and Cluster Munitions - A Danger to Life, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060215213959/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/files/C
luster%20Munitions%20-%20A%20Danger%20to%20Life.pdf. 
Actiongroup Landmine.de (2007) Pressemitteilung - Weltweiter Aktionstag gegen Streumunition 
[Press Release - Worldwide Action Day against cluster munitions] [online], available: 
http://www.landmine.de/archiv/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/pressemitteilungen/news-
detailseite/article/pressemitteilung-weltweiter-aktionstag-gegen-str.html [accessed 19 Nov 
2013]. 
AFP (1996)  ‘Mine  bans  under  attack’,  The Weekend Australian, 4 May. 
Aftenposten  (2001a)  ‘Norske  offiserer  til  terrorsenter  i  USA  [Norwegian  officers  to  terrorist  center  in  
the  U.S]’,  Aftenposten, 8 Nov, available: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/article226362.ece [accessed 28 Aug 2011]. 
Aftenposten  (2001b)  ‘Kr.F.  mot  bruk  av  klasebomber  i  Afghanistan  [CDP  on  the  use  of  cluster  bombs  
in  Afghanistan]’,  3  Nov,  available:  
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article223373.ece [accessed 28 Aug 2011]. 
Aftenposten  (2001c)  ‘Bondevik  møter  George  W.  Bush  [Bondevik  meets  George  W.  Bush]’,  
Aftenposten, 19 Nov, available: 
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=no&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aftenp
osten.no%2Fnyheter%2Furiks%2Farticle232452.ece [accessed 28 Aug 2011]. 
Aftenposten  (2003a)  ‘Norge  skal  delta  med  ingeniørsoldater  i  Irak-styrke [Norway will participate 
with  engineer  troops  in  Iraq  force]’,  Aftenposten, 12 May, available: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/irak/article544501.ece [accessed 5 Sep 2011]. 
Aftenposten  (2003b)  ‘Velgerne  i  bevegelse  [Voters  in  motion]’,  Aftenposten, 16 Feb, available: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/leder/article491392.ece [accessed 5 Sep 2011]. 
Aftenposten  (2003c)  ‘SV  større  enn  Ap  på  meningsmåling  [Socialist  Left  higher  than  Labour  in  poll]’,  
Aftenposten, 20 Mar, available: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/politikk/article512405.ece [accessed 5 Sep 2011]. 
Aftenposten  (2005)  ‘Norwegian  radar  aided  Iraq  war’,  Aftenposten, 12 Oct, available: 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1501230/posts [accessed 26 Aug 2011]. 
Agg, C. (2006) Trends in Government Support for Non-Governmental  Organizations  Is  the  ‘Golden  
Age’  of  the  NGO  Behind  Us?, Paper Number 23, Civil Society and Social Movements 
Programme, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, available: 
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/E8BC05C1E4B8AD6FC12571D1
002C4F0B/$file/Agg.pdf [accessed 19 May 2009]. 
Agir  Ici  (2005)  ‘Cluster  Bombs:  Landmines  by  Another  Name  - Campaign for the banning of cluster 
bombs’,  Campaign of Agir Ici, (71), Oct, available: 
http://www.obsarm.org/campagnes/munitions/doc-campagne-ang.pdf. 
Aidwatch (2003) NGO Directory - Handicap International [online], available: 
http://www.observatoire-humanitaire.org/fusion.php?l=GB&id=21 [accessed 16 Jul 2010]. 
Aidwatch  (2009a)  Norwegian  People’s  Aid  [online],  available:  http://www.observatoire-
humanitaire.org/fusion.php?l=GB&id=75 [accessed 16 Jul 2010]. 
Aidwatch (2009b) Oxfam [online], available: http://www.observatoire-
humanitaire.org/fusion.php?l=GB&id=77 [accessed 16 Jul 2010]. 
Aidwatch (2011) NGO Directory: Comité International de La Croix Rouge [International Committee of 
the Red Cross] [online], available: http://www.observatoire-
humanitaire.org/fusion.php?l=GB&id=84 [accessed 15 Jan 2012]. 
285 
 
Aka,  P.C.  (2006)  ‘Analyzing  US  Commitment  to  Socioeconomic  Human  Rights’,  Akron L. Rev., 39, 417. 
Albin,  C.  (1999)  ‘Can  NGOs  Enhance  the  Effectiveness  of  International  Negotiation?’,  International 
Negotiation, 4(3), 371–387. 
Albrow,  M.,  Anheier,  H.K.  (2006)  ‘Violence  and  the  Possibility  of  Global  Civility’,  Global Civil Society, 
7, 1–17. 
Albrow,  M.,  Glasius,  M.  (2008)  ‘Democracy  and  the  Possibility  of  a  Global  Public  Sphere’,  in  Kaldor,  
M., Glasius, M., Anheier, H.K. and Albrow, M., eds., Global Civil Society 2007/8: 
Communicative Power and Democracy, Sage Publications Ltd, 1–18, available: 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/civilSociety/yearBook/con
tentsPages/2007-2008.aspx. 
Albrow, M., Seckinelgin, H. (2011)  ‘Introduction:  Globality  and  the  Absence  of  Justice’,  in  Albrow,  M.  
and Seckenelgin, H., eds., Global Civil Society 2011: Globality and the Absence of Justice, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1–11. 
Alcalde Villacampa, J. (2010) International Disarmament Campaigns: A Current State of Affairs 
[online], Generalitat de Catalunya Ministry of Home Affairs, Institutional Relations and 
Participation Office for the Promotion of Peace and Human Rights, available: 
http://www10.gencat.cat/drep/binaris/14_MPDH_angles_web_tcm112-135880.pdf. 
Alqadhafi, S. (2007) THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE DEMOCRATISATION OF GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE  INSTITUTIONS:  From  ‘Soft  Power’  to  Collective  Decision-Making?, available: 
http://images.derstandard.at/2011/02/23/Diss_Gaddafi.pdf [accessed 30 Nov 2012]. 
Althusser, L. (1971) Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation) 
[online], Marxist Internet Archive, available: 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm [accessed 27 Jan 
2010]. 
Americas Watch (1986) Land Mines in El Salvador and Nicaragua: The Civilian Victims, Americas 
Watch. 
Amoore,  L.,  Langley,  P.  (2003)  ‘Ambiguities  of  global  civil  society’,  Review of International Studies, 
30(01), available: http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0260210504005844 
[accessed 16 Mar 2012]. 
Anderson, C. (2007) Unacceptable Harm [online], Landmine Action, available: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nO4fpQ1IQHY&feature=youtube_gdata [accessed 11 
Aug 2010]. 
Anderson,  K.  (2000)  ‘The  Ottawa  Convention  banning  landmines, the role of international non-
governmental  organizations  and  the  idea  of  international  civil  society’,  European Journal of 
International Law, 11(1), 91–121. 
Anderson,  K.,  Schurtman,  M.  (1995)  ‘The United Nations response to the crisis of landmines in the 
developing  world’,  Harvard International Law Journal, 36(2), 359–371. 
Anderson,  P.  (1976)  ‘The  Antinomies  of  Antonio  Gramsci’,  New left review, 100, 5–78. 
Anderson,  P.  (1988)  ‘The  Affinities  of  Norberto  Bobbio’,  New Left Review, 170(3). 
Anderson,  P.  (2002)  ‘Force  and  Consent’,  New  Left Review, 5–30. 
Anheier, H.K. (2004) Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy, Earthscan. 
Anheier,  H.K.,  Daly,  S.  (2004)  ‘Philanthropic  Foundations:  A  New  Global  Force?’,  in  Anheier,  H.K.,  
Glasius, M. and Kaldor, M., eds., Global Civil Society 2004/5, 158–176. 
Anheier,  H.K.,  Glasius,  M.,  Kaldor,  M.  (2001a)  ‘Introducing  global  civil  society’,  in  Global Civil Society 
Yearbook 2001, available: 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/civilSociety/yearBook/cha
pterPdfs/2001/chapter01.pdf. 
Anheier, H.K., Glasius, M., Kaldor, M. (2001b) Global Civil Society 2001, Sage. 
Anheier,  H.K.,  Glasius,  M.,  Kaldor,  M.  (Eds.)  (2001c)  ‘Table  Programme’,  in  Global Civil Society 
Yearbook 2001, 231–322. 
Anheier,  H.K.,  Kaldor,  M.,  Glasius,  M.  (2005)  ‘Introduction’,  in  Global Civil Society 2005/6 - Risk, Sage. 
286 
 
Anheier,  H.K.,  Kaldor,  M.,  Glasius,  M.  (2012)  ‘The  Global  Civil  Society  Yearbook:  Lessons  and  Insights  
2001–2011’,  in  Kaldor,  M.,  Moore,  H.L.  and  Selchow,  S.,  eds.,  Global Civil Society 2012: Ten 
Years of Critical Reflection, Palgrave Macmillan, 2–27. 
Anheier,  H.K.,  Katz,  H.  (2003)  ‘Mapping  Global  Civil  Society’,  in  Kaldor,  M.,  Anheier,  H.K.  and  Glasius,  
M., eds., Global Civil Society 2003, Oxford University Press, 241–258, available: 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/civilSociety/yearBook/con
tentsPages/2003.aspx [accessed 18 Mar 2012]. 
Anheier, H.K., Leat, D. (2006) Creative Philanthropy: Toward a New Philanthropy for the Twenty-First 
Century, 1st ed, Routledge. 
Anheier, H.K., Toepler, S. (1999) Private Funds, Public Purpose: Philanthropic Foundations in 
International, Nonprofit and civil society studies, Kluwer Academic / Plenum: New York. 
Annan,  K.  (1997a)  ‘Message  from  Mr    Kofi  A  Annan,    Secretary-General  of  the United  Nations to the 
First Continental Conference of African Experts on Landmines 19 - 21 May 1997, World 
Trade  Centre,  Kempton  Park,  South  Africa’,  available:  
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/other/landminefree/Annan.pdf. 
Annan, K. (1997b) Secretary-General Calls on International Community to Make Land-Mines  ‘A  
Weapon  of  the  Past  and  a  Symbol  of  Shame’, Press Release SG/SM/6313, United Nations, 
Oslo, available: http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/sgsm6313.htm [accessed 17 Aug 
2009]. 
Annan, K. (1997c) Statement of the Secretary-General: Welcomes Convention Banning Landmines as 
`Landmark  Step  in  History  of  Disarmament’  [online],  mineaction.org, available: 
http://www.mineaction.org/docs/615_.asp [accessed 17 Aug 2009]. 
Annan, K. (2005) In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All: 
Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations. 
ANZCMC (2008a) Report On Activities - Wellington Conference On Cluster Munitions, 18-22 February 
2008, available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2008/07/anzcmc-wellington-report.pdf. 
ANZCMC (2008b) The Coalition [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080113024442/http://www.stopclusterbombs.org.nz/about/
. 
AOAV (2013) Kate Moore MBE [online], available: http://aoav.org.uk/staff/kate-moore-mbe/ 
[accessed 29 Nov 2013]. 
AP  (1997)  ‘US  move  may  end  Diana’s  landmines  dream’,  3  Sep. 
Archibugi,  D.  (2004)  ‘Cosmopolitan  Democracy  and  its  Critics’,  European Journal of International 
Law, 10(3). 
Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Lebanon, Mexico, Palau, Uruguay (2008) Proposal by 
Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Lebanon, Mexico, Palau and Uruguay for the 
Amendment of Article 2 [online], available: 
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/CCM71.pdf. 
Arms  Control  Association  (1997)  ‘The  Ottawa  Landmine  Treaty’,  Arms Control Today, (September 
1997), available: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_09/apltreat [accessed 20 May 
2011]. 
Armstrong, J.D., Lloyd, L., Redmond, J. (2004) International Organisation in World Politics, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Arnold,  R.  (2004)  ‘Emperor  Soros:  A  closer  look  at  the  man  who  would  be  philosopher-king’,  
Foundation Watch, Sep, available: http://www.capitalresearch.org/pubs/pdf/FW0904.pdf. 
Arts,  B.  (2003)  ‘Non-State  Actors  in  Global  Governance:  Three  Faces  of  Power’,  54,  available:  
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2003_4.pdf. 
Asia Watch (1989) Khmer Rouge Abuses along the Thai-Cambodian Border, Human Rights Watch. 
Asia Watch (1990) Human Rights in Burma (Myanmar), Human Rights Watch. 
287 
 
Asia Watch, PHR (1991) Land  Mines  in  Cambodia:  The  Coward’s  War, Human Rights Watch & 
Physicians for Human Rights. 
Askin,  S.,  Goose,  S.D.  (1994)  ‘The  Market  for  Anti-Personnel Landmines - A  Global  Survey’,  Jane’s  
Intelligence Review, (September 1994), 426–431. 
Atwood,  D.C.  (1999)  ‘Implementing  Ottawa:  Continuity  and  Change  in  the  Roles  of  NGOs’,  
Disarmament Forum, 4, 19–31. 
Atwood,  D.C.  (2002)  ‘NGOs  and  Disarmament:  Views  from  the  Coal  Face’,  Disarmament Forum, (1), 
5–13. 
Augelli,  E.,  Murphy,  C.N.  (1993)  ‘Gramsci  and  international  relations:  a  general  persepctive  with  
examples from recent US policy toward the Third World’,  in  Gill,  S.,  ed.,  Gramsci, Historical 
Materialism and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 127–147. 
Augsburg  College  (1999)  ‘Peace  Prize  Forum’,  Augsburg Now, 61(2), Winter, available: 
http://www.augsburg.edu/now/archives/winter99/ppf.html [accessed 11 Dec 2011]. 
Austcare (2008) Annual Report 2007-8 [online], available: 
http://www.actionaid.ie/sites/files/actionaid/austcare_annual_report_2007-08.pdf 
[accessed 5 Dec 2013]. 
Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland,  United  Kingdom  (2008)  ‘DISCUSSION  PAPER  - CLUSTER MUNITIONS AND INTER-
OPERABILITY: THE OSLO-PROCESS DISCUSSION TEXT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL  OPERATIONS’,  available:  http://www.delegfrance-cd-
geneve.org/declarations/ssdos_decl_sous_munitions/discussion-paper-like-minded-conf-
wellingtion.pdf. 
Austria (1996) First Austrian Draft of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines 
[online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/200101171810/http://www.mines.gc.ca/english/documents/vi
enntrt.html. 
Austria (1997a) Second Tentative Austrian Draft, CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, 
STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR 
DESTRUCTION [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202154413/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/international
/updates/events/treaty.html [accessed 12 Jul 2012]. 
Austria (1997b) Third Austrian Draft of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines 
[online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152724/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/austrian.html. 
Axworthy,  L.  (1997a)  ‘Canada  and  Human  Security:  The  Need  for  Leadership’,  International Journal, 
52(2), 183–196. 
Axworthy, L. (1997b) Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to the Oslo NGO Forum on Banning Landmines [online]. 
Axworthy,  L.  (1997c)  ‘Statement  by  Lloyd  Axworthy,  Foreign  Minister,  to  the  Opening  Session  of  the  
Mine  Action  Forum,  2  December  1997’,  in  Opening Session of the Mine Action Forum, 
Presented at the Mine Action Forum, Ottawa, available: 
www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd21/21ott.htm. 
Axworthy,  L.  (1998a)  ‘Towards  a  New  Multilateralism’,  in  Cameron,  M.  and  Lawson,  R.,  eds.,  To Walk 
Without Fear: The International Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 448–459. 
Axworthy,  L.  (1998b)  ‘Notes  for  an  Address  by  the  Honourable  Lloyd  Axworthy,  Minister  of  Foreign  
Affairs  to  the  Foreign  Policy  Association:  The  Landmines  Campaign  in  Context’,  available: 
http://www.international.gc.ca/mines/process-ottawa-processus/1998-06-
19.aspx?lang=eng&view=d [accessed 15 Sep 2011]. 
288 
 
Axworthy, L. (1999) Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, to the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Relations Princeton 
University  ‘Kosovo  and  the  Human  Security  Agenda’  [online],  available:  
http://wayback.archive.org/web/19991008070026/http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/english/news/statements/99_state/99_028-e.htm [accessed 2 Nov 2013]. 
Axworthy,  L.,  Taylor,  S.  (1998)  ‘A  ban  for  all  seasons  - The landmines convention & its implications 
for  Canadian  diplomacy’,  International Journal, 53(2), 189–203. 
Bachrach,  P.,  Baratz,  M.S.  (1962)  ‘Two  Faces  of  Power’,  The American Political Science Review, 56(4), 
947–952. 
Baehr, P. (1996) Mobilization of the Conscience of Mankind: Conditions of Effectiveness of Human 
Rights NGOs [online], available: http://www.gdrc.org/ngo/lecture14.html. 
Bajpai, K. (2000) Human Security: Concept and Measurement, 19, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper, 
University of Notre Dame, Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. 
Bandler,  J.  (1998)  ‘Laureate  in  a  minefield’,  Boston Globe Magazine, 27 Dec, available: 
http://cache.boston.com/globe/magazine/1998/6-7/featurestory/ [accessed 16 Jun 2010]. 
Bashow, L.D.L., Davies, C.D., Viens, A., Rotteau, L.-C.J., Balfe, M.N., Stouffer, M.R., Pickett, C.J., 
Harris,  D.S.  (2000)  ‘Mission  Ready:  Canada’s  Role  in  the  Kosovo  Air  Campaign’,  Canadian 
Military Journal, (Spring 2000), 55–61. 
Batora,  J.  (2005)  ‘Multistakeholder  Public  Diplomacy  of  Small  and  Medium-Sized States: Norway and 
Canada  Compared’,  in  International Conference on Multi-Stakeholder Diplomacy, 
Mediterranean Diplomatic Academy, Malta, February, 11–13, available: 
http://www.diplomacy.edu/conferences/MSD/papers/batora.pdf. 
BBB Wise Giving Report (2009) Charity Review of Human Rights Watch [online], available: 
http://www.bbb.org/charity-reviews/national/toc/human-rights-watch-in-new-york-ny-
3452 [accessed 3 Sep 2009]. 
BBC  (1999)  ‘Two  in  Three  Support  Strikes’  [online],  BBC, available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/326481.stm#map [accessed 21 Jun 2012]. 
BBC  (2001)  ‘Call  for  cluster  bombs  halt’,  BBC, 25 Oct, available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1619159.stm [accessed 4 Nov 2013]. 
BBC  (2003)  ‘Europe  and  Iraq:  Who  stands  where?’,  BBC, 29 Jan, available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2698153.stm [accessed 13 Nov 2013]. 
BBC  (2004)  ‘Diana’s  fund  in  legal  settlement’,  BBC, 10 Nov, available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4000867.stm [accessed 4 Nov 2013]. 
Beach,  G.S.H.  (2001)  ‘Cluster  Bombs:  the  Case  for  New  Controls’,  ISIS Briefing Paper No. 25, 
available: 
http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/beach_cluster%20bombs%20new%20controls.pdf
. 
Beer,  A.  (1994)  ‘The  German  Campaign  Against  Landmines,  Presented  by:  Angelika  Beer,  
Coordinator,  German  Campaign’,  in  ICBL,  ed.,  Second Ngo Conference On Landmines: Report 
of Proceedings - Geneva, 9-11 May 1994, DIANE Publishing Company, 46–49, available: 
http://books.google.ie/books?id=tbrmQslpLK4C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_sum
mary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false [accessed 31 Aug 2009]. 
Behringer,  R.M.  (2005)  ‘Middle  Power  Leadership  on  the  Human  Security  Agenda’,  Cooperation and 
Conflict, 40(3), 305–342. 
Beier,  J.M.  (2002)  ‘Siting  Indiscriminacy:    India  and  the  Global  Movement  to  Ban  Landmines.’,  Global 
Governance, 8(3), 305. 
Beier,  J.M.  (2003)  ‘“Emailed  applications  are  preferred”:  ethical  practices  in  mine  action  and  the  idea  
of global civil society’,  Third World Quarterly, 24(5), 795–808. 
Beier,  J.M.  (2011)  ‘Dangerous  Terrain:  Re-Reading the Landmines Ban through the Social Worlds of 
the  RMA’,  Contemporary Security Policy, 32(1), 159–175. 
289 
 
Beier,  J.M.,  Denholm  Crosby,  A.  (1998)  ‘Harnessing  Change for Continuity: The Play of Political and 
Economic  Forces  behind  the  Ottawa  Process’,  in  To Walk Without Fear: The International 
Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Belgian  Security  and  Defence  Industry  (2005)  ‘Submission  of  the  Belgian arms industry regarding the 
draft law to ban cluster munitions, Presented by the Belgian Security and Defence Industry 
(BSDI),  Brussels,  19  December  2005’. 
Belgium  (1996)  ‘Belgian  Draft  of  a  Convention  on  the  Total  Prohibition  of  Anti-Personnel Mines’. 
Bellamy, A.J. (2009) Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, Polity. 
Bellamy,  A.J.  (2010)  ‘Humanitarian  Intervention’,  in  Collins,  A.,  ed.,  Contemporary Security Studies, 
Oxford University Press: New York, 359–377. 
Bellamy, C.  (1996)  ‘Fury  at  UN  failure  to  ban  mines  that  maim’,  The Independent (London), 4 May. 
Bellamy,  R.  (2004)  ‘Norberto  Bobbio’,  the Guardian, 13 Jan, available: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2004/jan/13/guardianobituaries.obituaries [accessed 27 
Nov 2012]. 
Benesch,  S.,  McGrory,  G.,  Rodriguez,  C.,  Sloane,  R.  (1999)  ‘International  Customary  Law  and  
Antipersonnel  Landmines:  Emergence  of  a  New  Customary  Norm’,  in  Landmine Monitor 
Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World, Human Rights Watch: New York, available: 
http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/appendices/custom_law.html. 
Berglund, N. (2001) Majority in Parliament Supports Bombing of Afghanistan [online], 
Aftenposten.no, available: http://www.aftenposten.no/english/local/article230633.ece 
[accessed 11 Jul 2011]. 
Berglund, N. (2002) Norway Has Forces in Afghanistan [online], Aftenposten.no, available: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/english/local/article254448.ece?service=print [accessed 11 Jul 
2011]. 
Bernard  Jr.,  P.  (2006)  ‘Canada  and  human  security:  from  the  Axworthy  doctrine  to middle power 
internationalism’,  American Review of Canadian Studies, 36(2), 233–261. 
Bernstein,  E.  (2008)  ‘Still  Alive  and  Kicking:  The  International  Campaign  to  Ban  Landmines’,  in  
Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Human Security and Citizen Diplomacy, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, Maryland; Plymouth, 31–48. 
Bernstein, L. (1997) Message from Brussels Conference Organizers [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152625/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/brusselsmessage.html. 
Biddle, S., Klare, J.L., Oelrich, I., Wallis, J. (1996) Landmine Arms Control, Prepared for the Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, available: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA315050. 
Biddle, S., Klare, J.L., Rosenfeld, J. (1994) The Miltary Utility of Landmines: Implications for Arms 
Control,Prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, available: 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA283061. 
Bieler, A., Morton, A.D.  (2003)  ‘Globalisation,  the  state  and  class  struggle:  a  “Critical  Economy”  
engagement  with  Open  Marxism’,  British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 5(4), 
467–499. 
Biersteker,  T.J.  (2010)  ‘Global  Governance’,  in  Dunn  Cavelty,  M.  and  Mauer,  V., eds., The Routledge 
Handbook of Security Security, Routledge, 439–452. 
Birnbaum,  B.  (2010)  ‘Minority  Report’,  The New Republic, 10 May, available: 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/minority-report-2 [accessed 21 Nov 2013]. 
Bjøreng, E. (2001) Will Bombing Afghanistan Stop International Terrorism? [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20011122065437/http://www.npaid.org/npa_news/gen_bomb
.htm. 
Blair, T. (1999) Doctrine of the International Community, Speech by Prime Minister Tony Blair to the 
Economic Club of Chicago, April 22nd 1999 [online], available: 
290 
 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html 
[accessed 8 Sep 2011]. 
Blair,  T.  (2003)  Speech  by  Prime    Minister,  Tony  Blair,    at    Labour’s    Local    Government,    Women’s    
and Youth Conferences, SECC, Glasgow, 15 February 2003. [online], available: 
http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=306 [accessed 12 Nov 
2013]. 
Blair, T. (2004) Speech given by the Prime Minister in Sedgefield, Justifying Military Action in Iraq and 
Warning of the Continued Threat of Global Terrorism [online], available: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/mar/05/iraq.iraq [accessed 8 Sep 2011]. 
Bleicher,  M.  (2000)  ‘The  Ottawa  Process:  Nine-Day Wonder or a New Model for Disarmament 
Negotiations?’,  Disarmament Forum, 2(2000), 69–86. 
Bobbio,  N.  (1979)  ‘Gramsci  and  the  conception  of  civil  society’,  in  Mouffe,  C.,  ed.,  Gramsci and 
Marxist Theory, Routledge, 21–46. 
Bodeux,  P.  (2006a)  ‘Appel  au  sursis  pour  les  sous-munitions  [Appeal  for  a  stay  on  cluster  munitions]’,  
Le Soir, 10 Feb, available: http://archives.lesoir.be/appel-au-sursis-pour-les-sous-
munitions_t-20060210-004FQU.html?query=sous-munitions&queryor=sous-
munitions&firstHit=160&by=10&when=-1&sort=datedesc&pos=163&all=180&nav=1 
[accessed 29 Dec 2013]. 
Bodeux,  P.  (2006b)  ‘Vers  la  fin  des  sous-munitions  [Towards  the  end  of  cluster  munitions]’,  Le Soir, 2 
Feb, available: http://archives.lesoir.be/vers-la-fin-des-sous-munitions_t-20060202-
004DEG.html [accessed 29 Dec 2013]. 
Bodeux,  P.  (2006c)  ‘Les  travailleurs  de  FZ  secouent  le  PS  [The  workers  of  FZ  shake  up  the  Socialist  
Party]’,  Le Soir, 3 Feb, available: http://archives.lesoir.be/les-travailleurs-de-fz-secouent-le-
ps_t-20060203-004DQW.html?query=sous-munitions&queryor=sous-
munitions&firstHit=160&by=10&when=-1&sort=datedesc&pos=165&all=180&nav=1 
[accessed 29 Dec 2013]. 
Boer,  R.  (2008)  ‘The  World  is  Watching:  “We  Want  a Ban!”’,  Cluster Ban News, (2), 21 May, 4. 
Boin, C., Harris, J., Marchesetti, A. (2009) Fake Aid: How Foreign Aid Is Being Used to Support the 
Self-Serving Political Activities of NGOs, International Policy Network, available: 
http://www.policynetwork.net/sites/default/files/Fake%20Aid.pdf [accessed 14 Jan 2010]. 
Boli, J., Loya, T., Loftin, T. (1999) in Boli, J. and Thomas, G.M., eds., Constructing World Culture: 
International Non-Governmental Organizations since 1875, Stanford University Press: 
Stanford, California. 
Bolton,  M.  (2008)  ‘The  Movements  against  Mines,  Cluster  Munitions  and  Explosive  Remnants  of  
War:  The  Indochinese  Wars  to  the  Present’,  Presented  at  the  Peace  Movements  in  the  Cold  
War and Beyond: An International Conference, London School of Economics, UK, 33. 
Bolton,  M.,  Nash,  T.  (2010)  ‘The  Role  of  Middle  Power–NGO Coalitions in Global Policy: The Case of 
the  Cluster  Munitions  Ban’,  Global Policy, 1(2), 172–184. 
Bond,  P.  (2008)  ‘Reformist  Reforms,  Non-Reformist Reforms and Global Justice: Activist, NGO and 
Intellectual  Challenges  in  the  World  Social  Forum1’,  The world and US social forums: a better 
world is possible and necessary, 157. 
Bonde,  A.  (2001)  ‘Ja  til  bombing,  men  nei  til  klasebomber  [Yes  to  the  bombing,  but  no  to  cluster  
bombs]’,  Aftenposten, 4 Nov, available: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/article223484.ece [accessed 28 Aug 2011]. 
Boothman,  D.  (1999)  ‘Introduction’,  in  Boothman,  D.,  ed.,  Further Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, ElecBook: London, 27–111. 
Borrie, J. (2003) Explosive Remnants of War: A Global Survey [online], Landmine Action, available: 
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/ERW%20Global%20survey%202003.pdf. 
Borrie,  J.  (2005)  ‘Rethinking  Multilateral  Negotiations:  Disarmament  as  Humanitarian  Action’,  in  
Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: From Perspective to Practice, 17–23. 
291 
 
Borrie,  J.  (2008)  ‘How  the  Cluster  Munition  Ban  Was  Won:  Oslo  Treaty  Negotiations  conclude  in  
Dublin’,  Disarmament Diplomacy, (88), available: 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd88/88jb.htm [accessed 16 Aug 2009]. 
Borrie, J. (2009) Unacceptable Harm: A History of How the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions Was Won, 
United Nations Publications. 
Borrie,  J.,  Brehm,  M.,  Cattaneo,  S.,  Atwood,  D.  (2009)  ‘Learn,  adapt,  succeed:  potential  lessons  from  
the Ottawa  and  Oslo  processes  for  other  disarmament  and  arms  control  challenges’,  
Disarmament Forum, 2(1), 19–26. 
Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992) An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping - Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the 
Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277 - S/24111, available: 
http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html. 
Boutros-Ghali,  B.  (1994)  ‘The  Land  Mine  Crisis.    Humanitarian  Disaster.’,  Foreign Affairs, 73(5), 8–13. 
Boutros-Ghali, B. (1995) Supplement to an Agenda For Peace [online], available: 
http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html [accessed 22 Aug 2009]. 
Bowers,  P.,  Dodd,  T.  (1998)  ‘Anti-personnel  mines  and  the  policies  of  two  British  governments’,  The 
RUSI Journal, 143(1), 11–17. 
Brabant,  S.  (2010)  ‘The  Ban  Advocates:  cluster  munition  victims’  commitment  to  the  implementation  
of  the  Convention  on  Cluster  Munitions’,  Disarmament Forum - Implementing the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2010(1), 3–12. 
Breitegger, A. (2010a) Disarmament with a Human Face? 
Breitegger, A. (2010b) Banning Cluster Munitions: The Austrian Process - An NGO Perspective, CMC & 
ICBL Austrian Section. 
Brem,  S.  (2003)  ‘The  Future  of  Arms  Control:  The  Role  of  Middle  Powers  and  NGOs’, in Rutherford, 
K., Brem, S. and Matthew, R., eds., Reframing the Agenda: The Impact of NGO and Middle 
Power Cooperation in International Security Policy, Greenwood Publishing Group, 211–226. 
Brem,  S.,  Rutherford,  K.  (2001)  ‘Walking  Together  or  Divided  Agenda?: Comparing Landmines and 
Small-Arms  Campaigns’,  Security Dialogue, 32(2), 169–186. 
Brenton, M. (1985) The Voluntary Sector in British Social Services, Longman. 
Bricmont, J. (2006) Humanitarian Imperialism: Using Human Rights to Sell War, Monthly Review 
Press: New York. 
Bridgman, J. (1996) Report on International Strategy Conference on Landmines [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202155039/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events96/vvaf-oct16.html. 
Brinkert,  K.  (2003)  ‘The  convention banning anti-personnel  mines:  applying  the  lessons  of  Ottawa’s  
past  in  order  to  meet  the  challenges  of  Ottawa’s  future’,  Third World Quarterly, 24(5), 781–
793. 
Brinkert,  K.,  Hamilton,  K.  (2004)  ‘Clearing  the  Path  to  a  Mine-Free World: Implementing the Ottawa 
Convention’,  in  Matthew,  R.,  McDonald,  B.  and  Rutherford,  K.,  eds.,  Landmines and Human 
Security, SUNY Press, 67–80. 
Brody,  R.,  Narula,  S.,  Ganesan,  A.,  Stork,  J.,  Buttigieg,  J.,  Swanson,  J.,  Gordon,  N.  (2001)  ‘Human  
Rights and Global Capitalism: A  Roundtable  Discussion  with  Human  Rights  Watch’,  
Rethinking Marxism, 13(2), 52–71. 
Brown, G. (2008) Breakthrough on Cluster Bombs Draws Closer [online], available: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page15608 
[accessed 15 Aug 2010]. 
Brussels  Conference  (1997a)  ‘List  of  Participants’. 
Brussels  Conference  (1997b)  ‘List  of  Countries  Associating  Themselves  with  the  Policy  Declaration  of  
the Brussels International Conference for a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel  Landmines’,  
available: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=CD/1467. 
292 
 
Bryant,  K.  (2006)  ‘Cluster  munitions  and  their  submunitions—a  personal  view’,  Disarmament Forum, 
4, 45–49. 
Brysk, A. (2009) Global Good Samaritans, Oxford University Press US. 
Buci-Glucksmann, C.  (1979)  ‘State,  transition  and  passive  revolution’,  in  Mouffe,  C.,  ed.,  Gramsci and 
Marxist Theory, Routledge, 207–236. 
Buechler,  S.M.  (1995)  ‘New  Social  Movement  Theories’,  The Sociological Quarterly, 36(3), 441–464. 
Bugnion,  F.  (2002)  ‘Just  war,  war  of  aggression  and  international  humanitarian  law’,  International 
Review of the Red Cross, 84(847), 523–546. 
Burger, R., Owens, T. (2011) Receive Grants or Perish? The Survival Prospects of African 
Nongovernmental Organizations, CREDIT Research Paper, available: 
http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/65462 [accessed 19 Sep 2013]. 
Burkhalter, H., Goose, S.D. (1996) Calling for the Clinton Administration to Support an International 
Ban on Landmines [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970704005212/http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/minesed.ht
ml [accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
Burnham,  P.  (1991)  ‘Neo-Gramscian  Hegemony  and  the  International  Order’,  Capital & Class, 
1991(45), 73–93. 
Bush, G. (2001a) Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People [online], available: 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html 
[accessed 28 Nov 2011]. 
Bush, G. (2001b) President Directs Humanitarian Aid for Afghanistan, Remarks by the President to 
State Department Employees U.S. Department of State Washington, D.C. [online], available: 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011004.html 
[accessed 27 Nov 2011]. 
Bush, G. (2002a) President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat. Remarks by the President on Iraq Cincinnati 
Museum Center - Cincinnati Union Terminal Cincinnati, Ohio. [online], available: 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html 
[accessed 27 Nov 2011]. 
Bush, G. (2002b) President Discusses Growing Danger Posed by Saddam Hussein’s  Regime,  Radio  
Address by the President to the Nation [online], available: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020914.html [accessed 27 Nov 2011]. 
Buttigieg,  J.  (1995)  ‘Gramsci  on  civil  society’,  boundary 2, 22(2), 1–32. 
Buttigieg,  J.  (2005)  ‘The  contemporary  discourse  on  civil  society:  a  Gramscian  critique’,  boundary 2, 
32(1), 33–52. 
Buttigieg,  J.  (2009)  ‘Reading  Gramsci  Now’,  in  Francese,  J.,  ed.,  Perspectives on Gramsci: Politics, 
Culture and Social Theory, Taylor & Francis, 20–32. 
Callinicos,  A.  (2010)  ‘The  limits  of  passive  revolution’,  Capital & Class, 34(3), 491–507. 
Cameron,  M.  (1998)  ‘Democratization  of  Foreign  Policy:  The  Ottawa  Process  as  a  Model’,  in  To Walk 
Without Fear: The International Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 424–447. 
Cameron,  M.  (1999)  ‘Global  Civil  Society  and  the  Ottawa  Process:  Lessons  from  the  Movement  to  
Ban Anti-Personnel  Mines’,  Canadian Foreign Policy, 7(1), 85–102. 
Cameron, M., Lawson, R. (Eds.) (1998) To Walk Without Fear: The International Movement to Ban 
Landmines, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Cameron,  M.,  Lawson,  R.,  Tomlin,  B.  (1998)  ‘To  Walk  Without  Fear’,  in  To Walk Without Fear: The 
International Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1–17. 
Cammack,  P.  (2003)  ‘The  governance  of  global  capitalism:  a  new  materialist  perspective’,  Historical 
Materialism, 11(2), 37–59. 
Cammack,  P.  (2004)  ‘What  the  World  Bank  means  by  poverty  reduction’,  New Political Economy, 
9(2), 189–211. 
293 
 
Cammack, P. (2006a) UN Imperialism: Unleashing Entrepreneurship in the Developing World, Papers 
in the Politics of Global Competitiveness No. 2, Institute for Global Studies, Manchester 
Metropolitan University, available: http://www.e-space.mmu.ac.uk/e-
space/handle/2173/6599. 
Cammack, P. (2006b) The Politics of Global Competitiveness, 1, Papers in the Politics of Global 
Competitiveness, available: http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/e-
space/bitstream/2173/6190/3/The%20Politics%20of%20Global%20Competitiveness.pdf. 
Campaign Against Landmines - New Zealand (1997) Newsletter December 1997 [online], available: 
http://calm.org.nz/archive/news/dec97.html [accessed 16 Dec 2011]. 
Campbell,  M.  (1996)  ‘Axworthy  sets  land-mine treaty date, Surprise move challenges countries 
reluctant  to  endorse  timetable  on  banning  the  explosives’,  Globe & Mail, 7 Oct. 
Campioli,  G.  (2006)  ‘Sous-munitions: pas de sous-décision! [Submunitions: no sub-decision!]’,  Le Soir, 
16 Feb, available: http://archives.lesoir.be/sous-munitions-pas-de-sous-decision-_t-
20060216-004HD0.html?query=sous-munitions&queryor=sous-
munitions&firstHit=160&by=10&when=-1&sort=datedesc&pos=160&all=180&nav=1 
[accessed 29 Dec 2013]. 
Canadian Council on Social Development (2003) Funding  Matters:  The  Impact  of  Canada’s  New  
Funding Regime on Nonprofit and Voluntary Organizations [online], available: 
http://www.vsi-isbc.org/eng/funding/fundingmatters/cont.cfm [accessed 14 Jul 2012]. 
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997) Preventing Deadly Conflict, available: 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/rept97/exec.pdf. 
Carnegie Corporation (2013) Grants Search: Human Rights Watch [online], available: 
http://carnegie.org/grants/grants-database/ [accessed 20 Nov 2013]. 
Carnoy,  M.,  Castells,  M.  (2001)  ‘Globalization,  the knowledge society, and the Network State: 
Poulantzas  at  the  millennium’,  Global Networks, 1(1), 1. 
Carothers,  T.  (2000)  ‘Civil  Society’,  Foreign Policy, (117), available: 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=2595205&site=ehost-
live. 
Carstairs,  T.  (1997)  ‘Diplomacy,  international  law  and  the  civic  campaign  against  landmines’,  
International Peacekeeping, 4(3), 104–111. 
Castells,  M.  (2000)  ‘Materials  for  an  exploratory  theory  of  the  network  society’,  British  Journal of 
Sociology, 51(1), 5–24. 
Castells, M. (2004) The Power of Identity, 1st ed, Wiley-Blackwell. 
Castells, M. (2010a) The Rise of the Network Society, With a New Preface: The Information Age: 
Economy, Society, and Culture, 2nd ed, Blackwell Publishing. 
Castells, M. (2010b) The Power of Identity, 2nd ed, Wiley-Blackwell. 
Castells, M., Fernandez-Ardevol,  M.,  Linchuan  Qiu,  J.,  Sey,  A.  (2006)  ‘ELECTRONIC  COMMUNICATION  
AND SOCIO-POLITICAL  MOBILISATION:  A  NEW  FORM  OF  CIVIL  SOCIETY’,  in  Glasius,  M.,  
Kaldor, M. and Anheier, H.K., eds., Global Civil Society 2005/6, Taylor and Francis, 112–130, 
available: http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/05-06%20ch%208%20castells.pdf. 
Cave, R. (2003) Explosive Remnants of War: ERW in Sri Lanka, Landmine Action, available: 
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/ERW_Sri_Lanka.pdf. 
Cave,  R.  (2006)  ‘Disarmament  as  Humanitarian  Action?  Comparing  Negotiations  on  Anti-personnel 
Mines  and  Explosive  Remnants  of  War’,  in  Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: From 
Perspective to Practice, UNIDIR, 51–78. 
Cave, R., Lawson, A., Sherriff, A. (2006) Cluster Munitions in Albania and Lao PDR, UNIDIR/2006/15, 
UNIDIR, Geneva, available: 
http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/ClusterMunitionsWithCover.pdf. 
CCS - Fund Raising, Development, Consultants (2010) Global Issues Projects [online], available: 
http://www.ccsfundraising.com/global-issues?start=8 [accessed 5 Jul 2011]. 
294 
 
CCW (1980) Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects [online], 
available: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/500?OpenDocument [accessed 26 Aug 2009]. 
CCW (1996a) Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be 
Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects - Final Document Part II - Documents 
and Summary Records of the Conference, Geneva, 1996, CCW/CONF.I/16 (Part II), Geneva. 
CCW (1996b) Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be 
Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects - Final Document Part I - Documents 
and Summary Records of the Conference, Geneva, 1996, CCW/CONF.I/16 (Part I), Geneva. 
CCW (1996c) List of Participants, REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR 
RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED 
TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS, 2nd Resumed Session, 
Geneva, 22 April - 3rd May  1996, CCW/CONF.1/INF.9. 
CCW (1996d) Protocol On Prohibitions Or Restrictions On The Use Of Mines, Booby-Traps And Other 
Devices As Amended On 3 May 1996. 
CCW (2007) SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3RD MEETING, HELD AT THE PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 
ON WEDNESDAY,  8  NOVEMBER  2006 :  3RD  REVIEW  CONFERENCE  OF  THE  STATES  PARTIES  
TO THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN 
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO 
HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS, GENEVA, 7-17 NOVEMBER 2006, CCW/CONF.III/SR.0003. 
Center for Security Policy (1997a) The  Ottawa  Landmine  Ban:  Hardly  ‘Historic’, Decision Brief No. 97-
D 187, available: http://web.archive.org/web/19980209235333/http://security-
policy.org/papers/1997/97-D187.html. 
Center for Security Policy (1997b) Back From the Brink: Center Commends President Clinton for 
Rejecting A Defective, Unverifiable Landmine Ban, Press Release No. 97-P 141, Center for 
Security Policy, available: http://web.archive.org/web/19980210004903/http://security-
policy.org/papers/1997/97-P141.html. 
Center for Security Policy (1997c) ‘Let  Us  Count  the  Ways’  The  Landmine  Ban  Would  Disserve  U.S.  
Interests, Decision Brief No. 97-D 184, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980209235403/http://security-policy.org/papers/1997/97-
D184.html. 
Cerny,  P.G.  (1997)  ‘Paradoxes  of  the  Competition  State:  The  Dynamics  of  Political  Globalization’,  
Government and Opposition, 32(2), 251–274. 
Cerny,  P.G.  (2008)  ‘Embedding  neoliberalism:  the  evolution  of  a  hegemonic  paradigm’,  The Journal 
of International Trade and Diplomacy, 2(1), 1–46. 
Chabasse,  P.  (1994)  ‘The  French  Campaign’,  in  ICBL,  ed.,  Second Ngo Conference On Landmines: 
Report of Proceedings - Geneva, 9-11 May 1994, DIANE Publishing Company, 38–45, 
available: 
http://books.google.ie/books?id=tbrmQslpLK4C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_sum
mary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false [accessed 31 Aug 2009]. 
Chabasse,  P.  (1998)  ‘The  French  Campaign’,  in  Cameron,  M.  and  Lawson,  R.,  eds.,  To Walk Without 
Fear: The International Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 60–
67. 
Chabasse, P. (2011) Philippe Chabasse [online], LinkedIn, available: 
http://fr.linkedin.com/pub/chabasse-philippe/5/667/8b8 [accessed 11 Jun 2011]. 
Chandhoke,  N.  (2002)  ‘The  limits  of  global  civil  society’,  in  Global Civil Society 2002, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 35–53. 
Chandhoke,  N.  (2005)  ‘How  Global  is  Global  Civil  Society?’,  Journal of World Systems Research, XI(2), 
355–371. 
295 
 
Chandler,  D.  (2001)  ‘Road  to  Military  Humanitarianism:  How  the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New 
Humanitarian  Agenda’,  Human Rights Quarterly, 23, 678. 
Chandler, D. (2004a) Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations, 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Chandler,  D.  (2004b)  ‘The  responsibility  to  protect?                              Imposing  the  “Liberal  Peace”’,  
International Peacekeeping, 11, 59–81. 
Chandler,  D.  (2008)  ‘Human  Security  II:  Waiting  for  the  Tail  To  Wag  the  Dog  -- A Rejoinder to 
Ambrosetti,  Owen  and  Wibben’,  Security Dialogue, 39(4), 463–469. 
Chandler, D., Hynek, N. (Eds.) (2011) Critical  Perspectives  on  Human  Security :  Rethinking  
Emancipation and Power in International Relations, Prio New security studies., Routledge: 
London ;  New  York. 
Chapnick,  A.  (1999)  ‘The  Middle  Power’,  Canadian Foreign Policy, 7(2), 73–82. 
Charity Navigator (2010) 2009 CEO Compensation Study, available: 
http://www.charitynavigator.org/__asset__/_etc_/CN_CEO_Compensation_Study_2009_Fin
al.pdf. 
Cheru,  F.  (2000)  ‘Transforming  our  common  future:  the  local  dimensions  of  global  reform’,  Review of 
International Political Economy, 353–368. 
Chikoto,  G.L.  (2007)  ‘Government  Funding  and  INGOs’  Autonomy:  A  Tool  Choice  Approach’,  
available: http://aysps.gsu.edu/nonprofit/working/NSPwp0706.pdf [accessed 19 May 2009]. 
Chikoto, G.L. (2009) Government Funding and INGO Autonomy: From Resource Dependence and Tool 
Choice Perspectives, Doctoral Thesis. 
Chomsky,  N.  (1993)  ‘Humanitarian  Intervention’,  Boston Review, (December 1993 - January 1994), 
available: http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199401--02.htm [accessed 22 Jun 2012]. 
Chomsky, N. (1999) The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, Pluto Press. 
Chomsky,  N.  (2008)  ‘Humanitarian  Imperialism:  The  New  Doctrine  of  Imperial  Right  - Monthly 
Review’,  Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine, available: 
http://www.monthlyreview.org/080908chomsky.php [accessed 14 Dec 2009]. 
Chossudovsky,  M.  (1995)  ‘Who  won  the  Vietnam  War?’,  Peace Magazine, 11(4), Aug, 6. 
Chrispin Marin, D. (2008) Brasil Rejeita Tratado Para Banir Bombas de Cacho [Brazil Rejects Treaty to 
Ban Cluster Bombs] [online], Estadão.com.br, available: 
http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/internacional,brasil-rejeita-tratado-para-banir-
bombas-de-cacho,287963,0.htm [accessed 4 Dec 2011]. 
Christensen, S. (2003) Nå Må Fagbevegelsen Mobilisere Mot Krig! [The Trade Union Movement Now 
to Mobilize against the War!] [online], available: http://www.heis.no/Diverse/2003/-
%20Naa%20maa%20fagbevegelsen%20mobilisere%20mot%20krig.htm [accessed 26 Aug 
2011]. 
Cimilluca,  D.  (2008)  ‘Wachovia’s  Golden  West  Deal  Turns  to  Bronze’,  WSJ Blogs - Deal Journal, 
available: http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/01/22/wachovias-golden-west-deal-turns-to-
bronze/ [accessed 21 Nov 2013]. 
Clancy,  F.  (1992)  ‘Breaking  Away :  What  Happens When a Son Determines to Live a Life in Opposition 
to  His  Father?’,  Los Angeles Times, 21 Jun, available: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-06-
21/magazine/tm-1513_1_father-s-life/4 [accessed 11 Jun 2011]. 
Clark,  A.M.  (1995)  ‘Non-governmental organizations  and  their  influence  on  international  society’,  
Journal of International Affairs, 48(2), 507. 
Clark, H.C. (1998) Formal Knowledge Networks: A Study of Canadian Experiences, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, available: www.iisd.org/pdf/fkn.pdf. 
Clark,  N.  (2003)  ‘NS  Profile  - George  Soros’,  New Statesman, 2 Jun, available: 
http://www.newstatesman.com/200306020019 [accessed 21 Jun 2009]. 
Clines,  F.X.  (1997)  ‘28-Year  Quest  to  Abolish  Land  Mines  Pays  Off  for  Veteran,  Who  Fights  On’,  New 
York Times, 3 Dec, available: http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/03/world/28-year-quest-to-
296 
 
abolish-land-mines-pays-off-for-veteran-who-fights-on.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 
[accessed 8 Oct 2012]. 
Clines,  F.X.  (1998)  ‘In  Fighting  Land  Mines,  Friendship  Is  Casualty’,  New York Times, 20 Feb, available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/20/world/in-fighting-land-mines-friendship-is-
casualty.html [accessed 16 Jun 2010]. 
Clinton, B. (1994) Address by the President at the 49th Session of the  UN General Assembly [online], 
available: http://archives.clintonpresidentialcenter.org/?u=092694-speech-by-president-
address-to-un-general-assembly.htm [accessed 7 Nov 2010]. 
Clinton, B. (1997) Remarks by the President on Landmines [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202151937/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/news10_3a.html. 
Clinton,  B.  (2000)  ‘Remarks  at  a  Reception  for  Senator  Patrick  J.  Leahy,  Public  Papers  of  the  
Presidents,    Pres.  Doc.  727’. 
CMC (2003a) An Invitation to Join the Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC) [online], available: 
http://homepage.eircom.net/~cmcinternational/erw/overview.htm [accessed 15 Jun 2010]. 
CMC  (2003b)  ‘International  Launch  of  the  Cluster  Munition  Coalition’,  available:  
http://217.136.251.239:8888/storage/SD38E03.pdf. 
CMC (2004a) Steering Committee [online], available: 
http://homepage.eircom.net/~cmcinternational/cmc/committee.htm [accessed 15 Jun 
2010]. 
CMC (2004b) Dealing with the Impact of Cluster Munitions, Prepared by the Cluster Munition 
Coalition, CCW/GGE/IX/WG.1/WP.1, available: http://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/637/43/pdf/G0463743.pdf?OpenElement [accessed 28 Oct 
2013]. 
CMC  (2004c)  ‘CMC  Registration  List:  Applications  for  CMC  registration  (until  January  2004)’,  in  
Conference Report, International Launch Conference, Cluster Munition Coalition, 12-13 
November 2003, The Hague, 53–55. 
CMC (2004d) Future Events [online], available: 
http://homepage.eircom.net/~cmcinternational/cmc/futureevents.htm [accessed 15 Jun 
2010]. 
CMC (2004e) Campaigns [online], available: 
http://homepage.eircom.net/~cmcinternational/cmc/campaigns.htm [accessed 15 Jun 
2010]. 
CMC (2005a) Cluster Munition Coalition Home Page [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050827003042/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/ 
[accessed 19 Nov 2013]. 
CMC (2005b) May 2005 Bulletin [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070731090758/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=3 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC (2005c) Conference Agenda, Paris Conference on Cluster Munitions [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070908235234/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/doku
menti/dokument.asp?id=71. 
CMC (2005d) Members [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060514094253/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/doku
menti/dokument.asp?id=33. 
CMC (2005e) CMC Statement at the CCW, Delivered by Thomas Nash [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20051104083250/http://www.minesactioncanada.org/home/i
ndex.cfm?fuseaction=News&ID=176 [accessed 22 Oct 2013]. 
CMC (2006a) NGOs Call on States to Join Norwegian Initiative for New Cluster Munition Treaty 
[online], available: 
297 
 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070823235153/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=43 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC (2006b) Cluster Munition Casualties Mount in Lebanon While Governments Meet in Geneva 
[online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070823235234/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=32 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC (2006c) February 2006 Bulletin [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070823231304/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=15. 
CMC (2006d) Frequently Asked Questions about Cluster Munitions [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070521024521/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/doku
menti/dokument.asp?id=72. 
CMC (2006e) What Is the CMC? [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060514094238/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/doku
menti/dokument.asp?id=31. 
CMC (2006f) Daily Update 7 from the Review Conference on Conventional Weapons [online], 
available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070823235429/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=39 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC (2006g) 24 States Call for a New Treaty on Cluster Munitions [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070823230917/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=40 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC (2006h) Israel Should Not Use Cluster Munitions in Lebanon [online], available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/media/press-releases/?id=1644 [accessed 4 Aug 
2010]. 
CMC (2006i) New Report on Cluster Munitions Highlights Devastation in Lebanon [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20071121012625/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=37 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC (2006j) January 2006 Bulletin [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070319145651/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=14 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC (2007a) Cluster Munition Coalition: Global Day of Action to Ban Cluster Bombs [online], 
available: http://storage.paxchristi.net/07-0913.pdf [accessed 18 Aug 2011]. 
CMC (2007b) Report on the Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions and Next Steps, available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/cmc-report-on-the-
lima-conference-23-25-may.pdf. 
CMC (2007c) CMC Report on the Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, available: 
http://storage.paxchristi.net/PUBLIC/07-01374.pdf [accessed 18 Aug 2011]. 
CMC (2007d) Oslo Report and next Steps [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20071121013800/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=53 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC (2007e) Members [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080101032735/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/doku
menti/dokument.asp?id=33. 
CMC (2007f)  ‘Guidelines  for  lobbying  on  cluster  munitions’. 
CMC (2007g) UK Moves Closer to Cluster Bomb Ban, But Keeps Unacceptable Weapons for Use 
[online], available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/media/press-releases/?id=1640 
[accessed 4 Aug 2010]. 
CMC  (2007h)  ‘CMC  Call’,  available:  
http://web.archive.org/web/20070703232322/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/doku
menti/dokument.asp?id=32. 
298 
 
CMC  (2007i)  ‘Cluster  Munition  Coalition  Definition  for  the  Future  Cluster  Munition  Convention’. 
CMC  (2007j)  ‘Global  public  unites  in  day  of  action  to  ban  cluster  bombs’,  available:  
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/cmc-press-release-
5-november-2007.pdf. 
CMC (2007k) Oslo Conference: Calls for New a Treaty on Cluster Munitions as 40 Governments Meet 
[online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070310092341/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=49 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC (2007l) Press Release: Cambodia Announces Support for New Treaty Banning Cluster Munitions 
[online], available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/media/press-releases/?id=1641 
[accessed 4 Aug 2010]. 
CMC  (2007m)  ‘CMC  Key  Principles’,  available:  
http://web.archive.org/web/20071121012302/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=59. 
CMC (2007n) Military Utility [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070629203342/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/doku
menti/dokument.asp?id=25 [accessed 15 Aug 2008]. 
CMC (2007o) NO HOPE FOR CLUSTER BOMB BAN IN GENEVA BUT MOMENTUM GROWS FOR VIENNA 
TREATY TALKS [online], available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/media/press-
releases/?id=1634 [accessed 4 Aug 2010]. 
CMC (2007p) Observations  by  the  Cluster  Munition  Coalition  on  the  Chair’s  Discussion  Text  for  the  
Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions 23-25 May 2007. 
CMC (2007q) Treaty Principles [online], available: 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/5DB577A05EC2AE2BC125730
E00611C62/$file/CCW+GGE+2007+WP.7+E.pdf. 
CMC (2007r) Cluster Munition Coalition Campaigning Bulletin July 2007 [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20071121012715/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=78 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC (2007s) Global Day of Action to Ban Cluster Bombs: 5 November 2007, available: 
www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/.../gdoareport_5nov07.pdf. 
CMC  (2008a)  ‘Statement  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  on  the  Agreement  to  Adopt  the  Cluster  
Munitions  Convention’,  Presented  at  the  Dublin  Diplomatic  Conference  on  Cluster  
Munitions, Dublin. 
CMC (2008a) What Is the Threat? [online], available: 
file:///C:/Users/Diana/Documents/New%20Phd/CMC%20Chapters/Old%20stuf%20on%20cl
uster%20munitions/CMC/CMC-%20Threat%20to%20Civilians.htm [accessed 15 May 2008]. 
CMC  (2008b)  ‘List  of  Red,  Amber  and  Green  Nations  on  Article  1  - General Scope and Obligations’,  
available: http://img.scoop.co.nz/stories/images/0802/a83769f819734598283f.jpeg 
[accessed 6 Dec 2013]. 
CMC  (2008c)  ‘List  of  Red,  Amber  and  Green  nations  on  Article  2  - Definitions’,  available:  
http://img.scoop.co.nz/stories/images/0802/d831beeedc8c68a3c898.jpeg [accessed 6 Dec 
2013]. 
CMC  (2008d)  ‘List  Of  Red  Countries’,  available:  
http://blog.banadvocates.org/index.php?post/2008/05/16/Training-on-key-advocacy-goals-
for-Dublin-16-May (dead link). 
CMC (2008e) Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions: List of Participants [online], available: 
http://www.stopclusterbombs.org.nz/wp-
content/uploads/2008/02/cmcnz_biosparticipants_6feb08.pdf [accessed 5 Dec 2013]. 
CMC (2008f) Steering Committee [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080527083148/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/the-
coalition/steering-committee/ [accessed 27 May 2008]. 
299 
 
CMC  (2008g)  ‘The  Dublin  Diplomatic  Conference  on  Cluster  Munitions:  Biographies  of  Civil  Society  
Participants’. 
CMC  (2008h)  ‘Oslo  Signing  Conference:  Civil  Society  Participants  Biographies’,  available:  
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/biographies.pdf 
[accessed 28 Nov 2013]. 
CMC (2008i) Over 100 Governments Gather In Dublin To Secure Global Ban [online], available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/media/press-releases/?id=102 [accessed 4 Aug 2010]. 
CMC  (2008j)  ‘CMC  Participants’,  available:  http://thebanbus.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/cmc-
participants-screen1.pdf. 
CMC (2008k)  ‘Report  on  Recent  Developments,  Delivered  by  Thomas  Nash,  Cluster  Munition  
Coalition  18  February  2008’. 
CMC (2008l) Frequently Asked Questions about Cluster Munitions [online], available: 
file:///C:/Users/Diana/Documents/New%20Phd/CMC%20Chapters/Old%20stuf%20on%20cl
uster%20munitions/CMC/CMC%20FAQ.htm [accessed 15 May 2008]. 
CMC  (2008m)  ‘CMC  Policy  Notes’,  available:  
http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/files/Documenten/wap%20cluster%20munitie/Position%20pap
ers.pdf. 
CMC (2008n) Global Push to Ban Cluster Bombs at Crossroads - Governments Called Upon to Keep 
Protection of Civilians at Forefront of Negotiations [online], available: 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Library/News-Articles/The-Treaties/wellington-CMC-pr 
[accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC  (2008o)  ‘CLUSTER  MUNITION  COALITION  RESPONDS  TO  US  CLUSTER  BOMB  ANNOUNCEMENT’,  
available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/cmc-
media-response-to-us-statement.pdf. 
CMC (2008p) Historic Step Forward for Treaty to Ban Cluster Bombs: After Week of Tough Talks, 
Nations Agree to Move Forward [online], available: 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Library/News-Articles/The-Treaties/Wellington-final 
[accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC (2008q) Livingstone Conference on Cluster Munitions: Strong Landmark African Declaration to 
Ban Cluster Bombs Only South Africa Calls for Exceptions to the Ban [online], available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news/?id=49 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC (2008r) Intervention on Clearance and User Responsibility (Article 4), By Bonnie Docherty Cluster 
Munition Coalition February 20, 2008 [online], available: 
http://www.landmine.de/fix/pdf/CMC-statement-clearance.pdf. 
CMC  (2008s)  ‘CMC  Policy  Papers’. 
CMC (2008t) A Strong African Voice Is Needed [online], available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news/?id=41 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC  (2008u)  World’s  Most  Cluster-Bombed Region Prepares For Ban Negotiation [online], available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/media/press-releases/?id=99 [accessed 4 Aug 2010]. 
CMC (2008v) The Global Day Of Action To Ban Cluster Bombs [online], available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news/?id=40 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
CMC (2008w) Campaigners Call On U.S. To Stop Bullying Negotiators [online], available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/media/press-releases/?id=254 [accessed 4 Aug 2010]. 
CMC  (2008x)  ‘Cluster  Munition  Coalition  Statement  To  the  Opening  Plenary  of  the  Dublin  Diplomatic  
Conference on Cluster Munitions, Monday 19 May 2008, Steve Goose, Human Rights Watch 
and CMC Co-Chair’,  Presented at the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 
Dublin, available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2008/08/opening-statement-steve-goose-190508.pdf. 
CMC (2008y) Campaigners Call For A Comprehensive Ban On Cluster Bombs [online], available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/media/press-releases/?id=176 [accessed 4 Aug 2010]. 
300 
 
CMC (2008z) Over 100 Countries Adopt Treaty To Ban Cluster Bombs [online], available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/media/press-releases/?id=296 [accessed 4 Aug 2010]. 
CMC  (2008aa)  ‘CMC  Statement  to  the  Sofia  Regional  Conference  on  the  Convention  on  Cluster  
Munitions  Thursday  18  September  2008,  Delivered  by  Thomas  Nash,  CMC  Coordinator’,  
Presented at the Sofia Regional Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Sofia, 
available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/cmc-
opening-statement-18-sep-2008.pdf. 
CMC  (2008ab)  ‘Editorial:  Make  it  Better,  Not  Worse’,  Cluster Ban News, (1), 19 May. 
CMC  (2008ac)  ‘Opening Statement, Delivered by Steve Goose, Human Rights Watch/Cluster 
Munition  Coalition,  18  February  2008’,  in  ANZCMC,  ed.,  Report On Activities - Wellington 
Conference On Cluster Munitions, 18-22 February 2008, 11–12. 
CMC (2008ad) Groundbreaking Treaty Banning Cluster Bombs Agreed [online], available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/media/press-releases/?id=286 [accessed 4 Aug 2010]. 
CMC (2009a) Annual Report 2008, CMC, available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2009/12/cmc-annual-report-2008.pdf. 
CMC (2009b) Members [online], available: 
http://wayback.archive.org/web/20090726221414/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/th
e-coalition/members/ [accessed 21 Oct 2013]. 
CMC  (2009c)  ‘Chronology  of  the  international  movement  to  ban  cluster  bombs’,  available:  
http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/files/Documenten/wap%20cluster%20munitie/Chronology%20o
f%20the%20International%20Movement%20to%20Ban%20Cluster%20Bombs.pdf. 
CMC (2010a) By Country [online], available: http://stopclustermunitions.org/the-problem/countries/ 
[accessed 7 Jun 2010]. 
CMC (2010b) CMC Press Release -- Cluster Bombs: 66-Point Plan Turns Legal Obligations Into 
Concrete Actions [online], available: 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Library/News/Work/cmcpressrelease-12nov2010 
[accessed 28 Nov 2013]. 
CMC (2010b) Calendar & Events [online], available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/calendar/ 
[accessed 13 Jul 2010]. 
CMC  (2013)  ‘Who’s  Joined  the  Convention  on  Cluster  Munitions?’,  available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/who-has-joined-
the-ccm-140513.pdf. 
CMC  (n.d.)  ‘Investment  in  Civilian  Suffering  To  Be  halted  by  Future  Cluster  Munitions  Convention’,  
available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2009/09/disinvestment-policy-paper.pdf [accessed 25 Oct 2013]. 
CMC Ireland (2008) Member Organisations [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20100122172613/http://www.stopclusterbombs.ie/coalition/
member_organisations. 
CMC-Austria (2008) Mehr Informationen Zu AAMV [More Information on AAMV] [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/save/http://www.stopstreubomben.at/CMC/icblmore.html 
[accessed 19 Nov 2013]. 
CMC-Austria  (n.d.)  ‘CMC  Austria:  Österreichische  Sektion  Der  Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) [CMC 
Austria:  Austrian  Sekcion  of  the  Cluster  Munition  Coalition  (CMC)]’. 
Cobb,  C.  (2007)  ‘The  Canucks,  the  landmines  and  the  bombshell’,  Ottawa Citizen, 2 Dec, available: 
http://www.michenerawards.ca/english/landmines.htm [accessed 23 Jan 2012]. 
Cobb,  C.  (2008)  ‘Canada’s  dilemma;  Our  relationship  with  the  U.S.  and  NATO  makes  it  tricky  to  sign  a  
treaty  banning  cluster  bombs’,  The Ottawa Citizen, 17 May. 
Cohen,  J.L.  (1985)  ‘Strategy  or  Identity:  New  Theoretical  Paradigms  and  Contemporary Social 
Movements’,  Social Research, 52(4). 
Cohen, J.L., Arato, A. (1992) Civil Society and Political Theory, MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass. 
Colas, A. (2002) International Civil Society, Polity Press. 
301 
 
Colas,  A.  (2005)  ‘Review  article  -Imperious civility:  violence  and  the  dilemmas  of  global  civil  society’,  
Contemporary Politics, 11(2-3). 
Collins,  R.  (2006)  ‘Tied  Campaigns:  Cluster  Munitions,  Explosive  Remnants  of  War  and  Anti-Personnel 
Landmines’,  Journal of Mine Action, 10(1), available: 
http://www.maic.jmu.edu/JOURNAL/10.1/feature/collins/collins.htm (16/5/08). 
Commission  on  Global  Governance  (1995a)  ‘Chapter  One  - A  New  World’,  in  Our Global 
Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Oxford University 
Press: Oxford. 
Commission on Global  Governance  (1995b)  ‘Chapter  Three  - Promoting  Security’,  in  Our Global 
Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Oxford University 
Press: Oxford. 
Conflux (2007) En Framtid Uten Frykt for Miner - 10 År Med Minekonvensjonen [A Future without 
Fear of Mines - 10 Years of Mine Ban Convention] [online], available: 
http://www.conflux.no/bok/mine.html [accessed 3 Dec 2013]. 
Conteh-Morgan,  E.  (2002)  ‘Globalization  and  Human  Security:  A  Neo-Gramscian  Perspective’,  
International Journal of Peace Studies, VII(2), available: 
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/hsp/ecm.html [accessed 18 Nov 2011]. 
Convention on Cluster Munitions [online] (2008) available: 
http://www.clusterconvention.org/downloadablefiles/ccm77_english.pdf. 
Conway,  S.  (2006a)  ‘Letter  from  Landmine  Action  to  MPs,  17  February  2006’,  available:  
http://web.archive.org/web/20070823231304/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=15. 
Conway,  S.  (2006b)  ‘Finding  new  uses  for  old  weapons  is  not  the  answer’,  Landmine Action 
Campaign, (Campaign 12: Cluster Munitions. The time for action is now), Summer, 3. 
Conway,  S.  (2007)  ‘Cluster  munitions:  they  won’t  make  friends  and  they  won’t  win  wars’,  (13),  2  Nov,  
8–9. 
Cooley,  A.,  Ron,  J.  (2002)  ‘The  NGO  Scramble:  Organizational  Insecurity  and the Political Economy of 
Transnational  Action’,  International Security, 27(1), 5–39. 
Cooper, A.F. (1997) Niche Diplomacy, Macmillan. 
Cooper, A.F., Higgott, R.A., Nossal, K.R. (1993) Relocating Middle Powers, UBC Press. 
Cooper,  N.  (2011)  ‘Humanitarian arms control and processes of securitization: moving weapons 
along  the  security  continuum’,  Contemporary Security Policy, 32(1), 134–158. 
Correlates  of  War  Project  (2008)  ‘State  System  Membership  List,  v2008.1’,  available:  
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/SystemMembership/2008/System2008.ht
ml. 
Coutinho, C.N. (2012) Gramsci’s  Political  Thought, BRILL. 
Cox,  R.W.  (1981)  ‘Social  forces,  states,  and  world  orders:  beyond  international  relations  theory’,  in  
Approaches to World Order, Cambridge University Press, 1996: Cambridge, 85–123. 
Cox,  R.W.  (1983)  ‘Gramsci,  Hegemony  and  International  Relations:  An  Essay  in  Method’,  in  Gill,  S.,  
ed., Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 
1993: Cambridge, 49–66. 
Cox, R.W. (1987) Production Power and World Order, Columbia University Press. 
Cox,  R.W.  (1989)  ‘Middlepowermanship,  Japan,  and  Future  World  Order’,  International Journal, 
44(4), 823–862. 
Cox,  R.W.  (1992)  ‘Global  Perestroika’,  Socialist Register, 1992, 26–43. 
Cox,  R.W.  (1995)  ‘Critical  Political  Economy’,  in  International Political Economy: Understanding 
Global Disorder, Zed Books, 31–45. 
Cox,  R.W.  (1996)  ‘Production  and  Security’,  in  Approaches to World Order, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 279–298. 
Cox,  R.W.  (1999)  ‘Civil  society  at  the  turn  of  the  millenium:  prospects  for  an  alternative  world  order’,  
Review of International Studies, 25(1), 3–29. 
302 
 
Cox, R.W. (2002) The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and 
Civilisation, Routledge: London. 
Cox,  R.W.  (2007)  ‘“The  International”  in  Evolution’,  Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 
35(3), 513–529. 
Cox, R.W., Sinclair, T.J. (1996) Approaches to World Order, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Coyne,  A.  (2008)  ‘Notes  on  a  crisis:  Where  have  you  gone,  John  Manley?’,  Andrew  Coyne’s  Blog,  
Capital Read,  Macleans.ca, available: http://www2.macleans.ca/2008/12/03/notes-on-a-
crisis-where-have-you-gone-john-manley/ [accessed 31 Aug 2011]. 
Croll, M. (2009) Landmines in War and Peace: From Their Origin to the Present Day, Pen & Sword 
Books (ncr). 
Crossette,  B.  (1996)  ‘Pact  on  Land  Mines  Stops  Short  of  Total  Ban’,  New York Times, 4 May. 
Crouch,  G.  (2003)  ‘NATO  Names  a  Dutchman  To  Be  Its  Secretary  General’,  New York Times, 23 Sep, 
available: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/23/world/nato-names-a-dutchman-to-be-its-
secretary-general.html?scp=1&sq=jaap+de+hoop+scheffer&st=nyt [accessed 5 Dec 2011]. 
Crowther, G. (2008) Counting the Cost: The Economic Impact of Cluster Munition Contamination in 
Lebanon, Landmine Action. 
Dahl, R.A. (2005) Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City, Yale University Press: 
New Haven; London. 
DanChurchAid (2004a) Conference Documentation, Cluster Bombs - Effective Weapon or 
Humanitarian Foe? Conference Hosted by DanChurchAid and MP Morten Helveg Petersen & 
Second International Cluster Munition Coalition Meeting, March 18-19 2004, Landmine 
Action. 
DanChurchAid  (2004b)  ‘Minutes  of  the  Meeting  of  Cluster  Munition  Coalition - Copenhagen 
Conference Sub-group  reports,  19  March  2004’,  in  Conference Documentation, Cluster 
Bombs - Effective Weapon or Humanitarian Foe? Conference Hosted by DanChurchAid and 
MP Morten Helveg Petersen & Second International Cluster Munition Coalition Meeting, 
March 18-19 2004, Copenhagen, 56–61. 
Davis,  J.  (2004)  ‘The  Campaign  to  Ban  Landmines:  Public  Diplomacy,  Middle  Power  Leadership  and  
an  Unconventional  Negotiating  Process’,  Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, available: 
http://www.jha.ac/articles/a134.htm. 
Dearden,  N.  (2006)  ‘From  charity  to  solidarity’,  Globalizations, 3(2), 261–263. 
Debrett’s  (2013)  Dr  Andrew  Purkis,  OBE  Authorised  Biography  – Debrett’s  People  of  Today  [online],  
available: 
http://www.debretts.com/people/biographies/browse/p/10304/Andrew%20James+PURKIS.
aspx [accessed 4 Nov 2013]. 
Demirovic,  A.  (2000)  ‘NGOs  and  social  movements:  A  study  in  contrasts’,  Capitalism Nature 
Socialism, 11(4), 131–140. 
Demirovic,  A.  (2003)  ‘NGOs,  the  State,  and  Civil  Society:  The  Transformation  of  Hegemony’,  
Rethinking Marxism, 15(2), 213–235. 
Dentico,  N.  (1997)  ‘Tearing  the  veil:  popular  protest  can  make  a  difference  and  even  the  people  who  
produce  landmines  can  take  a  moral  stand’,  New Internationalist, (294), 4 Sep. 
Development Initiatives (2000) Global Humanitarian Assistance 2000, Development Initiatives. 
Devex (2013) CEO Salaries at Top DfID NGO Partners [online], available: 
http://www.slideshare.net/Devex/ceo-salaries-at-top-dfid-ngo-partners [accessed 2 Sep 
2013]. 
DFAIT (1995a) Canada in the World - Canadian Foreign Policy Review [online], available: 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp [accessed 22 Aug 
2009]. 
DFAIT  (1995b)  ‘The  Protection  of  Our  Security  Within  a  Stable  Global  Framework’,  in  Canada in the 
World - Canadian Foreign Policy Review, available: http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/chap4-en.asp [accessed 25 Jun 2011]. 
303 
 
DFAIT  (1996a)  ‘Towards  a  Global  Ban  on  Anti-Personnel  Mines’:  International  Strategy  Conference 
[online], available: http://web.archive.org/web/19961102093138/http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/disarm/mines/mines3.htm [accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
DFAIT (1996b) Questions and Answers Document, Prepared and Circulated by the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs: Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel (AP) Mines, 
International Strategy Conference - Ottawa, October 3-5, 1996 [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980110170930/http://www.pgs.ca/pages/lm/ldott831.html 
[accessed 14 Jul 2012]. 
DFAIT  (1996c)  ‘States  and  Organizations  Attending  Towards  A  Global  Ban  on  Anti-Personnel Mines,  
International Strategy Conference -  Ottawa, October 3-5,  1996’. 
DFAIT  (1997)  ‘Towards  a  Global  Ban  on  Anti-personnel  Mines’,  AP Mine Ban: Progress Report, (1), 
Feb, available: web.archive.org/web/20000304114200/http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/disarm/mines/report1f.htm. 
DFAIT (1999) Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World [online], available: 
http://www.summit-americas.org/canada/humansecurity-english.htm [accessed 26 Jun 
2011]. 
DFAIT (2002) Freedom  from  Fear:  Canada’s  Foreign  Policy  for  Human  Security. 
DFAIT (2008) Negotiating the Ottawa Convention [online], available: 
http://www.international.gc.ca/mines/process-ottawa-processus/negotiations-
negociations.aspx?menu_id=35&menu=R [accessed 2 Sep 2009]. 
Diamond,  L.  (1994)  ‘Toward  democratic  consolidation’,  Journal of Democracy, 5(3), 4–17. 
Diana  Fund  (2001a)  Pressroom :  03.11.01  New  Call  for  UK  to  Lead  on  Cluster  Bomb  Controls  [online]. 
Diana  Fund  (2001b)  Pressroom :  25.10.01  Letter  to  The  Times  [online]. 
Diana  Fund  (2003)  Pressroom :  28.02.03  ‘No  Cluster  Bombs  in  Iraq’  Plea  as  CLEAR  UP!  Petition  Is  
Launched [online]. 
Diana Fund (2008) Report and Financial Statements from the Year to 31 December 2007, available: 
http://www.theworkcontinues.org/document.asp?id=212&pageno=. 
Diana  Fund  (2013a)  The  Fund’s  First  Year  of  Grantmaking  [online],  available:  
http://www.dianaprincessofwalesmemorialfund.org/who-we-supported/funds-first-year-
grantmaking [accessed 19 Nov 2013]. 
Diana Fund (2013b) Settlement Grants: 2004 [online], available: 
http://www.dianaprincessofwalesmemorialfund.org/who-we-supported/settlement-grants-
2004 [accessed 19 Nov 2013]. 
Diana Fund (2013c) Cluster Munitions Initiative: 2007 - 2012 [online], available: 
http://www.dianaprincessofwalesmemorialfund.org/who-we-supported/cluster-munitions-
initiative-2007-2012 [accessed 19 Nov 2013]. 
Directgov (2005) Gift Aid - Information for Charities [online], available: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121015000000/http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/
MoneyTaxAndBenefits/ManagingMoney/GivingMoneyToCharity/DG_10015097 [accessed 
27 Sep 2013]. 
Docherty, B.L., Garlasco, M.E., Goose, S.D. (2008) Flooding  South  Lebanon:  Israel’s  Use  of  Cluster  
Munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006, Volume 20, No. 2(E), Human Rights Watch, 
available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/flooding-
south-lebanon-hrw.pdf. 
Dolan,  M.,  Hunt,  C.  (1998)  ‘Negotiating  in  the  Ottawa  Process:  The  New  Multilateralism’,  in  To Walk 
Without Fear: The International Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 392–421. 
Donaldson,  M.  (2007)  ‘Gramsci  and  Class’,  Faculty of Arts-Papers, 138. 
Donaldson,  M.  (2009)  ‘Gramsci,  Class  and  Post-Marxism’,  International Gramsci Journal, 1(1), 2. 
Donini,  A.  (1995)  ‘The  bureaucracy  and  the  free  spirits:  stagnation  and  innovation  in  the  relationship  
between  the  UN  and  NGOs’,  Third World Quarterly, 16(3), 421–439. 
304 
 
Donnelly, J. (2000) Realism and International Relations [online], Cambridge University Press, 
available: http://www.amazon.com/Realism-International-Relations-
Themes/dp/0521597528 [accessed 6 Jan 2014]. 
DP  Evaluation  (2012)  ‘Case  Study  One:  The  Cluster  Munitions  initiative’,  in  Resource Materials 1: Full-
Length Case Studies, 2–6, available: 
http://www.dianaprincessofwalesmemorialfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/5.%20Ca
se%20Studies.pdf [accessed 4 Nov 2013]. 
Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P., Thiel, S., Thiele, R. (2010) Aid Allocation by German NGOs: Does the 
Degree of Public Refinancing Matter?, Discussion Paper Number 92, Centre for European 
Governance and Economic Development Research, available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1553082 [accessed 28 Jan 2013]. 
Dublin Conference (2008a) SUMMARY RECORD OF SECOND SESSION OF THE PLENARY Held at Croke 
Park, Dublin on Monday, 19 May 2008. 
Dublin Conference (2008b) SUMMARY RECORD OF SECOND SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE 
WHOLE Held at Croke Park, Dublin on Monday, 20 May 2008 [online], available: 
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/CoW2May20am_004.pdf. 
Dublin Conference (2008c) SUMMARY RECORD OF EIGHTH SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE 
WHOLE Held at Croke Park, Dublin on Monday, 26 May 2008 [online], available: 
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/CoW10May26am_002.pdf. 
Dublin Conference (2008d) SUMMARY RECORD OF OPENING CEREMONY AND FIRST SESSION OF THE 
PLENARY, Held at Croke Park, Dublin on Monday, 19 May 2008 [online], available: 
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/ClusterMunitionsSR1.pdf. 
Dublin Conference (2008e) Summary Record of Fourth Session of the Plenary and Closing Ceremony 
of the Conference [online], available: 
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/Plenary4May30am_006.pdf. 
Duffield, M.R. (2007) Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples, 
Polity: Cambridge. 
ECOSOC  (1968)  ‘Arrangements  for  consultation  with  non-governmental organizations: Economic and 
Social  Council  Resolution  1296  (XLIV)’,  available:  http://habitat.igc.org/ngo-rev/1296.html 
[accessed 25 Nov 2012]. 
ECOSOC (1996) ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 [online], available: 
http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/ [accessed 29 Apr 2009]. 
ECOSOC Secretariat (2003) UN System and Civil Society -  An Inventory and Analysis of Practice, 
Background Paper  for the  Secretary-General’s    Panel  of  Eminent  Persons  on    United  Nations  
Relations with Civil Society. 
EDA (2006) An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs. 
Edwards, M. (2000a) Ngo Rights and Responsibilities: A New Deal for Golbal Governance, Foreign 
Policy Centre. 
Edwards,  M.  (2000b)  ‘Civil  society  and  global  governance’,  in  International  Conference  “On  the  
Threshold: The United Nations and Global Governance in the New Millennium, 1–14, 
available: http://www.unu.edu/millennium/edwards.pdf. 
Edwards,  M.  (2001)  ‘Introduction’,  in  Edwards,  M.  and  Gaventa,  J.,  eds.,  Global Citizen Action, Lynne 
Rienner Pub, 1–14. 
Edwards, M. (2003) Civil Society, 1st ed, Polity Press. 
Edwards, M. (2009) Civil Society, 2nd ed, Polity. 
Edwards, M., Gaventa, J. (2001) Global Citizen Action, Lynne Rienner Pub. 
Edwards, M., Hulme, D. (1996) Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the 
Post-Cold War World, Kumarian Press. 
Edwards,  M.,  Hulme,  D.  (1998)  ‘Too  close  for  comfort?  The  impact  of  official  aid  on  
nongovernmental  organizations’,  Current Issues in Comparative Education, 1(1), 1–21. 
305 
 
Egeland, J. (1988) Impotent Superpower--Potent Small State: Potentials and Limitations of Human 
Rights Objectives in the Foreign Policies of the United States and Norway, Norwegian 
University Press. 
Ehrlich,  W.  (1996)  ‘Convention  on  the  Prohibition  of  Anti-Personnel Mines (1st Draft by W. Ehrlich, 
April  1996)’. 
English, J. (1997) Notes for an Address by John English, Former Member of Parliament, Canada 
[online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/200101121334/http://mines.gc.ca/english/documents/english.
html. 
English,  J.  (1998)  ‘The  Ottawa  process:  Paths  followed,  paths  ahead’,  Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 52(2), 121. 
Evans, G.J., Grant, B. (1991) Australia’s  Foreign  Relations:  In  the  World  of  the  1990s, Melbourne 
University Press. 
Everts,  P.,  Isernia,  P.  (2005)  ‘The  War  in  Iraq’,  Public Opinion Quarterly, 69(2), 264–323. 
Fafo (2013a) About Fafo [online], available: http://www.fafo.no/english/hist/abo-Fafo.html 
[accessed 22 Oct 2013]. 
Fafo (2013b) Fafo Board of Directors and Advisory Committee [online], available: 
http://www.fafo.no/english/pers/board.htm [accessed 22 Oct 2013]. 
Falk,  R.  (1997)  ‘Resisting  “Globalisation-from-above”  through  “Globalisation  from  Below’’,  New 
Political Economy, 2(1), 17. 
Faulkner, F. (2007) Moral Entrepreneurs and the Campaign to Ban Landmines, Rodopi. 
Federal Election Commission (2011) Federal Election Commisssion Individual Contribution Search 
Results: Robert Muller [online], available: http://query.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/qind/ [accessed 
15 Sep 2011]. 
Feld,  W.J.  (1972)  ‘Chapter  6  “The  Traditional  NGOs”’,  in Nongovernmental Forces and World Politics: 
A Study of Business, Labor, and Political Groups, Praeger: New York. 
Feld,  W.J.  (1979)  ‘Nongovernmental  Organizations’,  in  International Relations: A Transnational 
Approach, Alfred Publishing Co.: California, 225–270. 
Femia, J. (1981) Gramsci’s  Political  Thought:  Hegemony,  Consciousness,  and  the  Revolutionary  
Process, Clarendon Press. 
Femia,  J.  (2005)  ‘Gramsci,  Machiavelli  and  International  Relations’,  The Political Quarterly, 76(3), 
341–349. 
Feraru, A.T. (1974) ‘TRANSNATIONAL  POLITICAL  INTERESTS  AND  THE  GLOBAL  ENVIRONMENT’,  
International Organization, 28(1), 31. 
Ferguson, C.H. (2008) No  End  in  Sight:  Iraq’s  Descent  into  Chaos, PublicAffairs. 
Financial  Times  (1997)  ‘Momentum  grows  for  UN  landmine  ban  talks’,  Financial Times, 22 Jan. 
Finnemore,  M.,  Sikkink,  K.  (1998)  ‘International  Norm  Dynamics  and  Political  Change’,  International 
Organization, 52(4), 887–917. 
Florini, A. (2000a) The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. 
Florini,  A.  (2000b)  ‘Lessons  Learned’,  in  The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 211–239. 
Florini,  A.  (2001)  ‘Transnational  Civil  Society’,  in  Edwards,  M.  and  Gaventa,  J.,  eds., Global Citizen 
Action, Lynne Rienner Pub. 
Florini,  A.,  Simmons,  P.J.  (2000)  ‘What  The  World  Needs  Now’,  in  The Third Force: The Rise of 
Transnational Civil Society, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1–15, available: 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/thirdForceCH1.pdf. 
Flynn,  M.  (1999)  ‘Political  Minefield’,  The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 55(2), available: 
http://66.102.1.104/scholar?num=100&hl=en&lr=lang_en&q=cache:6jMHtMBmoLwJ:bullat
omsci.org/issues/1999/ma99/ma99flynn.html+international+campaign+to+ban+landmines. 
306 
 
Fontana,  B.  (2008)  ‘Hegemony    and    Power    in    Gramsci’,  in  Howson,  R.  and  Smith,  K.,  eds.,  
Hegemony: Studies  in  Consensus  and  Coercion, Routledge. 
Ford Foundation (2001) A Primer for Endowment Grantmakers: Endowment Strategies to Assist and 
Enhance the Work of Nonprofit Organizations, available: 
http://www.fordfoundation.org/pdfs/library/primer_for_grantmakers.pdf. 
Ford Foundation (2002) Ford Foundation Annual Report 2001. 
Forgacs,  D.  (2000a)  ‘Glossary  of  Key  Terms  - State’,  in  The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 
1916-1935, NYU Press, 429–430. 
Forgacs,  D.  (2000b)  ‘Glossary  of  Key  Terms  - Intellectuals’,  in  The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected 
Writings 1916-1935, NYU Press, 425. 
Forgacs,  D.  (2000c)  ‘Passive  Revolution, Caesarism, Fascism - Introduction’,  in  The Antonio Gramsci 
Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935, NYU Press, 246–249. 
Forgacs,  D.  (2000d)  ‘Glossary  of  Key  Terms  - Hegemony’,  in  The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected 
Writings 1916-1935, NYU Press, 422–424. 
Forsythe,  D.P.  (1976)  ‘The  Red  Cross  as  Transnational  Movement:  Conserving  and  Changing  the  
Nation-State  System’,  International Organization, 30(4), 607–630. 
Foster,  M.  (1999)  ‘Kosovo  and  the  1997  Landmines  Treaty’,  The Ploughshares Monitor, 20(3), 
available: http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/mons99c.html [accessed 10 Aug 
2010]. 
Foundation  Center  (1999)  ‘Top  50  Recipients  of  Foundation  Grants  for  International  Affairs,  circa  
1998*’,  available:  
http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/statistics/pdf/04_fund_sub/1998/50_recp_sub/su
b_q_r.pdf. 
Foundation Center (2000) Top U.S. Foundations Ranked by Assets [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20000914202923/http://foundationcenter.org/grantmaker/tre
nds/top100assets.html [accessed 22 Sep 2013]. 
Foust,  D.  (2008)  ‘Wachovia:  Golden  West  Wasn’t  Golden’,  BusinessWeek: magazine, 3 Jun, available: 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-06-03/wachovia-golden-west-wasnt-golden 
[accessed 21 Nov 2013]. 
Fowler,  A.  (2000)  ‘Introduction  - Beyond Partnership: Getting Real about NGO Relationships in the 
Aid  System’,  IDS Bulletin, 31(3), 1–12. 
France, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, 
Canada, Australia, UK, Japan, Finland (2008) Statement by France on Behalf of like-Minded 
Countries to Closing Plenary [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20081015031550/http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionsw
ellington/conference-documents/closing-statements/France-et-al-closing-statement.pdf 
[accessed 29 Oct 2013]. 
Freeman, J. (1970) The Tyranny of Structurelessness [online], available: 
http://struggle.ws/pdfs/tyranny.pdf [accessed 9 Apr 2009]. 
Frerks, G. (2009) The Cluster Munition Coalition 2003-2009, IKV Pax Christi Best Practice Study No. 4, 
IKV Pax Christi, available: http://edepot.wur.nl/175653. 
Fusaro,  L.  (2010)  ‘Gramsci’s  concept  of  hegemony  at  the  national  and  international  level.’,  available:  
http://www.iippe.org/wiki/images/0/09/CONF_IPE_Fusaro.pdf [accessed 5 Mar 2013]. 
G77, China (2000) Declaration of the South Summit [online], available: 
http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm [accessed 11 Jul 2011]. 
G77, China (2001) Ministerial Declaration 2001 [online], available: 
http://www.g77.org/doc/Decl2001.htm [accessed 11 Jul 2011]. 
G77, China (2002) Declaration of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Ministerial Meeting of the G-77 [online], 
available: http://www.g77.org/doc/Decl2002.htm [accessed 11 Jul 2011]. 
G77, China (2003) Declaration of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Ministerial Meeting of the G-77 and 
China [online], available: http://www.g77.org/doc/Decl2003.htm [accessed 11 Jul 2011]. 
307 
 
G77, China (2005) Doha Declaration, Second South Summit, Doha, Qatar, 12-16 June 2005 [online], 
available: http://www.g77.org/southsummit2/doc/Doha%20Declaration%28English%29.pdf. 
Gallup (2001) Gallup International Poll on Terrorism in the US (figures) [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20011030184935/http://www.gallup-
international.com/terrorismpoll_figures.htm [accessed 11 Nov 2013]. 
Garcia,  D.  (2011)  ‘Banning  Cluster  Munitions’,  in  Disarmament Diplomacy and Human Security: 
Regimes, Norms and Moral Progress in International Relations, Taylor & Francis, 153–182. 
Garden, A.M.S.T., Ramsbotham, G.S.D. (2003)  ‘Dangers  of  cluster  bombs  in  Iraq’,  The Times, 9 Aug, 
available: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.remote.library.dcu.ie/uk/nexis/delivery/DownloadDoc.do?delFm
t=QDS_EF_PDF&fileSize=5000&dnldFilePath=%2Fl-
n%2Fshared%2Fprod%2Fdiscus%2Fqds%2Frepository%2Fdocs%2F5%2F12%2F2825%3A4389
22125%2Fformatted_doc&zipDelivery=false&dnldFileName=_Dangers_of_cluster_bombs_in
_Iraq_The_Times_&jobHandle=2825%3A438922125 [accessed 26 Nov 2013]. 
Gareis, S., Varwick, J. (2005) The United Nations: An Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan. 
GCAP (2004) Case Study: International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) [online], available: 
http://www.whiteband.org/resources/campaign-tools/international-campaign-to-ban-
landmines-icbl [accessed 31 Aug 2009]. 
Gebauer,  T.  (1997)  ‘On  the  way  from  a  legal  prohibition to an effective abolition of mines: Remarks 
on  integrating  mine  action’,  in  Report: NGO Forum on Landmines, Oslo, Norway, September 
7-10 1997, 10–13. 
Gebauer,  T.  (1998a)  ‘Die  NGOs  und  der  Perspektiven  internationaler  Solidarität:  Das  Beispiel  der  
internationalen  Minenkampagne’,  in  Görg,  C.  and  Roth,  R.,  eds.,  Kein Staat zu machen: zur 
Kritik der Sozialwissenschaften,  Westfälisches  Dampfboot:  Münster,  484–502. 
Gebauer,  T.  (1998b)  ‘US  Military  Bases  and  Landmines  Policies  in  Japan  and  NATO  Member Countries 
Struggling with Loopholes - Landmines  Policy  in  Continental  Europe’,  in  Current State of the 
Landmine Ban Treaty, Presented at the Third Tokyo Conference Session 1, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19990421233752/http://pgs.ca/pages/lm/mi981124.htm 
[accessed 15 Jul 2012]. 
Gebauer,  T.  (2000)  Minen  Editorial: »Nicht  Locker  Lassen« Über  Den  Anhaltenden  Kampf  Gegen  Eine  
Mörderische  Waffe  [Mines  Editorial:  Don’t  Let  Up:  About  the  Onoing  Struggle  against  a  
Deadly Weapon] [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/200012140424/http://www.medico.de/kampagne/min_edi.ht
m [accessed 6 Jul 2012]. 
Gebauer,  T.  (2001)  ‘Die  Staatswerdung  der  NGOs  (Kommentar)  [The  Statehood  of  NGOs  
(comment)]’,  Der Überblick - Zeitschrift für ökumenische Begegnung und Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit | Heftartikel, 30. 
Gebauer,  T.  (2007)  ‘Kampagnenarbeit  im  Wandel?  NICHTREGIERUNGSORGANISATIONEN  ZWISCHEN  
MORALDISKURS UND MACHTKRITIK [Campaigning in Flux? Non-governmental Organisatons 
between Moral Discourse and a Critqiue of Power]’,  in  MI,  ed.,  „Was  Tun?‘  Kritische  
Kampagnenarbeit  in  Zeiten  Der  Globalisierung  [’What  Is  to  Be  Done?’  Critical  Campaign  
Work in a Time of Globalisation], 5–12, available: http://www.medico.de/datei/was-tun.pdf. 
Geneva Convention (1977a) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) [online], 
available: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/470?opendocument [accessed 27 Jul 2010]. 
Geneva Convention (1977b) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) 
[online], available: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/470?opendocument [accessed 27 Jul 
2010]. 
Germain,  R.D.,  Kenny,  M.  (1998)  ‘Engaging  Gramsci:  international  relations  theory  and  the  new  
Gramscians’,  Review of International Studies, 00024(00001), 3–22. 
308 
 
German  Initiative  to  Ban  Landmines  (1997)  ‘Guidelines  for Mine Action  Programmes from a 
development-oriented point of view - Revised Version integrating proposals made at the 
International NGO-Symposium  from  Bad  Honnef  23rd/24th  June  1997’,  in  Report: NGO 
Forum on Landmines, Oslo, Norway, September 7-10 1997, 14–19. 
German Initiative to Ban Landmines (2003) Quo Vadis? - Deutsche Landminenpolitik Am Scheideweg 
[Where Do We Go from Here? German Landmine Policy at a Crossroads], available: 
http://www.landmine.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Publi/LM_2003_deutsch.pdf. 
German Initiative to Ban Landmines, Landmine Action (2001) Alternative Anti-Personnel Mines: The 
next Generations, available: 
http://www.landmine.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Publi/english_report.pdf. 
German  Landmines  Campaign  (1996)  ‘Complex  issues  or  simple  solution?’,  CCW News, 2(2), 19 Jan, 
available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010702132313/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/genev
a_update2.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
Germino, D. (1990) Antonio Gramsci: Architect of a New Politics, LSU Press. 
Germino, D.,  Fennema,  M.  (1998)  ‘Antonio  Gramsci  on  the  Culture  of  Violence  and  its  Overturning’,  
Philosophical forum, 29(3-4), 182–205. 
GICHD (2004) A Study of Local Organisations in Mine Action, GICHD, available: 
http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Local_Organisations.pdf. 
GICHD  (2012)  AP  Mine  Ban  Convention:  States  Parties’  Requests  for  Extension  [online],  available:  
http://www.apminebanconvention.org/background-status-of-the-convention/clearing-
mined-areas/article-5-extensions/states-parties-requests-for-extension/ [accessed 15 Aug 
2012]. 
Gill, S. (Ed.) (1993a) Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations [online], Cambridge 
University Press, available: 
http://books.google.ie/books?id=Opkof1vyDAgC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_sum
mary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
Gill, S. (Ed.) (1993b) Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gill,  S.  (1995a)  ‘Theorizing  the  Interregnum:  The  Double  Movement  and  Global  Politics  in  the  1990s’,  
in International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder, Zed Books, 65–99. 
Gill,  S.  (1995b)  ‘Globalisation,  Market  Civilisation,  and  Disciplinary  Neoliberalism’,  Millennium - 
Journal of International Studies, 24(3), 399–423. 
Gill,  S.  (2000)  ‘Toward  a  Postmodern  Prince?  The  Battle  in  Seattle  as  a  Moment  in  the  New  Politics  of  
Globalisation’,  Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29(1), 131–140. 
Gill,  S.  (2002)  ‘Constitutionalizing  Inequality  and  the  Clash  of  Globalizations’,  International Studies 
Review, 4(2), 47–65. 
Gill,  S.  (2009)  ‘Pessimism  of  the  intelligence,  optimism  of  the  will:  reﬂections  on  political  agency  in  
the  age  of  “empire”’,  in  Francese,  J.,  ed.,  Perspectives on Gramsci: Politics, Culture and Social 
Theory, Taylor & Francis, 97–109. 
Gill,  S.,  Law,  D.  (1989)  ‘Global  Hegemony  and  the  Structural  Power  of  Capital’,  International Studies 
Quarterly, 33(4), 475–499. 
Gill,  S.,  Law,  D.  (1993)  ‘Global  Hegemony  and  the  Structural Power  of  Capital’,  in  Gill,  S.,  ed.,  Gramsci, 
Historical Materialism and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 93–124. 
Gillon, S. (2010) Boomer Nation: The Largest and Richest Generation Ever, and How It Changed 
America, Simon and Schuster. 
Glasius,  M.  (2005)  ‘Deliberation  or  struggle?  Civil  society  traditions  behind  the  social  forums’,  
Ephemera: Theory and Politics in Organization, 5(2), 240–252. 
Glasius,  M.,  Anheier,  H.K.,  Kaldor,  M.,  Howell,  J.  (Eds.)  (2005)  ‘Gender  and  Civil  Society’,  in Global 
Civil Society Yearbook 2005/6, Sage Publications Ltd, 2–27, available: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/05-06%20ch%201%20jowhell.pdf. 
309 
 
Glasius,  M.,  Timms,  J.  (2006)  ‘The  role  of  social  forums  in  global  civil  society:  radical  beacon  or  
strategic  infrastructure?’,  in  Global Civil Society 2005-2006. 
Gleditsch,  N.P.,  Wallensteen,  P.,  Eriksson,  M.,  Sollenberg,  M.,  Strand,  H.  (2002)  ‘Armed  Conflict  1946-
2001:  A  New  Dataset’,  Journal of Peace Research, 39(5), 615–637. 
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2010) Who We Are [online], available: 
http://globalr2p.org/whoweare/index.php [accessed 1 Jul 2011]. 
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2011) International Advisory Board [online], 
available: http://globalr2p.org/whoweare/iab.php [accessed 1 Jul 2011]. 
Global Policy Forum (2009) NGOs in Consultative Status with ECOSOC by Region (1996 and 2007) 
[online], available: http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/tables/ngosregion.htm [accessed 13 
May 2009]. 
Godal, B.T. (1997) Oslo Diplomatic Conference on an International, Total Ban on Anti-Personnel 
Mines [online], 032005-090158, available: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumentarkiv/Regjeringen-Jagland/ud/Taler-og-artikler-
arkivert-individuelt/1997/oslo_diplomatic_conference_on_an.html?id=262166 [accessed 17 
Jan 2012]. 
Gollom,  M.  (2008)  ‘Our  own  voice  on  Iraq?’,  Reality Check, available: 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canadavotes/realitycheck/2008/10/our_own_voice_on_iraq.html 
[accessed 3 Dec 2011]. 
Goose,  S.D.  (1994)  ‘Status  of  the  Campaign  to  Ban  Landmines  Country  Report  of  the  United  States’,  
in ICBL, ed., Second Ngo Conference On Landmines: Report of Proceedings - Geneva, 9-11 
May 1994, DIANE Publishing Company, 82–87, available: 
http://books.google.ie/books?id=tbrmQslpLK4C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_sum
mary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false [accessed 31 Aug 2009]. 
Goose,  S.D.  (1995)  ‘“Smart”  Mines’,  CCW News, 1(1), 30 Sep, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010702125121/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/vienna
_updates.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
Goose,  S.D.  (1998a)  ‘Interview  with  Steve  Goose,  Program  Director,  Human  Rights  Watch’,  available:  
http://www.cdi.org/adm/1226/goose.html [accessed 10 Jun 2011]. 
Goose,  S.D.  (1998b)  ‘The  Ottawa  Process  and  the  1997  Mine  Ban  Treaty’,  Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law, 1, 269–291. 
Goose,  S.D.  (2004a)  ‘Cluster  Munitions:  Toward  a  Global  Solution’,  in  Human Rights Watch World 
Report 2004: Human Rights and Armed Conflict, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k4/12.htm#_Toc58744961. 
Goose,  S.D.  (2004b)  ‘Humanitarian Consequences and International Response, By Stephen Goose, 
Director  of  Arms  Division,  Human  Rights  Watch’,  in  Conference Documentation, Cluster 
Bombs - Effective Weapon or Humanitarian Foe? Conference Hosted by DanChurchAid and 
MP Morten Helveg Petersen & Second International Cluster Munition Coalition Meeting, 
March 18-19 2004, DanChurchAid: Copenhagen, 23–28. 
Goose,  S.D.  (2008a)  ‘The  Campaign  to  Ban  Antipersonnel  Mines:  Potential  Lessons’,  in  MacKenzie,  
H., ed., Democratizing Global Governance: Ten Years of Case Studies and Reflections by Civil 
Society Activists, Mosaic Books: New Delhi, 87–97. 
Goose,  S.D.  (2008b)  ‘Goodwill  Yields  Good  Results:  Cooperative  Compliance  and  the  Mine  Ban  
Treaty’, in Williams, J., Goose, S.D. and Wareham, M., eds., Banning Landmines: 
Disarmament, Human Security and Citizen Diplomacy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: 
Lanham, Maryland; Plymouth, 105–126. 
Goose,  S.D.  (2008c)  ‘Cluster  Munitions  in  the  Crosshairs:  In  Pursuit  of  a  Prohibition’,  in  Williams,  J.,  
Goose, S.D. and Wareham, M., eds., Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Human Security and 
Citizen Diplomacy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, Maryland; Plymouth, 217–239. 
310 
 
Goose, S.D., Wareham, M., Williams, J. (2008)  ‘Banning  Landmines  and  Beyond’,  in  Williams,  J.,  
Goose, S. and Wareham, M., eds., Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Human Security and 
Citizen Diplomacy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, Maryland; Plymouth, 1–14. 
Gordenker, L., Weiss, T.G. (1995)  ‘NGO  participation  in  the  international  policy  process’,  Third World 
Quarterly, 16(3), 543–555. 
Gordon,  N.,  Berkovitch,  N.  (2006)  ‘The  Political  Economy  of  Human  Rights:  The  Donor/  NGO  Nexus’,  
Presented at the 101st Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Montreal, 
21, available: 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/3/9/3/pages103938
/p103938-1.php [accessed 24 Aug 2009]. 
Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks, International Publishers: New York. 
Gramsci, A. (1975a) History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci, Telos Press. 
Gramsci,  A.  (1975b)  ‘After  The  Congress’,  in  Cavalcanti,  P.  and  Piccone,  P.,  eds.,  History, Philosophy 
and Culture in the Young Gramsci, Telos Press, 99–101. 
Gramsci, A. (1977a) Quaderni del carcere, Volume 1, 2nd ed, G. Einaudi. 
Gramsci, A. (1977b) Quaderni del carcere, Volume 2, 2nd ed, Einaudi. 
Gramsci, A. (1977c) Quaderni del carcere, Volume 3, 2nd ed, Einaudi. 
Gramsci, A. (1977d) Selections from the Political Writings (1910-1920), Lawrence & Wishart. 
Gramsci, A. (1978) Selections from the Political Writings (1921-1926), Lawrence & Wishart. 
Gramsci, A. (1988) Prison Letters, Pluto Press. 
Gramsci, A. (1992) Prison Notebooks, Volume 1, Columbia University Press. 
Gramsci, A. (1994a) Gramsci: Pre-Prison Writings, Cambridge University Press. 
Gramsci,  A.  (1994b)  ‘Three  Principles’,  in  Bellamy,  R.P.  and  Cox,  V.,  eds.,  Gramsci: Pre-Prison 
Writings, Cambridge University Press, 20–25. 
Gramsci, A. (1996) Prison Notebooks, Volume 2, Columbia University Press. 
Gramsci, A. (1999a) Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ElecBook: London. 
Gramsci, A. (1999b) Selections from the Cultural Writings, ElecBook: London. 
Gramsci, A. (2000) The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935, NYU Press. 
Gramsci, A. (2007) Prison Notebooks, Volume 3, Columbia University Press. 
Grant, T. (1997) Ban Bus Tour Updates [online], Ban Bus Tour, available: 
http://members.iinet.net.au/~pictim/p17.html [accessed 9 Jan 2012]. 
Greenaway,  N.  (1997)  ‘Stopping  a  scourge’,  Ottawa Citizen, 29 Nov. 
Greenwood, C. (2002) LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR. 
Grillot,  S.,  Stapley,  C.,  Hanna,  M.  (2006)  ‘Assessing  the  Small  Arms  Movement:  The  trials  and  
tribulations of a transnational  network’,  Contemporary Security Policy, 27(1), 60–85. 
Gulamo,  F.  (1994)  ‘Mozambique  Country  Report’,  in  ICBL,  ed.,  Second Ngo Conference On 
Landmines: Report of Proceedings - Geneva, 9-11 May 1994, DIANE Publishing Company, 58–
60, available: 
http://books.google.ie/books?id=tbrmQslpLK4C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_sum
mary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false [accessed 31 Aug 2009]. 
Guzzini, S. (1998) Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The 
Continuing Story of a Death Foretold [online], Taylor & Francis, available: 
http://books.google.ie/books/about/Realism_in_International_Relations_and_I.html?id=1vn
UrVzZmgsC&redir_esc=y [accessed 6 Jan 2014]. 
Habermas, J. (1998) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, The MIT Press. 
Habib, S.G. (2008) Soraj Ghulam Habib, Opening Ceremony, Wellington Conference on Cluster 
Munitions, Wellington, New Zealand, 18 February 2008 [online], available: 
http://blog.banadvocates.org/index.php?post/2008/02/18/Sorajs-Statement-Wellington-
February-2008 [accessed 13 Aug 2010]. 
311 
 
Hammer, T. (2004) The Relationship between the Foreign, Defense and Development Policy? 
Minutes of the Seminar 22 March 2004 [online], Bitstanstorget, available: 
http://www.bistandstorget.no/newsread/news.asp?wce=ReferatNorsk&docid=10109&N=50
22 [accessed 26 Aug 2011]. 
Hampson, F.O., Hart, M. (1999) Multilateral Negotiations, JHU Press. 
Hampson,  F.O.,  Oliver,  D.F.  (1998)  ‘Pulpit  Diplomacy – A critical assessment of the Axworthy 
doctrine’,  International Journal, 53, 379–406. 
Hampson,  F.O.,  Reid,  H.  (2003)  ‘Coalition  Diversity  and  Normative  Legitimacy  in  Human  Security  
Negotiations’,  International Negotiation, 8(1), 7–42. 
Handel, M.I. (1990) Weak States in the International System, Routledge. 
Hansen,  T.  (2004)  ‘The  campaign  to  ban  landmines’,  Peace Review, 16(3), 365–370. 
Harbom,  L.,  Wallensteen,  P.  (2005)  ‘Armed  Conflict  and  Its  International  Dimensions,  1946-2004’,  
Journal of Peace Research, 42(5), 623–635. 
Harbom,  L.,  Wallensteen,  P.  (2007)  ‘Armed  Conflict,  1989  2006’,  Journal of Peace Research, 44(5), 
623. 
Harman,  C.  (1977)  ‘Gramsci  versus  Eurocommunism’,  International Socialism, 1(98), available: 
http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=239 [accessed 15 May 2012]. 
Harper,  T.  (2003)  ‘Canadians  back  Chrétien  on  war,  poll  finds’,  Toronto Star, 22 Mar, available: 
http://25461.vws.magma.ca/admin/articles/torstar-24-03-2003c.html. 
Harpviken,  K.B.  (2002)  ‘The  Landmines  Campaign:  Representations  and  Reflections’,  Cooperation and 
Conflict, 37(1), 101. 
Harrison, K. (2008a) Report from the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions 18-22 February 
2008, WILPF, available: 
http://www.wilpfinternational.org/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/ClusterMunitions/REPORT_Wellin
gton.pdf. 
Harrison, K. (2008b) Report from the Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions 5-7 December 2007, 
WILPF, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120504184037/http://www.wilpfinternational.org/PDF/Disar
mamentPDF/ClusterMunitions/ViennaReport.pdf. 
Harvey, D. (1976)  ‘The  Marxian  theory  of  the  state’,  Antipode, 8(2), 80–89. 
Harvey, D. (2007a) A Brief History Of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press. 
Harvey,  D.  (2007b)  ‘Neoliberalism  as  Creative  Destruction’,  The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 610(1), 21–44. 
Head,  J.  (1994)  ‘Second  NGO  Conference  On  Landmines,  Country  Report  New  Zealand,  By  John  Head,  
Convenor  Of  New  Zealand  Campaign  Against  Landmines’,  in  ICBL,  ed.,  Second Ngo 
Conference On Landmines: Report of Proceedings - Geneva, 9-11 May 1994, DIANE 
Publishing Company, available: 
http://books.google.ie/books?id=tbrmQslpLK4C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_sum
mary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false [accessed 31 Aug 2009]. 
Head,  J.  (1997)  ‘Oslo  report  from  John  Head:  The  role  of  NGOs at  Oslo’,  New Zealand Campaign 
Against Landmines (CALM) Newsletter, (November 1997), Nov, available: 
http://calm.org.nz/archive/news/News_Nov97.html. 
Hearn,  J.  (2001)  ‘The  “Uses  and  Abuses”  of  Civil  Society  in  Africa’,  Review of African Political 
Economy, 87, 43–53. 
Hearn,  J.  (2007)  ‘African  NGOs:  The  New  Compradors?’,  Development & Change, 38(6), 1095–1110. 
Heinrich, V.F. (2004) Assessing and Strengthening Civil Society Worldwide: A Project Description of 
the CIVICUS Civil Society Index: A Participatory Needs Assessment & Action-Planning Tool for 
Civil Society, Vol 2, Issue 1, `, available: 
http://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_Heinrich_paper.pdf. 
Held,  D.  (1997)  ‘Democracy  and  Globalization’,  Global Governance, 3 (1997), 251. 
Held, D., Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2004)  ‘Introduction’,  Government & Opposition, 39(2), 125–131. 
312 
 
Held,  D.,  McGrew,  A.  (2002a)  ‘Introduction’,  in  Held,  D.  and  McGrew,  A.,  eds.,  Governing 
Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, Polity Press: Malden, 
Massachusetts, 1–22. 
Held, D., McGrew, A. (Eds.) (2002b) Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global 
Governance, Polity Press: Malden, Massachusetts. 
Held,  D.,  McGrew,  A.  (2007)  ‘(Mis)-managing  the  World’,  in  Globalization/anti-Globalization, Polity, 
137–160. 
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., Perraton, J. (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics 
and Culture, Polity: Cambridge. 
Henrikson,  A.K.  (2005)  ‘Niche  Diplomacy  in  the  World  Public  Arena:  The  Global  “Corners”  of  Norway  
and  Canada’,  in  The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, Palgrave 
MacMillan: UK, 67–87. 
Herby,  P.  (1996)  ‘Third  Session  of  the  Review  Conference  of  States  Parties  to  the  1980  United  
Nations  Convention  on  Certain  Conventional  Weapons  (CCW)’,  International Review of the 
Red Cross, (312), 361–368. 
Herby,  P.,  La  Haye,  E.  (2007)  ‘How  Does  It  Stack  Up?  The  Anti-Personnel  Mine  Ban  Convention  at  10’,  
Arms Control Today, (December 2007), available: 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Herby [accessed 31 Aug 2009]. 
Herman,  E.,  Peterson,  D.  (2005)  Morality’s  Avenging  Angels  [online],  ZNet, available: 
http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/5525 [accessed 24 Aug 2009]. 
Herman,  E.S.  (2002)  ‘Tragic  Errors  in  U.S.  Military  Policy:  Targeting  the  civilian  population’,  Z 
Magazine, (September 2002), Sep, available: 
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/War_Peace/Tragic_Errors_Military.html [accessed 16 
Jun 2012]. 
Hewitt  de  Alcántara,  C.  (1998)  ‘Uses  and  abuses  of  the  concept  of  governance’,  International Social 
Science Journal, 50(155), 105–113. 
HI  (1995a)  ‘Massacres  en  temps  de  paix’,  in  Mines Antipersonnel: Pour Interdire Les Massacres de 
Civils  En  Temps  de  Paix :  Faits  et  Chronologies, available: 
http://www.bibliomines.org/recherche/document/item/doc/les-map-massacres-en-temps-
de-paix-1/. 
HI  (1995b)  ‘Rétrospective  de  la  mobilisation  internationale  contre  les  mines  antipersonnel’,  in  Mines 
Antipersonnel: Pour Interdire Les Massacres de Civils  En  Temps  de  Paix :  Faits  et  
Chronologies, available: 
http://www.bibliomines.org/recherche/document/item/doc/retrospective-de-la-
mobilisation-internationale-contre-les-mines-antipersonnel-1/. 
HI (1995c) Mines Antipersonnel: Pour Interdire Les Massacres de Civils En Temps de Paix [online], 1st 
ed, available: http://www.bibliomines.org/recherche/document/item/doc/retrospective-de-
la-mobilisation-internationale-contre-les-mines-antipersonnel-1/. 
HI (1996a) Mines antipersonnel: la guerre en temps de paix [online], GRIP, available: 
http://www.bibliomines.org/fileadmin/tx_bibliodocs/MAP__guerre_en_temps_de_paix.pdf. 
HI (1996b) Etat Du Monde Des Mines Antipersonnel [online]. 
HI (1996c) Bilan Au 31.12.96: Comptes Compilés(*) Handicap International France - Belgique - Suisse 
(en Milliers de Francs)  [Balance Sheet to 31.12.96: Compiled Accounts (*) Handicap 
International France - Belgium - Switzerland (in Thousands of Francs)] [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980201061317/http://www.handicap-
international.org/part2/bilan.html [accessed 24 Jun 2012]. 
HI  (1996d)  Une  Seule  Solution:  L’Interdiction  Totale  [Only  One  Solution:  A  Total  Ban]  [online],  
available: http://web.archive.org/web/19970128084639/http://www.handicap-
international.org/part5/interdiction.html [accessed 24 Jun 2012]. 
HI (1997a) Mines  Antipersonnel:  Pour  Interdire  Les  Massacres  de  Civils  En  Temps  de  Paix :  Faits  et  
Chronologies, 2nd ed. 
313 
 
HI (1997b) Origine [Origins] [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970128085024/http://www.handicap-
international.org/part1/origine.html [accessed 8 Nov 2012]. 
HI (1997c) Objets et Missions [Objects and Mission] [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970128084336/http://www.handicap-
international.org/part1/index.html [accessed 8 Nov 2012]. 
HI (1997d) Actions Sur Le Terrain [Actions on the Ground] [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970128085042/http://www.handicap-
international.org/part1/actionsterrain.html [accessed 8 Nov 2012]. 
HI (1997e) Sièges et Représentations [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970128084252/http://www.handicap-
international.org/part3/index.html. 
HI (1997f) The Problem of Antipersonnel Landmines [online]. 
HI (1997g) Agenda - Brussels Conference [online]. 
HI (1998) Bilan Au 31.12.97: Comptes Compilés Handicap International France et Suisse (en Milliers 
de Francs Français) [Balance Sheet as at 31.12.97: Combined Accounts (*) Handicap 
International France and Switzerland (in Thousands of French Francs)] [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19981202050311/http://www.handicap-
international.org/part2/bilan.html [accessed 24 Jun 2012]. 
HI (1999) Profil Des Createurs et Dirigeants: Phillipe Chabasse [online], available: 
http://www.handicap-international.org/presentation/createurs/cv_philippe.htm [accessed 
24 Jun 2012]. 
HI (2001a) Handicap International: Son Histoire [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20021204111421/http://www.handicap-
international.org/presentation/histoire/index.html [accessed 24 Jun 2012]. 
HI  (2001b)  ‘Afghanistan: Le problème des mines au coeur du conflit cinq à sept millions de mine pour 
vingt  millions  d’habitants  [Afghanistan:  The  problem  of  mines  at  the  heart  of  the  conflict  
with 5-7  millions  mines  for  twenty  million  inhabitants]’,  available:  
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/briefingkit-
d10a93b3b2fc6c68a2f8fae9654ae9b7.pdf. 
HI  (2001c)  ‘Les  bombardements  en  Afghanistan:  les  ONG  d’ICBL  lancent  un  appel  aux  Étas-Unis et à 
leurs alliés [The bombing of Afghanistan: NGOs of the ICBL launch an appeal to the United 
States  and  its  allies]’,  available:  
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-88893.pdf. 
HI (2003) Cluster Munitions Systems: Situation and Inventory [online], actually written by Centre de 
Documentation et de Recherche sur la Paix et les Conflits but then edited by HI, Handicap 
International, available: http://www.handicap-
international.de/fileadmin/redaktion/pdf/cluster_gb1.pdf. 
HI (2004a) Le Danger Des Sous-Munitions Non Explosées, Assimilable À Celui Des Mines [The Danger 
of Unexploded Submunitions , Comparable to that of Mines] [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050412234338/http://www.handicap-
international.org/esperanza/site/onglet4/pyramide/ssmunit.asp. 
HI  (2004b)  ‘Ban Mines Newsletter - A  Newsletter  from  Handicap  International’,  Ban Newsletter - 
Newsletter of Landmines & Cluster Munitions, (14), Oct. 
HI  (2004c)  ‘Ban  Mines  Newsletter  - A  Newsletter  from  Handicap  International’,  Ban Newsletter - 
Newsletter of Landmines & Cluster Munitions, (13), Jun. 
HI (2005a) Les Bombes A Sous-Munitions, Des Mines Antipersonnel Qui Ne Disent Pas Leur Nom 
[Cluster Munitions, Anti-Personnel Mines By Another Name], available: http://www.dijon-
ecolo.fr/doc-telechargeable/banques/CA-bombes-sous-munitions.pdf. 
HI  (2005b)  ‘Ban  Mines  Newsletter  - A  Newsletter  from  Handicap  International’,  Ban Newsletter - 
Newsletter of Landmines & Cluster Munitions, (16), Sep. 
314 
 
HI  (2006a)  La  Belgique  Vote  L’interdiction  Des  Bombes  À  Sous-Munitions [online]. 
HI (2006b) Compte Emplois-Ressources 2005, available: 
http://main.1212.be/pdf/HandInt_RappRevis.pdf. 
HI  (2006c)  ‘Ban  Mines  Newsletter  - A  Newsletter  from  Handicap  International’,  Ban Newsletter - 
Newsletter of Landmines & Cluster Munitions, (17), Apr. 
HI (2006d)  ‘Ban  Mines  Newsletter  - A  Newsletter  from  Handicap  International’,  Ban Newsletter - 
Newsletter of Landmines & Cluster Munitions, (18), Sep. 
HI (2007) Annual Report 2006, available: http://www.handicap-
international.fr/uploads/media/AnnualReport06_05.pdf. 
HI (2008) Rapport  d’Activites  2007, available: http://www.handicap-
international.fr/uploads/media/RA2007fr.pdf. 
HI (2009) Annual Report 2008, available: http://www.handicap-
international.fr/uploads/media/RA2008eng_01.pdf. 
HI (2012) La Mission de Handicap International [The Mission of Handicap International] [online], 
available: http://web.archive.org/web/20021204181255/http://www.handicap-
international.org/presentation/objet/mission.htm [accessed 24 Jun 2012]. 
HI, Action contre la faim, Enfants du Monde - Droits  de  l’Homme,  Médecins  du  Monde,  Première  
Urgence, Solidarités (2003) Face Aux Menaces Qui Pèsent Sur Les Populations Civiles En Irak 
et Dans La Zone, Plusieurs ONG Ont Décidé de Coordonner Leur Action Selon Des Principes 
Communs [online], available: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/OCHA-
64C8WB?OpenDocument [accessed 20 Oct 2010]. 
HI, ICBL (1997) An Explosion Every Twenty Minutes: Conference Report: Brussels International 
Conference for the Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines, 24-27 June 1997. 
HI,  Observatoire  des  transferts  d’armements  (1997)  ‘L’évolution  de  la  réglementation  internationale  
et  ses  contournements’,  27–33, available: 
http://www.bibliomines.org/recherche/document/item/doc/levolution-de-la-
reglementation-internationale-et-ses-contournements-1/ [accessed 21 Jun 2012]. 
HI-Belgium (2001) Activity Report 2001. 
HI-Belgium (2004) Activity Report 2003. 
HI-Belgium (2006a) Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions - Preliminary 
Report, available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2008/07/fatal_footprint_final-hi.pdf. 
HI-Belgium (2006b) Board of Directors [online], available: http://en.handicapinternational.be/Board-
of-Directors_a56.html [accessed 12 May 2011]. 
HI-Belgium (2006c) Annual Report 2005, available: http://en.handicapinternational.be/downloads/. 
HI-Belgium (2007) Circle of Impact - The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and 
Communities, available: http://en.handicapinternational.be/downloads/files/47273/. 
HI-Belgium (2010) Qui Sommes Nous? [online], available: 
http://issuu.com/handicapinternationalbelgium/docs/brochureinfogenerale [accessed 12 
May 2011]. 
High-Level Mission on the situation of human rights in Darfur (2007) Report of the High-Level Mission 
on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur pursuant to Human Rights Council Decision S-
4/101, A/HRC/4/80, available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_03_07_un_sudan.pdf. 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility - Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, 
United Nations, available: http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf. 
Hirsch,  J.  (2003)  ‘The  State’s  New  Clothes:  NGOs  and  the  Internationalization  of  States’,  Rethinking 
Marxism, 15(2), 237–262. 
315 
 
HI-UK (2005) Annual Report 2004 [online], available: http://www.handicap-
international.org.uk//files/Annual%20report%202004,%20Handicap%20International%20UK
.pdf [accessed 28 Apr 2009]. 
HI-US (2011) Our Board [online], available: www.handicap-international.us/in-the-us/board 
[accessed 12 Aug 2011]. 
Hiznay,  M.  (2008)  ‘The  Challenges  Involved  in  Identifying  Cluster  Munition  Producers’,  in  Report On 
Activities - Wellington Conference On Cluster Munitions, 18-22 February 2008, 41–4, 
available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/anzcmc-
wellington-report.pdf. 
Hoare,  Q.,  Nowell  Smith,  G.  (1971a)  ‘The  Intellectuals  - Introduction’,  in  Hoare,  Q.  and  Nowell  Smith,  
G., eds., Selections from the Prison Notebooks, International Publishers: New York, 3–4. 
Hoare,  Q.,  Nowell  Smith,  G.  (1971b)  ‘Notes  on  Italian  History  - Introduction’,  in  Hoare,  Q.  and  Nowell  
Smith, G., eds., Selections from the Prison Notebooks, International Publishers: New York, 
44–51. 
Holbrooke,  R.  (2008)  ‘“The  Doves  Were  Right”’,  The New York Times, 30 Nov, available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/books/review/Holbrooke-t.html [accessed 23 Sep 
2013]. 
Holland,  K.  (2008)  ‘Countries  urged  to  stand  firm  over  attempts  to  dilute  a  ban’,  Irish Times, 26 May, 
4. 
Hollestelle, M. (2013) Micha Hollestelle | LinkedIn [online], available: 
http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=16727673&authType=NAME_SEARCH&authToke
n=CUen&locale=en_US&srchid=484342721385656510134&srchindex=8&srchtotal=159&trk
=vsrp_people_res_name&trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A484342721385656510134%2CVSRPtarg
etId%3A16727673%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary [accessed 28 Nov 2013]. 
Howell, J., Pearce, J. (2002) Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Inc,US. 
Hrab,  N.  (2003)  ‘The  MacArthur  Foundation  on  Foreign  Policy  and  Defense:  Funding  the  Left’s  
Counterattack  on  Bush  Administration  Policies’,  Foundation Watch, (September 2003), Sep, 
available: http://www.capitalresearch.org/pubs/pdf/x3786755822.pdf. 
HRW  (1989)  ‘MONITORING  VIOLATIONS  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  WAR’,  in  World Report 1989, HRW. 
HRW  (1992a)  ‘Introduction’,  in  World Report 1992, HRW. 
HRW  (1992b)  ‘Human  Rights  Watch’,  in  World Report 1992, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/HRW.htm#P8_0 [accessed 15 Jun 2012]. 
HRW  (1993)  ‘The  Arms  Project’,  in  World Report 1993, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Hrw-07.htm#P258_107800 [accessed 1 Nov 
2010]. 
HRW  (1994a)  ‘Landmines  in  International  Law  - Memorandum - Landmines in International Law: 
Why  is  a  Complete  Ban  Required’,  in  Williams,  J.  and  Roberts,  S.,  eds.,  After the Guns Fall 
Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines. 
HRW  (1994b)  ‘The  Arms  Project’,  in  World Report 1994, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Back-02.htm#P77_30041 [accessed 1 Nov 2010]. 
HRW  (1995)  ‘STAFF  AND  COMMITTEES’,  in  World Report 1995, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/HRWGEN-10.htm#P886_173457 [accessed 1 Nov 
2010]. 
HRW  (1996)  ‘Staff  and  Committees’,  in  Annual Report 1996, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Back-10.htm#P1356_250647 [accessed 1 Nov 
2010]. 
HRW (1997a) Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa, Human Rights Watch. 
HRW (1997b) HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970704003033/http://www.hrw.org/about/info/qna.html 
[accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
316 
 
HRW  (1997c)  ‘Addendum’,  in  Annual Report 1997, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/WR97/BACK-06.htm [accessed 1 Nov 2010]. 
HRW (1997d) HRW Board Of Directors & Advisory Committee [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970704003354/http://www.hrw.org/about/info/board.html 
[accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
HRW  (1998a)  ‘Defending  the  Right  to  Monitor’,  in  Annual Report 1997/8, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20000623063301/http://www.hrw.org/annual-
report/1998/20years2.html [accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
HRW  (1998b)  ‘Human  Rights  Watch  1978-1998 - 20  Years’,  in  Annual Report 1997/8, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20000307134949/http://www.hrw.org/annual-
report/1998/20years.html [accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
HRW  (1998c)  ‘Protecting  Civilians  in  Wartime’,  in  Annual Report 1997/8, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20000307233741/http://www.hrw.org/annual-
report/1998/20years4.html [accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
HRW (1998d)  ‘Financials  1997/8’,  in  Annual Report 1997/8, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20001019044659/http://www.hrw.org/annual-
report/1998/finance1.html [accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
HRW  (1998e)  ‘Form  990  1997’. 
HRW  (1998f)  ‘Staff  and  Committees’,  in  Annual Report 1998, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport/Ps-05.htm#P737_46371 [accessed 1 Nov 2010]. 
HRW (1999a) Human Rights Trump Sovereignty In 1999 [online], available: 
http://www.hrw.org/es/news/1999/12/09/human-rights-trump-sovereignty-1999 [accessed 
17 Mar 2010]. 
HRW (1999b) Ticking  Time  Bombs:  NATO’s  Use  of  Cluster  Munitions  in  Yugoslavia, A Human Rights 
Watch Report Vol. 11, No. 6 (D), available: http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nato2/ 
[accessed 12 Jul 2010]. 
HRW  (1999c)  NATO’s  Use  of  Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia [online], available: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/05/11/natos-use-cluster-munitions-yugoslavia [accessed 
6 Jul 2012]. 
HRW (1999d) Cluster Bombs: Memorandum For Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
Delegates [online], available: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/1999/12/15/cluster-bombs-
memorandum-convention-conventional-weapons-ccw-delegates [accessed 24 Jul 2010]. 
HRW (1999e) Human Rights Watch Announces Landmark Endowment Campaign [online], available: 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/1999/09/14/human-rights-watch-announces-landmark-
endowment-campaign [accessed 5 Jul 2011]. 
HRW  (1999f)  ‘Form  990  January-March  1999’. 
HRW (2000a) Clinton’s  Landmine  Legacy, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/2000%20June%20Arms%20Clinton%20Land
mine%20Rpt..pdf. 
HRW  (2000b)  ‘Form  990  1999’. 
HRW  (2001a)  ‘Form  990  2000’. 
HRW (2001b) Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan [online], available: 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2001/10/31/cluster-bombs-afghanistan [accessed 13 Jul 
2010]. 
HRW (2002a) Annual Report 2002 [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20030513083053/http://hrw.org/annual-report/2002.pdf 
[accessed 5 May 2009]. 
HRW (2002b) Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and Their Use by the United States in Afghanistan, Vol 
14, No 7 (G), available: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2002/12/18/fatally-flawed-0 
[accessed 13 Jul 2010]. 
317 
 
HRW (2003a) Annual Report 2003 [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060113162319/http://www.hrw.org/annual-report/2003.pdf 
[accessed 5 May 2009]. 
HRW (2003b) Off Target: The Conduct of the War and the Civilian Casualties in Iraq, Human Rights 
Watch. 
HRW  (2003c)  ‘Cluster  Munitions:  a  Foreseeable  Hazard  in  Iraq’,  available:  
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/03/18/cluster-munitions-foreseeable-hazard-iraq 
[accessed 13 Jul 2010]. 
HRW  (2003d)  ‘Appendix:  Staff,  Council,  and  Board  Committees’,  in  Human Rights Watch World 
Report 2003, available: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k3/appendix3.html [accessed 15 Jun 
2012]. 
HRW  (2003e)  ‘Afghanistan’,  in  Human Rights Watch World Report 2003, available: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3e2818670.html [accessed 17 Dec 2013]. 
HRW (2003f) Human Rights Watch Policy on Iraq [online], available: 
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/iraq/hrwpolicy.htm [accessed 1 Aug 2010]. 
HRW (2004a) Annual Report 2004 [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060104035809/http://hrw.org/annual-report/2004.pdf 
[accessed 5 May 2009]. 
HRW  (2004b)  ‘Cluster Munitions and International Humanitarian Law: The Need for Better 
Compliance and Stronger Rules, Prepared for the Convention on Conventional Weapons 
(CCW) Group of Governmental Experts on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) July 5-16, 
2004’,  available:  
http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/HRW%20paper%20on%20Cluster%20Munitions%20
and%20IHL.pdf. 
HRW (2005a) Worldwide Production and Export of Cluster Munitions, A Human Rights Watch Briefing 
Paper. 
HRW (2005b) Annual Report 2005 [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070313211921/http://www.hrw.org/annual-report/2005.pdf 
[accessed 5 May 2009]. 
HRW (2005c) Time to Take Stock: The U.S. Cluster Munition Inventory and the FY 2006 Department 
of Defense Budget [online], available: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/07/21/time-
take-stock-us-cluster-munition-inventory-and-fy-2006-department-defense-budg [accessed 
13 Jul 2010]. 
HRW (2006a) Fatal  Strikes:  Israel’s  Indiscriminate  Attacks  Against  Civilians  in  Lebanon, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/lebanon0806/. 
HRW (2006b) Annual Report 2006 [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070313212233/http://www.hrw.org/annual-report/2006.pdf 
[accessed 5 May 2009]. 
HRW (2006c) Unexploded Cluster Munitions Threatening Civilians in Lebanon: Israel Must Provide 
Data to Save Lives [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070823231118/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=26 [accessed 27 Jun 2012]. 
HRW (2006d) Norway Opens Way to Cluster Munition Treaty [online], available: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/11/17/norway-opens-way-cluster-munition-treaty 
[accessed 7 Sep 2011]. 
HRW (2007a) Survey of Cluster Munition Policy and Practice, Human Rights Watch. 
HRW (2007b) Civilians  under  Assault:  Hezbollah’s  Rocket  Attacks  on  Israel  in  the  2006  War, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/08/28/civilians-under-assault-0 [accessed 5 Aug 
2010]. 
HRW (2007c) Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/10734/section/1 [accessed 5 Aug 2010]. 
318 
 
HRW (2007d) Survey of Cluster Munitions Produced and Stockpiled - Briefing Paper Prepared for the 
ICRC Experts Meeting on Cluster Munitions [online], available: 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/arms/cluster0407/ [accessed 13 Jul 2010]. 
HRW (2008a) Our History [online], available: http://www.hrw.org/en/node/75134 [accessed 27 Aug 
2009]. 
HRW (2008b) A Decade Under Chávez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing 
Human Rights in Venezuela, available: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/09/22/decade-
under-ch-vez [accessed 8 Oct 2013]. 
HRW  (2008c)  Key  Facts  on  the  United  States’  Use,  Production,  Stockpiling,  and  Transfer  of  Cluster  
Munitions [online], available: 
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/06/25/global19192.htm [accessed 7 Jun 2010]. 
HRW (2008d) Financial Statements Year Ended June 30 2007, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/finStmt2007.pdf. 
HRW (2008e) Annual Report 2008 [online], available: 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/AR2008-web.pdf [accessed 5 May 
2009]. 
HRW (2009a) Twelve Facts and Fallacies about the Convention on Cluster Munitions [online], 
available: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/14/twelve-facts-and-fallacies-about-
convention-cluster-munitions [accessed 27 Jul 2010]. 
HRW (2009b) Human Rights Watch Visit to Saudi Arabia [online], available: 
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/84512 [accessed 27 Aug 2009]. 
HRW  (2009c)  ‘Form  990  2008’,  available:  
http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2009/132/875/2009-132875808-05b95b56-9.pdf. 
HRW  (2010)  ‘Timeline  of  Cluster  Munition  Use’. 
HRW (2011a) Stephen Goose [online], available: http://www.hrw.org/en/bios/stephen-goose 
[accessed 11 Jun 2011]. 
HRW (2012a) Jan Egeland [online], available: http://www.hrw.org/bios/jan-egeland [accessed 24 Jun 
2012]. 
HRW (2012b) Human Rights Watch Mourns Loss of Marion Sandler [online], available: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/02/human-rights-watch-mourns-loss-marion-sandler 
[accessed 22 Sep 2013]. 
HRW  (2013a)  Venezuela:  Chávez’s  Authoritarian  Legacy [online], available: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/05/venezuela-chavez-s-authoritarian-legacy [accessed 
6 Mar 2013]. 
HRW (2013b) Frequently Asked Questions [online], available: http://www.hrw.org/node/75138#9 
[accessed 23 Sep 2013]. 
HRW (2013b) Financials [online], available: http://www.hrw.org/financials [accessed 20 Nov 2013]. 
HRW (2013c) Partners [online], available: http://www.hrw.org/partners [accessed 20 Nov 2013]. 
HRW, Africa Watch (1994) Landmines in Mozambique [online], Human Rights Watch, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1994/03/01/landmines-mozambique [accessed 1 Sep 
2009]. 
HRW, IHRC (2008a) User State Responsibility for Cluster Munition Clearance: Memorandum to 
Delegates of the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, available: 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/arms0208.pdf. 
HRW,  IHRC  (2008b)  ‘Interoperability  and  the  Prohibition  on  Assistance:  Memorandum  to  Delegates  
of  the  Dublin  Diplomatic  Conference  on  Cluster  Munitions’,  available:  
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/05/19/interoperability-and-prohibition-assistance. 
HRW, Landmine Action (2009) Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice, Mines 
Action Canada. 
HRW, PHR (1993) Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, Human Rights Watch. 
319 
 
HRW, VVAF (1997) In Its Own Words: The US Army and Antipersonnel Mines in the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars, Vol. 9, No. 3 (G), available: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1997/07/01/its-
own-words. 
Hubert,  D.  (1998)  ‘The  Challenge  of  Humanitarian  Mine  Clearance’,  in  Cameron,  M.  and  Lawson, R., 
eds., To Walk Without Fear: The International Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 314–335. 
Hubert,  D.  (2000)  ‘The  Landmine  Ban:  A  Case  Study  in  Humanitarian  Advocacy’,  available:  
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Watson_Institute. 
Hudock, A. (1999) NGOs and Civil Society: Democracy by Proxy, Wiley-Blackwell. 
Hulme, D., Edwards, M. (Eds.) (1997) NGOs, States and Donors,  St.  Martin’s  Press  in  association  with  
Save the Children. 
Human Security Centre (2005) Human Security Report. 
Hummel, H. (2007) A Survey of Involvement of 15 European States in the Iraq War 2003, paks 
working paper 7, Düsseldorf, available: http://paks.uni-
duesseldorf.de/Dokumente/paks_working_paper_7_rev.pdf [accessed 13 Nov 2013]. 
Huntington,  S.  (1973)  ‘Transnational  organizations  in  world  politics’,  World Politics: A Quarterly 
Journal of International Relations, 333–368. 
Hynek,  N.,  Bosold,  D.  (2008)  ‘A  History  and  Genealogy  of  the  Freedom-from-Fear  Doctrine`’,  
International Journal, 64, 735. 
IASC (2003) ‘Statement  by  the  Inter  Agency  Standing  Committee  to  the  Meeting  of  State  Parties  to  
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
which  may  be  Excessively  Injurious  or  have  Indiscriminate  Effects’,  available:  
http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/IASC%20Statement%20on%20cluster%20munitions.
pdf. 
ICBL  (1993)  ‘A  Joint  Call  to  Ban  Antipersonnel  Landmines’,  in  HRW  and  PHR,  eds.,  Landmines: A 
Deadly Legacy, Human Rights Watch, 361–2. 
ICBL (1994a) Second Ngo Conference On Landmines: Report of Proceedings - Geneva, 9-11 May 1994 
[online], DIANE Publishing Company, available: 
http://books.google.ie/books?id=tbrmQslpLK4C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_sum
mary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false [accessed 31 Aug 2009]. 
ICBL (1994b) Landmines Update #7 [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202154558/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/international
/updates/events/update7.html [accessed 12 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL (1994c) Second Ngo Conference On Landmines: Report of Proceedings - Geneva, 9-11 May 1994, 
ICBL edition. ed, ICBL. 
ICBL (1995a) Landmines Update #11 [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202154530/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/international
/updates/events/5a.html [accessed 12 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1995b)  ‘Majority  of nations  call  for  a  ban’,  CCW News, 1(1), 30 Sep, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010702125121/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/vienna
_updates.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1995c)  ‘CCW  News’,  CCW News, 1(6), 13 Oct, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010414005315/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/vienna
6.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1995d)  ‘France  bans  mine  production’,  CCW News, 1(1), 30 Sep, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010702125121/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/vienna
_updates.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1995e)  ‘The  good,  the  bad,  and  the  ugly,  part  1’,  CCW News, 1(2), 1 Oct, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010702125945/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/vienna
_updates2.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
320 
 
ICBL (1995f)  ‘The  good,  the  bad,  and  the  ugly,  part  II’,  CCW News, 1(2), 1 Oct, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010702125945/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/vienna
_updates2.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1995g)  ‘India  has  a  “major  problem”’,  CCW News, 1(4), 6 Oct, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20001011165816/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/vienna
_updates4.html#india [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1995h)  ‘Overheard  in  the  Corridor’,  CCW News, 1(6), 13 Oct, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010414005315/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/vienna
6.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1995i)  ‘CCW  conference:  unjust  and  immoral’,  CCW News, 1(6), 13 Oct, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010414005315/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/vienna
6.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1995j)  ‘Summary  of  Discussion:  US  delegate  discussing  battery  back-up for self-destruct 
systems  talking  to  Rae  McGrath,  MAG:’,  CCW News, 1(6), 13 Oct, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010414005315/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/vienna
6.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1995k)  ‘Dear  Delegates’,  CCW News, 1(6), 13 Oct, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010414005315/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/vienna
6.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1995l)  ‘What  exactly  does  “eventually”  mean?’,  CCW News, 1(4), 6 Oct, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20001011165816/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/vienna
_updates4.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1995m)  ‘The  Austrian  position’,  CCW News, 1(3), 4 Oct, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010702131352/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/vienna
_updates5.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1996a)  ‘CCW  News’,  3(9),  9  Apr. 
ICBL  (1996b)  ‘CCW  News’,  3(10),  25  Apr. 
ICBL  (1996c)  ‘Global  Demining  “Critically    Underfunded,”    say  Experts, Funds Flow to Mine 
Conversion,  Production,  Rather  than  Demining’. 
ICBL (1996d) Organizations Working to Ban Landmines. As of 6th February 1996, Provided by Jody 
Williams, Coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines [online], available: 
http://www.uib.no/People/mfakh/LMK/LMcamporg [accessed 18 May 2011]. 
ICBL (1996e) Report On Activities, Review Conference Of The Convention On Conventional Weapons, 
2nd Resumed Session Geneva, Switzerland 22 April-3 May  1996, available: 
https://mail.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/content/download/25197/444114/file/5_6.pdf. 
ICBL (1996f) Landmines Update #13 [online], available: 
vhttp://web.archive.org/web/19980202155314/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events96/28.htm. 
ICBL (1996g) Announcing the 4th International NGO Conference on Landmines: Toward a Mine-Free 
Southern Africa, 25-28 February 1997, Maputo, Mozambique [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202155047/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events96/oct22.html. 
ICBL (1996h) Landmines Update #14 [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202154502/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/international
/updates/events/vvaf-update14.html [accessed 12 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1996i)  ‘Call  for  Action  on  Anti-Personnel  (AP)  Mines’. 
ICBL (1996j) (ICBL Draft) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, 
Transfer and Use of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. 
ICBL  (1996k)  ‘The  New  Protocol  - Not  a  Step  Out  of  the  Minefield’. 
321 
 
ICBL  (1996l)  ‘Introduction  to  Geneva’,  2(1),  15  Jan,  available:  
http://web.archive.org/web/20010702131609/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/genev
a_update1.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL (1996m) Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines:. International Strategy Conference, 
Ottawa, Canada October 3-5, 1996, Report On Activities. 
ICBL  (1996n)  ‘NGOs  Demand  Ban  on  Landmines  by  the  Year  2000’. 
ICBL  (1996o)  ‘International  Campaign  to  Ban  Landmines,  Presentation  to  the  Opening  Session  of  the  
Ottawa  Conference  3  October  1996  by  Chris  Moon’,  in  Towards a Global Ban on Anti-
Personnel Mines:. International Strategy Conference, Ottawa, Canada October 3-5, 1996, 
Report On Activities, 18–20. 
ICBL  (1996p)  ‘ICBL  Comments  to  the  Chairman’s  Session  Ottawa  Conference,  3  October  1996,  
delivered by Jody Williams,  VVAF,  Coordinator,  ICBL.’,  in  Towards a Global Ban on Anti-
Personnel Mines:. International Strategy Conference, Ottawa, Canada October 3-5, 1996, 
REPORT ON ACTIVITIES, ICBL, 25–26. 
ICBL  (1996q)  ‘Press Statement: International Campaign to Ban Landmines Statement, Closing Press 
Conference, Ottawa Conference, 5 October 1996, by Jody Williams. Vietnam Veterans of 
America  Foundation,  Coordinator,  ICBL’. 
ICBL  (1996r)  ‘Notes  from  Pro-Ban  Meetings’,  in  Report On Activities, Review Conference Of The 
Convention On Conventional Weapons, 2nd Resumed Session Geneva, Switzerland 22 April-3 
May  1996, 95–96, available: 
https://mail.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/content/download/25197/444114/file/5_6.pdf. 
ICBL (1997a) Organizations Working to Ban Landmines (as of April 1997) [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202154723/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/international
/updates/events/icbl-list.html [accessed 12 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1997b)  ‘Towards  a  Mine-Free Southern Africa: Fourth International NGO Conference on 
Landmines  Delegate  Pack’,  available:  
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=112&ved=0CDgQFjAB
OG4&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.icbl.org%2Findex.php%2Ficbl%2Fcontent%2Fdownload%2F
25065%2F442898%2Ffile%2FFourth%2520NGO%2520Conference_Mozambique%25201997.
pdf&ei=0wyZUKa2CoGRhQfyqYHgCw&usg=AFQjCNGZRGBRWI-
e0PzvFOKwzbrTZ1waYw&sig2=LR1nsmgdFeazEJnb9xC8dA&cad=rja. 
ICBL (1997c) UNITED STATES SEEKS TO UNDERMINE LANDMINE BAN TREATY [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152530/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/undermine.html. 
ICBL (1997d) Campaigners Pack [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152345/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/campaignpack.html. 
ICBL (1997e) A Gift to the World in Oslo - Treaty Banning Antipersonnel Mines Adopted! [online], 
available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152055/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/news9_17a.html. 
ICBL (1997f) Final Declaration of the 4th International NGO Conference on Landmines, Maputo, 
Mozambique; 25-28 February 1997 [online], available: 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/other/landminefree/AppendK.html [accessed 23 Jan 2012]. 
ICBL  (1997g)  ‘Nobel  Lecture,  Oslo,  December  10,  1997,  by  Rae McGrath on behalf of the 
International  Campaign  to  Ban  Landmines’,  available:  
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1997/icbl-lecture.html [accessed 
7 Oct 2013]. 
ICBL  (1997h)  NGOs  Welcome  Oslo  Mine  Ban  Negotiations:  Don’t  Weaken  the  Treaty! [online], 
available: 
322 
 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152352/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/oslo8_29.html. 
ICBL (1997i) Landmines Update #15/part One [online], available: 
https://groups.google.com/forum/?hl=en&fromgroups#!topic/alt.peace/e2k1BtyIvCg 
[accessed 12 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL (1997j) Mozambique Announces Landmine Ban at Conference [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980614043245/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/international
/updates/events/latemaputo.html [accessed 12 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL (1997k) Landmine Conference Opens In Maputo [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980614043245/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/international
/updates/events/latemaputo.html [accessed 12 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL (1997l) ICBL Contacts in Vienna [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980110171159/http://www.pgs.ca/pages/lm/ldviennr.htm#s
tat [accessed 14 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL (1997m) International Campaign to Ban Landmines Statement To The Expert Meeting On The 
Text Of A Convention To Ban Antipersonnel Landmines, 12 February 1997, Vienna, Austria, 
by Jody Williams, Coordinator, International Campaign to Ban Landmines [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202154455/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/international
/updates/events/icblaustria.html [accessed 12 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  (1997n)  ‘ICBL  Remarks  at  the  Closing  Session  in  Bonn’. 
ICBL  (1997o)  ‘Historic  Meeting  Discusses  Elements  of  a  Landmine  Treaty’. 
ICBL (1997p) Brussels Landmine Conference: Separating Rhetoric from Reality [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980110165732/http://www.pgs.ca/pages/lm/ldbrusse.htm 
[accessed 14 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL (1997q) No Exceptions, No Reservations, No Loopholes [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152536/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/loophole.html. 
ICBL (1997r) U.S. To Make Final Attempt to Maim Landmine Ban Treaty [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152122/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/news9_15.html. 
ICBL (1997s) Will the Mine Ban Treaty Survive the Weekend? [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152143/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/news9_12.html. 
ICBL (1997t) U.S. Delays the Inevitable [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152115/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/news9_16.html. 
ICBL (1997u) Copy of Letter to Mr.Klaus Kinkel, German Minister of Foreign Affairs [online], 
available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152143/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/news9_12.html. 
ICBL (1997v) Statement  to the Closing Plenary of the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on a Treaty to Ban 
Antipersonnel Landmines by Jody Williams, Campaign Coordinator on Behalf of the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152041/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/news9_18.html. 
ICBL  (1997w)  ‘Entry  Into  Force  Before  the  Year  2000:  International  Campaign  to  Ban  Landmines  Plan  
of Action for the Ratification, Implementation, Monitoring and Universalization of the 
International Treaty Banning Antipersonnel Landmines and for the Eradication of the 
Weapon, and Assistance to Mine Victims, Presented at the Oslo Diplomatic Conference, 18 
September 1997.’ 
323 
 
ICBL (1998a) Report: NGO Forum on Landmines, Oslo, Norway, September 7-10 1997, available: 
http://www.google.ie/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CCIQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fw
ww.arabic.icbl.org%2Findex.php%2Ficbl%2Flayout%2Fset%2Fprint%2Flayout%2Fset%2Fprin
t%2Fcontent%2Fdownload%2F25199%2F444120%2Ffile%2F5_13.pdf&rct=j&q=%22NGO%20
forum%20on%20landmines%22&ei=RqvSTN6UH4yOjAfzwPTUDQ&usg=AFQjCNEsD9b5brB04
wU1Fap2xMaf7xb2cg&sig2=VYuV4TdmEOHwBKpRhO1uqg&cad=rja. 
ICBL  (1998b)  ‘Final  Statement  General  Meeting  of  the  ICBL’,  Presented  at  the  General  Meeting  of  the  
ICBL, Frankfurt, available: http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Library/News-Articles/About-
Us/statements-frankfurt [accessed 9 Jul 2010]. 
ICBL (1998c) CC Meeting, Ottawa 29, 30 November and 3 December 1998 - Summary of Decisions 
Made [online], available: http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Library/News-
Articles/08_Contents/Archive/Before_2001/1999-minutesCCdec98 [accessed 23 Jun 2010]. 
ICBL (2001a) ICBL Letter to NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson [online], available: 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Library/News/08_Contents/Archive/Old/121 [accessed 
12 Nov 2013]. 
ICBL  (2001b)  ‘ICBL  Statement  on  Cluster  Munitions  and  Explosive  Remnants  of  War’,  in  ICBL 
Statement Addressed to the Final Plenary of the Convention on Conventional Weapons 
Review Conference in Geneva, Presented at the Convention on Conventional Weapons 
Second Review Conference, Geneva, available: 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/layout/set/print/Library/News-
Articles/08_Contents/Archive/Old/137 [accessed 12 Jul 2010]. 
ICBL (2002a) Biographical Information of ICBL Participants [online], available: 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/layout/set/print/Library/News-
Articles/08_Contents/Archive/Old/212 [accessed 9 Jul 2010]. 
ICBL  (2002b)  ‘Form  990  2001’. 
ICBL (2003)  ‘Form  990  2002’. 
ICBL (2004) Ban Movement Chronology [online], available: 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/About-Us/History/Chronology [accessed 7 Nov 2010]. 
ICBL  (2007)  ‘ICBL  Messages  Booklet  for  Campaigners,  8th  Meeting  of  the  States  Parties,  18-22 
November  2007,  Dead  Sea,  Jordan’,  available:  
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaties/MBT/Annual-Meetings/8MSP/OLD/Booklet. 
ICBL (2008) Report of Activities 2007, available: http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Library/About-
Us/Annual-Reports/ar2007. 
ICBL  (2009a)  ‘Form  990  2008’,  available:  
http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments//2008/134/113/2008-134113075-055acd88-9.pdf. 
ICBL (2009b) Annual Report 2008, available: http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Library/About-
Us/Annual-Reports/2008-annual-report. 
ICBL (2012a) States Parties [online], available: 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Parties [accessed 17 Aug 2012]. 
ICBL  (2012b)  ‘ICBL  Statement  on  Compliance,  Mine  Ban  Treaty  Intersessional  Work  Program,  
Standing Committee on General Status  and  Operation  of  the  Convention,  25  May  2012’,  
available: http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaty/MBT/ISC/Intersessionals12/ICBL-
Statement-on-Compliance. 
ICBL African Regional Group (1999) General Meeting 1999: Africa Regional Group [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20000614131739/http://www.icbl.org/resources/gm99/africar
ep.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL Asia-Pacific Regional Group (1999) GM 1999 - Asia-Pacific Regional Meeting [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20000614194329/http://www.icbl.org/resources/gm99/asiapa
c.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
ICBL  Ethics  and  Justice  Working  Group  (2000)  ‘Ethics  and  Justice  Working  Group  Report’,  in  LM,  ed.,  
Landmine Monitor Report 2000, available: http://www.the-
324 
 
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2000/icbl/ethics.html [accessed 9 Jul 
2012]. 
ICISS (2000) Axworthy Launches International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
[online], available: http://www.iciss.ca/press1-en.asp [accessed 7 Nov 2010]. 
ICM Research (2001) ICM Research/ Guardian Poll October 10th-11th 2001 [online], available: 
http://www.icmresearch.com/pdfs/2001_october_guardian_afghanistan_poll_1.pdf#search
= [accessed 11 Nov 2013]. 
ICRC (1992a) Mines: A Perverse Use of Technology, International Committee of the Red Cross. 
ICRC  (1992b)  ‘Mines:  A  Perverse  Use  of  Technology’,  in  Maresca,  L.  and  Maslen,  S.,  eds.,  The Banning 
of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Cambridge University Press. 
ICRC  (1993)  ‘Mines:  A  Perverse  Use  of  Technology’,  in  Maresca,  L.  and  Maslen, S., eds., The Banning 
of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Cambridge University Press, 257–264. 
ICRC  (1994a)  ‘Statement  of  the  International  Committee  Of  The  Red  Cross  [ICRC]’,  in  The Global 
Landmine Crisis: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United 
States Senate - One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session: Special Hearing, 106–108. 
ICRC  (1994b)  ‘Report  of  the  ICRC  for  the  review  conference  of  the  1980 UN conventions on 
Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be 
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects - Results of the 
Montreux symposium on anti-personnel  mines’,  International Review of the Red Cross, (299), 
123–182. 
ICRC (1996a) Anti-Personnel Landmines - Friend  or  Foe? :  A  Study  of  the  Military  Use  and  
Effectiveness of Anti-Personnel Mines [online], available: 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/C2951729922B4364C1256B6600599B
F2#a13. 
ICRC (1996b) The Mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19961106095050/http://www.icrc.org/icrcnews/21f6.htm 
[accessed 3 Jul 2012]. 
ICRC  (1996c)  ‘Communication  and  external  resources’,  in  Annual Report 1995, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970302201943/http://www.icrc.org/icrcnews/34ca.htm 
[accessed 3 Jul 2012]. 
ICRC (1997) Financing and Budget [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970302145238/http://www.icrc.org/icrcnews/276a.htm 
[accessed 3 Jul 2012]. 
ICRC (1998) Banning Anti-Personnel Mines - The Ottawa Treaty Explained, available: 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0702/$File/ICRC_002_0702_OTTAWA_
EXPLAINED.PDF [accessed 1 Sep 2009]. 
ICRC  (2007)  The  ICRC’s  Position  on  Cluster  Munitions  and  the  Need  for  Urgent  Action  [online],  
available: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/cluster-munitions-
statement-251007.htm [accessed 19 Sep 2011]. 
ICRC (2010) State Parties / Signatories to Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 
1980 Convention), 28 November 2003 [online], available: 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=610&ps=P [accessed 24 Jul 2010]. 
ICRC (2012) Structure [online], available: http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/structure/index.jsp 
[accessed 15 Jan 2012]. 
Incite | Insight (2013) Clients - Cluster Munition Coalition [online], available: 
http://www.inciteinsight.net/clients.htm#CMC [accessed 29 Nov 2013]. 
Inequality.org (2013) Income Inequality [online], Inequality.org, available: 
http://inequality.org/income-inequality/ [accessed 22 Sep 2013]. 
Inglehart,  R.  (1971)  ‘The  Silent  Revolution  in  Europe:  Intergenerational  Change  in  Post-Industrial 
Societies’,  The American Political Science Review, 65(4), 991–1017. 
325 
 
Inglehart,  R.  (2008)  ‘Changing  Values  among  Western  Publics  from  1970  to  2006’,  West European 
Politics, 31(1-2), 130–146. 
Ives,  P.,  Short,  N.  (2013)  ‘On  Gramsci  and  the  international:  a  textual  analysis’,  Review of 
International Studies, 39(03), 621–642. 
Jaeger, H.-M.  (2007)  ‘“Global  Civil  Society”  and  the  Political  Depoliticization  of  Global  Governance’,  
International Political Sociology, 1(3), 257–277. 
Jenkins,  J.C.  (1998)  ‘Channeling  Social  Protest:  Foundation  Patronage  of  Contemporary  Social 
Movements’,  in  Powell,  W.W.  and  Clemens,  E.S.,  eds.,  Private Action and the Public Good, 
Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, 206–216. 
Jenkins,  J.C.,  Eckert,  C.M.  (1986)  ‘Channeling  Black  Insurgency:  Elite  Patronage  and  Professional  
Social Movement Organizations  in  the  Development  of  the  Black  Movement’,  American 
Sociological Review, 51(6), 812–829. 
Jochnick,  C.  af,  Normand,  R.  (1994)  ‘The  Legitimation  of  Violence:  A  Critical  History  of  the  Laws  of  
War’,  Harvard International Law Journal, 35, 49–95. 
Johansen, B.A. (2006) Lånte Ut Radarer Til Irak-Invasjon [Radars Loaned for the Iraq Invasion] 
[online], available: 
http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/innenriks/5562584.html&usg=ALkJrhiSwZmsor2Wl78JtO8nhvxb
9TwkMA [accessed 23 Nov 2013]. 
Johnson,  A.  (2004)  ‘Norberto Bobbio, 1909-2004’,  Solidarity Online, 3(44), available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050316221311/http://www.workersliberty.org/node/view/1
613. 
Jones,  G.  (2009)  ‘Farewell  to  all  that?  What  thirteen  years  of  New  Labour  has  meant  for  civil  society’,  
Charity Finance, Apr, 20–26. 
Journal  of  Mine    Action  (1999)  ‘Vietnam  Veterans  of  America  Foundation  (VVAF)’,  Journal of Mine 
Action, 3(3), available: http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/3.3/profiles/VietnamVeterans.pdf. 
Kaiser,  K.  (1971)  ‘Transnational  Politics:  Toward a  Theory  of  Multinational  Politics’,  International 
Organization, 25(4), 790–817. 
Kaldor,  M.  (2003a)  ‘The  idea  of  global  civil  society’,  International Affairs, 79(3), 583–593. 
Kaldor, M. (2003b) Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. 
Kaldor,  M.  (2003c)  ‘Civil  Society  and  Accountability’,  Journal of Human Development and 
Capabilities, 4(1), 5–27. 
Kaldor,  M.  (2007a)  ‘The  Idea  of  Global  Civil  Society’,  in  Human Security, Polity, 134–153. 
Kaldor, M. (2007b) Human Security, Polity. 
Kaldor,  M.  (2008)  ‘Democracy  and  Globalisation’,  in  Kaldor,  M.,  Glasius,  M.,  Anheier,  H.K.  and  
Albrow, M., eds., Global Civil Society 2007/8: Communicative Power and Democracy, Sage 
Publications Ltd, 34–45, available: http://www.gcsknowledgebase.org/wp-
content/uploads/0708-04-ch2-red.pdf. 
Kaldor,  M.,  Anheier,  H.K.,  Glasius,  M.  (2003)  ‘Global  Civil  Society  in  an  Era  of  Regressive  
Globalisation’,  in  Global Civil Society 2003, Sage, 3–33. 
Kaldor,  M.,  Anheier,  H.K.,  Glasius,  M.  (2004)  ‘Introduction’,  in  Anheier,  H.K.  and  Kaldor,  M., eds., 
Global Civil Society 2004/5, Sage Publications Ltd, 1–22. 
Kaldor, M., Glasius, M., Anheier, H.K., Albrow, M. (Eds.) (2008) Global Civil Society 2007-8: 
Communicative Power and Democracy [online], Sage Publications Ltd, available: 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/civilSociety/yearBook/con
tentsPages/2007-2008.aspx. 
Kaldor,  M.,  Kumar,  A.,  Seckenelgin,  H.  (2009)  ‘Introduction’,  in  Kumar,  A.,  Scholte,  J.A.,  Kaldor,  M.,  
Glasius, M., Seckinelgin, H. and Anheier, H.K., eds., Global Civil Society 2009: Poverty and 
Activism, Sage Publications Ltd, 1–25, available: http://www.gcsknowledgebase.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009_Intro1.pdf. 
Kaldor, M., Moore, H.L., Selchow, S. (2012) Global Civil Society 2012: Ten Years of Critical Reflection, 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
326 
 
Kapetanovic, B. (2008a) Branislav Kapetanovic, Opening Ceremony, Wellington Conference on 
Cluster Munitions, Wellington, New Zealand, 18 February 2008 [online], available: 
http://blog.banadvocates.org/index.php?post/2008/02/18/Branislavs-Statement-
Wellington-February-2008 [accessed 13 Aug 2010]. 
Kapetanovic,  B.  (2008b)  Branislav  Kapetanovic,  Opening  Ceremony,  Dublin’s  Diplomatic  Conference  
on Cluster Munitions, Dublin, 19 May 2008 [online], available: 
http://blog.banadvocates.org/index.php?post/2008/05/19/Branislavs-Statement-Dublin-19-
May-2008 [accessed 13 Aug 2010]. 
Karns, M.P., Mingst, K.A. (2010a) International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global 
Governance, 2nd ed, Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Karns, M.P., Mingst, K.A.  (2010b)  ‘Introduction’,  in  International Organizations: The Politics and 
Processes of Global Governance, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 3–33. 
Katz,  H.  (2006)  ‘Gramsci,  Hegemony,  and  Global  Civil  Society  Networks’,  Voluntas: International 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 17(4), 332–347. 
Keane, J. (1998) Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions, Polity Press: Oxford. 
Keane,  J.  (2001)  ‘Global  Civil  Society?’,  in  Global Civil Society 2001, 23–47, available: 
http://johnkeane.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/jkgcs2001full.pdf. 
Keck, M., Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists  beyond  Borders :  Advocacy  Networks  in  International  Politics, 
Cornell University Press: London. 
Kennedy,  D.  (2012)  ‘The  international  human  rights  regime:  still  part  of  the  problem?’,  in  Dickinson, 
R., Katselli, E., Murray, C. and Pedersen, O.W., eds., Examining Critical Perspectives on 
Human Rights, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 19–34. 
Keohane,  R.O.  (1971)  ‘The  Big  Influence  of  Small  Allies’,  Foreign Policy, (2), 161–182. 
Keohane,  R.O.,  Nye,  J.S.  (1974)  ‘Transgovernmental  Relations  and  International  Organizations’,  
World Politics, 27(1), 39–62. 
Keohane, R.O., Nye, J.S. (2001) Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed, Longman. 
Keohane,  R.O.,  Nye  Jr.,  J.S.  (1998)  ‘Power  and  Interdependence  in  the  Information  Age’,  Foreign 
Affairs, 77(5), 81–94. 
Khagram, S., Riker, J.V., Sikkink, K. (Eds.) (2002a) Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social 
Movements, Networks, and Norms, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis; London. 
Khagram,  S.,  Riker,  J.V.,  Sikkink,  K.  (2002b)  ‘From  Santiago  to  Seattle:  Transnational  Advocacy  Groups  
Restructuring  World  Politics’,  in  Khagram,  S.,  Riker,  J.V.  and  Sikkink,  K.,  eds.,  Restructuring 
World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, University of 
Minnesota Press: Minneapolis; London, 3–23. 
Khilnani,  S.  (2001)  ‘The  development  of  civil  society’,  in  Khaviraj,  S.  and  Khilnani,  S.,  eds.,  Civil 
Society. 
King, C., Dullum, O., Østern, G. (2007) M85 - An Analysis of Reliability, NPA, available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/m85-analysis-of-
reliability-npa.pdf. 
Kitchen,  V.  (2002)  ‘From  Rhetoric  to  Reality  - Canada, the United States, and the Ottawa Process to 
ban  Landmines’,  International Journal, 37–56. 
Kjell,  D.  (2001)  ‘Ønsker  forbud  mot  klasebomber  [For  a  ban  on  cluster  bombs]’,  Aftenposten, 15 Nov, 
available: 
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=no&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aftenp
osten.no%2Fnyheter%2Furiks%2Farticle230178.ece [accessed 28 Aug 2011]. 
Kmentt,  A.  (2008)  ‘A  Beacon  of  Light:  The  Mine  Ban  Treaty  Since  1997’,  in  Williams,  J.,  Goose,  S.  and  
Wareham, M., eds., Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Human Security and Citizen 
Diplomacy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, Maryland; Plymouth, 17–30. 
Koch, D.-J.,  Dreher,  A.,  Nunnenkamp,  P.,  Thiele,  R.  (2009)  ‘Keeping  a  Low  Profile:  What  Determines  
the Allocation of Aid by Non-Governmental  Organizations?’,  World Development, 37(5), 
902–918. 
327 
 
Koch,  R.  (1997)  ‘Diana’s  death  casts  gloom  over  Oslo  landmine  conference’,  AFP, 1 Sep. 
Koh,  H.  (2004)  ‘On  America’s  Double  Standard’,  The American Prospect, 20 Sep, available: 
http://prospect.org/article/americas-double-standard [accessed 23 Sep 2013]. 
Koh,  H.H.  (1998a)  ‘The  1998  Frankel  Lecture:  Bringing  International  Law  Home’,  Houston Law 
Review, 35(3), 623–663. 
Koh,  H.H.  (1998b)  ‘How  Is  International  Human  Rights  Law  Enforced?’,  Indiana Law Journal, 74(4), 
1397–1417. 
Korey,  W.  (1999)  ‘Human  Rights  NGOS:  The  Power  of  Persuasion’,  Ethics & International Affairs, 13, 
151–174. 
Koring,  P.  (1997)  ‘Behind  the  scenes  of  Canada’s  quiet  land-mine  diplomacy’,  The Globe and Mail, 17 
Sep. 
Kramer, R.M. (1981) Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State, University of California Press. 
Kranish, M.  (2003)  ‘No  Retreat,  No  Surrender:  Vietnam  hero  Bobby  Muller,  a  vet  who  inspired  “Born  
in  the  U.S.A.,”  soldiers  on  for  a  cause,  with  help  from  the  Boss’,  Boston Globe, 3 Sep, 
available: http://www.veteransforamerica.org/about/no-retreat-no-surrender/ [accessed 30 
Aug 2009]. 
Krause, K. (1995) Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Krause, K. (2007) Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda, Policy Paper No. 26, Geneva Centre 
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. 
Krebs,  A.  (1981)  ‘Frank  Altschul,  A  Banker  and  Noted  Philanthropist’,  New York Times, 30 May, 
available: http://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/30/obituaries/frank-altschul-a-banker-and-
noted-philanthropist.html [accessed 20 Nov 2013]. 
Krepon, M. (1974)  ‘Weapons  Potentially  Inhumane:  The  Case  of  Cluster  Bombs’,  Foreign Affairs, 
52(3), 595–611. 
Kuchenmeister, T. (2000) Why Antivehicle Mines Should Also Be Banned, available: 
http://www.landmine.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Publi/landmine.pdf. 
Laclau, E., Mouffe, C. (2001) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 
Verso. 
Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor (2011) Ireland - Cluster Munitions Ban Policy [online], 
available: http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/1060 
[accessed 9 Dec 2011]. 
Landmine  &  Cluster  Munition  Monitor  (2012)  ‘Ireland:  Cluster  Munition  Ban  Policy’,  in  Cluster 
Munition Monitor 2012, available: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/1879 [accessed 3 Jan 2014]. 
Landmine  &  Cluster  Munition  Monitor  (2013)  ‘Ireland:  Cluster  Munition  Ban  Policy’,  in  Cluster 
Munition Monitor 2013, available: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/2717 [accessed 3 Jan 2014]. 
Landmine Action (2001a)  ‘Cluster  bomb  campaign  update’,  Landmine Action Campaign, (Campaign 
2: Vote for me), Spring, 7. 
Landmine  Action  (2001b)  ‘Cluster  bombs  campaign  update:  explosive  remnants  of  war’,  Landmine 
Action Campaign, (Campaign 3: Alternative anti-personnel mines: the next generations), 
Autumn, available: http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/campaign3.pdf. 
Landmine  Action  (2001c)  ‘Cluster  bomb  campaign’,  Landmine Action Campaign, (Campaign 4: 
Explosive remnants of war), Dec, 2. 
Landmine Action (2001d) Audited Accounts, 13 December 1999 to 31 December 2000. 
Landmine  Action  (2002)  ‘ERW  destroys  lives  and  livelihoods’,  Landmine Action Campaign, (Campaign 
6: ERW destroys lives and livelihoods), 1 Sep, available: 
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/campaign6.pdf. 
328 
 
Landmine Action (2003a) Petition: Cluster Bombs and Other Explosive Remnants of War [online], 
available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20030416143340/http://www.clearup.org/petition.asp. 
Landmine  Action  (2003b)  ‘Campaign  Action  - Clear  Up!’,  Campaign, (Campaign 7: ERW and the Clear 
Up! Campaign), 1 Mar, available: 
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Campaign8%281%29.pdf. 
Landmine  Action  (2003c)  ‘Landmine  Action  campaign  coalition  members’,  Campaign, (Campaign 7: 
ERW and the Clear Up! Campaign), 1 Mar, 8. 
Landmine  Action  (2003d)  ‘Landmine  Action  Week:  Join  the  Clear  Up!  campaign’,  Landmine Action 
Campaign, (Campaign 8: New protocol on ERW!), 1 Dec, 2. 
Landmine Action (2003e) Landmine Campaigners Fear Breaches of International Conventions as Iraq 
War Looms [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20030202124148/http://www.landmineaction.org/news171.as
p. 
Landmine  Action  (2005)  ‘Landmine  Action  UK  network  members’,  Landmine Action Campaign, 
(Campaign  10:Let’s  finish  the  job),  Summer,  8. 
Landmine Action (2006a) Annual Report and Financial Statements, Year Ended 31 December 2005. 
Landmine  Action  (2006b)  ‘Cluster  Munitions.  The  time  for  action  is  now’,  (Campaign  12:  Cluster  
Munitions. The time for action is now), Summer, available: 
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Campaign12Final.pdf. 
Landmine Action (2007) Annual Report and Financial Statements, Year Ended 31 December 2006. 
Landmine Action (2008) Annual Report and Financial Statements, Year Ended 31 December 2007. 
Landmine Action (2009) Annual Report and Financial Statements, Year Ended 31 December 2008. 
Landmine Action (2010) Contacts [online], available: 
http://www.landmineaction.org/contacts/ContactUs.asp [accessed 14 Jul 2010]. 
Landmine Action, Actiongroup Landmine.de, MAC (2005) Explosive Remnants of War and Mines 
Other than Anti-Personnel Mines: Global Survey 2003-2004. 
Landmine Action, CMC, Diana Fund (2006a) Why the UK Must Take Action [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20061120141257/http://spreadingourvalues.com/TakeAction/i
ndex.asp [accessed 28 Jun 2012]. 
Landmine Action, CMC, Diana Fund (2006b) Product Recall – Home Page [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20061109034609/http://spreadingourvalues.com/ [accessed 
28 Jun 2012]. 
Landmine Action, Diana Fund  (2003)  ‘BRIEFING:  Indiscriminate  attack?  The  potential  use  of  
landmines  and  cluster  bombs  in  Iraq’,  available:  
http://web.archive.org/web/20030522190803/http://www.clearup.org/download/iraqbriefi
ng.pdf. 
Landmine  and  Cluster  Munition  Monitor  (2009)  ‘Canada’,  in  Banning Cluster Munitions - 
Governmental Policy and Practice, available: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2009&pqs_type=cm&pq
s_report=canada&pqs_section=%2327621#27621 [accessed 13 Aug 2010]. 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (2010) Cluster Munition Monitor 2010, available: 
http://www.the-monitor.org/cmm/2010/pdf/CMM_2010_pdf.pdf. 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (2011) United States - Mine Ban Policy [online], available: 
http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/1445 [accessed 4 
Jan 2012]. 
Landmine Monitor (1999a) Landmine Monitor Report 1999 Executive Summary, Human Rights 
Watch, available: http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999b)  ‘Country  Report  - Austria’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, available: 
http://www.the-
329 
 
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=austria&pqs_section= [accessed 24 Jan 2012]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999c)  ‘Country  Report  - Canada’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, available: 
http://www.lm.icbl.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_t
ype=lm&pqs_report=canada#Heading3840 [accessed 10 Sep 2009]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999d)  ‘Country  Report  - Norway’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, available: 
http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=norway&pqs_section=%23Heading10797#Heading10797 [accessed 1 Sep 2011]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999e)  ‘Country  Report  - Ireland’,  in Landmine Monitor Report 1999, available: 
http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=ireland&pqs_section= [accessed 17 Jan 2012]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999f)  ‘Country  Report  - Belgium’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, available: 
http://www.lm.icbl.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_t
ype=lm&pqs_report=belgium&pqs_section= [accessed 10 Sep 2009]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999g)  ‘Country  Report  - Netherlands’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, 
available: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=netherlands&pqs_section= [accessed 2 Nov 2010]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999h)  ‘Country  Report  - United  Kingdom’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, 
available: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=uk&pqs_section=%23Heading11548#Heading11548 [accessed 14 Sep 2011]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999i)  ‘Country  Report  - France’,  in Landmine Monitor Report 1999, available: 
http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=france&pqs_section=%23Heading10260#Heading10260 [accessed 14 Sep 2011]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999j)  ‘Country  Report - Germany’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, available: 
http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/1999/germany.html#Heading10546 
[accessed 14 Sep 2011]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999k)  ‘Country  Report  - South  Africa’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, 
available: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=south_africa&pqs_section= [accessed 19 Jan 2012]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999l)  ‘Country  Report  - Cambodia’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, available: 
http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=italy&pqs_section= [accessed 2 Nov 2010]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999m)  ‘Country  Report  - Mexico’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, available: 
http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=mexico&pqs_section= [accessed 19 Jan 2012]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999n)  ‘Country  Report  - Italy’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, available: 
http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=italy&pqs_section= [accessed 2 Nov 2010]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999o)  ‘Country  Report  - Sweden’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, available: 
http://www.the-
330 
 
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=sweden&pqs_section= [accessed 2 Nov 2010]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999p)  ‘Country  Report  - Russia’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, available: 
http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=russia&pqs_section=%23Heading13555#Heading13555 [accessed 5 Jul 2012]. 
Landmine  Monitor  (1999q)  ‘Country  Report  - Mozambique’,  in  Landmine Monitor Report 1999, 
available: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=italy&pqs_section= [accessed 2 Nov 2010]. 
Landmine Monitor (2002) Landmine Monitor Report 2002 Executive Summary, Human Rights Watch, 
available: http://www.icbl.org/lm/2002/. 
Landmine  Monitor  (2003)  ‘Country  Report  - Germany’,  in  Landmine Monitor 2003, available: 
http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2003&pqs_type=lm&pq
s_report=germany&pqs_section= [accessed 16 Jul 2012]. 
Landmine Monitor (2004) Landmine Monitor Report 2004 Executive Summary, Human Rights Watch, 
available: http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/. 
Landmine Monitor (2005) Landmine Monitor Report 2005 Executive Summary, Human Rights Watch, 
available: http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005. 
Landmine Monitor (2007) Landmine Monitor Report 2007 Executive Summary, Human Rights Watch, 
available: http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/. 
Landmine Monitor (2009a) Landmine Monitor Report 2009, available: http://www.the-
monitor.org/lm/2009. 
Landmine Monitor (2009b) Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Major Findings: 1999–2009 [online], 
available: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2009/es/major_findings.html#major_fin
dings2008-2009 [accessed 5 Nov 2010]. 
Landmine Monitor (2010) Landmine Monitor 2010. 
Landmine Monitor (2011a) Landmine Monitor 2011: Executive Summary, available: http://www.the-
monitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf. 
Landmine Monitor (2011b) Ukraine: Mine Ban Policy [online], available: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/2279 [accessed 15 Aug 2012]. 
De  Larrinaga,  M.,  Turenne  Sjolander,  C.  (1998)  ‘(Re)presenting  Landmines  from  Protector  to  Enemy:  
The Discursive Framing of a  New  Multilateralism’,  in  To Walk Without Fear: The International 
Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Latham, A. (2000) Global Cultural Change and the Transnational Campaign to Ban Antipersonnel 
Landmines: A Research Agenda, YCISS Occasional Paper Number 62, available: 
http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP62-Latham.pdf [accessed 25 Aug 2009]. 
Laurance,  E.,  Stohl,  R.  (2002)  ‘Making  Global  Public  Policy:  The  Case  of  Small  Arms  and  Light  
weapons’. 
Lawson,  R.  (1997a)  ‘Toward  a  New  Multilateralism:  Canada  and  the  Landmine  Ban’,  Behind the 
Headlines, 54(4), 18–23. 
Lawson,  R.  (1997b)  ‘Canada  and  the  International  Movement  to  Ban  Landmines:  Ottawa  Process  
Points  Towards  a  New  Multilateralism’,  Peace and Environment News, (November 1997), 
Nov, available: http://www.quaker.org/peaceweb/lmhist.html [accessed 10 Sep 2009]. 
Lawson, R. (2002) Ban Landmines! The Social Construction of the International Ban on Anti-Personnel 
Landmines 1991-2001. 
Lawson, R., Gwozdecky, M., Sinclair, J., Lysyshyn, R.  (1998)  ‘The  Ottawa  Process  and  the  
International Movement to Ban Anti-Personnel  Mines’,  in  To Walk Without Fear: The 
International Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 160–184. 
331 
 
Le  Généraliste  (2006)  Le  Virus  de  L’humanitaire  [online], available: 
http://www.legeneraliste.fr/layout/Rub_ACTU.cfm?espace=ACTU&id_rubrique=1001&id_ar
ticle=13273 [accessed 12 Aug 2011]. 
Leahy,  S.P.  (1997a)  ‘Seize  This  Moment’,  Statement  Of  Senator  Patrick  Leahy,  Oslo  N.G.O.  Forum  On  
The Landmine Treaty, September 8, 1997 [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152243/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/news9_8c.html. 
Leahy, S.P. (1997b) Statement on the Conclusion of the Ottawa Landmines Treaty [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19990421130354/http://www.senate.gov/member/vt/leahy/g
eneral/s970917a.html [accessed 8 Nov 2012]. 
Leblanc,  G.  (1999)  Canada’s  Military  Boasts  of  Its  Role  in  Bombardment  of  Yugoslavia  [online],  World 
Socialist Web Site, available: http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/1999/07/can-
j07.html?view=print [accessed 8 Nov 2013]. 
Leer-Salvesen,  T.  (2002)  ‘Mot  Irak-krig,  uansett  [Against  the  Iraq  war,  no  matter  what]’,  
Klassekampen, 9 Nov, available: http://www.klassekampen.no/28920/article/item/null/mot-
irak-krig-uansett [accessed 26 Aug 2011]. 
Leupp, G. (2003) The Weekend the World Said No to War, Notes on the Numbers [online], 
CounterPunch, available: http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/02/25/the-weekend-the-
world-said-no-to-war-notes-on-the-numbers/ [accessed 13 Nov 2013]. 
Liberal Party of Canada (1997) Securing Our Future Together: The Liberal Plan - 1997, available: 
http://www.llbc.leg.bc.ca/public/pubdocs/docs/289598/securing_our_future_together%20.
pdf. 
Lipschutz,  R.D.  (1992)  ‘Reconstructing  World  Politics:  The  Emergence  of  Global  Civil  Society’,  
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 21(3), 389–420. 
Lipschutz,  R.D.  (2000)  ‘Pondering  postinternationalism’,  in  Hobbs,  H.H.,  ed.,  Pondering 
Postinternationalism: A Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century?, SUNY Press. 
LM (2011) Global Landmine Overview 2010–2011 [online], available: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2011/es/Major_Findings.html [accessed 
18 Jan 2012]. 
Long,  D.  (2002)  ‘The  European  Union  and  the  Ottawa  Process  to  ban  landmines’,  Journal of European 
Public Policy, 9(3), 429–446. 
Long,  D.,  Hindle,  L.  (1998)  ‘Europe  and  the  Ottawa  Process:  An  Overview’,  in  Cameron,  M.,  Lawson,  
R. and Tomlin, B., eds., To Walk Without Fear: The International Movement to Ban 
Landmines, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Lopez,  G.A.,  Smith,  J.,  Pagnucco,  R.  (1998)  ‘Globalizing  Human  Rights:  The  Work  of  Transnational  
Human  Rights  NGOs  in  the  1990s’,  Human Rights Quarterly, 20(2), 379–412. 
Losurdo, D. (2011) Liberalism: A Counter-History, Verso Books: London; New York. 
LSE Centre for Civil Society (2004) Definition of Civil Society [online], available: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/introduction/default.htm#generated-subheading6 
[dead link] [accessed 29 Apr 2009]. 
LSE Centre for Civil Society (2006) Report on Activities 2002-5, available: 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29399/1/CCS_Report_on_Activities_2002-5.pdf. 
LSE Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit (2012) Global Civil Society [online], available: 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/civilSociety/globalCivilSoci
etyHome.aspx [accessed 15 Mar 2012]. 
LSN  (2008)  ‘2007  Annual  Report  Landmine  Survivors  Network’. 
MAC (1996) Ottawa Conference on Landmines October 3-5: Update [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980110170930/http://www.pgs.ca/pages/lm/ldott831.html 
[accessed 14 Jul 2012]. 
332 
 
MAC  (2001)  ‘The  Campaign  Against  Cluster  Bombs:  Key  considerations  for  Mines  Action  Canada’,  
available: http://www.scribd.com/doc/32149599/MAC-2001-Cluster-Bomb-Position-Paper-
Corrected?secret_password=&autodown=pdf [accessed 9 Jul 2010]. 
MAC (2004) 2003-4 Annual Report, available: 
http://www.minesactioncanada.org/documents/final%202003-2004%20AR.pdf [accessed 14 
Jul 2010]. 
MAC (2005) 2004-5 Annual Report, available: 
http://www.minesactioncanada.org/documents/MAC%20Annual%20Report%202005%20En
glish.pdf [accessed 14 Jul 2010]. 
MacArthur  Foundation  (1998)  ‘Form  990  (1997)’. 
MacArthur Foundation (2008) Working in Nations in Transition: 2007 Report on Activities, available: 
http://www.macfound.org/atf/cf/%7Bb0386ce3-8b29-4162-8098-
e466fb856794%7D/ANNUALREPORT2007.PDF. 
MacArthur Foundation (2013) Human Rights Watch [online], available: 
http://www.macfound.org/grantees/389/ [accessed 20 Nov 2013]. 
MacDonald, J., Mendez, C. (2005) Unexploded Ordnance Cleanup Costs: Implications of Alternative 
Protocols, Rand Corporation. 
Machel, G. (1995) Impact of Armed Conflict on Children:  Report of the Expert of the Secretary-
General,  Ms.  Grac’a  Machel, Submitted pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 48/157, 
available: http://www.unicef.org/graca/a51-306_en.pdf. 
Maes, K. (2013) Katleen Maes, LinkedIn Profile [online], available: 
http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=255163371&authType=NAME_SEARCH&authTok
en=Kq2d&locale=en_US&srchid=484342721385572903883&srchindex=2&srchtotal=6&trk=v
srp_people_res_name&trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A484342721385572903883%2CVSRPtargetI
d%3A255163371%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary [accessed 27 Nov 2013]. 
MAG (2000) Unexploded Ordnance [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010710072055/http://www.mag.org.uk/uxominetxt.htm 
[accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
Magri, L. (2011) The Tailor of Ulm: A History of Communism, Verso. 
Malone,  D.M.  (2000)  ‘Eyes on the Prize: The Quest for Nonpermanent Seats on the UN Security 
Council’,  Global Governance, 6(1), 3. 
Manyin,  M.E.  (2005)  ‘The  Vietnam-US  Normalization  Process’,  available:  
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA461414 
[accessed 7 Oct 2013]. 
Maresca, L., Maslen, S., Cross, I.C. of the R. (2000a) The Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Maresca,  L.,  Maslen,  S.,  Cross,  I.C.  of  the  R.  (Eds.)  (2000b)  ‘Final  Declaration  of  Participants  in  the 
ICRC Regional Seminar for States of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
Harare, Zimbabwe 21–23  April  1997’,  in  The Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines, 
Cambridge University Press, 519–520. 
Martens,  K.  (2002)  ‘Mission  impossible?  Defining  nongovernmental  organizations’,  Voluntas: 
International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 13(3), 271–285. 
Martin,  M.,  Owen,  T.  (2010)  ‘The  second  generation  of  human  security:  lessons  from  the  UN  and  EU  
experience.’,  International Affairs, 86(1), 211–224. 
Martin,  P.,  Fortmann,  M.  (2001)  ‘Public  Opinion:  Obstacle,  Partner  or  Scapegoat?’,  Policy Options, 
(January-February 2001), 66–72. 
Marx, K. (1954) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Marx 1852, 3rd ed, Progress Publishers: 
Moscow. 
Marx,  K.  (1970)  ‘Preface  to  A  Contribution  to  the  Critique  of  Political  Economy’,  in  A Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy, Progress Publishers: Moscow, 19–23. 
333 
 
Marx, K. (1977) The Poverty of Philosophy [online], 3rd ed, Foreign Languages Press: Peking, 
available: http://www.scribd.com/doc/11343837/The-Poverty-of-Philosophy [accessed 23 
May 2013]. 
Marx, K. (1999) A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy [online], Marxist Internet Archive 
Online Version. ed, Progress Publishers (1977): Moscow, available: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/ [accessed 16 
Oct 2009]. 
Marx, K. (2000) Critique  of  Hegel’s  Philosophy  of  Right [online], Marxist Internet Archive Online 
Edition (pdf). ed, Oxford University Press (1970), available: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr. 
Marx,  K.,  Engels,  F.  (1975)  ‘Theses  on  Feuerbach’,  in  Marx Engels Collected Works, International 
Publishers: New York, 3, available: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.pdf. 
Marx, K., Engels, F. (2004) The German Ideology Part One, with Selections from Parts Two and Three, 
Together  with  Marx’s  ‘Introduction  to  a  Critique  of  Political  Economy’, International 
Publishers: New York. 
Maslen,  S.  (1998)  ‘The  Role  of  the  International  Committe  of  the  Red  Cross’,  in  To Walk Without 
Fear: The International Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Maslen, S. (2001a) Anti-Personnel Mines under Humanitarian Law, Intersentia nv. 
Maslen, S. (2001b) Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo: Explosive Remnants of War [online], 2nd 
ed, ICRC - Mines-Arms Unit: Geneva, available: 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/explosive-remnants-of-war-brochure-
311201/$File/ICRC_002_0780.pdf. 
Maslen, S. (2004a) Mine Action After Diana: Progress in the Struggle Against Landmines, Landmine 
Action/Pluto Press. 
Maslen, S. (2004b) Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties Volume I: The Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
Their Destruction [online], Oxford Commentaries on International Law, Oxford University 
Press, available: http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-928702-3.pdf. 
Maslen,  S.,  Herby,  P.  (1998)  ‘An  international  ban  on  anti-personnel mines: History and negotiation 
of  the  “Ottawa  treaty”’,  International Review of the Red Cross, (325), 693–713. 
Maslen, S., Wiebe, V. (2008) Cluster Munitions: A Survey of Legal Reponses, Landmine Action, 
available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/a-survey-
of-legal-responses-lma.pdf. 
Mathews,  J.T.  (1997a)  ‘Power  Shift’,  Foreign Affairs, 76(1), 50–66. 
Mathews,  J.T.  (1997b)  ‘The  New,  Private  Order’,  Washington Post, 21 Jan. 
Matthew,  R.A.  (2003)  ‘MIDDLE  POWER  AND  NGO  PARTNERSHIPS: THE EXPANSION OF WORLD 
POLITICS’,  in  Rutherford,  K.,  Matthew,  R.  and  Brem,  S.,  eds.,  Reframing the Agenda: The 
Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security Policy, Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 3–20. 
Mayne, R. (2010) External Evaluation of the  Ban Advocates (BAs) Initiative, The Diana Princess of 
Wales Memorial Fund, available: http://blog.banadvocates.org/index.php? [accessed 15 Jul 
2010]. 
MCC, Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Action, German Initiative to Ban Landmines, New 
Zealand Campaign Against Landmines, HI, MI, Engineers for Social Responsibility New 
Zealand, Mines Action Southern Africa, Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, NGOs in 
Canada, International Committee for the Peace Council. (2001) The Call for a Moratorium, 
Statement Read by Titus Peachey, Mennonite Central Committee, to the Second CCW 
Review Conference, December 12, 2001 [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20020619110301/http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/moratoriu
m/ngo_opening.html. 
334 
 
McGrath, R. (1994a) Landmines: Legacy of Conflict – A Manual for Development Workers, Oxfam. 
McGrath,  R.  (1994b)  ‘“Safe  Mines”  and  Sub-Munitions: Information Paper by Rae McGrath, Director 
Mines Advisory Group, to the 2nd International NGO Conference on Landmines’,  in  ICBL,  ed.,  
Second Ngo Conference On Landmines: Report of Proceedings - Geneva, 9-11 May 1994, 
ICBL, 95–101. 
McGrath,  R.  (1994c)  ‘The  Reality  of  the  Present  Use  of  Mines  by  Military  Forces  (Presentation  to  
Montreux  Symposium  of  Experts)’,  in  Maresca, L. and Maslen, S., eds., The Banning of Anti-
Personnel Landmines, 135–139. 
McGrath, R. (1996) Landmines and Proportionality: Balancing the Scales [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19990220151514/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/rae_le
cture.html. 
McGrath, R. (1997a) MAG - Founder’s  Message  [online],  available:  
http://web.archive.org/web/19990209072652/http://www.oneworld.org/mag/mag2.html. 
McGrath,  R.  (1997b)  ‘Presentation  by  Rae  McGrath,  Funding  for  Mine  Clearance  and  Victim  
Assistance’,  in  Working Group 3: Enhancing the Provision of Assistance to Victims of 
Landmines, Summaries of Presentations, Presented at the Towards a Landmine-free Africa 
Proceedings of the First Continental Conference of African Experts on Landmines 19 - 21 
May 1997, World Trade Centre, Kempton Park, South Africa. 
McGrath, R. (1997c) A Definition for Anti-Personnel Landmines: A Discussion Paper [online], 
available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19990222093213/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/discus
sion.html. 
McGrath, R. (2000a) Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance: A Resource Book, Pluto Press: London. 
McGrath, R. (2000b) Cluster Bombs: The Military Effectiveness and Impact on Civilians of Cluster 
Munitions, Landmine Action, London. 
McGrath, R. (2004a) Cluster Munitions – Weapons of Deadly Convenience? Reviewing the Legality 
and Utility of Cluster Munitions, Presentation by Rae McGrathMeeting of Humanitarian 
Experts, Palais Des Nations, Geneva, Thursday 11th November 2004. Organised by Mines 
Action Canada for the Cluster Munition Coalition [online], available: 
http://www.academia.edu/3103015/Cluster_Munitions_-
_Weapons_of_Deadly_Convenience_2004_-_lecture. 
McGrath,  R.  (2004b)  ‘Campaigning  against  Cluster  Munitions  - Strategic Issues - A  Discussion  Paper’. 
McGrath, R. (2008) ‘Sensor-fuzed  submunitions  &  clean  battlefields’,  The Ban Bus, available: 
http://thebanbus.org/2008/05/sensor-fuzed/ [accessed 5 Aug 2010]. 
McNamara, C. (2010) Free Complete Toolkit for Boards [online], available: 
http://managementhelp.org/boards/boards.htm#anchor98036 [accessed 28 Jun 2010]. 
McNamara,  L.  (2001)  ‘Anti-bombing  campaigners  fill  the  streets’,  Aftenposten, 14 Nov, available: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/english/local/article229616.ece [accessed 28 Aug 2011]. 
Mège, A. (2005) Handicap International [online], available: 
http://maic.jmu.edu/partnership_no_longer_active/conferences/PDFpresentations/32%20H
andicap%20International%20Presentation.pdf. 
Meiksins,  P.  (1986)  ‘Beyond  the  Boundary  Question’,  New  Left Review, 1(157), 101–120. 
Meiksins Wood, E. (1981)  ‘The  Separation  of  the  Economic  and  the  Political  in  Capitalism’,  New Left 
Review, 1(127), available: http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=1597 [accessed 20 Oct 
2009]. 
Meiksins  Wood,  E.  (1983)  ‘Marxism  without  Class  Struggle?’,  The Socialist Register, 239–71. 
Meiksins  Wood,  E.  (1990)  ‘The  uses  and  abuses  of  “civil  society”’,  Socialist Register, 26, 60–84. 
Meiksins Wood, E. (1998) The  Retreat  from  Class:  A  New  ‘True’  Socialism, 2nd ed, Verso. 
Meiksins  Wood,  E.  (1999)  ‘Kosovo  and  the  New  Imperialism’,  Monthly Review: An Independent 
Socialist Magazine, (June 1999), 1–8. 
335 
 
Mekata,  M.  (2000)  ‘Building  Partnerships  toward  a  Common  Goal:  Experiences  of  the  International  
Campaign  to  Ban  Landmines’,  in  Florini,  A.,  ed.,  The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational 
Civil Society, 143–176. 
Melucci,  A.  (1980)  ‘The  new  social  movements:  A  theoretical  approach’,  Social Science Information, 
19(2), 199–226. 
Merrington,  J.  (1968)  ‘Theory  and  Practice  in  Gramsci’s  Marxism’,  Socialist Register, 5(1968), 145–
176. 
Michaud, N., Belanger,  L.  (2000)  ‘Canadian  Institutional  Strategies:  New  Orientations  for  a  Middle  
Power  Foreign  Policy?’,  Australian Journal of International Affairs, 54(1), 97–110. 
Middle East Watch (1992) Hidden Death: Landmines and Civilian Casualties in Iraqi Kurdistan, Human 
Rights Watch. 
Middle Powers Initiative (2011) Delegations [online], available: 
http://www.middlepowers.org/delegations.html [accessed 18 May 2011]. 
Miliband,  R.  (1965)  ‘Marx  and  the  State’,  The Socialist Register, 
http://socialistregister.com/node/7(2), 278–296. 
Miliband, R. (1969) The State in Capitalist Society, Basic Books: New York. 
Miliband, R. (2004) Marxism and Politics, The Merlin Press. 
Mills, C.W. (1979) The Power Elite, Oxford University Press: London. 
Mitterrand,  D.  (1994)  ‘Letter  from  Danielle  Mitterrand’,  in  Second Ngo Conference On Landmines: 
Report of Proceedings - Geneva, 9-11 May 1994, ICBL, 63. 
Mohan,  G.  (2002)  ‘The  disappointments  of  civil  society:  the  politics  of  NGO  intervention  in  northern  
Ghana’,  Political Geography, 21(1), 125. 
Monin, L., Gallimore, A. (2002) The  Devil’s  Gardens:  A  History  of  Landmines, Pimlico: London. 
Moody, E.M. (2008) Landmines on the Table: A Negotiations Analysis of the Global Campaign to Ban 
Landmines. 
Moore, K. (2013) Kate Moore MBE | LinkedIn [online], available: 
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/kate-moore-mbe/6b/281/64 [accessed 29 Nov 2013]. 
Morten,  F.  (2001)  ‘Petersen  og  Powell  i  harmonisk  “krigsråd”  [Petersen  and  Powell  in  harmonious  
“council  of  war”]’,  Aftenposten, 6 Nov, available: 
http://www.aftenposten.no%2Fnyheter%2Furiks%2Farticle224458.ece [accessed 28 Aug 
2011]. 
Morton, A.D. (2007a) Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Economy, 
Pluto Press. 
Morton,  A.D.  (2007b)  ‘Waiting for Gramsci: State Formation, Passive Revolution and the 
International’,  Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 35(3), 597–623. 
Morton,  A.D.  (2010)  ‘The  continuum  of  passive  revolution’,  Capital & Class, 34(3), 315–342. 
Moss, M., Fabrikant, G.  (2008)  ‘Once  Trusted  Mortgage  Pioneers,  Now  Scrutinized’,  The New York 
Times, 24 Dec, available: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/25/business/25sandler.html 
[accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
Mouffe,  C.  (1979a)  ‘Hegemony  and  Ideology  in  Gramsci’,  in  Mouffe,  C.,  ed., Gramsci and Marxist 
Theory, Routledge, 168–204. 
Mouffe, C. (1979b) Gramsci and Marxist Theory, Routledge. 
Moyes, R. (2007) Cluster Munitions in Kosovo: Analysis of Use, Contamination and Casualties, 
Landmine Action. 
Moyes,  R.  (2008)  ‘Closing  Statement  by Richard Moyes, CMC Co-Chair and Policy Director, Landmine 
Action’,  available:  http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2008/12/cmc-closing-statement-richard-041208.pdf. 
Moyes, R., Nash, T. (2005) Cluster Munitions in Lebanon, Landmine Action. 
Moyes, R., Nash, T. (2011a) Global Coalitions: An Introduction to Working in International Civil 
Society  Partnerships [online], available: http://www.globalcoalitions.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/Global_Coalitions_published_Dec_2011.pdf. 
336 
 
Moyes, R., Nash, T. (2011b) Global Coalitions ~ Notes [online], available: 
http://www.globalcoalitions.org/notes [accessed 16 Dec 2012]. 
Moyes, R., Tinning, D. (2005) Formal and Informal Responses to Ordnance Contamination, UNIDIR, 
available: http://www.unidir.org/pdf/EU_background_papers/EU_BGP_08.pdf. 
Moyes, R., Vannachack, L. (2005) A Study of Scrap Metal Collection in Lao PDR, GIHCD, available: 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/scrap-metal-
collection-in-laopdr-gichd.pdf. 
Muller, B. (1997) About VVAF - A Message from Bobby [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19981205131843/http://www.vvaf.org/about/index.html. 
Muller,  R.  (1994a)  ‘The  International  Campaign  to  Ban  Landmines:  Where  do  we  go  from  here?’,  in  
ICBL, ed., Second Ngo Conference On Landmines: Report of Proceedings - Geneva, 9-11 May 
1994, DIANE Publishing Company, 1–10, available: 
http://books.google.ie/books?id=tbrmQslpLK4C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_sum
mary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false [accessed 31 Aug 2009]. 
Muller,  R.  (1994b)  ‘Statement  of  Robert  Muller,  executive  director,  Vietnam  Veterans  of  America  
Foundation - Prepared statement - Attachment  A’,  in  The Global Landmine Crisis: HEARING  
BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, UNITED STATES 
SENATE - ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION: SPECIAL HEARING, 76–78, 
available: 
http://ia341011.us.archive.org/1/items/globallandminecr00unit/globallandminecr00unit.pdf
. 
Muller,  R.O.  (1998)  ‘New  Partnerships  for  a  New  World  Order:  NGOs,  State  Actors, and International 
Law in the Post-Cold  War  World’,  Hofstra L. Rev., 27, 21. 
Murphy,  C.  (1998a)  ‘The  Nobel  Prize  Fight;  Claims  of  jealousy  and  betrayal.  A  friendship  in  ruin.  How  
the  world’s  most  prestigious  award  turned  into  a  land  mine.’,  The Washington Post, 22 Mar, 
available: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.remote.library.dcu.ie/uk/nexis/search/homesubmitForm.do 
[accessed 16 Jun 2010]. 
Murphy,  C.N.  (1998b)  ‘Understanding  IR:  understanding  Gramsci’,  Review of International Studies, 
00024(00003), 417–426. 
Murphy,  C.N.  (1998c)  ‘Understanding  IR:  understanding  Gramsci’,  Review of International Studies, 
24(03), 417–425. 
Mutua,  M.  (2001)  ‘Human  Rights  International  NGOs.  A  Critical  Evaluation’,  in  Welch,  C.E.,  ed.,  NGOs 
and Human Rights: Promise and Performance, University of Pennsylvania Press, 151–163. 
Naidoo,  K.,  Heinrich,  V.F.  (2000)  ‘Global  Civil  Society  and  the  Challenges  of  the  New  Millennium:  
Implications  for  Civil  Society  in  Africa’,  5–18, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.civicus.org/new/media/Global%20Civil%20Socie
ty%20and%20the%20Challenges%20of%20the%20New%20Millennium.doc. 
NAM (1997) NAM XII Ministerial Conference New Delhi, April 1997: Chapter 1: Global Issues [online], 
available: http://www.nam.gov.za/minmeet/delhi1.htm [accessed 11 Jul 2011]. 
Narum,  H.  (2003a)  ‘En  gjenoppstått  strid  i  Ap  [A  Resurrected  Split  in  the  Labour  Party]’,  Aftenposten, 
10 Feb, available: 
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=no&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aftenp
osten.no%2Fmeninger%2Fkommentatorer%2Fnarum%2Farticle486961.ece [accessed 5 Sep 
2011]. 
Narum,  H.  (2003b)  ‘Klart  norsk  nei  til  krig  i  Irak  [Clear  Norwegian  no  to  war  in  Iraq]’,  Aftenposten, 19 
Mar, available: 
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=no&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aftenp
osten.no%2Fnyheter%2Furiks%2Firak%2Farticle511630.ece [accessed 5 Sep 2011]. 
Narum,  H.  (2003c)  ‘SVs  orientering  i  ukjent  terreng  [Socialist  Left  in  unknown  terrain]’,  Aftenposten, 
4 Nov, available: 
337 
 
http://www.aftenposten.no%2Fmeninger%2Fkommentatorer%2Fnarum%2Farticle526775.e
ce [accessed 5 Sep 2011]. 
Nash,  T.  (2005a)  ‘The  right  campaign  to  stop  cluster  munitions’,  Landmine Action Campaign, 
(Campaign  10:Let’s  finish  the  job),  Summer,  5. 
Nash,  T.  (2005b)  ‘Cluster  munitions  in  Lebanon’,  Landmine Action Campaign, (Campaign 11: 
Cambodia), Winter, available: 
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Campaign%2011.pdf. 
Nash, T. (2006a) Foreseeable Harm: The Use and Impact of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon: 2006, 
Landmine Action, available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2008/07/foreseeable-harm-lma.pdf. 
Nash,  T.  (2006b)  ‘Stopping  cluster  munitions’,  Disarmament Forum, Special Issue on Cluster 
Munitions, (4), 35–44. 
Nash,  T.  (2006c)  ‘Progress  towards  a  ban  on  cluster  munitions’,  Landmine Action Campaign, 
(Campaign 12: Cluster Munitions. The time for action is now), Summer, 8. 
Nash,  T.  (2010)  ‘The  role  of  NGO  activism  in  the  implementation  of  the  Convention  on  Cluster  
Munitions’,  Disarmament Forum - Implementing the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 
2010(1), 45–56. 
Nash,  T.  (2012)  ‘Civil  Society  and  Cluster  Munitions:  Building  Blocks  of  a  Global  Campaign’,  in  Kaldor,  
M., Moore, H.L. and Selchow, S., eds., Global Civil Society 2012: Ten Years of Critical 
Reflection, Palgrave Macmillan, 124–141. 
Natsios,  A.S.  (1995)  ‘NGOs  and  the  UN  system  in  complex  humanitarian  emergencies:  conflict  or  
cooperation?’,  Third World Quarterly, 16(3), 405–419. 
Neier, A. (2003) Taking Liberties, PublicAffairs. 
Netherlands Advisory Council On International Affairs (2010) The Netherlands and the Responsibility 
to Protect People from Mass Atrocities, available: 
http://cms.webbeat.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/webversie_AIV_70eng(1).pdf 
[accessed 18 Nov 2013]. 
Neufeld,  M.  (1995)  ‘Hegemony  and  foreign  policy  analysis:  The  case  of  Canada  as  middle  power’,  
Studies in Political Economy, 48(0). 
Neufeld,  M.  (1999)  ‘Democratization  in/of  Foreign  Policy:  Critical  Reflections  on  the  Canadian  Case’,  
Studies in Political Economy, 58(0). 
Neufeld,  M.  (2004)  ‘Pitfalls  of  Emancipation  and  Discourses  of  Security:  Reflections  on  Canada’s  
“Security  with  a  Human  Face”’,  International Relations, 18(1), 109–123. 
Neumann,  I.B.  (2002)  ‘Harnessing  social  power:  State  diplomacy  and  the  land-mines  issue’,  in  
Cooper, A.F., English, J. and Thakur, R.C., eds., Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a 
New Diplomacy?, United Nations University Press, 106–132. 
Neumann,  I.B.,  Sending,  O.J.  (2007)  ‘`The  International’  as  Governmentality’,  Millennium - Journal of 
International Studies, 35(3), 677–701. 
New  York  Times  (1996)  ‘An  Open  Letter  to  President  Clinton’,  3  Apr. 
Newport, Fr. (2001) Retaliation [online], gallup.com, available: 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/4948/Retaliation.aspx [accessed 11 Nov 2013]. 
Newsweek  (1999)  ‘It’s  Not  A  Pretty  Picture’,  Newsweek (Atlantic Edition), 133(10), 8 Mar, 26–33. 
NGO Forum on Cambodia (1998) Annual Progress Report 1997, available: 
http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/docs/publications/annualreport1997.pdf. 
NGO Forum on Cambodia (2012)  The  NGO  Forum  on  Cambodia’s  Background  [online],  available:  
http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/eng/core/en_program_artticle.php?artticle=17 [accessed 9 
Jan 2012]. 
Nobel Committee (1998) Nobel Lecture, Oslo, December 10, 1997, by Rae McGrath on Behalf of the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines [online], available: 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1997/icbl-lecture.html [accessed 
9 Oct 2013]. 
338 
 
Nobel  Women’s  Initiative  (2011)  Jody  Williams  [online],  available:  
http://www.nobelwomensinitiative.org/about-us/laureates/jody-williams [accessed 19 May 
2011]. 
Nocera,  J.  (2008)  ‘Self-Made  Philanthropists’,  The New York Times, 9 Mar, available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/magazine/09Sandlers-t.html [accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
Norad (2007) Organisational  Performance  Review  of  Norwegian  People’s  Aid  Synthesis  Report, 
available: 
http://www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+Page?key=1096
23. 
Norad  (2009)  ‘Guidelines  for  Norad’s  support  to  international  non-governmental organisations and 
networks – valid  from  January  2009’. 
Norad Evaluation Department (2009) Evaluation of the Humanitarian Mine Action Activities of 
Norwegian  People’s  Aid, Evaluation Report 6/2009, available: 
www.norad.no/en/_attachment/150597/binary/86530?download=true. 
Normand,  R.,  Jochnick,  C.  af  (1994)  ‘The  Legitimation  of  Violence:  A  Critical  Analysis  of  the  Gulf  War’,  
Harvard International Law Journal, 35, 387–416. 
Norton-Taylor,  R.  (2008)  ‘National:  Military  chiefs  urge  UK  to  ban  cluster  bombs’,  The Guardian, 20 
May. 
Norway  (2006a)  ‘CCW  - Norwegian  statement  on  ERW  20  June  2006’,  available:  
http://www.delegfrance-cd-
geneve.org/Site_CCW/DocumentsCCW/ERW/20062006erwnorvegein.pdf. 
Norway  (2006b)  ‘Norwegian  Invitation  to  the  Oslo  Conference  on  Cluster  Munitions’, available: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/UD/Vedlegg/Hum/CCW%20Invitation%20letter.pdf. 
Norway  (2006c)  ‘Statement  by  Norway  at  the  Third  Review  Conference  of  the  CCW  by  H.E.  Steffen  
Kongstad,  Ambassador  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs’, available: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/tar/2006/0002/ddd/pdfv/304895-
ccw061117.pdf. 
Norway (2011) Minister of Defence Grete Faremo - Regjeringen.no [online], available: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/the-ministry/grete-faremo.html?id=582237 
[accessed 19 Aug 2011]. 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002) Forsvarsministerens Redegjørelse Om Bruk Av 
Klasebomber  I  Hjerkinn  Skytefelt  [Defence  Minister’s  Statement  on  the  Use  of  Cluster  Bombs  
in Hjerkinn Range] [online], available: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Bondeviks-
2nd-Government/ministry-of-defence/Nyheter-og-
pressemeldinger/2002/forsvarsministerens_redegjorelse.html?id=233691 [accessed 28 Aug 
2011]. 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007a) Oslo Declaration and Signatories. 
Norwegian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (2007b)  ‘Oslo  Conference  on  Cluster  Munitions,  Soria  Moria  22  
– 23 February 2007 - Programme’,  available:  
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/UD/Vedlegg/Hum/PROGRAMME%202002.pdf. 
Nossal,  K.R.  (1998)  ‘Pinchpenny  Diplomacy:  The  Decline  of  “Good  International  Citizenship”  in  
Canadian  Foreign  Policy’,  International Journal, 54(1), 88–105. 
NPA (1997) NPA Landmine Campaign [online], available: 
http://ccinzia.tripod.com/campaigns/icbl.html [accessed 21 Dec 2011]. 
NPA (2006a) Annual Report 2005, available: 
http://otto.idium.no/nf.no/filestore/Annualreportinclaccounts2005.pdf [accessed 30 Nov 
2013]. 
NPA  (2006b)  ‘Letter  to  MPs:  Belgium  has  banned  cluster  bombs  – why  is  Norway  hesitating?’,  
available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070823231304/http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.
asp?id=15. 
339 
 
NPA  (2007a)  Update  on  NPA’s  Work  against  Cluster  Munitions  [online],  available:  
http://www.norskfolkehjelp.no/?module=Articles;action=Article.publicShow;ID=4533 
[accessed 8 Jul 2010]. 
NPA (2007b) Yellow Killers: The Impact of Cluster Munitions in Serbia and Montenegro, available: 
http://www.npaid.org/filestore/YellowKillersNPA.pdf. 
NPA (2007c) Annual Report 2006, available: http://www.npaid.org/filestore/FolkehjelpEngelsk.pdf. 
NPA (2008) Annual Report 2007, available: 
http://www.npaid.org/filestore/2007NFENGrapportWEB.pdf. 
NPA (2011) Iraq [online], available: 
http://www.npaid.org/en/mine_action_programme/where_we_work/completed_projects/
?module=Articles&action=Article.publicShow&ID=10181 [accessed 26 Aug 2011]. 
NPA  (2012)  ‘Minerydding  20  ar  [20  Years  of  Demining]’,  Appell, 2012(3), 24–29. 
Nye,  J.S.  (1990)  ‘Soft  power’,  Foreign Policy, (80), 153. 
Nye,  J.S.  (2002)  ‘The  Information  Revolution  and  American  Soft  Power’,  Asia-Pacific Review, 9(1), 60–
76. 
Nye, J.S. (2004) Soft Power, Public Affairs. 
Nye,  J.S.,  Keohane,  R.O.  (1971a)  ‘Transnational  Relations  and  World  Politics:  An  Introduction’,  
International Organization, 25(3), 329. 
Nye,  J.S.,  Keohane,  R.O.  (1971b)  ‘Transnational  Relations  and  World  Politics:  A  Conclusion’,  
International Organization, 25(3), 721. 
O’Clery,  C.  (2008)  The  Billionaire  Who  Wasn’t:  How  Chuck  Feeney  Secretly  Made  and  Gave  Away  a  
Fortune, PublicAffairs. 
O’Dwyer,  D.  (2008a)  ‘Notes  from  Informal  Sessions  on  Interoperability,  May  20-27th’. 
O’Dwyer,  D.  (2008b)  ‘Notes  from  Informal  Sessions  on  Interoperability,  May  22nd’. 
O’Dwyer,  D.  (2008c)  ‘Notes  from  Informal  Sessions  on  Interoperability,  May  23nd’. 
O’Neill,  J.  (1997a)  ‘Delay  used  to  entice  U.S.  on  mines  deal:  Chretien  offers  compromise to salvage 
treaty’,  Ottawa Citizen, 17 Sep. 
O’Neill,  J.  (1997b)  ‘Axworthy  puts  positive  spin  on  U.S.  reaction  to  land-mines treaty: Canada praised 
for  role  in  organizing  global  ban’,  The Ottawa Citizen, 11 Sep. 
Oak  Foundation  (2004)  ‘Form  990  2003’. 
Oak Foundation (2011a) About Us [online], available: http://www.oakfnd.org/node/9 [accessed 20 
Nov 2013]. 
Oak Foundation (2011b) Leadership [online], available: http://www.oakfnd.org/node/7 [accessed 20 
Nov 2013]. 
Oakes,  S.  (1994)  ‘National NGO Campaign Report: Second NGO Conference on Landmines 9-11 May  
1994,  Geneva,    Switzerland  Britain    Report’,  in  ICBL,  ed.,  Second Ngo Conference On 
Landmines: Report of Proceedings - Geneva, 9-11 May 1994, DIANE Publishing Company, 76–
81, available: 
http://books.google.ie/books?id=tbrmQslpLK4C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_sum
mary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false [accessed 31 Aug 2009]. 
OAU (1995) RESOLUTION ON THE  1980 UNITED  NATIONS  CONVENTION  ON  CERTAIN 
CONVENTIONAL     WEAPONS     AND     PROBLEMS     POSED     BY    THE PROLIFERATION  OF  
ANTI-PERSONNEL  MINES  IN  AFRICA [online], available: 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/other/landminefree/AppendixC.pdf. 
OAU (1996) RESOLUTION   ON   THE   REVISION   OF   THE   1980   UNITED   NATIONS CONVENTION    
ON   CERTAIN    CONVENTIONAL    WEAPONS    AND    THE PROBLEMS  POSED BY THE 
PROLIFERATION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL  MINES IN AFRICA [online], available: 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/other/landminefree/AppendixD.pdf. 
OAU (1997) Plan Of  Action: First Conference of African Experts on Landmines, available: 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/other/landminefree/Plan.pdf. 
340 
 
Observatoire  de  l’action  humanitaire  (2011)  Handicap  International  [online],  available:  
http://www.observatoire-humanitaire.org/fusion.php?l=FR&id=21 [accessed 12 Aug 2011]. 
Observatoire  des  transferts  d’armaments,  Agir  Ici,  HI  (2005)  Les Sous-Munitions  et  l’Union  
Européenne: Production, Commercialisation, Eléments Pour Une Interdiction. 
OECD (1993) DAC Orientations on Participatory Development and Good Governance, 
OCDE/GD(93)191. 
OECD (1996) Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-Operation, available: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/35/2508761.pdf. 
OECD (2008) The Accra Agenda for Action [online], available: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf. 
OECD (2011) How DAC Members Work with Civil Society Organisations:  An Overview, OECD, 
available: http://www.oecd.org/development/peer-reviews/48843465.pdf. 
Office  of  the  Press  Secretary  (1994)  ‘Fact  Sheet  on  Landmine  Control’,  available: 
http://archives.clintonpresidentialcenter.org/index.php?u=092694-fact-sheet-on-landmine-
control.htm [accessed 26 May 2011]. 
Ohmae, K. (1996) The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies, Free Press 
Paperbacks. 
One World Trust (2008) 2007 Global Accountability Report Accountability Profile - Human Rights 
Watch. 
OneWorld Online (1995) The Vienna Conference - Action or Rhetoric? [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010702131120/http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/news_
landmines.html [accessed 7 Jul 2012]. 
Orford,  A.  (1999)  ‘Muscular  Humanitarianism:  Reading  the  Narratives  of  the  New  Interventionism’,  
European Journal of International Law, 10(4), 679–711. 
Orford, A. (2003) Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in 
International Law, Cambridge University Press. 
OSI (1997) Soros Lauds Nobel Peace Prize Winners [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19990128205651/http://www.soros.org/textfiles/press/Nobel_
Peace_Prize.txt [accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
OSI  (1998)  ‘Form  990  1998’. 
OSI (2009) Aryeh Neier | Open Society Institute [online], available: 
http://www.soros.org/about/bios/b_neier [accessed 26 Aug 2009]. 
Osler  Hampson,  F.  (2008)  ‘Human  Security’,  in  Williams,  P.D.,  ed.,  Security Studies: An Introduction, 
Routledge. 
Oslo Conference (1997) List of Participants, Oslo Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-
Personnel Land Mines [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/200101121405/http://mines.gc.ca/english/documents/part.ht
ml [accessed 12 Jul 2012]. 
Oslo  Conference  on  Cluster  Munitions  (2007a)  ‘Final  List  of  Participants’,  available:  
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/UD/Vedlegg/Final%20List%20of%20Participants%20010
3.pdf. 
Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions (2007b) Oslo Declaration [online], available: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Oslo%20Declaration%20%28final%29%202
3%20February%202007.pdf. 
Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions (2007c) Addressing the Humanitarian Impacts of Cluster 
Munitions: Key Issues - Background Paper to the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, 22–
23 February 2007 [online], available: 
http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages_vi/vib_opdoc_backgrpaper.html [accessed 
12 Aug 2010]. 
341 
 
Ottawa  Declaration  (1996)  ‘Towards  a  Global  Ban  on  Anti-Personnel Mines: Declaration of the 
Ottawa  Conference’,  available:  
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.1/51/10. 
Ottawa  Treaty  Signing  Conference  and  Mine  Action  Forum  (1997)  ‘A  Program  for  Mine  Action:  Final  
Conference Documets of the Ottawa Treaty Signing Conference  and  Mine  Action  Forum’,  
available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010210041702/http://mines.gc.ca/english/documents/index
.html. 
Overbeek,  H.  (1994)  ‘The  Forum:  Hegemony  and  Social  Change’,  Mershon International Studies 
Review, 38(2), 368–369. 
Overbeek,  H.  (2005)  ‘Global  governance,  class,  hegemony:  A  historical  materialist  perspective’,  in  Ba,  
A.D. and Hoffmann, M.J., eds., Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence 
Contestation and World Order, Routledge: London, 39–56, available: 
http://www.fsw.vu.nl/en/Images/Global%20Governance,%20Class,%20Hegemony%20A%20
historical%20materialist%20perspective_tcm31-42721.pdf. 
Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations (2004) We the Peoples: Civil 
Society, the United Nations and Global Governance - Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons 
on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, A/58/817, United Nations, available: 
http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/sg-report.htm. 
Paris,  R.  (2002)  ‘International  peacebuilding  and  the  “mission  civilisatrice”’,  Review of International 
Studies, 28(04), 637–656. 
Paris,  R.  (2007)  ‘Post-Conflict  Peacebuilding’,  in  The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, Oxford 
University Press, 404–426. 
Parsons, L. (2001) Canada Joins War on Afghanistan [online], available: 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/oct2001/can-o16.shtml [accessed 28 Nov 2011]. 
Pax Christi Netherlands (2004) Conference Report, International Launch Conference, Cluster Munition 
Coalition, 12-13 November 2003, The Hague. 
Peace Initiative (2011) History [online], available: http://fredsinitiativet.no/historien/ [accessed 26 
Aug 2011]. 
Peacejam (2011) Jody Williams [online], Peacejam, available: 
http://www.peacejam.org/laureates/Jody-Williams-11.aspx [accessed 19 May 2011]. 
Perlo-Freeman, S., Ismail, O.,  Solmirano,  C.  (2010)  ‘Military  expenditure’,  in  SIPRI Yearbook 2010, 
SIPRI, 177–249, available: http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/05 [accessed 16 Aug 2010]. 
Peters,  A.  (n.d.)  ‘International  Partnerships  on  the  Road  to  Ban  Anti-Personnel  Landmines’, available: 
International Partnerships on the Road to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines2000.pdf+. 
Petras,  J.  (1997)  ‘Imperialism  and  NGOs  in  Latin  America’,  Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist 
Magazine, available: http://www.monthlyreview.org/1297petr.htm [accessed 29 Apr 2010]. 
Petras,  J.  (1999)  ‘NGOs:  In  the  service  of  imperialism’,  Journal of Contemporary Asia, 29(4), 429. 
Petras,  J.,  Veltmeyer,  H.  (2005)  ‘Bad  Government,  Good  Governance:  Civil  Society  versus  Social  
Movements’,  in  Social Movements and State Power: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Pluto 
Press: London, 8–27. 
Petrova, M.H. (2007) Small States and New Norms of Warfare, European University Institute 
Working Paper MWP 2007/28, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2930.pdf. 
Petrova, M.H. (2010) Banning Obsolete Weapons or Reshaping  Perceptions of  Military Utility: 
Discursive Dynamics in  Weapons Prohibitions, IBEI WORKING PAPERS, available: 
http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/96134/WP_IBEI_31.pdf?sequence=1 
[accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
Philanthropy  in  Europe  (2006)  ‘Philanthropy  in  Europe’,  Philanthropy in Europe, (25), Dec. 
PHR (1992) Hidden Enemies: Landmines in Northern Somalia, Physicians for Human Rights. 
342 
 
Pianta,  M.  (2001)  ‘Parallel  Summits  of  Global  Civil  Society’,  in  Global Civil Society 2001, 169–194, 
available: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/Yearbooks/2001/2001chapter7.pdf. 
Van  der  Pijl,  K.  (1989)  ‘Ruling  Classes,  Hegemony,  and  the  State  System’,  International Journal of 
Political Economy, 19(3), 7–35. 
Van der Pijl, K. (2004) The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class [online], online. ed, 
www.theglobalsite.ac.uk, available: http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/atlanticrulingclass/ 
[accessed 16 Oct 2009]. 
Pilger, J. (2011) Tell Me No Lies: Investigative Journalism and Its Triumphs, Random House. 
Pinter,  F.  (2001)  ‘Funding  global  civil  society  organisations’,  in  Global Civil Society Yearbook 2001, 
195–217, available: http://www.pinter.org.uk/2001chapter8.pdf. 
Pinter,  F.  (2002)  ‘Chapter  Updates  - Chapter 8: Funding Global Civil Society Organisations, 2002 
Update:  Developments  in  Funding’,  in  Glasius,  M.,  Kaldor,  M.  and  Anheier,  H.K.,  eds.,  Global 
Civil Society 2002, 391, available: 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/civilSociety/yearBook/con
tentsPages/2002.aspx [accessed 18 Mar 2012]. 
Potter,  E.H.  (1996)  ‘Niche  Diplomacy  as  Canadian  Foreign  Policy’,  International Journal, 52, 25. 
Poulantzas,  N.  (1969)  ‘The  problem  of  the  capitalist  state’,  New Left Review, 58, 67–78. 
Poulantzas,  N.  (1976)  ‘The  capitalist  state:  a  reply  to  Miliband  and  Laclau’,  New Left Review, 95, 63–
83. 
Pouligny,  B.  (2000)  ‘NGOs  as  transnational  forces?  Beyond  the  myth,  evolving  interactions  which  
question  the  political’,  in  Globalisation Project: Resilience or Erosion? The State under Attack 
- From Above and From Below, Presented at the Colloquium, CERI, Paris, 46. 
Pouligny,  B.  (2001)  ‘L’émergence  d’une  «société  civile  internationale»?  Processus,acteurs,  enjeux’,  
available: http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/cherlist/pouligny/stecivile.pdf. 
Price,  R.  (1998a)  ‘Reversing  the  Gun  Sights:  Transnational  Civil  Society  Targets  Land  Mines’,  
International Organization, 52(3), 613–644. 
Price,  R.  (1998b)  ‘Reversing  the  Gun  Sights:  Transnational  Civil  Society  Targets  Land  Mines’,  
International Organization, 52(3), 613–644. 
Price,  R.  (2003)  ‘Transnational  Civil  Society  and  Advocacy  in  World  Politics’,  World Politics, 55(4), 
579–606. 
Priest,  D.  (1997a)  ‘Mine  Decision  Boosts  Clinton-Military  Relations’,  Washington Post, 21 Sep. 
Priest,  D.  (1997b)  ‘56  in  Senate  to  Press  for  Law  Banning  Use  of  Land  Mines  by  U.S’,  Washington 
Post, 12 Jun. 
Prince,  R.  (2008)  ‘Spin  doctor  No8  joins  the  team  in  Downing  St’,  Telegraph.co.uk, 25 Apr, available: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1903986/Spin-doctor-No8-joins-the-team-in-Downing-
St.html [accessed 25 Oct 2013]. 
Principle Consulting (2013a) Clients - Landmine Action [online], available: 
http://principleconsulting.org.uk/clients/landmine/ [accessed 29 Nov 2013]. 
Principle Consulting (2013b) Charity Advocacy Services [online], available: 
http://principleconsulting.org.uk/services/ [accessed 29 Nov 2013]. 
Prokosch, E. (1995) The Technology of Killing, Zed Books. 
Pugh,  M.  (1998)  ‘Military  intervention  and  humanitarian  action:  Trends  and  issues’,  Disasters, 22(4), 
339–351. 
Pugh,  M.  (2004)  ‘Peacekeeping  and  critical  theory’,  International Peacekeeping, 11(1), 39–58. 
Pugh,  M.  (2005)  ‘The  political  economy  of  peacebuilding:  a  critical  theory  perspective’,  International 
Journal of Peace Studies, 10(2), 23. 
Purkis,  A.,  Lloyd,  R.  (2001)  ‘Letter  to  the  Independent’,  The Independent (London, England), 
available: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-5201414.html [accessed 4 Nov 2013]. 
Quarmby,  K.  (2005)  ‘Why  Oxfam  is  failing  Africa’,  New Statesman, 
http://www.newstatesman.com/200505300004, 30 May. 
343 
 
Quigley, K.F.F. (1997) For  Democracy’s  Sake:  Foundations  and  Democracy  Assistance  in  Central  
Europe, Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
Rädda  Barnen,  Von  Essen,  C.  (1996a)  ‘Introduction’,  in  Sweden’s  Landmine  Defence, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970102033211/http://www.rb.se/kampanj/mine1.html 
[accessed 28 Sep 2012]. 
Rädda Barnen, Von Essen, C. (1996b) Sweden’s  Landmine  Defence, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970102033211/http://www.rb.se/kampanj/mine1.html 
[accessed 28 Sep 2012]. 
Rappert, B. (2005) Out  of  Balance:  The  UK  Government’s  Efforts  to  Understand  Cluster  Munitions  and  
International Humanitarian Law, Landmine Action, available: 
http://eric.exeter.ac.uk/exeter/bitstream/10036/35217/1/Out_of_Balance.pdf. 
Rappert, B. (2006) Failure to Protect: A Case for the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions, Landmine 
Action. 
Rappert, B. (2008) A Convention beyond the Convention: Stigma, Humanitarian Standards and the 
Oslo Process, Landmine Action, available: http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2008/07/a-convention-beyond-the-convention-lma.pdf. 
Rappert,  B.,  Moyes,  R.  (2004)  ‘Stop  Killing  Civilians,  Start  Taking  Responsibility:  Searching  questions  
about cluster munitions - Discussion paper by Dr. Brian Rappert and  Richard  Moyes’,  
available: 
http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/Discussion%20Paper%20by%20Rappert%20and%20
Moyes.pdf. 
Rappert,  B.,  Moyes,  R.  (2009)  ‘The  Prohibition  of  Cluster  Munitions’,  The Nonproliferation Review, 
16(2), 237–256. 
Rappert, B., Moyes, R.  (2010)  ‘Enhancing  the  protection  of  civilians  from  armed  conflict:  
precautionary  lessons’,  Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 26(1), 24–47. 
Rappert,  B.,  Moyes,  R.,  Crowe,  A.,  Nash,  T.  (2013)  ‘The  roles  of  civil  society  in  the  development  of  
standards around  new  weapons  and  other  technologies  of  warfare’,  International Review of 
the Red Cross, 94(886), 765–785. 
Rappert,  B.,  Moyes,  R.,  Other,  A.N.  (2011)  ‘Statecrafting  Ignorance:  Strategies  for  Managing  Burdens,  
Secrecy  and  Conflict’,  in  Goldman,  J.,  ed.,  Part III: Government Secrecy: Current Policy 
(Research in Social Problems and Public Policy, Vol. 19), Emerald Group Publishing, 301–324. 
Red-Green Alliance (2005) Political Platform for a Majority Government - Issued by The Labour Party, 
The Socialist Left Party and The Centre Party, Negotiated at Soria Moria from 26 September 
to 13 October 2005. 
Reimann,  K.D.  (2006)  ‘A  View  from  the  Top:  International  Politics,  Norms  and  the  Worldwide  Growth  
of  NGOs’,  International Studies Quarterly, 50(1), 45–68. 
Reinalda, B.  (2001)  ‘Private  in  Form,  Public  in  Purpose:  NGOs  in  International  Relations  Theory’,  in  
Non-State Actors in International Relations, Ashgate: Aldershot, 11–40. 
Retina Consultiing (2008) Retina Consulting - Home Page [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080208050126/http://retina.as/ [accessed 3 Dec 2013]. 
Reuters (2011) North Korea Spends about a Third of Income on Military: Group [online], available: 
http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE70H1BW20110118 [accessed 30 Jan 2013]. 
Rieff, D. (2003) A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis, Simon & Schuster. 
Rieff, D. (2007) Crimes of War – Humanitarian Intervention [online], available: 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/humanitarian-intervention/ [accessed 10 Jul 2011]. 
Risse,  T.  (2000)  ‘`Let’s  Argue!’:  Communicative  Action  in  World  Politics’,  International Organization, 
54(1), 1–39. 
Risse,  T.  (2002)  ‘Transnational  Actors  and  World  Politics’, in C. 
Risse,  T.,  Sikkink,  K.  (1999)  ‘The  Socialization  of  International  Human  Rights  Norms  into  Domestic  
Practices:  Introduction’,  in  Risse,  T.,  Ropp,  S.  and  Sikkink,  K.,  eds.,  The Power of Human 
Rights :  International  Norms  and  Domestic  Change, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
344 
 
Risse-Kappen, T. (Ed.) (1995) Bringing  Transnational  Relations  Back  in :  Non-State Actors, Domestic 
Structures, and International Institutions, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; New York. 
Robinson, B., Epps, K. (1997)  ‘Swords  into  ploughshares:  Agenda  for  the  next  parliament’,  The 
Ploughshares Monitor, 18(2), available: 
http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/monj97a.html [accessed 22 Aug 2009]. 
Robinson, W.I. (1996) Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Robinson,  W.I.  (2001)  ‘Social  theory  and  globalization:  The  rise  of  a  transnational  state’,  Theory and 
Society, 30(2), 157–200. 
Robinson, W.I. (2004) A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational 
World, John Hopkins University Press. 
Robinson,  W.I.  (2007)  ‘Beyond  the  theory  of  imperialism:  global  capitalism  and  the  transnational  
state’,  Societies Without Borders, 2(1), 5–26. 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund (2002) 2001 Annual Review, available: 
http://www.rbf.org/sites/default/files/2001_Annual_Review.pdf [accessed 20 Nov 2013]. 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund (2004) 2003 Annual Report, available: 
http://www.rbf.org/sites/default/files/2003_Annual_Report.pdf [accessed 20 Nov 2013]. 
Rockefeller Foundation (1993) 1992 Annual Report, available: 
http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/1123ceb2-744c-4ce3-9e73-
df03359865d7-1992.pdf. 
Rodsted,  J.  (2008)  ‘How  close  is  too  close?’,  available:  http://thebanbus.org/2008/06/how-close-is-
too-close/ [accessed 5 Aug 2010]. 
Roelofs, J. (2003) Foundations and Public Policy: The Mask of Pluralism, SUNY series in radical social 
and political theory, State University of New York Press: Albany. 
Roelofs,  J.  (2007)  ‘Foundations  and  Collaboration’,  Critical Sociology, 33(3), 479–504. 
Rogers,  B.A.V.  (2000)  ‘The  Mines  Protocol:  Negotiating  History’,  in  Maresca,  L.,  Maslen,  S.  and  Cross,  
I.C. of the R., eds., The Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Cambridge University Press, 
178–189. 
Roodman, D., Standley, S. (2006) Tax Policies to Promote Private Charitable Giving in DAC Countries, 
Working Paper 82, Center for Global Development, available: 
http://cdi.mecon.gov.ar/biblio/doc/cgdev/wp82.pdf. 
Van  Rooy,  A.  (1997)  ‘The  frontiers  of  influence:  NGO  lobbying  at the 1974 World Food Conference, 
the  1992  Earth  Summit  and  beyond’,  World Development, 25(1), 93–114. 
Van Rooy, A. (2004) The  Global  Legitimacy  Game :  Civil  Society,  Globalization,  and  Protest, 
Houndmills: Basingstoke. 
Rosenau  (1999)  ‘Toward  an  ontology  for  Global  Governance’,  in  Hewson,  M.  and  Sinclair,  T.J.,  eds.,  
Approaches to Global Governance Theory, State University of New York: New York, 287–302. 
Rosenau,  J.N.  (1995)  ‘Governance  in  the  Twenty-First  Century’,  Global Governance, 1, 13. 
Rosenau, J.N. (2000)  ‘Change,  complexity  and  governance  in  globalizing  space’,  in  Pierre,  J.,  ed.,  
Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Rosenau,  J.N.  (2002)  ‘Governance  in  a  New  Global  Order’,  in  Governing Globalization: Power, 
Authority and Global Governance, Polity Press: Malden, Mass. 
Rosenau,  J.N.  (2005)  ‘Global  governance  as  disaggregated  complexity’,  in  Ba,  A.D.  and  Hoffmann,  
M.J., eds., Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence Contestation and 
World Order, Routledge: London, 131–153. 
Rosenau, J.N., Czempiel, E.-O. (1992) Governance without Government: Order and Change in World 
Politics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Rosenberg,  J.  (2005)  ‘Globalization  Theory:  A  Post  Mortem’,  International Politics, 42, 2–74. 
Rosenberg,  J.  (2006)  ‘Why  is  There  No  International  Historical  Sociology?’,  European Journal of 
International Relations, 12(3), 307. 
345 
 
Rossiter, C. (2000) Winning in Korea without Landmines, VVAF, available: 
http://calebrossiter.com/WinKorea.pdf. 
Roth, K. (2004) War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention [online], available: 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/war-in-iraq.pdf. 
Roth, K. (2011) The Security Council Has At Last Lived Up To Its Duty [online], Foreign Policy, 
available: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/18/does_the_world_belong_in_libyas_war
?page=0,5 [accessed 22 Mar 2011]. 
Rowat, R. (2013) Cambodian Refugee Camp Khao-I-Dang [online], http://www.websitesrcg.com, 
available: http://www.websitesrcg.com/border/camps/Khao-I-Dang.html [accessed 10 Oct 
2013]. 
Rudberg  Elstad,  L.  (2003)  ‘De  ødelegger  for  oss  [They  are  destroying  us]’,  Klassekampen, 9 Jul, 
available: http://www.klassekampen.no/23985/article/item/null/-de-odelegger-for-oss 
[accessed 25 Nov 2013]. 
Ruge,  C.  (1997)  ‘On  the  Road  to  Ottawa:  Next  Stop  Oslo!  Oslo  NGO  Forum  on  Landmines  September  
7-10,  1997’,  AP Mine Ban: Progress Report Number 3, Jun, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20000303205405/http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/disarm/mines/report1.htm. 
Rupert,  M.  (1998)  ‘(Re-)Engaging  Gramsci:  a  response  to  Germain  and  Kenny’,  Review of 
International Studies, 24(3), 427–435. 
Rupert,  M.  (2003)  ‘Globalising  Common  Sense:  A  Marxian-Gramscian (Re-)vision of the Politics of 
Governance/Resistance’,  Review of International Studies, 29, 181–198. 
Rutherford,  K.  (1999a)  ‘The  Hague  and  Ottawa  Conventions:  A  Model  for  Future  Weapons  Ban  
Regimes’,  The Non-Proliferation Review, 1999(Spring-Summer), 36–50. 
Rutherford,  K.  (1999b)  ‘The  Landmine  Ban  and  NGOs:  The  Role  of  Communications  Technologies’,  in  
Information Technology and American Foreign Policy Decision-Making Workshop, Presented 
at the Internet and International Systems, Nautilus Institute, San Francisco, available: 
http://oldsite.nautilus.org/gps/info-policy/workshop/papers/rutherford.html [accessed 15 
Sep 2010]. 
Rutherford,  K.  (2000a)  ‘Internet  activism:  NGOs  and  the  Mine  Ban  Treaty’,  International Journal on 
Grey Literature, 1(3), 99–106. 
Rutherford,  K.  (2000b)  ‘The  Evolving  Arms  Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in 
Banning  Antipersonnel  Landmines’,  World Politics, 53, 74–114. 
Rutherford,  K.  (2001a)  ‘Partnering  against  major  States:  Implications  of  the  mid-size State and NGO 
role in banning anti-personnel  landmines’, Paper prepared in preparation for the 
International Studies Association Annual Conference, Chicago, February, available: 
http://home.datacomm.ch/sbrem/ISA2001.Mines.pdf. 
Rutherford,  K.  (2001b)  ‘Nongovernmental  Organizations  (NGOs)  and  International  Politics in the 
Twenty-First  Century’,  American Foreign Policy Interests, 23(1), 23–29. 
Rutherford,  K.  (2001c)  ‘Asserting  Authority  in  International  Security:  The  Mid-Size State Role in 
Banning  Landmines’,  available:  
http://peacecorpsonline.org/scanned/019014Rutherford.pdf. 
Rutherford,  K.  (2003)  ‘Post-Cold War Superpower? Mid-Size State and NGO Collaboration in Banning 
Landmines’,  in  Rutherford,  K.,  Brem,  S.  and  Matthew,  R.,  eds.,  Reframing the Agenda: The 
Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security Policy, Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 23–38. 
Rutherford, K. (2010) Disarming States: The International Movement to Ban Landmines, ABC-CLIO. 
Rutherford, K., Brem, S., Matthew, R. (Eds.) (2003) Reframing the Agenda: The Impact of NGO and 
Middle Power Cooperation in International Security Policy, Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Rutherford,  K.,  Matthew,  R.  (2003)  ‘The  evolutionary  dynamics  of  the  movement  to  ban  landmines’,  
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 1/1/2003(1/1/2003). 
346 
 
SACBL (1997) Campaigners  Welcome  South  Africa‘s  Announcement  of  a  Landmines  Ban  as  a  
’Triumph"  [online],  available:  
http://web.archive.org/web/19980110171218/http://www.pgs.ca/pages/lm/ld970222.htm 
[accessed 15 Jul 2012]. 
Saccarelli, E. (2008) Gramsci and Trotsky in the Shadow of Stalinism: The Political Theory and Practice 
of Opposition, Routledge. 
Saillant, F. (2007) Identités et Handicap: Circuits Humanitaires et Posthumanitaires, La Dignité Pour 
Horizon, KARTHALA Editions. 
Salamon,  L.M.  (1994)  ‘The  Rise  of  the  Nonprofit  Sector’,  Foreign Affairs, 73(4), 109–122. 
Salamon,  L.M.  (2002)  ‘What  Nonprofit  Wage  Deficit?’,  The Nonprofit Quarterly, 62–63. 
Salamon, L.M., Anheier, H.K., List, R., Toepler, S., Sokolowski, S.W. (1999) Global Civil Society: 
Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector [online], available: http://ccss.jhu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2011/08/Global-Civil-Society-I.pdf. 
Salamon, L.M., Sokolowski, S.W. (Eds.) (2004) Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit 
Sector, Kumarian. 
Salamon,  L.M.,  Sokolowski,  S.W.,  Anheier,  H.K.  (2002)  ‘Social  origins  of  civil  society:  An  overview’,  
John Hopkins University: Working papers of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit sector 
Project. 
Salamon, L.M., Sokolowski, S.W., List, R. (2003) Global Civil Society: An Overview, The Johns Hopkins 
Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project. 
Salamon,  L.M.,  Sokolowski,  S.W.,  List,  R.  (2004)  ‘Global  Civil  Society:  An  Overview’,  in  Salamon,  L.M.  
and Sokolowski, S.W., eds., Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector, 
Kumarian. 
Sallot,  J.  (1997)  ‘PM  confident  U.S.  will  sign  land-mine treaty Conference in Oslo postponed for 24 
hours  at  Clinton’s  request’,  The Globe and Mail, 17 Sep. 
Sallot,  J.  (2000)  ‘Manley  looks  past  election’,  The Globe and Mail, 21 Oct. 
Sandven, J.W. (2003) Vietnam-Spøkelset Hjemsøker USA I Irak [Vietnam-Ghost Haunting the U.S. in 
Iraq] [online], Internasjonale Sosialister, available: http://intsos.no/?id=940 [accessed 26 
Aug 2011]. 
Scholte,  J.A.  (2002)  ‘Civil  Society  and  Democracy  in  Global  Governance’,  Global Governance, 8(3), 
281. 
Scholte,  J.A.  (2004)  ‘Civil  Society  and  Democratically  Accountable  Global  Governance’,  Government 
& Opposition, 39(2), 211–233. 
Scott,  M.J.O.  (2001)  ‘Danger  - Landmines! NGO-Government Collaboration in the  Ottawa  Process’,  in  
Edwards, M. and Gaventa, J., eds., Global Citizen Action, Lynne Rienner Pub, 121–134. 
Scotto, T.J., Reifler, J., Clarke, H.D., Lopez, J.A.D., Sanders, D., Stewart, M.C., Whiteley, P. (2010) 
‘Attitudes  towards  British  Involvement  in  Afghanistan’,  Briefing Paper, Institute for 
Democracy and Conflict Resolution. Available online at: http://www. idcr. org. uk/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/03_11. pdf, available: http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/03_11.pdf [accessed 24 Nov 2013]. 
Seibert,  T.  (2000)  ‘Zum  Erfolg  der  Internationalen  Kampagne  zum  Verbot  von  Landminen  (ICBL),  
Vortrag, zuerst gehalten in Bonn, November 2000 [On the Success of the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines - Lecture,  first  held  in  Bonn,  November  2000]’,  available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20040629231218/http://www.medico.de/kampagne/icbl.pdf. 
Senarclens,  P.  de  (1998)  ‘Governance  and  the  crisis  in  the  international  mechanisms  of  regulation’,  
International Social Science Journal, 50(155), 91–104. 
Sending, O.J.,  Neumann,  I.B.  (2006)  ‘Governance  to  Governmentality:  Analyzing  NGOs,  States,  and  
Power’,  International Studies Quarterly, 50(3), 651–673. 
Seymour, R. (2008) The Liberal Defence of Murder, Verso Books. 
Shaw,  D.  (1991)  ‘The  Temptation  Of  Tom  Dooley :  He Was The Heroic Jungle Doctor Of Indochina In 
The 1950s. But He Had A Secret, And To Protect It, He Helped Launch The First 
347 
 
Disinformation  Campaign  Of  The  Vietnam  War.’,  Los Angeles Times, 15 Dec, available: 
http://articles.latimes.com/1991-12-15/magazine/tm-868_1_tom-dooley [accessed 23 Aug 
2011]. 
Shaw,  M.  (1994)  ‘Civil  Society  and  Global  Politics:  Beyond  a  Social  Movements  Approach’,  
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 23(3), 647–667. 
Shawki,  N.  (2010)  ‘Organizational  structure  and  strength  and  transnational campaign outcomes: a 
comparison  of  two  transnational  advocacy  networks’,  Global Networks, 11(1), available: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2011.00309.x/pdf [accessed 6 Jun 
2011]. 
Shivji, I.G. (2007) Silences in NGO Discourse, Fahamu/Pambazuka. 
Short,  N.  (1997)  ‘A  Review  of  the  Ottawa  Process  to  Ban  Landmines’,  available:  
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/shn01/index.html [accessed 7 Sep 2009]. 
Short,  N.  (1998)  ‘A  New  Model  for  Arms  Control?  The  Strengths  and  Weaknesses  of  the  Ottawa 
Process  and  Convention’,  Disarmament Diplomacy, (24), available: 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/textonly/dd/dd24/24ott.htm [accessed 18 Oct 2013]. 
Short,  N.  (1999)  ‘The  Role  of  NGOs  in  the  Ottawa  Process  to  Ban  Landmines’,  International 
Negotiation, 4(3), 483–502. 
Showstack Sassoon, A. (2000) Gramsci and Contemporary Politics: Beyond Pessimism of the Intellect, 
Routledge. 
Showstack  Sassoon,  A.  (2001)  ‘Globalisation,  Hegemony  and  Passive  Revolution’,  New Political 
Economy, 6(1), 5–17. 
Showstack Sassoon, A. (2005)  ‘Intimations  of  a  Gramscian  approach  to  global  civil  society’,  in  
Germain, R.D. and Kenny, M., eds., The Idea of Global Civil Society: Politics and Ethics in a 
Globalizing Era, Routledge/RIPE Series in Global Political Economy, Routledge: New York, 
35–47. 
Shulman,  K.  (1999)  ‘`There’s  Still  Too  Many.’’,  Newsweek (Atlantic Edition), 133(10), 8 Mar, 29. 
Sigal, L.V. (2006) Negotiating Minefields, CRC Press. 
Sikkink,  K.  (1998)  ‘Transnational  Politics,  International  Relations  Theory,  and  Human  Rights’,  PS: 
Political Science and Politics, 31(3), 517–523. 
Sikkink,  K.  (2002)  ‘Restructuring  World  Politics:  The  Limits  and  Asymmetries  of  Soft  Power’,  in  
Khagram, S., Riker, J.V. and Sikkink, K., eds., Restructuring World Politics: Transnational 
Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis; 
London, 301–317. 
Skills – Third  Sector,  NCVO,  TSRC  (2013a)  ‘How  many  people  work  in  the  voluntary  sector?’,  in  UK 
Voluntary Sector Workforce Almanac 2013, available: 
http://www.3rdsectorworkforce.org.uk/how-many-people-work-in-the-voluntary-sector/ 
[accessed 25 Sep 2013]. 
Skills – Third  Sector,  NCVO,  TSRC  (2013b)  ‘What  are  working  patterns  like  in  the  voluntary  sector?’,  
in UK Voluntary Sector Workforce Almanac 2013, available: 
http://www.3rdsectorworkforce.org.uk/what-are-working-patterns-like-in-the-voluntary-
sector/ [accessed 25 Sep 2013]. 
Skills – Third  Sector,  NCVO,  TSRC  (2013c)  ‘How  secure  are  jobs  in  the  voluntary  sector?’,  in UK 
Voluntary Sector Workforce Almanac 2013, available: 
http://www.3rdsectorworkforce.org.uk/how-secure-are-jobs-in-the-voluntary-sector/ 
[accessed 25 Sep 2013]. 
Skills – Third  Sector,  NVCO,  TSRC  (2013)  ‘What  is  the  state  of  pay  in  the  voluntary  sector?’,  in UK 
Voluntary Sector Workforce Almanac 2013, available: 
http://www.3rdsectorworkforce.org.uk/what-is-the-state-of-pay-in-the-voluntary-sector/ 
[accessed 25 Sep 2013]. 
Skjelsbaek,  K.  (1971)  ‘The  Growth  of  International  Nongovernmental  Organization  in  the  Twentieth 
Century’,  International Organization, 25(3), 420. 
348 
 
Slaughter, A.-M.  (1997)  ‘The  Real  New  World  Order’,  Foreign Affairs, 76(5), 183–197. 
Smillie,  I.  (1993)  ‘Changing  Partners:  Northern  NGOs,  Northern  Governments’,  in  Smillie,  I.  and  
Helmich, H., eds., Non-Governmental Organisations and Governments: Stakeholders for 
Development, OECD Publishing, 13–44. 
Smith, C. (Ed.) (1996) The Military Utility of Landmines...?, North-South Defence and Security 
Programme.  Centre  for  Defence  Studies.  King’s  College.  University of London.: London. 
Smith,  S.  (2008)  ‘Surround  the  Cities  with  the  Village:  Universalisation  of  the  Mine  Ban  Treaty’,  in  
Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Human Security and Citizen Diplomacy, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, Maryland; Plymouth, 69–86. 
Smouts, M.-C.  (1998)  ‘The  proper  use  of  governance  in  international  relations’,  International Social 
Science Journal, 50(155), 81–89. 
Soederberg, S. (2006) Global Governance in Question, Pluto Press. 
Sommaruga, C. (1994) ICRC: A Total Ban on Antipersonnel Mines and Blinding Weapons Is the Best 
Option [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970614091022/http://www.icrc.org/icrcnews/2356.htm. 
Soros Foundations (2000) Soros Foundations Network 1999 Annual Report, available: 
http://www.soros.org/resources/articles_publications/publications/soros_AR_1999/a_a_co
mplete_99.pdf. 
Soros  Foundations  Network  (1998a)  ‘Landmines  Project’,  in  Annual Report 1997, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980525115918/http://www.soros.org/annual4.htm#landmin
es [accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
Soros Foundations Network (1998b) Landmine Project Grantees [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980525123908/http://www.soros.org/landmine/lmgrant.ht
ml [accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
Soros Foundations Network (1999a) Landmines Project Grantees [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19990128203325/http://soros.org/landmine/lmgrant.html 
[accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
Soros Foundations Network (1999b) The Landmines Project [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19990128150553/http://soros.org/landmine.html [accessed 26 
Jun 2012]. 
Soros Foundations Network (2000) Landmines Project - Grantees [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20000302110538/http://www.soros.org/landmine/lmgrant.ht
ml [accessed 26 Jun 2012]. 
Spero, J.E. (2010) The Global Role of US Foundations, Foundation Center, available: 
http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/global_role_of_us_foundations.p
df. 
Spoerri, D.P. (2006) ICRC Statement to the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons [online], ICRC, available: 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/conventional-weapons-statement-071106 
[accessed 2 Aug 2010]. 
Spoke (2011) Christian Ruge, Independent Consultant, Landmine Action [online], Spoke, available: 
http://www.spoke.com/info/p3e84vt/ChristianRuge [accessed 11 Aug 2011]. 
Spokesman for the UN Secretary-General (2001) Special Adviser Egeland Appointed Secretary-
General of Norwegian Red Cross [online], available: 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2001/sgsm8007.html [accessed 11 Nov 
2013]. 
Stalker, C. (2008) Local Voices, Global Ban: How Small Grants to Campaigners Can Contribute to 
Global Change, The Diana Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, available: 
http://www.theworkcontinues.org/downloaddoc.asp?id=64. 
349 
 
Standing Commission of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2012) What Is the International 
Conference? [online], available: http://www.standcom.ch/rcrc-conference/ [accessed 18 Oct 
2013]. 
Stavrianakis, A. (2010) Taking Aim at the Arms Trade: NGOs, Global Civil Society and the World 
Military Order, Zed Books. 
Steen,  O.I.  (1996)  ‘Autonomy  or  Dependency?  Relations  bween  non-governmental aid organisations 
and  government’,  Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organizations, 
7(2), 147–159. 
Stempel,  J.  (2008)  ‘Wachovia  loses  $8.86  billion,  slashes  jobs’,  Reuters, 22 Jul, available: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/22/us-wachovia-results-idUSWNAB160920080722 
[accessed 21 Nov 2013]. 
Stoker,  G.  (1998)  ‘Governance  as  theory:  five  propositions’,  International Social Science Journal, 
50(155), 17–28. 
Stott,  N.  (1998)  ‘The  South  African  Campaign’,  in  Cameron,  M.,  Lawson,  R.  and  Tomlin,  B.,  eds.,  To 
Walk Without Fear: The International Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 68–75. 
Strange,  S.  (1976)  ‘The  Study  of  Transnational  Relations’,  International Affairs, 52(3), 333. 
Sudpresse.be (2006) Herstal Armement Les Forges de Zeebrugge Sur La Sellette À La Chambre 
[online], available: http://archives.sudpresse.be/herstal-armement-les-forges-de-zeebrugge-
sur-la_t-20060202-ZR9NYJ.html?queryand=armement&firstHit=460&by=20&when=-
1&sort=datedesc&pos=472&all=1831&nav=1 [accessed 29 Dec 2013]. 
Syed, M. (2008) Understanding the responsibility to protect, Meena Syed, Higher Excecutive Officer, 
Norwegian Foreign Service program, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [online], 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill/menneskerettigheter/sy
ed_protect.html?id=534734 [accessed 13 Dec 2012]. 
Tarrow, S. (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Tarrow,  S.  (2001)  ‘TRANSNATIONAL  POLITICS:  Contention  and  Institutions  in  International  Politics’,  
Annual Review of Political Science, 4(1), 1. 
Texier,  J.  (1979)  ‘Gramsci,  theoretician  of  the  superstructures:  On  the  concept  of  civil  society’,  in  
Mouffe, C., ed., Gramsci and Marxist Theory, Routledge, 48–79. 
Textron Defense Systems (2011a) Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) [online], available: 
http://www.textrondefense.com/products/smart-weapons-air/sfw/index.php [accessed 9 
Sep 2011]. 
Textron Defense Systems (2011b) Clean Area Weapon (CLAW) [online], available: 
http://www.textrondefense.com/products/smart-weapons-air/claw.php [accessed 16 Jul 
2012]. 
Textron Defense Systems (2011c) Textron CLAW Data Sheet 1 [online], available: 
http://www.textrondefense.com/sites/default/files/datasheets/claw_datasheet.pdf 
[accessed 15 Nov 2013]. 
Thakur,  R.,  Maley,  W.  (1999)  ‘The  Ottawa  Convention  on  Landmines:  A  Landmark  Humanitarian  
Treaty  in  Arms  Control?’,  Global Governance, 5(3), 273–302. 
That’s  My  Congress  (2012)  Senator  Patrick  Leahy  of  Vermont:  Profile, Legislative Scorecard, Contact 
Information, News and Campaign Contribution Data for the 112th Congress [online], That’s  
My Congress: an independent voice on campaigns & legislation, available: 
http://thatsmycongress.com/senate/senLeahyVT112.html [accessed 15 Nov 2012]. 
The Diana Fund (2013) Frequently Asked Questions [online], available: 
http://www.dianaprincessofwalesmemorialfund.org/information-and-resources/frequently-
asked-questions [accessed 25 Nov 2013]. 
The  Economist  (2000)  ‘Sins  of  the  secular missionaries’,  354(8155),  29  Jan,  25. 
350 
 
The  Guardian  (1996)  ‘LANDMINE  TALKS  REOPEN’,  The Guardian, 23 Apr. 
The  Guardian  (2003)  ‘Press  review:  “The  real  fault  lies  with  the  trustees”,  Diana  fund  assets  have  
been  frozen  in  fight  against  US  firm’,  the Guardian, 14 Jul, available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2003/jul/14/monarchy.theeditorpressreview [accessed 4 
Nov 2013]. 
The  Herald  (Glasgow)  (1995)  ‘Plea  to  black  mine  makers’,  The Herald (Glasgow), 14 Oct. 
The  Herald  (Glasgow)  (1996)  ‘Anger  as  Britain  carries on  buying  land  mines’,  The Herald (Glasgow), 
24 Apr. 
The  Independent  (London)  (2008)  ‘A  significant  step  forward’,  The Independent (London), 29 May. 
The Nobel Foundation (1997) Jody Williams - Curriculum Vitae [online], nobelprize.org, available: 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1997/williams-cv.html [accessed 11 Jun 
2011]. 
The  Overbrook  Foundation  (2004)  ‘Form  990  2003’. 
The Overbrook Foundation (2013) About [online], available: http://www.overbrook.org/about/ 
[accessed 20 Nov 2013]. 
Thomas,  D.C.  (2002)  ‘Human  Rights  in  U.S.  Foreign  Policy’,  in  Khagram,  S.,  Riker,  J.V.  and  Sikkink,  K.,  
eds., Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, 
University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis; London, 71–95. 
Thomas, P.  (2006)  ‘Gramsci  and  the  Intellectuals:  Modern  Prince  Vs  Passive  Revolution’,  in  Marxism, 
Intellectuals and Politics, 68–85. 
Thomas, P.D. (2011) The Gramscian Moment, Haymarket Books. 
Time  (2009)  ‘25  People  to  Blame  for  the  Financial  Crisis’,  Time, 11 Feb, available: 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1877351_1877350_18773
43,00.html [accessed 21 Nov 2013]. 
Tisdall, J. (2001) Norway to Help Clear Mines in Kandahar - [online], Aftenposten.no, available: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/english/local/article247887.ece [accessed 11 Jul 2011]. 
Toje,  A.  (2011)  ‘Government  Funded  Non  Governmental  Organisations:  Civil  society  aid  
organisations  and  Donor  Governments,  the  case  of  Norway’, available: 
www.rorg.no/noop/file.php?id=2455&d=weklcdgtqazdyss. 
Toje,  A.  (2013)  ‘State  Capture  of  Civil  Society:  Effects  of  Patronage  in  the  Norwegian  Aid  Industry’,  in  
Trägårdh, L., Witoszek, N. and Taylor, B., eds., Civil Society in the Age of Monitory 
Democracy, Berghahn Books, 269–288. 
Tomlin,  B.  (1998)  ‘On  A  Fast-Track  To  a  Ban:  The  Canadian  Policy  Process’,  Canadian Foreign Policy, 
5(3). 
Touraine, A. (1971) The Post-Industrial  Society:  Tomorrow’s  Social  History:  Classes,  Conflicts  and  
Culture in the Programmed Society, Random House: New York. 
Trotsky, L. (2000) History of the Russian Revolution [online], Marxist Internet Archive, available: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/download/hrr-vol1.pdf. 
Troxell,  J.F.  (2000)  ‘Landmines:  Why  the  Korea  exception  should  be  the  rule’,  Parameters: US Army 
War College, 30(1), 82. 
Tucker, S.C. (2011) The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History: A 
Political, Social, and Military History, ABC-CLIO. 
Tuininga,  M.  (1994)  ‘Being Adult: Jean-Baptiste-Richardier’,  La Vie, (2523), 6 Jan, available: 
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.lavie.fr/archives/1994/0
1/06/jean-baptiste-
richardier,1238603.php&ei=JaVTTvO7CoyyhAeDkIXwBQ&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resn
um=3&ved=0CCsQ7gEwAg&prev=/search%3Fq%3DThomas%2BDooley%2Bjean-
baptiste%2Brichardier%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dfirefox-
a%26hs%3DMHC%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-GB:official%26prmd%3Divnso [accessed 23 Aug 
2011]. 
Tuttle,  C.  (1997)  ‘Landmine  ban  rooted  in  civil  society’,  Peace Magazine, (Nov-Dec 1997), Dec. 
351 
 
Tvedt, T. (1995) NGOs as a Channel in Development Aid: The Norwegian System. 
Tvedt, T. (1998) Angels of Mercy or Development Diplomats?: NGOs & Foreign Aid, Africa World 
Press. 
Tvedt,  T.  (2002)  ‘Development  NGOs:  Actors in a Global Civil Society or in a New International Social 
System?’,  Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organizations, 13(4), 
363–375. 
Tvedt,  T.  (2006)  ‘The  international  aid  system  and  the  non-­‐governmental organisations: a new 
research  agenda’,  Journal of International Development, 18(5), 677–690. 
Tvedt, T. (2009) Utviklingshjelp, Utenrikspolitikk Og Makt [online], 2nd ed, available: 
http://www.gyldendal.no/Faglitteratur/Samfunnsfag/Statsvitenskap/Utviklingshjelp-
utenrikspolitikk-og-makt [accessed 25 Nov 2013]. 
UIA (2004) Yearbook of International Organizations 2004/5, Union of International Associations. 
UK  (1997)  New  UK  Policy  on  Landmines,’  Joint  Announcement  by  the  Foreign  Secretary,  Robin  Cook,  
and the Defence Secretary, George Robertson, 21 May 1997 [online], available: 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd15/15uk.htm [accessed 17 Aug 2009]. 
UK (2005) Military Utility of Cluster Munitions, Prepared by the United Kingdom, 
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.1, available: http://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/604/14/pdf/G0560414.pdf?OpenElement [accessed 28 Oct 
2013]. 
UK (2008) Wellington Conference On Cluster Munitions, Statement by Ambassador John Duncan, UK 
Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament, 18 February 2008 [online], 
available: 
http://ukunarmscontrol.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/5061551/postgv_cmstmt18Feb208 
[accessed 5 Aug 2010]. 
UN  (1982)  ‘Chapter  XVI  Environment’,  in  Yearbook of the United Nations 1981, available: 
http://unyearbook.un.org/isysquery/8185cc49-f299-497b-9d92-
82f7c1119517/8/doc/1981_P1_SEC2_CH16.pdf#xml=http://unyearbook.un.org/isysquery/8
185cc49-f299-497b-9d92-82f7c1119517/8/hilite/. 
UN  (1983)  ‘Chapter  XVI  Environment’,  in  Yearbook of the United Nations 1982, available: 
http://unyearbook.un.org/unyearbook.html?name=isysadvsearch.html [accessed 21 Mar 
2011]. 
UN  (1993)  ‘Part  One:  Political  and  security  questions  - Chapter  II:  Disarmament’,  in  Yearbook of the 
United Nations 1992, available: 
http://unyearbook.un.org/unyearbook.html?name=1992index.html [accessed 11 May 
2011]. 
UN  (1994)  ‘Part  One:  Political  and  security  questions  - Chapter  II:  Disarmament’,  in  Yearbook of the 
United Nations 1993, available: http://unyearbook.un.org/isysquery/d6af63d9-8ff1-4d2c-
b615-
338af6409e1b/1/doc/1993_P1_CH2.pdf#xml=http://unyearbook.un.org/isysquery/d6af63d9
-8ff1-4d2c-b615-338af6409e1b/1/hilite/ [accessed 11 May 2011]. 
UN  (2011)  ‘List  of  Peacekeeping  Operations  1948-2011’,  available:  
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf. 
UN (2012) States Parties and Signatories [online], available: 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/3CE7CFC0AA4A7548C12571C00039C
B0C?OpenDocument [accessed 12 Jul 2012]. 
UN (2013) United Nations and Afghanistan [online], UN News Centre, available: 
http://www.un.org/news/dh/latest/afghan/un-afghan-history.shtml#1980s [accessed 9 Oct 
2013]. 
UN General Assembly (1959) Resolution 1378 (XIV). General and Complete Disarmament [online], 
available: http://www.un-documents.net/a14r1378.htm [accessed 14 Aug 2010]. 
352 
 
UN General Assembly (1961) Question of Disarmament [online], available: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/167/75/IMG/NR016775.pdf?OpenElement. 
UN General Assembly (1981) Voting Record on 1981 Remnants of War Resolution [online], available: 
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=130YR12Y37180.134200&menu=searc
h&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=&index=.VM&term=36%2F1
88&matchopt=0%7C0&oper=AND&x=10&y=10&aspect=power&index=.VW&term=&matcho
pt=0%7C0&oper=AND&index=.AD&term=&matchopt=0%7C0&oper=AND&index=BIB&term=
&matchopt=0%7C0&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&sort= 
[accessed 21 Mar 2011]. 
UN General Assembly (1985) Remnants of War [online], available: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/479/04/IMG/NR047904.pdf?OpenElement [accessed 
19 Mar 2011]. 
UN General Assembly (1991) Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency 
Assistance of the United Nations [online], available: 
http://www.un.org/depts/dha/res46182.htm [accessed 16 Jan 2012]. 
UN General Assembly (1993) General and Complete Disarmament: Moratorium on the Export of Anti-
Personnel Land-Mines [online], available: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r075.htm [accessed 6 Nov 2010]. 
UN General Assembly (1994) General and Complete Disarmament: Moratorium on the Export of Anti-
Personnel Land-Mines [online], available: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r075.htm [accessed 6 Nov 2010]. 
UN General Assembly (2005) 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1. 
UN Global Compact (2009) Civil Society in the Global Compact [online], available: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/civil_society.html [accessed 
19 May 2009]. 
UN Human Rights Council (2009) Richard J. Goldstone Appointed to Lead Human Rights Council Fact-
Finding Mission on Gaza Conflict [online], available: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/2796E2CA43CA4D94C125758D002F8D25?o
pendocument [accessed 5 Dec 2013]. 
UN Secretary General (1990) The Situation in Cambodia: Report of the Secretary General, A/45/605. 
UN Secretary General (1994) General Review of Arrrangements for Consultations with Non-
Governmental Organizations: Report of the Secretary-General, E/AC.70/1994/5. 
UN  Secretary  General  (1996)  ‘Statement  of  Secretary-General to Review Conference of 1980 
Convention  on  Certain  Conventional  Weapons’. 
UN Secretary-General (1994) ASSISTANCE IN MINE CLEARANCE:: Report of the Secretary-General, 
A/49/357. 
UN Secretary-General  (2006)  ‘Secretary-General’s  message  to  the  Third  Review  Conference  of  the  
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons [delivered by Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Director-
General,  UN  Office  at  Geneva]’,  Geneva,  available:  
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2289 [accessed 2 Aug 2010]. 
UN Security Council (2004) Transcript of the First Security Council Meeting on the Role of Civil Society 
in Post-Conflict Peace Building, S/PV.4993, United Nations, available: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N04/398/44/PDF/N0439844.pdf?OpenElement. 
UNBISnet (n.d.) Voting Record: A/RES/32/152 - Incendiary and Other Specific Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be the Subject of Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use for Humanitarian Reasons: 
Resolution [online]. 
UNDHA (1996) International  Conference  on  Mine  Clearance  Technology:  ‘QUOTABLE’  [online],  
available: http://www.un.org/Depts/dha/mct/quotes.htm [accessed 17 Jan 2012]. 
UNDP (1994) Human Development Report 1994. 
353 
 
UNDP (2002) Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World, 
Oxford University Press, available: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2002_EN_Complete.pdf. 
UNICEF (1989) UNICEF Annual Report 1989, available: 
http://www.unicef.org/about/history/files/unicef_annual_report_1989.pdf [accessed 15 Jan 
2012]. 
UNICEF (1991) UNICEF Annual Report 1991, available: 
http://www.unicef.org/about/history/files/unicef_annual_report_1991.pdf [accessed 15 Jan 
2012]. 
UNICEF (1994) Anti-Personnel Mines: A Scourge on Children. 
United Nations Association in Canada (n.d.) The Canadian Contribution to United Nations 
Peacekeeping [online], 3rd ed, available: 
http://www.unac.org/peacekeeping/en/pdf/CdnUNPkpgBooklet_e.pdf. 
United Press International (2005) Norwegian-U.S.military Cooperation [online], available: 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2005/10/13/Norwegian-USmilitary-
cooperation/UPI-43661129213167/ [accessed 2 Dec 2011]. 
Universitas  (2003)  ‘Prepared  and  steeled  against  war’,  Universitas, 29 Jan, available: 
http://universitas.no/studietid/2695/stalsett-og-stalsatt-mot-krig [accessed 26 Aug 2011]. 
UNOPS  (n.d.)  ‘Switzerland  Operations  Centre  - SWOC’,  available:  
http://www.unops.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/Factsheets/English/EMO/EMO_SWITZERLA
ND_EN.pdf [accessed 20 Nov 2013]. 
US (1990) National Security Strategy of the United States, available: 
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/national_security_strategy_90.pdf. 
US (1995) A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, available: 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss-95.pdf. 
US (1996) A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, available: 
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm [accessed 25 Nov 2011]. 
US (1997a) Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Land Mines U.S. 
Proposal, 1 Sept 1997 [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152310/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/news9_4.html. 
US (1997b) A National Security Strategy for A New Century, available: 
http://www.fas.org/man/docs/strategy97.htm [accessed 25 Nov 2011]. 
US (1999) A National Security Strategy For The New Century, available: 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nssr-1299.pdf. 
US (2002) A Decade of Deception and Defiance: Saddam  Hussein’s  Defiance  of  the  United  Nations, 
Regnery Pub. 
US Congress (1993) Landmine Moratorium Extension Act of 1993 [online], available: 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c103:S.1276: [accessed 21 Jan 2012]. 
US Embassy Bern (2008) Oslo Process: Pm/wra Consultations With Ambassador Schraner - ‘Friend  Of  
The  Chair’  For  Interoperability, 08BERN238, Wikileaks, Embassy Bern (Switzerland), available: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08BERN238 [accessed 27 Mar 2013]. 
US Embassy Canberra (2007) Australia’s  Response  to  Cluster  Munitions  Demarche, 
07CANBERRA1763, available: 
http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07CANBERRA1763.html [accessed 3 Sep 2011]. 
US Embassy Canberra (2008a) Cluster Munitions: Australia Comments on Oslo Process, 
08CANBERRA90, available: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08CANBERRA90.html 
[accessed 3 Sep 2011]. 
US Embassy Canberra (2008b) Wellington Cluster Munitions Meeting Outcomes, 08CANBERRA199, 
available: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08CANBERRA199.html [accessed 3 Sep 2011]. 
354 
 
US Embassy Dublin (2006) Emerging Constraints on U.S. Military Transits at Shannon, 
06DUBLIN1020, available: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06DUBLIN1020.html# 
[accessed 3 Dec 2011]. 
US Embassy Dublin (2008a) Ireland Aims To Achieve An Anti-Cluster Munitions Convention, 
08DUBLIN251, available: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08DUBLIN251.html [accessed 3 
Sep 2011]. 
US Embassy Dublin (2008b) Ireland Willing To Discuss Interoperability Issues At Wellington Cluster 
Munitions Conference, 08DUBLIN84, available: 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08DUBLIN84.html [accessed 3 Sep 2011]. 
US Embassy Dublin (2008c) Irish Government on Outcome of May 2008 Cluster Munitions 
Conference, 08DUBLIN398, available: 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08DUBLIN398.html [accessed 3 Sep 2011]. 
US Embassy Hanoi (2010) U.S. - Vietnam Relations [online], 
http://usembassy.state.gov/chronology.html, available: 
http://vietnam.usembassy.gov/chronology.html [accessed 7 Oct 2013]. 
US Embassy London (2008) International Security Discussions With HMG, 08LONDON1535, available: 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08LONDON1535.html [accessed 3 Sep 2011]. 
US Embassy Oslo (2006a) SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO OSLO, MAY 16-17, 06OSLO615, available: 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06OSLO615.html [accessed 3 Sep 2011]. 
US Embassy Oslo (2006b) Ambassador’s  Introductory  Call  on  FM  Stoere, 06OSLO59, available: 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06OSLO59.html [accessed 6 Nov 2013]. 
US Embassy Oslo (2007a) GETTING NORWAY TO DO MORE ON AFGHANISTAN, 07OSLO988, available: 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/10/07OSLO988.html [accessed 3 Sep 2011]. 
US Embassy Oslo (2007b) Norway Dismisses U.S. Concerns on Cluster Munitions, 07OSLO1055, 
available: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/10/07OSLO1055.html [accessed 3 Sep 2011]. 
US Embassy Oslo (2008) Norway Unyielding on Cluster Munitions, 08OSLO119, available: 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08OSLO119.html [accessed 3 Sep 2011]. 
US Embassy Paris (2007a) FRENCH THOUGHTS ON NORWEGIAN CLUSTER MUNITIONS, 07PARIS256, 
available: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/01/07PARIS256.html [accessed 3 Sep 2011]. 
US Embassy Paris (2007b) CLUSTER MUNITIONS: FRANCE SUGGESTS NEED FOR A COORDINATED 
ALTERNATIVE TO SLOW OSLO PROCESS, 07PARIS1312, available: 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/04/07PARIS1312.html [accessed 3 Sep 2011]. 
US Embassy Paris (2007c) CLUSTER MUNITIONS: FRANCE PROPOSES PUSH IN CCW, 07PARIS2137, 
available: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07PARIS2137.html [accessed 3 Sep 2011]. 
US Embassy Paris (2008) P3 Meeting On Nonproliferation And Disarmament Issues [online], Cable 
reference id: #08PARIS245, available: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08PARIS245&q=cluster%20munitions 
[accessed 28 Apr 2011]. 
US Embassy Tokyo (2007a) Japan Supports U.s. Position On Cluster Munitions [online], 
#07TOKYO438, available: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07TOKYO438&q=cluster%20munitions 
[accessed 4 Aug 2011]. 
US Embassy Tokyo (2007b) Japan Calls For Cooperation On Cluster Munitions [online], 
#07TOKYO1716, available: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07TOKYO1716&q=cluster%20munitions 
[accessed 4 Aug 2011]. 
US Embassy Tokyo (2007c) Japan Urges Progress On Cluster Munitions In Ccw [online], 
#07TOKYO2004, available: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07TOKYO2004&q=cluster%20munitions 
[accessed 4 Aug 2011]. 
355 
 
US Embassy Tokyo (2007d) Cluster Munitions Demarche Delivered To Japanese [online], 
#07TOKYO5624, available: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07TOKYO5624&q=cluster%20munitions 
[accessed 4 Aug 2011]. 
US Embassy Tokyo (2008) Cluster Munitions: Japan Still Working CCW And Oslo Process, 
08TOKYO1212, available: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08TOKYO1212&q=dublin%20embassy 
[accessed 4 Aug 2011]. 
US Embassy Vienna (2008) Austria On Cluster Munitions: Political Drive For Total Ban; But 
Government Sees Need For Compromise, US Embassy Cable 08VIENNA676, Wikileaks, 
Embassy Vienna (Austria), available: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08VIENNA676 [accessed 28 Mar 2013]. 
US Embassy Wellington (2008a) New Zealand and Cluster Munitions, 08WELLINGTON157, available: 
http://dazzlepod.com/cable/08WELLINGTON157/?q=cluster%20munitions [accessed 3 Sep 
2011]. 
US Embassy Wellington (2008b) New Zealand, Cluster Munitions, And Interoperability [online], 
#08WELLINGTON157, available: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08WELLINGTON157&q=cluster%20munition
s [accessed 4 Aug 2011]. 
US Mission NATO (2008) Allies Support U.S. Request For Nato Military Advice On Impact Of Oslo 
Cluster Munitions Ban, 08USNATO143, Wikileaks, Mission USNATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization), available: http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08USNATO143 
[accessed 28 Mar 2013]. 
US Secretary of State (2009) U.s.-Uk Cluster Munitions Dialogue [online], Cable reference id: 
#09STATE52368, available: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09STATE52368&q=cluster%20munitions 
[accessed 28 Apr 2011]. 
US Senate (1994) The Global Landmine Crisis: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, United States Senate - One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session: Special 
Hearing, available: 
http://ia341011.us.archive.org/1/items/globallandminecr00unit/globallandminecr00unit.pdf
. 
US State Department (1993) Hidden Killers- The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines: A Report 
on International Demining Prepared by the United States Department of State Politiical-
Military Affairs Bureau Office of International Security Operations - Executive Summary. 
US State Department (1994a) Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis 1994 - Report to the U.S. 
Congress on the Problem with Uncleared Landmines and the United States Strategy for 
Demining and Landmine Control by the Office of International Security and Peacekeeping 
Operations, US Department of State, Washington, DC, available: 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9401_demine_toc.html [accessed 20 Aug 
2009]. 
US  State  Department  (1994b)  ‘Chapter  I:  The  Problem’,  in  Hidden Killers 1994: The Global Landmine 
Crisis, available: http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9401_demine_ch1.html 
[accessed 3 Oct 2012]. 
US  State  Department  (2001)  The  Taliban’s  War  Against  Women  [online],  available:  
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/6185.htm [accessed 18 May 2011]. 
USAID  (1994)  ‘Statement  by  Brian  Atwood,  Administrator, US Agency for International 
Development’,  in  The Global Landmine Crisis: HEARING  BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE - ONE HUNDRED THIRD 
CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION: SPECIAL HEARING, 98–101. 
356 
 
USAID (1995) EVALUATION REPORT: Prosthetics and Orthotics Project, Vietnam Veterans of America 
Foundation/Cambodia, available: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABN080.pdf. 
USAID (1996) Working Paper - IMPLEMENTATION OF USAID PROGRAMS IN NON-PRESENCE 
COUNTRIES BY NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. 
USAID (1997) SUSTAINABILITY OF THE MOZAMBICAN PROSTHETICS PROGRAM, available: 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABP852.pdf. 
USAID (1998) PARTNERING  FOR  RESULTS:  A  USER’S  GUIDE  TO  INTERSECTORAL  PARTNERING, 
available: http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/isp/handbook/guide.html [accessed 27 Sep 2010]. 
USAID (2010) USAID Special Programs to Address the Needs of Survivors: War Victims Fund Country 
Programs - Cambodia [online], available: 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/the_funds/lwvf/cambodia.html 
[accessed 14 Mar 2011]. 
USCBL (1996a) Minutes of Meeting of USCBL Steering Committee Held at Human Rights Watch 
Board Room, 1522 K St NW, Washington DC 1.30pm - 5.30pm, Thursday 13 June 1996 
[online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202155321/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events96/24.html. 
USCBL  (1996b)  Action  Alert:  Support  Canada’s  Lead  [online],  available:  
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202155100/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events96/oct9-2.html. 
USCBL (1997) When Is an Antipersonnel Landmine Not A Mine? When It Is American [online], 
available: http://www.mail-archive.com/ecofem@csf.colorado.edu/msg02414.html 
[accessed 18 Oct 2013]. 
Uvin,  P.  (2000)  ‘From  Local  Organizations  to  Global  Governance:  The  Role  of  NGOs in International 
Relations’,  in  Stiles,  K.W.,  ed.,  Global Institutions and Local Empowerment: Competing 
Theoretical, International Political Economy Series, Macmillan Press: Basingstoke, 9–29. 
Uvin,  P.,  Weiss,  T.G.  (1998)  ‘The  United  Nations  and  NGOs:  Global Civil Society and Institutional 
Change’,  in  Glassner,  M.I.,  ed.,  The United Nations at Work, Greenwood Publishing Group, 
213–235. 
Vasagar,  J.,  Hollingsworth,  M.  (2003)  US  Firm  Accuses  Diana  Fund  of  Failing  to  Release  Charities’  
Cash [online], the Guardian, available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2003/jul/26/charities.charitymanagement [accessed 4 
Nov 2013]. 
Velin, J.-A.  (1996a)  ‘Diplomacy  after  the  negotiation:  Protocol  II  and  the  Anti- Personnel Landmine 
Ban’,  Disarmament Diplomacy, (5), available: 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd05/index.htm#T-0028 [accessed 17 Aug 2009]. 
Velin, J.-A.  (1996b)  ‘Landmines:  developments  related  to  the  review  conference’,  Disarmament 
Diplomacy, (5), available: http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd05/index.htm#T-0141 
[accessed 17 Aug 2009]. 
Velin, J.-A.  (1997a)  ‘Verification  Issue  Cleaves  Landmine  Ban  Supporters’,  Disarmament Diplomacy, 
(14), available: http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd14/14land.htm [accessed 17 Aug 2009]. 
Velin, J.-A.  (1997b)  ‘Stage  Three  Of  The  Ottawa  Process:  The  Oslo  Diplomatic  Conference’,  
Disarmament Diplomacy, (18), available: http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd18/18three.htm 
[accessed 17 Aug 2009]. 
venezuelanalysis.com  (2008)  More  Than  100  Latin  America  Experts  Question  Human  Rights  Watch’s  
Venezuela Report [online], available: http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/4051 [accessed 6 
Mar 2013]. 
Veterans  For  America  (2009)  Veterans  For  America »  Bobby  Muller  [online],  available:  
http://www.veteransforamerica.org/about/who-we-are/bobby-muller/ [accessed 25 Aug 
2009]. 
357 
 
VG Nett (2010) Petter Eide - Skatten [Taxes] 2009 [online], Skattelister.no, available: 
http://skattelister.no/skatt/profil/petter-eide-33784797/ [accessed 11 Aug 2011]. 
Vuckovic,  S.  (2008)  Sladjan  Vučković, Statement on Definitions, Wellington Conference on Cluster 
Munitions, Wellington, New Zealand, 19 February 2008 [online], available: 
http://blog.banadvocates.org/index.php?post/2008/02/18/Sladans-Statement-Wellington-
Februqry-2008 [accessed 13 Aug 2010]. 
VVAF (1995) After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines [online], Vietnam Veterans 
of America Foundation: Washington, available: 
http://books.google.ie/books?id=tBzsZmbFrsYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=after+the+guns+f
all+silent&ei=iAkUT4ufEobNUZ3phYsO&cd=1&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=after%20the%20g
uns%20fall%20silent&f=false. 
VVAF (1997a) Vietnam [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970414043153/http://www.vvaf.org/vietnam.html. 
VVAF (1997b) Vietnam Business Fellowship Program [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970414043208/http://www.vvaf.org/business.html. 
VVAF  (1998a)  ‘Some  People  Turn  Tragedy  to  Hope’. 
VVAF  (1998b)  ‘Form  990  1997’. 
VVAF  (1998c)  ‘Form  990  Return  of  Organization  Exempt  from  Income  Tax’. 
De Waal, A. (2003)  ‘Human  rights  organizations  and  the  political  imagination:  how  the  West  and  
Africa  have  diverged’,  Journal of Human Rights, 2(4), 475–494. 
Wallace,  B.  (1998)  ‘Axworthy’s  “soft  power”’,  Maclean’s, (29), 13 Jul. 
Wallace,  T.  (2003a)  ‘NGO  Dilemmas  - Trojan  Horses  for  Global  Neoliberalism’,  Socialist Register 2003, 
2003, 1–17. 
Wallace,  T.  (2003b)  ‘Trends  in  UK  NGOs:  A  Research  Note’,  Development in Practice, 13(5), 564–569. 
Wareham,  M.  (1997a)  ‘More  from  Maputo’,  available:  
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202154447/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/international
/updates/events/maputo4.html [accessed 12 Jul 2012]. 
Wareham, M. (1997b) Update on U.S. Policy [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152435/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/usannounce2.html. 
Wareham,  M.  (1998)  ‘Rhetoric  and  Policy  Realities  in  the  United  States’,  in  To Walk Without Fear: 
The International Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 212–247. 
Wareham,  M.  (2006a)  ‘The  Role  of  Landmine  Monitor  in Promoting and Monitoring Compliance with 
the 1997 Anti-Personnel  Mine  Ban  Convention’,  in  Borrie,  J.  and  Randin,  M.,  eds.,  
Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: From Perspective to Practice, UNIDIR, 79–108. 
Wareham, M. (2006b) What  If  No  One’s  Watching?  Landmine Monitor 1999-2005, New Security 
Programme Fafo-rapport 550, Fafo. 
Wareham,  M.  (2008a)  ‘Evidence  Based-Advocacy:  Civil  Society  Monitoring  of  the  Mine  Ban  Treaty’,  
in Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Human Security and Citizen Diplomacy, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 49–67. 
Wareham,  M.  (2008b)  ‘Wellington  Conference  on  Cluster  Bombs  (Part  2)’,  available:  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O9pdYlhQjHI&feature=related [accessed 12 Aug 2010]. 
Wareham,  M.  (2008c)  ‘Wellington  Conference  on  Cluster  Bombs  (Part 1)’,  available:  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVdC2TbrG1M&feature=youtube_gdata [accessed 12 
Aug 2010]. 
Warkentin,  C.,  Mingst,  K.A.  (2000)  ‘International  Institutions,  the  State,  and  Global  Civil  Society  in  the  
Age  of  the  World  Wide  Web’,  Global Governance, 6(2), 237. 
Warmington,  V.  (1996)  ‘Landmine  abolition:  a  small  step  forward  at  Geneva’,  The Ploughshares 
Monitor, available: 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Landmine+abolition%3A+a+small+step+forward+at+Geneva
.-a030055712 [accessed 16 Jan 2012]. 
358 
 
Warmington,  V.,  Tuttle,  C.  (1998)  ‘The  Canadian  Campaign’,  in  To Walk Without Fear: The 
International Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 48–59. 
Warwick,  D.P.  (1971)  ‘Transnational  Participation  and  International  Peace’,  International 
Organization, 25(3), 655. 
Washington  Post  (1997)  ‘Mexico  Blocks  Conclave  On  World  Land-Mine  Ban’,  Washington Post, 13 
Jun. 
Washington  Post  (2001)  ‘Polls  show  war  losing  support  in  many  countries’,  Washington Post, 8 Nov. 
WCC  (1998)  ‘Appendix  1:  ICBL  national  coalitions  address  list’,  in  THE LANDMINES CAMPAIGN STILL 
NEEDS THE CHURCHES!, available: http://www.wcc-
coe.org/wcc/what/international/landmines/icbl.html [accessed 11 Dec 2009]. 
Weidacher, R., Wezeman, S., Hollestelle, M. (2005) Cluster Weapons: Necessity Or Convenience?, Pax 
Christi Netherlands. 
Weisbrod, B.A. (1978) The Private Nonprofit Sector: Facts in Search of Theory, University of 
Wisconsin. 
Weisbrod, B.A., Long, S.H. (1975) The Size of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector: Concepts and Measures, 
University of Wisconsin. 
Weiss,  T.G.  (2006)  ‘R2P  after  9/11  and  the  World  Summit’,  Wisconsin International Law Journal, 
24(3), 741–760. 
Weiss,  T.G.  (2009)  ‘What  Happened  to  the  Idea  of  World  Government*’,  International Studies 
Quarterly, 53(2), 253–271. 
Welch,  C.E.  (2009)  ‘Human  Rights  Watch’,  in  Forsythe,  D.P.,  ed.,  Encyclopedia of Human Rights, 
Oxford University Press, 478–485. 
Wendt,  A.  (1992)  ‘Anarchy  is  what  states  make  of  it:  The  social  construction  of  power  politics’,  
International Organization, 46(2), 391–425. 
Wheeler, N.J., Dunne, T. (2004) Moral  Britannia?  Evaluating  the  Ethical  Dimension  in  Labour’s  
Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Centre, available: 
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/23012/ipublicationdocument_singledocum
ent/815B8D57-B6B2-4734-A706-04D77C8B0964/en/Moral_Britannia.pdf [accessed 12 Nov 
2013]. 
White House (2003) Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition Members [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20090112010105/http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2003/03/20030327-10.html. 
White  House  Press  Secretary  (1997)  ‘United  States  to  Join  Ottawa  Process,’  Statement  by  White  
House Press Secretary, 18 August 1997 [online], available: 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd17/17join.htm [accessed 20 May 2011]. 
White,  J.  (2008)  ‘The  Man  on  Both  Sides  of  Air  War  Debate;    Bomb  Targeter  Turned-Human Rights 
Advocate  Lobbies  for  Greater  Restraint’,  The Washington Post, 13 Feb. 
White,  J.,  Rutherford,  K.  (1998)  ‘The  Role  of  the  Landmine  Survivors  Network’,  in  To Walk Without 
Fear: The International Movement to Ban Landmines, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 99–
117. 
Wiebe,  V.  (1995)  ‘Cluster  weapons  are  mines  too’,  CCW News, 1(6), 15 Oct, available: 
zotero://attachment/21666/ [accessed 10 Jul 2012]. 
Wiebe,  V.  (1996)  ‘Cluster  Bombs  are  Landmines  Too’,  CCW News, 3(12), 3 May, 2. 
Wiebe,  V.  (2000)  ‘Footprints  of  Death:  Cluster  Bombs  as  Indiscriminate  Weapons  under  International 
Humanitarian  Law’,  Michigan Journal of International Law, 22(1), 85–167. 
Wiebe,  V.  (2003)  ‘Cluster  Bombs  and  Explosive  Remnants  of  War:  Cooperation  and  Conflict  between  
Nongovernmental Organizations and Middle-Power  States’,  in  Rutherford,  K.,  Brem, S. and 
Matthew, R., eds., Reframing the Agenda: The Impact of NGO and Middle Power 
Cooperation in International Security Policy, Greenwood Publishing Group, 91–112. 
359 
 
Wiebe, V., Peachey, T. (1997) Drop Today, Kill Tomorrow: Cluster Munitions as Inhumane and 
Indiscriminate Weapons, available: 
http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/MCC_drop%20today%20kill%20tomorrow.pdf. 
Wiebe,  V.,  Peachey,  T.  (2009)  ‘Timeline  of  Mennonite  and  Quaker  work  on  Cluster  munitions’,  
available: http://clusterbombs.mcc.org/clusterbombs/ClusterBombTimeline.pdf. 
Willetts, P. (1982) Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-
Orientated Non-Governmental Organizations, Frances Pinter: London. 
Willetts,  P.  (1996a)  ‘Introduction’,  in  Willetts,  P.,  ed.,  The Conscience  of  the  World’ :  The  Influence  of  
Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System, C. Hurst: London, 1–14. 
Willetts, P. (Ed.) (1996b) The  Conscience  of  the  World’ :  The  Influence  of  Non-Governmental 
Organisations in the UN System, C. Hurst: London. 
Willetts,  P.  (2000)  ‘From  “Consultative  Arrangements”  to  “Partnership”:  The  Changing  Status  of  
NGOs  in  Diplomacy  at  the  UN’,  Global Governance, 6(2), 191–213. 
Willetts,  P.  (2001)  ‘Section  1  Institutional  and  Infrastructure  Resource  Issues,  Article  1.44.3.7: Non-
Governmental  Organizations’,  in  UNESCO Encyclopaedia of Life Support Systems, available: 
http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM [accessed 15 Apr 2009]. 
Willetts, P. (2011) Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of Global 
Governance, Kindle edition. ed, Taylor & Francis. 
Williams,  J.  (1993)  ‘Social  Consequences  of  Widespread  Use  of  Landmines,  Report  presented  by:  
Jody  Williams  Coordinator  Landmines  Campaign,  Vietnam  Veterans  of  America  Foundation’,  
in Maresca, L., Maslen, S. and Cross, I.C. of the R., eds., The Banning of Anti-Personnel 
Landmines, Cambridge University Press, 154–166. 
Williams,  J.  (1995)  ‘Landmines  and  measures  to  eliminate  them’,  International Review of the Red 
Cross, (307), 375–390. 
Williams,  J.  (1997a)  ‘Nobel  Lecture  by    Jody  Williams,  Coordinator,  International  Campaign  to  Ban  
Landmines’,  available:  http://boes.org/coop/lmines/jodyw1.html  [accessed  5  Jan  2012]. 
Williams, J. (1997b) Government Meeting in Bonn, Germany [online], available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19980202152810/http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/us/updates/
events97/bonn.html. 
Williams, J. (1999) The ICBL - A Model for Disarmament Initiatives? [online], nobelprize.org, 
available: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/articles/williams/index.html [accessed 
21 Aug 2009]. 
Williams,  J.  (2000)  ‘David  with  Goliath’,  Harvard International Review, 22(3), 88. 
Williams,  J.  (2008)  ‘New  Approaches  in  a  Changing  World:  A  Human  Security  Agenda’,  in  Goose,  S.D.,  
Wareham, M. and Williams, J., eds., Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Human Security and 
Citizen Diplomacy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, Maryland; Plymouth, 281–297. 
Williams, J. (2013) My  Name  Is  Jody  Williams:  A  Vermont  Girl’s  Winding  Path  to  the  Nobel  Peace  
Prize, University of California Press. 
Williams,  J.,  Goose,  S.D.  (1998)  ‘The  International  Campaign  to  Ban  Landmines’,  in  To Walk Without 
Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, 20–47. 
Williams,  J.,  Goose,  S.D.  (2008)  ‘Citizen  Diplomacy  and  the  Ottawa  Process:  A  Lasting  Model’,  in  
Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Human Security and Citizen Diplomacy, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, Maryland; Plymouth, 181–198. 
Wilper, A.P., Woolhandler, S., Lasser, K.E., McCormick, D., Bor, D.H., Himmelstein, D.U. (2009) 
‘Health  Insurance  and  Mortality  in  US  Adults’,  American Journal of Public Health, 99(12), 
2289–2295. 
WILPF (2008a) Report on the Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, 23-25 May 2007, available: 
http://www.wilpfinternational.org/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/ClusterMunitions/LIMA%20REPO
RT.pdf. 
360 
 
WILPF (2008b) Tuesday 27 May 2008 - Waiting…  [online],  available:  
http://www.wilpfinternational.org/disarmament/clustermunitions/Dublin%202008/Tuesday
27.html [accessed 8 Aug 2010]. 
WILPF (2010) Basic Information about the Conference on Disarmament [online], Reaching Critical 
Will, available: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/basicinfoindex.html 
[accessed 7 Nov 2010]. 
Wolfe, K. (2008) War Veteran Muller Now Promotes Peace [online], independence today, available: 
http://www.itodaynews.com/april2008/muller.htm [accessed 13 Nov 2012]. 
Wood, B. (1987) Middle Powers in the International System: A Preliminary Assessment of Potential, 
WP11, UN. 
Wood, D. (2004) Newsmaker: The Royal Appointment - Andrew Purkis, Chief Executive, The Diana, 
Princess of Wales Memorial Fund [online], ThirdSector, available: 
http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/news/611153/Newsmaker-royal-appointment---Andrew-
Purkis-Chief-executiveThe-Diana-Princess-Wales-Memorial-Fund/?DCMP=ILC-SEARCH 
[accessed 4 Nov 2013]. 
Woods, A. (2000) Facts about European NGOs Active in International Development [electronic 
Resource] [online], OECD Development Centre, available: http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-
Asset-Management/oecd/development/facts-about-european-ngos-active-in-international-
development_9789264187849-en#page11. 
Woodward,  S.L.  (2001)  ‘Humanitarian  War:  A  New  Consensus?’,  Disasters, 25(4), 331–344. 
World  Bank  (1989)  ‘Operational  Directive  14.70:  Involving  Nongovernmental  Organizations  in  Bank-
Supported  Activities’, in Working with NGOs: A Practical Guide to Operational Collaboration 
between the World Bank and Nongovernmental Organizations, 75–81, available: 
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1995/03/01/000009265
_3961219103437/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. 
World Bank (1995) Working with NGOs: A Practical Guide to Operational Collaboration between the 
World Bank and Nongovernmental Organizations, World Bank, available: http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1995/03/01/000009265
_3961219103437/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. 
World  Bank  (1997)  ‘Good  Practices  statement  14.70,    Involving  Nongovernmental  Organizations  in  
Bank-Supported  Activities’,  in  Operational Manual, World Bank, available: 
http://web.archive.org/web/19970524225135/http://www.worldbank.org/html/opr/opman
ual/gps/1470tx.html. 
World Bank (2000) Consultations with Civil Society Organizations: General Guidelines for World Bank 
Staff, available: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/873204-
1111663470099/20489515/ConsultationsWithCSOsGuidelines.pdf. 
World Bank (2007) Consultations with Civil Society: A Sourcebook Working Document, World Bank, 
available: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CSO/Resources/ConsultationsSourcebook_Feb2007.pdf 
[accessed 1 Dec 2012]. 
Young,  O.R.  (1972)  ‘The  Actors  in  World  Politics’,  in  The Analysis of International Politics: Essays in 
Honor of Harold and Margaret Sprout, 125–144. 
Zahran,  G.,  Ramos,  L.  (2009)  ‘Global  Governance  as  an  emergent  “extended  state”and  the  missing  
link  of  the  “political  society”’,  available:  
http://cambridge.academia.edu/documents/0029/6778/isaabri09_proceeding_381568.pdf. 
Zaleski,  P.  (2006)  ‘Global  Non-governmental Administrative System: Geosociology of the Third 
Sector’,  in  Gawin,  D.  and  Gliński,  P.,  eds.,  Civil Society in the Making, IFiS Publishers: Warsaw, 
113–143. 
 
